The making of a gay Muslim: social constructions of religion, sexuality and identity in Malaysia and Britain by Mohd Sidik, Shanon Shah
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 








The making of a gay Muslim: social constructions of religion, sexuality and identity in
Malaysia and Britain
Mohd Sidik, Shanon Shah
Awarding institution:
King's College London







THE MAKING OF A GAY MUSLIM: SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTIONS OF RELIGION, SEXUALITY AND 









Shanon Shah Mohd Sidik  





This study challenges many popular views and some academic perspectives on the role 
of Islam and gay sexuality in personal identity construction. By investigating the lived 
experiences of Muslim sexual minorities, it examines the complex ways in which individuals 
can come to identify themselves as ‘gay’ and ‘Muslim’, how they negotiate belonging to the 
wider society that tends to marginalise them, and the consequences of holding these identities. 
It examines their experiences in two national contexts – Malaysia and Britain. Based on 
ethnographic research conducted between October 2012 and September 2013, this study 
involved participant observation and in-depth interviews with gay Muslims, supplemented by 
media analysis for context-setting.  
The study shows that in constructing their sexual and religious identities, gay Muslims 
adjust their responses – rebelling, conforming, innovating, retreating or merely keeping up 
appearances – based on how strongly anti-gay or anti-Muslim sentiments inform their 
immediate surroundings. As a minority within the religious majority in Malaysia, they contend 
with religiously-motivated, state-sanctioned moral policing. In Britain, they enjoy legal 
protection as sexual and religious minorities but are sometimes affected by stereotypes equating 
Islam with violence or extremism. In both countries, these conditions contribute to Islam 
becoming a primary referent in the construction of gay Muslim identities. However, gay 
Muslims form their own religious self-understandings through engagement with multiple social 
authorities, spaces and available interpretations of Islam. Islam therefore becomes a ‘cultural 
resource’ while the concept of ‘gay’ serves as an umbrella category in the construction of their 
self-identities.  
The outcomes of this study challenge the notions that Islam is ‘inherently’ homophobic 
and that there is essentially a divide between ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’. Rather, it suggests that the 
experiences of gay Muslims illustrate the fluid and variable roles of religion and sexuality in 
constructions of individual and collective identity.   
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How could – or why would – anyone identify as ‘gay’ and ‘Muslim’? 
Especially given the widespread perceptions, doctrines and legislation (in many Muslim 
countries) upholding the notion that Islam condemns homosexuality? For people who 
do identify in this way, what are the consequences of being a ‘gay Muslim’ and how do 
they negotiate their lives?  
This study examines the experiences of gay Muslims in two national contexts – 
Malaysia and Britain. It explores how gay Muslims create everyday narratives, 
practices, and strategies to respond to understandings of Islam often used to vilify, 
marginalise or persecute them. Its main objective was to develop a useful and 
systematic framework for collecting and analysing qualitative data on the lived realities 
of people identifying as gay and Muslim in two different environments. More broadly, 
it aims to provide a perspective on how religion and sexuality intersect and inform the 
creation of particular groups of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in society. It was guided by 
the following research questions:  
 How do sexual minorities who are marginalised on the basis of their sexual identity 
use religion to negotiate their belonging in different social contexts?  
 What can the experiences of gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain tell us about 
majority-minority relations and how society embraces or excludes particular 
groups of people?  
Such concerns are not confined to Islam or Muslims, and concern gay followers 
of other religions, too. For example, Christian leaders and groups make the headlines in 
different parts of the world, voicing often vehement opposition to what they see as 
sexual deviance (e.g. see Luxmoore, 2013; Rajan, 2012; Vallely, 2014). There are 
therefore trends across different religious traditions in which influential religious actors 
condemn sexual outsiders. These condemnations have doctrinal and historical roots in 
many religions, which some religious actors continue drawing upon to justify the 
marginalisation, punishment, or violent persecution of sexual difference.  
These specific concerns about religion and sexuality also relate to larger 
questions about the experiences of people belonging to marginalised groups. How do 
they conceive of their circumstances? Do they accept their marginalised status or try to 
challenge it in the hopes of making society more inclusive? These questions further 
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suggest that marginalised groups are not preordained or permanent, but are formed 
through social processes involving the manipulation of power by specific actors. 
Examining these questions from the perspective of the marginalised allows us to see 
how they respond to these power dynamics under particular conditions.  
My focus on the experiences of gay Muslims comes from an understanding that 
they, and other Muslims, are shaped by and respond to socially-produced expressions 
of ‘Islam’. I therefore explore the interactions between individual and collective 
dimensions of religion and how this affects expressions of sexuality and vice versa. I 
am not merely interested in how religion can be used to justify marginalisation, but also 
how marginalised groups might use religion to adapt to or perhaps challenge their 
circumstances.  
This study argues that there are conditions now which increasingly enable 
individuals to use religion and sexuality as ‘cultural resources’ (Beckford, 2000: 178; 
2001: 232) to build personal identities and actively shape religious change. However, 
this does not occur in a social or cultural vacuum – agencies and institutions with the 
power to regulate religious and sexual expressions also influence the trajectories of 
identity-making and religious change. Shifting social conditions therefore create new 
opportunities and constraints for constructions of self-identity.  
In broad terms, the analytical approach I take can be referred to as social 
constructionist. Bearing in mind the wide range of understandings of social 
constructionism within the social sciences, I mostly draw upon the framework 
suggested by the sociologist of religion James Beckford. For Beckford (2008: 3), 
‘social construction’ does not mean that social reality consists of nothing but text and 
discourse, as argued by some radical constructionists. Nor does it merely mean that 
‘human beings create or construct meanings when they interact with each other’. 
Beckford’s approach ‘lies somewhere between these two extremes’ and, in reference to 
religion, ‘social construction’ refers to the ‘processes whereby the meaning of the 
category of religion is, in various situations, intuited, asserted, doubted, challenged, 
rejected, substituted, re-cast, and so on’. It is a useful ‘analytical strategy’ for 
investigating ‘the construction of religion as a complex and variable category of human 
knowing, feeling, acting and relating’ (Beckford, 2008: 4). For my purposes, I extend 
this analytical strategy to investigate the construction of sexuality as well. I view 
religion and sexuality not as independent entities which can ‘do’ anything but as 
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‘interpretive’ categories whose meanings need to be related to the social contexts in 
which they are used.   
Following this, I do not take ‘gay’, ‘Muslim’ or ‘gay Muslim’ as 
uncomplicated or self-evident identity labels. In fact, there are numerous scholarly 
debates and disputes about whether terms such as ‘gay’ or ‘homosexual’ can even be 
used to describe people from Muslim or other non-Western cultures accurately (e.g. 
Boellstorff, 2005: 8, 154–155; El-Rouayheb, 2009: 1, 5; Gaudio, 2009: 10; Habib, 
2010: xx–xxii; Ioannides, 2014: 124–128; Kugle, 2014: 14–19; Massad, 2007: 41–42, 
2013; Murray, 1997: 41; Najmabadi, 2008: 275, 2011: 551). It is beyond the scope of 
this study to settle these disputes, but my usage ‘gay Muslim’ does require further 
explanation as it is informed by particular analytical interests and preferences.  
On the whole, the term ‘gay Muslim’ in this study serves as a ‘reportive 
definition’ (Barker, 2004: 89), i.e. this is how the majority of my participants 
described themselves. However, many did not exclusively use ‘gay’, often 
accompanying it with terms such as ‘bisexual’, ‘lesbian’, ‘transgender’, or ‘queer’, and 
in Malaysia even combining it with local terms and euphemisms. A minority were in 
same-sex relationships but would not identify as gay, lesbian or even bisexual. 
Ultimately, however, most of the men and women I encountered accepted ‘gay’ as an 
umbrella term to describe themselves, while the minority who rejected it had various 
reasons which I discuss in upcoming chapters. My usage of the term ‘gay’ is thus not 
meant to be reductionist, but to highlight its centrality in shaping my participants’ 
understandings and expressions of their sexuality.  
 Similarly, I use ‘Muslim’ as a reportive definition – regardless of their personal 
commitments to Islam, this is how the majority described their religious identity, with 
a tiny minority no longer identifying as Muslim. Furthermore, other Muslims would 
also have differing reactions towards gay Muslims – from regarding them as too 
‘deviant’ to be considered ‘Muslim’ to tolerating them only as ‘inferior’ co-
religionists, or even embracing them as moral and religious equals. My choice to use 
‘Muslim’ should therefore be read as shorthand for the sheer diversity of experiences 
that can be found under Islam as an umbrella category.  
This study has therefore found no ‘precise cut-off point’ (Hospers, 1990: 119) 
between the applicability and non-applicability of the terms ‘gay’ and, to a lesser 
extent, ‘Muslim’. For this reason, it has proven exceptionally difficult for me to 
produce a ‘stipulative definition’ (Barker, 2004: 90) of ‘gay Muslim’, i.e. what I as a 
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researcher mean by it. In fact, I initially withheld from developing such a definition but 
decided upon a ‘defining characteristic’, namely, looking for individuals who saw 
themselves as Muslim and were attracted to the same biological sex. From here, I drew 
upon the range of my participants’ self-explanations and my own observations to 
develop this account of how they constructed, negotiated or challenged the boundaries 
of ‘gay’ and ‘Muslim’ identity. 
I chose to research in Malaysia and Britain because the two countries share 
crucial similarities and differences which make comparing gay Muslims’ responses to 
dominant perceptions of Islam and homosexuality useful.  
Most significantly, Islam is the religion of the majority in Malaysia and also the 
official religion, meaning that it informs state laws and public policies over a range of 
issues. Also, the Malaysian Federal Constitution (Malaysia, 2010: 153) defines ethnic 
Malays as Muslim and the state recognises only Sunni Islam, mostly based on the 
Syafii1 school of jurisprudence. In Britain, Islam is a minority religion within a liberal 
democratic state, with laws and institutions protecting various minorities. British 
Muslims consist mostly of migrants from diverse ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, 
countries of origin, and Islamic schools of thought. In other words, in relation to 
religion and sexuality, Malaysian gay Muslims are a minority within a majority, while 
British gay Muslims are a minority within a minority.   
Britain’s liberal democratic institutions also grew out of its particular trajectory 
of modernisation, e.g. through the various phases of parliamentary reform in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Harling, 2001: 6–8). Malaysia, however, 
experienced the beginnings of modernisation under British colonial rule from the late 
eighteenth century, with post-independence state policies driving modernisation much 
more aggressively in the latter half of the twentieth century (Abdul Rahman, 2001: 82–
83; Gomez & Jomo, 1999: 17). The expansion of Islamic or syariah legislation has 
gone hand-in-hand with state-led modernisation and has often been motivated by what 
tan beng hui2 (2012a: 66) refers to as an ‘anti-colonial factor’. Furthermore, although 
post-independence Malaysia is formally a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy, 
                                                          
1 In this study, I style Arabic terms based on the predominant or official spellings in each national 
context. Thus, ‘Syafii’ would be styled ‘Shafii’ when referring to the British context. See also my Notes 
on Transliteration and Transcription and Appendix 1: Glossary.  
2 The author prefers to style her name in lowercase letters only, and I will respect this preference when 
citing her throughout this study.  
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Islamic laws have often been used by successive governments to justify authoritarian 
rule (tan, 2012a: 44–45, 2012b: 373–375). Meanwhile, since the 1960s, the influence of 
the established Churches on the British state and society has reduced significantly 
alongside the liberalising of policies on various social issues (Brown, 2006: 36; Davie, 
1994: 33; Guest, Olson, & Wolffe, 2012: 63; Nye & Weller, 2012: 49).  
With these distinct trajectories of modernisation, the multi-ethnic middle class 
in Malaysia largely emerged after independence (Abdul Rahman, 2001: 83), more than 
a century after the rise of the middle class in Victorian Britain. In particular, the Malay 
middle class came into being as the result of various state policies on development and 
affirmative action, especially in education, employment, and finance. In Britain, 
however, the majority of Muslims come from immigrant backgrounds and statistics 
show that they are relatively more disadvantaged than other religious minorities, for 
example in health, employment and educational attainment (Gilliat-Ray, 2012: 113–
114). Therefore for many British Muslims, the experiences of being religious and 
ethnic minorities have been compounded by socio-economic disadvantage.  
Against this backdrop, the British state has also adopted increasingly liberal and 
inclusive attitudes towards sexual diversity even though it historically outlawed 
homosexuality and other sexual offences (Weeks, 2012: 21). These developments 
include passing legislation enabling same-sex marriage in 2013, albeit amid staunch 
opposition from some of the more conservative sectors of the political establishment 
and the Church of England (Rajan, 2012; Vallely, 2014). On the other hand, alongside 
other former British colonies, independent Malaysia inherited colonial policies on 
sexual immorality through its Penal Code and Islamic legislation, which postcolonial 
state actors have expanded and strengthened (Human Rights Watch, 2013: 97; tan, 
2012b: 350–351). In other words, while British gay Muslims now enjoy legal 
protection of their sexual and religious identities, Malaysian gay Muslims could 
potentially be targeted under anti-homosexual civil and syariah laws (tan, 2012b: 371).  
Thus, gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain construct their identities in different 
circumstances that include factors such as religious majority/minority status, class, 
ethnicity, and the state’s position on sexual diversity. However, these differences 
should not elide some key similarities.   
For one thing, the British and Malaysian populations are very ethnically and 
religiously diverse which, in recent decades, has formed the backdrop for particular 
minority demands for equal treatment and recognition. For example, Muslim activists 
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in Britain began campaigning in the 1990s for greater state recognition as a single 
religious minority (Hussain & Sherif, 2014: 419–420), while there has been increased 
campaigning and activism in the interests of marginalised Malaysian Indians (Lee, 
Wong, Wong, & Yeoh, 2010: 295). These and other developments have contributed to 
greater public debate on the rights and positions of ethnic and religious minorities in 
both countries, which often involve direct and indirect questions about national 
identity. Gender relations and sexuality are often implicated in such debates.  
At the same time, both countries are affected by trends of religiously-inspired 
movements, including within Islam, promoting or defending conservative moral values. 
These trends also involve challenges or contestations by relatively more liberal actors 
from religious and non-religious backgrounds, especially regarding gender and 
sexuality. This raises specific questions about how Islam is contested in both countries 
– from those advocating anti-Western, anti-liberal expressions to those seeking to 
harmonise Islamic with Western or liberal values. For example, anti-gay expressions of 
Islam in both countries are challenged by other Muslims (e.g. see Ahmad Fuad, 2011; 
Bunglawala, 2007, 2009; Sisters in Islam, 2011), but the specific dimensions and 
implications of these debates need further investigation.  
Against this backdrop, certain other actors in both countries – including 
politicians, media commentators and religious leaders – tend to construe Islamic and 
Western values as mutually incompatible. In some spheres, the debate is led by 
ideologues trying to polarise public opinion about the relationship between ‘Islam’ and 
the ‘West’, but this has different consequences in Malaysia and Britain. In Malaysia, 
state Islamic institutions paint ‘Western’ values as threats to the sanctity of Islam and 
can police and punish state-defined moral infractions among Muslims3. These and other 
non-state actors often list ‘gay rights’ or ‘homosexuality’ as one of the prime evils sent 
by Western powers to subjugate Muslims or destroy Islam. In this study, I analyse them 
as ‘moral entrepreneurs’ (Becker, 1991: 147) who create and police categories of 
deviant behaviour. In Britain, on the other hand, anti-Muslim ideologues often portray 
Islam or Muslims as particularly prone to extremism or violence, therefore threatening 
national security and social cohesion. Unlike in Malaysia, however, British legislation 
explicitly protects the rights of religious, sexual and other minorities, most prominently 
                                                          
3 For example, Muslims who drink alcohol in public, engage in extra-marital or non-marital heterosexual 
sex, liwat (male homosexual sex) or musahaqah (female homosexual sex) can be fined, imprisoned 
and/or whipped under the Syariah Criminal Offences Act (SCOA) (Malaysia, 1997: 13–17).  
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through the Equality Act 2010 (Hunt, 2012: 693; Nye & Weller, 2012: 43). Within this 
context, however, counter-terrorism policies and rhetoric have arguably still contributed 
to a highly visible ‘securitization of Islam’ (Croft, 2012: 16).    
Thus, although gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain construct their identities in 
environments where Islam and sexuality are regulated differently, the dominant 
expressions of Islam in both countries appear to be morally conservative and anti-
homosexual. Despite this, gay Muslims are increasingly aware of more inclusive 
Islamic approaches and other struggles for equality around the world. In this study, I 
pay attention to how these aspects shape the ways in which gay Muslims associate with 
Islam and their sexual identity. 
This study is ethnographic – I conducted long-term participant observation and 
in-depth interviews with gay Muslims and analysed relevant mass media coverage 
between October 2012 and September 2013. Before and during my research, I met, 
interacted with, and often befriended many men and women identifying as gay Muslims 
who were willing to participate or help. I also drew upon my own experiences and 
insights as a gay Muslim, often reflecting upon the same questions that I posed to all 
my participants.  
This, and my background as a Malaysian who completed undergraduate study in 
Australia and pursued postgraduate study in Britain, gave me a particular vantage point 
throughout my research. Mainly, I could empathise with my participants by drawing 
upon our shared Muslim backgrounds, experiences as sexual minorities, and cultural 
frames of reference in Malaysia and Britain. This does not mean that I have become 
their mouthpiece or vice versa. In fact, I encountered great diversity among the gay 
Muslims I interacted with, indicating the variety of individual constructions and 
expressions of identity within and between the two contexts. Some participants saw 
themselves as more strictly ‘Islamic’ than others, while some expressed themselves as 
more explicitly ‘gay’ than others. Their diverse opinions, questions, and experiences 
have shaped this study.  
 This empirical and systematic study aims to enrich our knowledge and enhance 
our understanding of the lived experiences of gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain. I 
investigate the making of gay Muslim identities in relation to the impacts of multiple 
social networks, understandings of Islam and sexuality, and Islamic and non-Islamic 
authorities in both countries. In this way, this study provides a glimpse of the fluid and 
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diverse roles that religion and sexuality can play in contemporary constructions of 
identity and of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.  
 
Structure of the thesis 
 
Why did I as a gay Muslim choose to study other gay Muslims as a topic of 
academic study? How did I even find any gay Muslims participants in Malaysia and 
Britain and how did I proceed once I found them? These questions are addressed in 
Chapter 1, where I introduce my settings and methods and discuss some of the key 
challenges I faced conducting ethnographic research.  
In Chapter 2, I review the academic literature that has addressed ‘Islam’ and 
‘homosexuality’ as inter-related objects of study. I begin by discussing the textual and 
interpretive strategies of progressive Muslim academics to promote more inclusive 
understandings of Islam, focusing especially on the work of the openly-gay American 
convert Scott Siraj Al-Haqq Kugle. I demonstrate that these interpretive strategies are 
often informed by other empirical studies of Islam and sexuality in various social 
contexts. I then examine studies of historical constructions of sexual expression in 
Muslim societies to contextualise my ensuing discussion on contemporary studies of 
Muslim sexual minorities in Western and non-Western contexts. In the second half of 
the chapter, I discuss the different social constructionist approaches I draw upon for this 
study to investigate the making of ‘outsider identities’. I focus particularly on 
sociological approaches to ‘deviance’ and insights into social constructions of ethnicity, 
nationalism and globalisation.  
Chapter 3 provides a historical background of the management of Islam and 
sexuality in Malaysia and Britain, beginning with a brief account of the shared legal 
and cultural legacies left by the British Empire. From here, the chapter compares the 
key variables in how Islam and sexuality are now managed by the British and 
Malaysian states and highlights those aspects especially relevant to the experiences of 
gay Muslims. 
The next three chapters form the core of the thesis and discuss my empirical 
findings. My narrative starts with individual meaning-making processes, then relates 
these to various dimensions of Islamic socialisation, and finally explores the influence 
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of larger transnational and geopolitical trends on everyday expressions and institutional 
regulations of Islam and sexuality.  
Chapter 4 looks at the complex processes involved when an individual comes to 
self-identify as ‘gay’ and ‘Muslim’. It begins with an analogy between widespread 
assumptions about the incompatibility of being gay and Muslim, and the anthropologist 
Mary Douglas’s (2002: 44) conceptualisation of ‘dirt’ as ‘matter out of place’. It then 
illustrates the ‘role adjustments’ (Merton, 1968: 672) gay Muslims engage in to 
negotiate their ‘out of place’-ness, i.e. how they create a sense of coherence in their 
identities and try to belong within wider society. The chapter also specifically examines 
the consequences of adopting ‘gay’ as an identity label and engages critically with 
claims of it being an Orientalist, imperialist imposition on non-Western or non-
European sexual minorities (Massad, 2002: 372–373). It also examines how ethnicity is 
a factor in the construction gay Muslim identities.  
Chapter 5 builds upon this analysis specifically by looking at the individual and 
collective aspects of Islamic socialisation in forging a specifically ‘gay Muslim’ 
identity. It begins by analysing three aspects of identity-making among gay Muslims – 
Islamic socialisation by multiple authorities and institutions; variations in self-
conceptions of sexuality based on their understandings of Islam; and the presence or 
absence of concrete spaces and networks to express a collective ‘gay Muslim’ identity. 
The chapter goes on to illustrate how gay Muslims utilise various physical locations to 
avoid, subvert or even challenge conventional Islamic authorities. I suggest that gay 
Muslims increasingly use Islam as a ‘cultural resource’ to fashion eclectic expressions 
of self-identity.  
In Chapter 6, I look more deeply at how gay Muslims are caught between 
competing ideological agendas which reinforce the idea that Islam condemns 
homosexuality, starting with a comparison of how these images appear in the mass 
media in both countries. I investigate how the politicised state regulation of Muslims in 
Malaysia and Britain affects the everyday negotiations of the halal (permissible) and 
haram (forbidden) among gay Muslims. Regarding Malaysia, I demonstrate that these 
images are strongly related to the aggressive anti-gay ‘moral panics’ often triggered by 
pro-syariah ‘moral entrepreneurs’. In Britain, they partly inform the anti-Muslim or 
anti-gay rhetoric of particular non-state ideologues, but this is mitigated by legislation 
protecting the rights of various minorities. The bulk of the chapter then investigates 
how gay Muslims in both countries respond to these state regulations and wider 
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sentiments, and highlights the influences of geopolitical and nationalist trends on 
expressions of Islam and sexual identity. 
The Conclusion draws these different strands together and discusses their 
implications for our current understandings of the roles of religion and sexuality in 
constructions of ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ identities.  
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Chapter 1: Looking for gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain 
 
Nobody is ‘born’ Muslim or gay. Instead, we might be born into families or 
communities with a particular sense of inherited religious identity. Also, while research 
shows that we might develop unique and inherent sexual predispositions from birth, 
there is a consensus among biologists that it is a mistake to reify ‘human nature’ 
(Wade, 2013: 279, 287). We interpret our biological states, including the sexual, within 
particular cultural frameworks.  
Thus, we acquire particular sexual or religious concepts of identity through 
socialisation – for example within families, schools, peer groups, communities, and via 
mass media images. Through complex processes of social interaction, some individuals 
can come to understand the religious and sexual components of their identity as 
‘Muslim’ and ‘gay’. Individually produced religious and sexual identities are thus 
interconnected with collectively produced understandings of religion and sexuality.  
Socially constructed images of religion and sexuality often also consist of 
stereotypes that can become particularly salient depending on the context. For example, 
some might construe ‘Islam’ as violent or anti-modern while others might construe 
being ‘gay’ as hedonistic and promiscuous. Neither image adequately reflects or 
represents the social reality of many gay people or Muslims, but they persist and are 
reproduced in various sectors of society. Ethnographic research on marginalised or 
stigmatised groups is thus an empirical and systematic way to examine and understand 
the social production of stereotypes that some groups can perceive as damaging or 
offensive.  
Ethnographers, however, are also products of society – they might hold 
unexamined assumptions or prejudices about the very groups they are interested in 
studying. For example, the sociologist Mitchell Duneier (1994: 149–150) has shown 
how landmark ethnographies of African American men have unintentionally 
reproduced racist stereotypes about blacks and yet are cloaked in an aura of scholarly 
rigour. Yet, an ethnographer’s particular experiences can contribute to fresh insights 
into the lives of the people being studied.  
In my case, my experiences and perspectives as a gay Muslim meant that I had a 
great deal in common with the gay Muslims who participated in this study. Like many 
of them, I have a complex relationship between my sexuality and religion. However, I 
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engaged with them not primarily for friendship or moral support – although some were 
already friends of mine and new friendships developed in the course of my research – 
but to produce academic knowledge on Islam and sexuality in the contemporary world.  
Thus, despite my seemingly self-evident status as an ‘insider’, I still had to constantly 
analyse the complex range of positions and viewpoints within myself as objectively as 
possible alongside those of my participants. As the religious studies scholar Russell 
McCutcheon (2007: 53) puts it, ‘there are insiders and then there are insiders’. 
 In this chapter, I discuss my research design and how it helped me produce 
useful knowledge about gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain. I elaborate on why I 
chose my three methods to gather and interpret data – the central methods of participant 
observation and in-depth interviewing, supplemented by media analysis for context-
setting. In-depth interviews allowed me to listen to and learn from my participants’ 
stories in their own voices, while participant observation provided an opportunity to 
verify and contextualise their accounts as well as to immerse myself in their everyday 
environments. Familiarising myself with mass media coverage on Islam and sexuality 
in the two countries helped me develop a fuller picture of the overall settings in which 
my participants lived. With all these methods, I used my ‘knowing self’ (Davidman, 
2002: 20) to gather and analyse data and I discuss the strengths and limitations of my 
approach. 
 
1.1 Why ethnography?  
 
An ethnographer ‘seeks a deeper immersion in others’ worlds in order to grasp 
what they experience as meaningful and important’ (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2011: 3). 
The ethnographic method involves the researcher’s long-term, first-hand participation 
in the group’s social world and the production of a written account drawing upon this 
participation (Emerson et al., 2011: 1). It produces knowledge based on people’s 
diverse experiences of social reality, encompassing the personal knowledge of the 
ethnographer and his or her participants. However, ethnographic research also aims to 
go beyond personal knowledge to help us gain fresh and useful insights about wider 
social interaction and change (Spickard & Landres, 2002: 13)4. At the same time, it 
                                                          
4 For other reflections on ethnographic methods in the study of religion, see the contributions in James V 
Spickard, J Shawn Landres, and Meredith B McGuire, (eds.) 2002. Personal Knowledge and Beyond: 
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creates social reality – the written ethnographic account is firstly a narrative 
constructed by the ethnographer who assumes ‘authorial privilege’ (Emerson et al., 
2011: 241).  
While ethnographic research provides a nuanced, detailed view of the lives of 
the people involved, this view still requires many levels of interpretation and 
translation. To begin with, the participants in the study often have to explain their 
actions, opinions, relationships or beliefs in terms that are intelligible to the 
ethnographer. The ethnographer then has to record these as comprehensively and 
accurately as possible in his or her fieldnotes. The ethnographer eventually has to use 
these notes to construct a final, written report of the study for an audience that most 
likely did not have the same direct and prolonged access to the research context. 
Instead, they will probably interpret it for their own purposes through personal filters 
influenced by prior exposure to information and experiences they perceive as relevant. 
Therefore at every stage, there is potential for distortion or loss of information simply 
due to the limits of human communication.  
The role of the ethnographer in controlling potential distortions or losses of 
information is crucial since there is no such thing as an unmarked, ‘“universal” 
researcher’ (Spickard & Landres, 2002: 7). As well-meaning or rigorous as any 
ethnographer intends to be, he or she still comes to the research enterprise with a set of 
images and assumptions about the self and the ‘Other’. This is why some 
anthropologists have become sceptical about the validity of ethnography and have even 
advocated replacing it with textual research5. However, the anthropologists John 
Borneman and Abdellah Hammoudi (2009: 20) assert that ethnographic research 
remains valid if we understand that the ‘mutual, intersubjective questioning’ between 
researchers and interlocutors is itself an integral aspect of the ethnographic enterprise. 
Ethnographers can reduce error and bias by taking into account ‘the dynamics of our 
interactions as well as the differences between our locations and those of our 
interlocutors’ (Borneman & Hammoudi, 2009: 19). 
I chose ethnographic methods to study gay Muslim experiences in Malaysia and 
Britain precisely because my research required comparative insights into the nuances 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Reshaping the Ethnography of Religion. New York: New York University Press. 
 
5 For example, John Borneman and Abdellah Hammoudi (2009: 8–9) critique fellow anthropologist Talal 
Asad’s advocacy of ‘textualist’ rather than ethnographic methods.   
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and layers of being gay and Muslim under particular social conditions. I experienced, 
recorded and thought through the ‘mutual, intersubjective questioning’ among my 
participants and also between them and me in specific, concrete circumstances. In the 
following sections, I discuss the main issues that presented themselves through my 
specific methods: participant observation, interviews and analyses of the mass media.  
 
1.2 Participant observation: Context and complexity 
 
On 8 October 2012, I boarded a plane in London headed for Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia. This was my first of two research visits – from October to December 2012 
and from July to September 2013 – to study ‘gay Muslim’ lives in Malaysia, in the 
hope that I could find enough gay Muslims to participate in my research6.  
When I first decided to research the lives of gay Muslims, I was asked by 
several British non-Muslims – gay and straight, white and non-white – if it was 
possible to even find such people in Malaysia. The fact is, even before I began this 
study I had already befriended many gay Muslims in Malaysia and elsewhere. I chatted 
informally with several of the Malaysians among them – online and in person when I 
was in Kuala Lumpur in 2011 – to gauge whether they were interested. In Britain, my 
task was even easier, as I had already made a few new friends in Imaan, the British 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex (LGBTQI) Muslim organisation. 
I simply needed to explain my research to the chair and a few trustees who then granted 
me access to several potential participants. Therefore, in both countries, I had no 
problems obtaining replies from potential participants offering varying degrees of 
assistance and support.  
Yet, why did so many of my non-Muslim British friends assume that it would 
be nearly impossible or even dangerous to recruit participants while I took for granted 
that this would be the easy part? In brief, our divergent perspectives were related to 
how our worldviews were shaped by our different social networks and experiences.  
In my case, even before starting my doctorate, I had already spent much time 
and energy seeking out supportive LGBTQI Muslim communities, networks and 
friends. My selective openness with various people about being gay and Muslim 
                                                          
6 I conducted the British phase of my research between January and July 2013.  
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enabled me to build and maintain these networks of trust. This is why recruiting 
participants appeared so easy – my ‘insider status’ and previous experiences meant that 
I had forged relationships which provided a ready basis for my research sample. 
The questions I was asked in London, however, affected my thoughts the 
minute I touched down at Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA). At the baggage 
reclaim area, I noticed the elegant hairdos, thick makeup, and high heels of the Malay-
speaking female flight attendants from Malaysia Airlines. The Malaysian Federal 
Constitution defines all ethnic Malays as Muslim7, but how could I take this for granted 
with this group of women? Could I assume that none of them were gay, or that all of 
them were practising Muslims? Their appearance contrasted with the Malay women 
workers at the airline taxi counter, who were all wearing demure yellow tudung, or 
Malay-style Islamic headscarves. Could I take for granted that they were ‘proper’ 
Muslims, or that none of them were gay? How could I find out if external markers such 
as the tudung or discernibly feminine dressing styles reliably indicated private, 
individual beliefs and practices?  
These questions were part of my consciousness as a Malaysian who was raised 
Muslim. I grew up in Alor Setar, the capital of Kedah State8, and studied for my 
undergraduate degree in chemical engineering in Australia. I returned to Kuala Lumpur 
and worked there for nine years, switching careers a couple of times. My work often 
took me to different parts of Malaysia – as a corporate executive, a human rights 
activist, a performing artist, and a journalist – and I thought I knew my country inside 
out. Conducting ethnographic research, however, made me see Malaysia with new eyes 
– hence my meticulous mental notes when touching down at KLIA in October 2012.  
Ethnographic research also forced me to reflect upon how my self-perception as 
gay and Muslim has influenced my social networks and worldview. For one thing, 
despite numerous negative media images of Islam’s doctrinal position on 
homosexuality, I personally managed to forge happy and deep friendships with other 
gay Muslims. By being open about my religious and sexual identity in several 
circumstances, I have also managed to nurture closer and more affectionate 
                                                          
7 Article 160(2) states: ‘“Malay” means a person who professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks 
the Malay language, [and] conforms to Malay custom’ (Malaysia, 2010: 153). 
8 Throughout this work, I use the word ‘state’ in two ways – as a broader concept referring to a political 
structure of government and authority (styled ‘state’), and in relation to the different territorial units that 
make up the Federation of Malaysia (styled ‘State’). 
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relationships with some of my family members and other heterosexual Muslims and 
non-Muslims. Even before I embarked on my research, I knew that several other gay 
Muslims had similarly positive experiences.  
Of course, this does not discount the negative and even traumatic experiences 
that many other gay Muslims have had with their families, communities, or state 
agencies in Malaysia, Britain and beyond. In my case, although I was open about my 
sexuality with friends, immediate family, and most of my colleagues, I never actively 
‘came out’ in ways that made me visible to the Malaysian authorities. I lived in a social 
world where all the people who mattered to me knew about my sexuality but 
understood that they, too, needed to protect me from potentially hostile state and non-
state actors. I relate my experiences to show how our choices to adopt and express 
certain facets of self-identity create particular yet fluid social worlds that we inhabit.  
When I assumed the role of researcher, I faced the question of how exactly to 
define a ‘gay Muslim’ social world as a concrete site for study. As the anthropologist 
Tom Boellstorff (2005: 20) argues in his study of Indonesia, there is no gay or lesbian 
‘village’ for an ethnographer to visit and inhabit. Instead, individuals express their 
religious and sexual identities in fragments, through specific interactions at certain 
times and in certain locations. Additionally, in environments where non-normative 
expressions of gender and sexuality are considered deviant or even criminal, people 
learn how to display conformity depending on whether the coast is clear.  
Therefore, instead of identifying a permanent, bounded locale in which to study 
‘gay Muslims’, I asked my friends about particular activities, events, or networks where 
I could observe other gay Muslims in everyday social interactions. This proved 
considerably easier in Britain because all I needed to do was keep up with Imaan’s 
calendar of activities and events. It was more complicated in Malaysia, because local 
self-identified LGBTQI collectives do not necessarily provide the space for gay-
identified Muslims to explore the religious aspects of their identity. Throughout the 
Malaysian part of my ethnographic fieldwork, I did not find a comparable equivalent of 
Imaan, i.e. a visible, organised collective primarily focusing on supporting LGBTQI 
and Muslim people.  
In Malaysia, nevertheless, I persevered and found informal groups such as 
women of diverse sexualities, including Muslims, who played indoor football (or 
‘futsal’) weekly. I also encountered many gay Muslims at various arts events or public 
forums on human rights and progressive discussions of Islam organised by civil society 
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groups. I even attended a buka puasa or Ramadan9  fast-breaking party organised by a 
group of ‘bears’10 in Kuala Lumpur – catered for gay Muslims and non-Muslims and 
their friends.  
 
1.2.1 Logistics of the research 
 
In terms of geographical locations, my research in Malaysia was conducted 
primarily in Kuala Lumpur and its surroundings, with a short visit to Kedah on both 
trips. In Britain, I focused mostly on Greater London, interspersed with a few short 
visits to Greater Manchester and Lancashire.  
My encounters and activities in the field involved capturing my experiences and 
observations in writing. I had to judge when to take notes contemporaneously as things 
were happening or when to put pen and paper aside to fully engage with my 
surroundings. I balanced between making ‘jottings or scratch notes’ whenever I could, 
and keeping ‘mental notes or “headnotes”’ (Emerson et al., 2011: 23) at other times, 
which I wrote down in my notebook immediately afterwards – in cafes, on the Tube, in 
libraries or in bed.  
Whether I made jottings or headnotes, I followed the recommendations by 
Robert Emerson, Rachel Fretz and Linda Shaw (2011: 24–27) to record: my ‘initial 
impressions’ of the scene, including all things available to my senses such as tastes, 
smells, sounds, and sights; my personal sense of the ‘significant or unexpected’; ‘what 
those in the setting experience and react to as “significant” or “important”’, i.e. beyond 
my personal impressions; and finally ‘how routine actions in the setting are organized 
and take place’. At the end of the day or the first thing the next day, I would construct 
full fieldnotes in Microsoft Word based on these headnotes and jottings, and stored 
these in an encrypted folder on my laptop.  
Where dialogue was concerned, I placed only those phrases captured verbatim 
in quotation marks and indicated all others as indirect quotations or paraphrases 
(Emerson et al., 2011: 63). In this thesis, for readability, I render all dialogue and direct 
                                                          
9 The ninth month of the Muslim calendar, during which the third of Islam’s five pillars states that 
Muslims need to fast, i.e. refrain from food, drink and sex from just before dawn until sunset. Buka 
puasa means ‘breaking the fast’.  
10   In the gay subculture, this is a reference to gay or bisexual men who are stocky, heavyset, and are also 
hairy or sport facial hair (PBWorks, 2008).  
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speech in quotation marks, but indicate non-verbatim exchanges with an asterisk (*) at 
the end of the relevant excerpt or paragraph. I also italicise my translations of 
exchanges originally in Malay11.  
Along the way, I also wrote ‘in-process memos’ based on particular themes or 
analytical leads that I was picking up in my data. These were not intended to produce a 
final, systematic analysis but rather ‘to provide insight, direction, and guidance for the 
ongoing fieldwork’ (Emerson et al., 2011: 123).  
All in all, I accumulated nearly 250,000 words worth of fieldnotes. Once I had 
finished participant observation, I read through these fieldnotes and in-process memos 
as a complete corpus. Upon my first reading, I began ‘open coding’, i.e. identifying and 
formulating ‘any and all ideas, themes, or issues they suggest, no matter how varied and 
disparate’ (Emerson et al., 2011: 172), using the ‘Comment’ function in Microsoft 
Word. Upon second reading, I embarked on more ‘focused coding’, i.e. subjecting my 
open codes to more fine-grained analysis based on clusters of topics of particular 
interest, also using Word’s ‘Comment’ function. During this process, I also wrote 
separate, more systematic and theoretically informed ‘coding memos’ based on the 
topics and categories generated by my open and focused codes. From here, I identified 
and pursued the ideas and themes that addressed my research questions and matched 
these with episodes or vignettes to include in this thesis.   
Besides providing rich data, my fieldnotes also made me aware of how power 
dynamics in the field influenced my methods and subsequent insights, which I now turn 
to.   
 
1.2.2 Gender, class and power 
 
From the beginning, I strove to include the experiences of gay Muslim men and 
women, because I did not want to ignore women’s experiences or contributions in my 
examination of constructions of religion and sexuality. Furthermore, in the Malaysian 
context, the government-controlled mass media regularly demonise male and female 
homosexuality, sometimes alongside negative reports on what are portrayed as 
‘deviant’ or ‘misbehaving’ heterosexual women. On the other end of the spectrum, 
                                                          
11 Italicised and non-italicised words appearing together are examples of code-switching between English 
and Malay. See Notes on Transliteration and Transcription.  
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discussions on the protection of sexual minorities in Britain accompany continuing 
campaigns and policies to achieve gender equality.  
At the same time, my gendered position as a Muslim man meant that I initially 
did not have equal access to gay male and female social worlds. For example, when one 
of my gay Muslim women friends invited me to observe her all-women futsal group, I 
somehow felt that it was more appropriate to sit on the side instead of joining in. I 
initially reflected that this was because I had discerned a gender boundary – these futsal 
activities were obviously an important avenue for the women to socialise comfortably 
and I did not want to disrupt them unduly. Later, I wondered if I was driven by other 
unexamined assumptions – gay men are often stereotyped as bad at sports whereas 
lesbians are often stereotyped as uncommonly sporty.  
Eventually, I discovered another female-majority futsal group which welcomed 
all genders and players of all abilities, which I joined regularly. Thus, although I 
initially found it more difficult to gain access to the social worlds of gay Muslim 
women, I persevered and managed to find welcome in some key women’s spaces. It 
was relatively easier with the men – for example, I knew the main nightclubs patronised 
by gay Muslim men and so did most of my male participants.  
Soon, however, I realised that these social circles – whether predominantly 
male, female, or mixed – consisted largely of middle class individuals within urban 
surroundings. Even the many people I spoke to who were raised in rural or working-
class environments had moved into more urban settings and were upwardly mobile. My 
own middle class background probably had a role to play in how I came into contact 
with most of my lower- to upper-middle class participants. Thus, when I heard of a 
restaurant in Kuala Lumpur with an adjoining pool hall that sounded like it was 
frequented by working-class gay Muslim women, I immediately asked one of my 
participants, Isma12, if we could visit. I recorded this visit with Isma and Fauziah, her 
girlfriend, as follows:  
 
The pool hall is a dimly-lit, cigarette smoke-infused room with eight 
to ten pool tables. There are two to four people playing at every 
                                                          
12 I use pseudonyms for all participants.   
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table. The first table to our left has a pengkid13 and a woman player. 
I see at least three other tables with pengkids – either playing with 
other pengkids, or in a mixed group with their girlfriends. One table 
has a girl wearing a tudung, and a man who looks like he could be a 
lelaki lembut14. The table at the far end of the room, to the left, has a 
couple of Indian men – besides them everyone else is Malay. There 
is moderately loud hip hop music playing on the sound system.  
 
The pengkids are all dressed in loose, baggy clothing. Many are in 
flannel shirts, and have short, spiky and even dyed hair. When we 
walk past they stare at us quite sternly.  Eventually, Isma asks, ‘Do 
you guys want to leave?’ I say, ‘I don’t know, are you 
uncomfortable?’ Isma says, ‘I’m not, but both of you look 
uncomfortable.’ I say, ‘Yes, I am a bit.’ She says, ‘Okay, then, let’s 
go.’*  
 
After we exit, I ask Fauziah, Isma’s girlfriend, ‘Were you 
uncomfortable, too?’ She says, ‘Yes, I was.’ I say, ‘I wanted to 
scream: Please don’t beat me up!’ Fauziah laughs and says, ‘Me 
too.’ I say, ‘They were quite fierce, weren’t they?’ Isma says, ‘Yes, I 
think it’s because these are people who hang out here every night, so 
it’s like home to them. So when new people enter they check us 
out….’*  
 
During and immediately after this encounter, I was at a loss to explain why I 
perceived the pengkids and their friends in this pool hall as working class. In hindsight, 
I understand that I carried unexamined privileges and assumptions as a middle-class, 
Malaysian, Muslim male into this encounter. Rightly or wrongly, I read certain aspects 
of the atmosphere – the lighting, music, fashion sense of the pengkids and their 
                                                          
13 A colloquial term, possibly coined from the English ‘punk kid’, used to describe masculine women 
who desire feminine women. For a more detailed explanation on the possible etymology of ‘pengkid’, 
see Chapter 2.1.5, where I discuss Yuenmei Wong. (2012). ‘Islam, Sexuality, and the Marginal 
Positioning of Pengkids and Their Girlfriends in Malaysia’. Journal of Lesbian Studies 16 (4): 435–48.   
14 Literally, ‘soft man’ – often used colloquially and in the mass media to refer to men perceived as gay 
or effeminate.  
30 
 
girlfriends, and surrounding neighbourhood – as ‘working class’, which felt alien to 
me. In fact, the pengkids and their girlfriends might have regarded me as an interloper 
and probably had better reason to feel threatened by my presence. Thus, while I caught 
a glimpse of the class boundary among Malaysian gay Muslims through encounters 
such as these, my own gender and class position made it difficult for me to cross it. 
Still, I tried my best to collect insights into class dynamics through my other encounters 
and to be as reflexive as possible about my own prejudices and assumptions in my 
analysis.   
This intersection of class and gender also complicated my access to transgender 
social circles. For one thing, although I have friends who self-identify as transgender or 
transsexual, I have also observed how the boundary between being gay and transgender 
can become blurred in various circumstances. I personally know individuals who play 
with labels and do not subscribe to a fixed notion of sexual orientation or gender 
identity15. At the same time, hostile mass media coverage of homosexuality in Malaysia 
often lumps together the concepts of ‘homosexuality’ and ‘transgenderism’.  
Within this context, the question of gender identity for some of my participants 
was more complex than it first appeared. Particular individuals whom I assumed were 
cisgender16 turned out to be more comfortable identifying as transgender and vice 
versa, and their narratives have informed my insights profoundly. For others, the 
notions of ‘cisgender’ and ‘transgender’ just did not emerge, or were alien to their 
vocabulary17.  
Against this background, I chose not to seek out individuals explicitly 
identifying as ‘transgender’ because their experiences of gender and sexuality would be 
distinct from those of people identifying as ‘gay’. In this study, however, my use of the 
term ‘gay Muslim’ is not meant to erase the ambiguities and nuances between the 
                                                          
15 One such person, Ebry, participated in my research and features in later chapters.  
16 Cisgender, i.e. non-transgender, refers to people whose self-understandings and expressions of gender 
correspond with their biological sex and conform to wider societal expectations. Transgender as a broad 
category refers to people whose self-understandings and/or expressions of gender do not correspond to 
their biological sex and thus do not match dominant societal expectations (Catalano & Shlasko, 2010: 
425).  
17 For an analysis of the legacy of blurred boundaries between ‘homosexuality’ and ‘transgenderism’ in 
Muslim Southeast Asia and its consequences today, see Michael Peletz. 2011. ‘Gender Pluralism: 




‘transgender’ and ‘gay’ experiences I eventually observed and learnt about18. Still, 
these observations were probably also limited by my own subjective position as a 
cisgender, middle class, gay Muslim man. For example, there is a stark difference 
between the discussions I had with my mostly middle-class participants and one chance 
encounter I had on the streets of Kuala Lumpur when my car broke down: 
 
It is nearly 9pm and the heavy traffic has subsided a little. I am 
standing on the pavement and waiting for the tow truck. I notice, to 
my left, a few transgender women loitering near the metal railing of 
the footpath by the river. They are about 30 feet away from me. I try 
to count them out of the corner of my eye, but can’t make out how 
many there are. I decide to walk past and observe them discreetly.   
 
When I pass by them I look at my mobile phone, trying not to stare 
so obviously. Out of the corner of my eye, I count four transgender 
women. The closest one stands upright and faces me, hands akimbo. 
I might be imagining this, but she also thrusts her hips forward 
suggestively. She is in a one-piece dress – a spaghetti strap, with the 
skirt just covering her bum – and is wearing high heels. Her hair is 
long, wavy and dyed blonde, and her face is heavily made up. Again, 
I might be imagining this (it is night time, after all), but she pouts 
seductively too.  
 
Of the other three, two are sitting on the railing, and one is standing 
– all stare at me. The last one I pass has her hair in a black beehive 
and is also heavily made up and skimpily dressed. She calls out, 
‘You want a massage? For your “inner strength”?’ I don’t look at 
her directly, but I smile and shake my head. I hurry past, and I can 
hear her still calling out, slightly more indistinctly, ‘If you want a bit 
of bum you can get it here, too.’*   
 
                                                          
18 Substituting with ‘queer’ would also be unsatisfactory, since it would not capture the centrality of the 
label ‘gay’ in forming the self-understandings and self-expressions of the majority of participants, as 
explained in the Introduction.  
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This fleeting interaction occurred on what, during the day, is a bustling Kuala 
Lumpur main road. I had not realised that at night, when the crowds have thinned, it 
was also where transgender women – locally known as mak nyah – who were probably 
working class, solicited attention. Like my indirect encounter with the working class 
pengkids in the pool hall, I caught a glimpse of a class and gender boundary here which 
I found difficult to cross because of my social position as a middle-class gay man.   
These class and gender dynamics show the complex ways in which power 
operates in the field and affects the lens through which the ethnographer sees the world. 
My middle class position and academic affiliation with a top-ranking British university 
gave me certain social advantages which facilitated easy access with my middle class 
participants. Yet these social advantages sometimes became barriers making it difficult 
for me to enter particular social worlds. Thus, although I have gathered rich data, the 
gathering process itself was done from a specific position in which several aspects of 
my own identity intersected. Moreover, these power dynamics were not static – I also 




1.2.3 Vulnerability, self-preservation and autonomy 
 
There were times when being gay made me feel vulnerable in situations where 
being male and Muslim might have given me certain advantages. In November 2012, an 
academic friend, Nai Ing – a non-Muslim, non-heterosexual Malaysian woman – 
informed me of an upcoming, government-sponsored workshop on the position of 
Islam in the Malaysian constitution. Many of the panellists were prominent Muslim 
opinion leaders or high-ranking officials in the Islamic bureaucracy whose anti-LGBT 
positions were prominently reported by the mass media. We anticipated that the 
audience would also consist of representatives from Islamic pressure groups, syariah 
lawyers, civil servants in the Islamic bureaucracy, and scholars of Islam.  
During a break on the first day, Nai Ing and I looked for a private space to sit 
but were invited by another participant to join her at her table. We soon gathered that 
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she was Aminah Ishak19, a pro-syariah, anti-LGBT, and anti-liberal scholar and 
commentator. Aminah20 tried to strike up a conversation with me, asking about the 
nature of my research. I gave her polite but vague responses to the effect that I was 
investigating ‘official and unofficial views of Islam in Malaysia and Britain’. When she 
prodded me about my findings, I said I did not have any yet. Nai Ing stared at her plate 
and ate silently throughout. 
I doubt that Aminah or the workshop organisers had any legal basis to expel or 
report Nai Ing and me to the authorities merely because of our research. I am less sure 
of the consequences had I revealed my sexual identity – my exchange with Aminah 
would have probably turned out differently, perhaps becoming more confrontational. 
As it happened, our conversation was brief and cordial and when the coffee break 
ended she excused herself, saying she wanted to get ready for the next session.  
During one of the later question-and-answer sessions, she got up and stated 
quite baldly that all advocates for freedom of sexuality should not be given ‘any space 
at all’ in Malaysia. I was troubled that she said this so unequivocally, relieved that I 
had not exposed myself unnecessarily, and happy to jot down her words as data.  
This was one of the few times I felt uncomfortable, frustrated, and slightly 
afraid during my research because of the polarised environment and its potential 
impacts on my personal security. I did not stop being gay, Muslim or a researcher when 
I met Aminah, but I did choose to present a particular version of myself to her in an 
environment where Islam was presented in ways that I found quite unpleasant and 
threatening.  
In other instances, I could be anonymous and feel relatively safe, for example 
when I attended Friday prayers at different venues in Malaysia and Britain to observe 
congregational dynamics and listen to the khutbahs (sermons). After all, accessing 
male-only mosque spaces depended only on the observable characteristics of being 
male and Muslim, while one’s sexuality could often safely go undetected or 
unremarked on. In fact, during several Friday prayers, I spotted other men in the 
congregation whom I was sure were gay.  
                                                          
19 Even though she is a public figure, I use a pseudonym for her because this was an informal, personal 
exchange.  
20 Malay names are patronymic, so it is correct to cite first names after the first mention.  
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These instances were not surprising to me, since I have attended Friday prayers 
in Malaysia and Britain with some of my heterosexual, male Muslim friends who know 
I am gay and are fine with it. Like me, they ignore or cringe at some of the more 
judgemental or punitive khutbahs, yet they worship in the mosque weekly because they 
consider it an important part of being Muslim. Like me, they understand that mosques 
can often be hostile spaces for outsiders or non-conformists, but not just regarding 
sexuality – for example, the state-controlled Friday khutbahs in predominantly Sunni 
Malaysia can be virulently anti-Syiah21 (e.g. Department of Islamic Development 
Malaysia, 2013). At the same time, my experiences and theirs show that despite being 
spaces in which dominant and normative Islamic teachings are transmitted, mosques do 
not host homogenous congregations. Many Muslims are capable of creating islands of 
autonomy or alternative modes of religious belonging during Friday prayers and at 
other times. This insight helped me to understand better the conditions that motivate 
some people to seek safer spaces to belong openly as gay Muslims, which I now 
discuss.  
 
1.2.4 Belief, belonging and the research endeavour 
 
I first encountered Imaan in 2007, when I visited Britain for a week for work. It 
was Ramadan – I contacted them online and got myself invited to one of their iftaris22 
in central London. I had hoped to find kindred spirits but instead found some of the 
conversations quite jarring. For example, I remember one of the attendees distributing 
pro-Palestine, anti-Zionist flyers produced by Hizb ut-Tahrir23, an organisation that I 
was personally fearful of at the time because of their extreme hostility towards 
homosexuality. I returned to Malaysia with an image of Imaan as an incoherent, 
inconsistent organisation.  
                                                          
21 The Malay style for Shii, a branch of Muslims who believe the Prophet Muhammad’s religious 
leadership, spiritual authority, and divine guidance were passed on to his descendants through his son-in-
law and cousin, Ali ibn Abi Talib. Sunnis are the largest branch of Muslims and stress the Sunnah, or 
Muhammad’s exemplary conduct, over beliefs in divinely-inspired succession.  
22 The fast-breaking meal during Ramadan.   
23 A transnational Muslim social movement aiming ‘to resume the Islamic way of life by establishing an 
Islamic State that executes the systems of Islam and carries its call to the world’ (Hizb ut-Tahrir, n.d.). 
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Yet, Imaan – along with other LGBTQI Muslim organisations in the West – 
remained on my radar, and when I returned to London in 2010 to pursue my masters, I 
made contact again. This time, I attended a study session they organised with the 
openly gay American imam, Daayiee Abdullah. This is where I first met Waqqas and 
Osman, who quickly befriended me and eventually participated in this study.  
At the time, however, I was jarred again by some of the discussions. I 
empathised with some of the questions posed to the imam, for example on the 
intricacies of child adoption for gay Muslim couples. I did not understand, and was 
privately impatient with, some other questions about the minutiae of Islamic worship. It 
was only much later that I understood these as the working out of individual 
expressions of Islam within a very diverse group – Imaan’s membership consists of 
individuals from various schools of Islamic jurisprudence, with differing emphases on 
what constitutes ‘true’ Islam. I also realised that as much as they wanted to express 
Muslim piety, many Imaan members – as with many other Muslims I encountered – 
were insecure about the gaps in their Islamic knowledge.  
I eventually spoke to the Imaan chair and asked if they had ever conducted 
internal seminars or discussions about the social or practical dimensions of shariah. In 
Malaysia, I had become familiar with these debates through the work of the Islamic 
feminist organisation Sisters in Islam (SIS). In fact, I joined SIS as their first male 
associate member in 2004 and was trained to facilitate workshops that deconstructed 
gender and syariah for a lay audience24. The workshop modules were essentially a 
compilation of traditional and contemporary scholarship – including jurisprudence, 
Quranic hermeneutics and social scientific studies – on Islam and gender. The Imaan 
chair was enthusiastic, assuring me that nothing like it had ever been done in the 
organisation, and invited me to run a pilot session. I conducted this in April 2012, a few 
months after I had started my doctorate, and received positive feedback and requests to 
conduct further sessions for other Imaan members.  
                                                          
24 The main takeaway from these workshops is that there is much diversity in Islam – from doctrinal to 
political expressions – now obscured by polarised, polemical debates that pit it as inimical to human 
rights. Specifically, the workshops explore the considerable flexibility within Islamic teachings to 
conceptualise gender, sexuality, and religious freedom in relatively non-judgemental, egalitarian, and 
inclusive ways.  
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My entry point into studying Imaan was thus preceded by a strong need to 
participate and belong with other gay Muslims25. This does not mean I have 
overwhelmingly met like-minded individuals – indeed, I have very different 
experiences and views on Islam compared to many Imaan members. It does mean, 
however, that I finally found a space in which I could meet other people who, like me, 
were working out the relationship between Islam and their sexuality.  
It also means that in coming to Imaan, I altered some key organisational 
dynamics. It could be argued that I therefore ‘contaminated’ my own research, but this 
view reproduces the myth that social researchers can aspire to invisibility or complete 
neutrality. My own view is that I worked with and through my ‘knowing self’ to gain 
an ‘emphatic, nuanced and sensitive account’ (Davidman, 2002: 20) of the lives of the 
people I studied.  
There were also other boundaries that affected my initial perceptions of and 
interactions with Imaan members. For example, I had assumed they were middle class 
like me but realised only later that the vast majority were second-generation Britons 
who had grown up in predominantly working class families and communities. I 
sometimes found it hard to join their conversations or understand their sense of 
humour, but in time I learnt that they were evaluating me before incorporating me into 
their fold.  
Initially, the Imaan chair and a few trustees built on my willingness to engage, 
recruiting me to coordinate some panel discussions and deliver the Friday khutbah 
during their national conference in August 2012. At the end of the second day, 
however, I became aware of another layer in our interactions when some of us decided 
to hang out in one member’s hostel room.  
Naved, a former Hizb ut-Tahrir member, Osman, a former Tablighi Jamaat26 
member, Waqqas, and a few others decided to take turns teasing me. Naved started 
asking me about my partner Giles27, an openly gay Anglican priest. He expressed mock 
                                                          
25 When I had decided upon my research topic, however, I approached the Imaan chair during an iftari to 
explain what I wanted to do and why. He was supportive and told me I could start once I had been 
granted ethical approval, and subsequently helped explain my research to the other Imaan trustees and 
members.  
26 A transnational Muslim movement aiming to persuade other Muslims to become more pious and 
rigorous with their beliefs and practices. 
27 Not anonymised.  
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disdain that I identified and practised as a Muslim and sang in the church choir on 
Sundays.  
‘What are you?’ Naved demanded, and the others egged him on. Naved 
maintained a mock stern expression, while some of the others giggled.*  
I laughed, and every time I tried to reply, Naved interrupted, making everyone 
laugh even more.  
‘Are you a cut-and-shut28?’ he asked.*  
‘That’s what you is!’ said Osman, in an exaggerated East London accent.*  
After this ritual teasing, most Imaan members became warmer and more 
affectionate with me. As I overheard Waqqas say to Osman later, ‘She’s29 one of us 
now.’ This ritual teasing also happened in other situations, such as when I attended the 
Imaan annual general meeting (AGM) in February 2013 and asked if I could be added 
to the Imaan WhatsApp30 group. Ebrahim, a member in his mid-20s, added me when 
approximately 30 of us were having a post-AGM meal at a kebab restaurant in East 
London, and I captured the ensuing exchange in my fieldnotes:  
 
Once added, I text a salam (greeting of peace) to everyone. Salleh, 
an Arab member in his late 20s, responds by calling me a ‘man-gash’ 
– an extremely rude term meaning ‘male vagina’. I laugh out loud – 
Salleh is sitting at the other end of the restaurant. ‘Did Salleh just 
call me a rude word?’ I type.  
 
The ensuing WhatsApp exchange is chaotic, funny, and rude, and 
occurs alongside our real-time exchanges, which are equally funny 
and chaotic. One member asks me on WhatsApp, ‘Slag31, why aren’t 
you sitting with me?’ 
 
                                                          
28 Slang referring to a form of automobile repair in which the wrecked section of a defective car is sawn 
off and replaced with a matching section from another car.  
29 Some Imaan members enjoy reversing gendered pronouns playfully, although they refrain from doing 
this to people who are uncomfortable with it.  
30 An electronic messaging system that operates across different smartphone platforms.  
31 Derogatory British slang for promiscuous woman.  
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These digital conversations provided crucial albeit unseen context to my 
participant observation and belonging within Imaan. On WhatsApp and the social 
networking site Facebook, for example, Imaan members share jokes about being gay 
and Muslim and keep in touch about important life events. When someone’s family 
member or partner is ill, they share dua (supplications) for shifa (cure). Members who 
are nervous about job interviews or ‘coming out’ to family or friends get moral support 
and duas through these virtual worlds. Occasionally they also argue viciously. 
Eventually, I left the WhatsApp group because I was overwhelmed by the volume of 
messages – I soon learnt that I was not the only member to leave for this reason. Yet, 
some of the newer members have told me that Imaan is their lifeline, and they 
communicate through WhatsApp and Facebook intensely and devotedly.  
My research in Britain thus introduced me to Imaan as a structured, close-knit 
social network primarily focusing on Islam and sexuality, which as yet has no direct 
equivalent in Malaysia. For balance, I also contacted gay British Muslims who did not 
belong to Imaan – a doctoral colleague introduced them to me. Eventually, I also found 
belonging as an openly gay Muslim in another British Muslim organisation, The 
Muslim Institute, and helped introduce some of the members and leaders of the two 
groups to each other. This eventually led to them jointly organising a conference on 
diversity in Islam in May 2014 (Muslim Institute & Imaan, n.d.).  
Whether in Malaysia or Britain, then, my participant observation was influenced 
by my own emotional and intellectual trajectory even as I was studying my 
participants’ journeys. Furthermore, while our lives were filled with concerns beyond 
religion and sexuality, I was asking them and myself to throw the spotlight on our 
religious and sexual identity. This study’s validity thus lies in whether I have rendered 
their experiences accurately and holistically enough to produce viable social scientific 
analysis. In the next section, I examine the kinds of insights I gained from in-depth 
interviews.  
 
1.3 Interviewing: Power and presentations of self 
 
I interviewed 29 participants in total – 17 in Malaysia and 12 in Britain – 
consisting of nine men and eight women in Malaysia, and seven men and five women 
in Britain. They were mostly in their 20s and 30s, with an average age of 31.5 and a 
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median of 31. The average and median ages of my Malaysian participants was 32 and 
33.5, slightly higher than those of my British participants, 29 and 28.7. Also, my 
Malaysian sample consisted entirely of Muslims who were categorised officially as 
ethnic Malays, whereas my British sample included Pakistanis, Indians, Somalis, an 
Arab, a Bengali, a mixed-South Asian individual and an English convert32.  
I contacted my Malaysian interviewees through a combination of going through 
my personal contact list and snowball sampling, which led to 15 interviews in Kuala 
Lumpur and its surroundings, and two in Alor Setar, Kedah. In Britain, I contacted ten 
interviewees through Imaan, supplementing these with two non-Imaan contacts. I 
focused on Imaan in Britain specifically to compare the dynamics of an organised 
LGBTQI Muslim social movement with looser, more indirect or hidden networks in 
Malaysia. Six interviews were conducted in London and six in Greater Manchester and 
Lancashire.  
In both countries, I focused on anyone self-identifying as ‘Muslim’ and was 
attracted to the same sex, but for fuller comparison also included a few who had 
privately disaffiliated from Islam. Also, during the course of my ethnographic research, 
I had informal conversations with several other Muslim and non-Muslim sexual 
minorities in both countries, as well as with progressive Muslim activists or community 
leaders.  
The interviews were semi-structured – I had on hand a sheet covering various 
potential aspects I wanted to find out about people’s religious and sexual self-
understandings, the dynamics of their close relationships, and their wider views on 
Islam and sexuality33. Prior to each interview, interviewees were given time to read the 
participant information sheet and the opportunity to ask clarifying questions before 
deciding to proceed. During the interviews, I referred to my printed guide but did not 
stick to the questions rigidly and instead allowed my participants to explore or elaborate 
on what they felt was important. My main objective was to gain a nuanced perspective 
of their ‘life-worlds’ (Stroh, 2000: 202).  
                                                          
32 The ethnic homogeneity of my Malaysian sample is due mostly to the constitutional definition of 
Malays as Muslims. For a more thorough breakdown of my interviewees’ profiles, please see 
Appendices 2a and 2b.  
33 For my full interview schedule, please see Appendix 3.  
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On average, the interviews lasted two to two-and-a-half hours, with one lasting 
just under an hour. They took place in locations which my interviewees found 
convenient and comfortable, including cafes, parks, restaurants and their homes. During 
each interview, I also made headnotes and jottings about the settings and other non-
verbal events, such as the interviewees’ body language or my own.   
I recorded each interview with my thumb-sized Sony MP3 player (NWZ-
B153F) and later transferred them into an encrypted folder on my personal laptop. I 
transcribed each interview onto Word with the aid of a transcription foot pedal. I 
transcribed my Malay interviews in the original language, capturing the particularities 
of different patois – in most cases, my Malaysian participants and I code-switched 
anyway – and only translated the excerpts I selected for analysis. The transcripts were 
stored in an encrypted folder and the audio recordings were deleted after transcription.  
I transcribed the interviews in three batches – after my first trip to Malaysia, 
after I finished interviewing in Britain, and after my second Malaysian trip. Along the 
way, I wrote in-process memos and eventually embarked on open and focused coding 
of each transcript, as I did with my fieldnotes (as explained in section 1.2).  
In essence, these interviews provided valuable opportunities for me to ask my 
participants about their inner states and views directly and at length. They allowed me 
to compare how they described their lives in their own words with my own 
observations. In the following sections, I discuss some key issues to take into account 
regarding my interview data.  
 
1.3.1 When interviewer becomes interviewee 
 
An early conversation with Rina, a Malaysian tudung-wearing lesbian in her 
early 30s, shows the fluidity of power dynamics in an interview. During a pre-interview 
dinner chat, she asked me to explain my research and I said one of the things I was 
interested in was how people defined and described themselves. I said I did not want to 
impose or suggest any categories for them, but wanted to hear what they would tell me.  
Rina asked, ‘So how do you define yourself?’*  
I paused and replied, ‘You know, this is so interesting. I’ve been the one asking 
this all this while, and I’ve always understood it can be a difficult question to answer, 
but now that you’re asking me I can feel first hand why it’s so difficult.’*  
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‘Why is it difficult?’ she asked*.  
‘Because I don’t know if what I think of myself matches what other people 
think,’ I said.*  
‘That’s how I feel, too!’ she said. ‘So what do you think of yourself?’*  
‘I think of myself as gay,’ I said.* 
‘That’s it? Just gay?’* 
‘Well, I always thought of myself as lembut (soft), too,’ I said.*  
‘But then what do other people think of you?’* 
‘Well, one of my friends the other day said I could be abang-abang.’* 
‘What is abang-abang?’ she asked.*  
‘Abang-abang can mean masculine gay man. But he says I could be abang-
abang jambu,’ I said. (Another interviewee defined ‘jambu’ as ‘twink’ or young, 
boyish gay man.)* 
‘Yes, I think that’s an accurate way to describe you. But let me know what you 
settle on, because I’m really curious, too,’ Rina said.*  
During this part of the exchange, Rina took the reins, becoming the interviewer 
and asking me to reflect on the very things I was asking her and my other participants 
to reflect on. By probing into my deeper thoughts, Rina reminded me not only to look 
out for the various subjective interpretations of the term ‘gay’ but also to be aware of 
how demanding my questions could potentially be. 
 
1.3.2 Influences of electronic recording 
 
Many interviewees appeared more conscious about speaking ‘properly’ when 
the conversation was being recorded, even though I often continued asking questions 
and jotting notes after turning off the recording device. In some instances, there was a 
distinct shift in tone even when participants appeared to be addressing the same topic 
during and after recording. For example Sulaiman, a gay Malaysian in his early 30s, 
agreed almost immediately to an interview but during our actual conversation, I noticed 
that his facial expressions and body language appeared slightly tense. This was 
especially clear when we discussed the issue of Azwan Ismail, the Malay man who 
came out as gay via a YouTube video in December 2010. This was part of an online 
video series produced by the Malaysian sexuality rights collective Seksualiti Merdeka 
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(literally ‘Independent Sexuality’)34, inspired by the American gay rights activist Dan 
Savage’s ‘It Gets Better’ (n.d.) campaign. In particular, Azwan’s public confession 
provoked intense backlash among state Islamic authorities and other Muslims which 
involved some violent online threats and condemnations.  
During the recorded portion of our interview, Sulaiman mildly critiqued the 
timing of Seksualiti Merdeka’s campaign and their lack of preparedness in dealing with 
the backlash. When I asked if he was angry about the campaign, he replied calmly, ‘No, 
I didn’t say anything – it’s just, I was worried that [the authorities] might screen my 
Facebook [account] or whatever, right? But then again, I don’t go to [gay] nightclubs 
and all, so it’s fine.’ Once the interview had ended and I had turned off my recorder, 
our informal chat returned to the topic of Seksualiti Merdeka. This time, Sulaiman 
rolled his eyes and sighed exasperatedly, saying: 
 
What I really hate is that after the incident with Azwan’s video, every 
day on TV there were all these [negative] statements about gays and 
so on. It didn’t affect me, because I could just turn off the TV. But 
think about the people in rural areas, every day they’d be watching 
news like that. Of course it would have an impact on them. It’s like, 
if the government came out with daily messages, don’t drink too 
much water, it’s bad for your health – surely people will start paying 
attention to how much water they drink, right?  Same thing applies 
here.*  
 
Sulaiman was aware that I was notating all my interactions and observations, 
but my use of a recording device clearly affected how he chose to express his 
opinions. A similar dynamic occurred with Ebry, a childhood friend in his mid-30s 
who lived outside Kuala Lumpur, in the far northwest of Malaysia. Ebry and I have 
always code switched between English and northern Malay patois, yet the minute I 
turned the recorder on he spoke in English only, which unsettled me slightly.  
After I turned the recorder off, signalling the end of the interview, Ebry 
reverted to code switching. I noted our post-interview exchange as follows: 
 
                                                          
34 Explained further in Chapter 3.3.2. 
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I ask, ‘Was the interview OK?’ He says, ‘Ya Allah, I had to control 
my emotions a little when you asked me those questions.’ I say, 
‘Really?’ (I thought he appeared calm and relaxed for the most part.) 
He said, ‘Yes, because I always think, how would I respond if a 
journalist were to ask me about Malaysian politics?’ I say, ‘But do 
you feel better after talking to me?’ He says, ‘Yes, I do, especially 
since I also have done my own research, watching YouTube videos 
and so on, even though I’m not as great as any professor.’*   
 
Ebry, like Sulaiman, was moderately critical of Seksualiti Merdeka during the 
interview but much more cutting after the recorder was switched off. This post-
interview candidness played out differently, however, on the issue of his religious 
observance. During the interview, Ebry said his decision to practise Islam more 
piously now made him calmer and less prone to gossiping or insulting others, 
something he reiterated after I stopped recording. Yet when I met him again two days 
later, he shared a hilarious account of a heated argument he recently had with a mutual 
gay Muslim friend, dripping with sarcasm and insult.  
 
I say, ‘You’re a funny one, Ebry. The other day you went on and on 
about how Islamic worship is wonderful, it calms us, makes us better 
people, and then today you say you’ve just had this bitch-fight with 
Mazlan.’ Ebry replies, ‘No, Shanon, you don’t understand – the 
more pious we are, the more Satan tests us.’ We both laugh.*  
 
Thus, although all my participants consented being interviewed and the 
majority appeared to relish the opportunity to share their experiences and opinions, 
they were also performing idealised aspects of themselves for my consumption. I 
suspect that some erred on the side of responding normatively when the recorder was 
on, especially regarding their feelings about Islam, while others might have opted for 
more provocative answers. I balanced these aspects with my own in-depth 
participation observation in various settings, as explained in section 1.2, to 




1.3.3 Confronting personal discomfort 
 
A minority of interviewees confessed feeling uncomfortable or unsettled by the 
interview experience. For example, Isma, a Malaysian lesbian in her early 30s, tried 
her best to answer all my questions, but smoked several cigarettes nervously during 
and after the interview. 
When the interview’s over, Isma says, ‘Oh, I’m stressed now.’ I say, 
‘Really? Why are you stressed?’ She says, ‘No, whenever anyone 
asks me about religion and sexuality I get stressed.  Even before this 
when I was interviewed by another researcher, she asked me all 
about Islam and homosexuality and I got quite stressed.’ I say, ‘But 
you know I just wanted to ask you your opinions, and I am totally 
not judgemental about anything you say.’ She says, ‘Yes I know, but 
it’s still stressful.’*   
 
In such situations, I felt guilty and protective of my interviewees – I did not 
want to simply feed off their insecurities for my own research goals. I tried to mitigate 
this by always thanking each interviewee via text message, phone call, email or 
Facebook, and catching up with them informally afterwards whenever possible. In one 
instance, I jointly interviewed a Malaysian lesbian couple in their early 30s, Ezan and 
Elly, who seemed wary initially but ended up saying they enjoyed the experience. 
They even asked if we could have a follow-up session for them to interview me. I 
agreed and got their permission to record this as well. Their desire to learn about me 
and my research was moving and humbling.  
Other participants were even more visibly enthused, for example Razak, a gay 
Malaysian in his late 20s who commended me after the interview:  
 
Razak tells me he doesn’t think I’ll have a problem with my 
interviews. He says, ‘You allow people to tell their stories and you 
don’t appear judgemental at all regarding their answers.’  I say one 
of my pengkid interviewees was ‘stressed’ when I asked her about 
Islam and sexuality, but I assured her that it was all confidential and 
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that I wouldn’t judge her at all. He says, ‘Yes, that’s what I feel 
about you.’* 
 
The majority of my interviewees responded similarly positively. In Britain, 
only one participant expressed anxiety via email months after our interview, but 
seemed reassured after I reiterated that I was bound by the ethical requirements spelt 
out in the consent form. These concerns, however, allowed me to infer the various 
potential anxieties that my participants might not have felt comfortable discussing 
with me. I suspect that in varying degrees, such anxieties also affected many of the 
more secretive Muslim sexual minorities that I did not have the chance to engage with.  
 
1.3.4 Physical, cultural and emotional locations 
 
The non-verbal and incidental details which I jotted down also taught me much 
more about my participants than the interview transcript alone. I first met Waqqas at 
an Imaan event in London in late 2010 but it was only in May 2013 that I travelled to 
Greater Manchester to visit him and some other Imaan members for my research. On 
the day of our interview, Waqqas was delivering a talk on behalf of Imaan in the 
seaside town of Blackpool in Lancashire and invited me to accompany him. After the 
talk, we strolled down the seaside and decided to carry out the interview over lunch at 
one of the restaurants there.  
A significant portion of the interview involved Waqqas explaining his 
upbringing to me, and what it was like growing up Muslim and gay in the north of 
England. I identified with much of his story, but not before asking many hesitant, 
clarifying questions about his school and home life. I was trying to visualise Waqqas’s 
world and imagine its similarities and differences with mine, but my mental picture 
remained a bit vague.  
After the interview, Waqqas and I walked to Pleasure Beach – an amusement 
park – because Ebrahim, based in London but originally from Lancashire, had earlier 
asked me to get him a souvenir from there. I promised I would but did not fully 




I ask Waqqas about Ebrahim’s request: ‘Am I supposed to get a stick 
or a rock?’ Waqqas laughs and says, ‘You don’t know what rock is?’ 
I say no. So when we get to the beach, I spot a stall selling really 
long sticks of rock candy – this is what Ebrahim requested, because 
the thought of rock brought back childhood memories for him.*  
 
Waqqas tells me this beach is filled with childhood memories for 
him, too. His extended family used to come here for picnics – the 
Pakistani mothers making tons of samosas beforehand and packing 
them in big plastic bags. Sometimes whole families would hire 
coaches to come to the beach – Pakistanis on their British beach 
holiday.  
 
Some other Imaan members told me they don’t like Blackpool 
because it’s too kitschy and Giles described it to me as 
predominantly working class. I could not develop a mental picture of 
the place from these verbal descriptions alone – being there with 
Waqqas changes this. And because of Waqqas’s story, I end up 
liking Blackpool, too. 
 
 In hindsight, I realise that being in Blackpool was the most memorable aspect 
of my interview with Waqqas. It allowed me a priceless glimpse into the making of 
British Asian Muslims, and specifically the making of Waqqas as a gay British 
Muslim.  
As a gay Muslim, I sometimes assumed that I had a straightforward ‘insider’s’ 
perspective of the lives of gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain. Being in Blackpool 
with Waqqas alerted me to the cultural distance between us, but our shared 
experiences in grappling with being gay and Muslim also helped reduce this distance. 
Waqqas’s Blackpool anecdote was also a reminder of the need for a balanced picture – 
the experiences of ethnic, religious, or sexual minorities, especially migrants, are not 
only punctuated by hardship and uncertainty, but also joy and celebration. As Waqqas 
and Ebrahim show, these experiences constitute what it means to be British for them, 




1.4 The mass media: context-setting and public debate 
 
 The mass media – print, broadcast, and digital – provide us with a ‘common 
stock’ of information and culture which influence our daily interactions as private 
citizens (Jacobs, 2005: 80). The news media, for example, are one of the most 
important sources of information that people use to talk about matters of common 
concern. This does not mean that there is only a one-way flow of information from 
media producers to a passive audience – the media cannot simply dictate what people 
think. Rather, the mass media provide people with information resources to construct 
their understandings and perspectives about the world. The mass media therefore 
shape the topics that people are most concerned about at any single moment in that 
most discussions about these issues would probably already be influenced by existing 
news coverage.  
 The mass media are therefore integral aspects in how we each understand 
religion and sexuality in contemporary society. The question is how and to what extent 
the mass media shape these understandings and experiences. These questions are 
especially important in relation to mass media constructions of Islam and 
homosexuality or LGBTQI issues, since these are politically charged topics and 
subject to intense public debate in various contexts. In many instances, Muslims and 
sexual minorities are likely to be misrepresented and have their concerns and 
experiences distorted in the mass media.  
 In this study, I analysed media coverage on Islam and sexuality as a 
supplementary method to set the context for my interviews and participant 
observation. This helped me develop a more informed picture of the similarities and 
differences in media constructions of Islam and sexuality in Britain and Malaysia and 
how these affected gay Muslims in each setting. To do this, I followed relevant 
coverage on Islam and/or sexual diversity in the main newspapers in both countries.  
Given the authoritarian government’s control over the media and the 
prevalence of ethnic and religious politics in Malaysia35, my concerns here were 
linguistic and political balance. I focused on The Star, the most widely circulated 
English daily, and Harian Metro (‘The Daily Metro’), the most widely circulated 
                                                          
35 Discussed further in Chapter 3.  
48 
 
Malay-language daily. These two dailies, however, are owned by the two biggest 
parties in the ruling coalition, so for further balance, I also followed the politically 
independent, most established, widely-read and multilingual news website, 
Malaysiakini.  
Within the wider context of the liberal democratic British state, I focused on 
political balance – I followed the right-leaning tabloid, The Daily Mail, and the left-
leaning broadsheet, The Guardian. For further balance, I also followed The Muslim 
News, a monthly newspaper catering particularly to British Muslim concerns.  
For both countries, I focused mainly on online content but would occasionally 
browse print editions to check for other relevant coverage, and used bibliographic 
software to compile relevant items. 
 Because of the degree of government control of news sources in Malaysia, I 
also made it a point to browse non-news Malay-language publications, focusing on 
Mastika (a popular, often sensationalist, monthly current affairs magazine), Mingguan 
Wanita (the Malaysian version of Women’s Weekly), and Mangga (a popular, glossy 
entertainment magazine). I did this to compare whether sexuality-related issues were 
represented in different or more nuanced ways in non-news publications aimed for a 
wide readership.  
 I also paid attention to relevant television or radio broadcasts and online 
discussions, and took account of theatre, cinema, and written fiction. This is because 
these media forms are just as powerful as the news media in shaping public 
conversations about issues such as religion, gender and sexuality (Jacobs, 2005: 82).  
 There are some important caveats in my comparison of media constructions of 
Islam and sexual diversity in Malaysia and Britain. Most clearly, there is overt state 
control and ownership of the mass media in Malaysia compared to Britain, along with 
an array of laws censoring public debate on Islam and sexuality. This does not mean 
that there were no misrepresentations and distortions about Islam and sexuality in the 
British media, since the political or ideological leanings of outlets here also influence 
their coverage of contentious issues.  
Furthermore, although Muslims and sexual minorities are liable to be 
misrepresented or sensationalised in the mass media, the type, extent, and 
consequences of these can differ. For one thing, sexual minorities are unlike ethnic 
and to some extent religious minorities because people who belong to them tend to 
arrive at their sexual identities later in life and may not be easily identifiable by others 
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(Gross, 1991: 20). Also, they remain particularly vulnerable to prevailing majoritarian 
attitudes about sexual norms and difference. Islam, on the other hand, is a minority 
religion in some countries and a majority religion in others. Thus, while distortions or 
misrepresentations of Islam might draw on a common stock of widespread 
assumptions, these are often expressed differently and for different purposes 
depending on particular national contexts. Where Muslims are a minority, certain 
media outlets might sensationalise aspects of Islam which run counter to the values or 
expectations of the majority. In Muslim-majority countries, however, state-endorsed 
versions of Islam are often used by political elites to justify the status quo and 
marginalise those construed as deviants.  
Thus, the lives of the people involved in this study have political dimensions 
that must be made explicit. Part of the reason why I was moved to pursue this study 
was precisely because of the intensity of public debates around Islam and sexual 
minorities. This is also partly why many participants were so eager to help me – they, 
too, needed to work out responses to these debates. Thus, the mass media were not 
only a source of data for me – their constructions of Islam and sexual diversity 




 Ethnographic research does not take place in a social and political vacuum. 
From the beginning of any ethnographic endeavour, the researcher is part of the power 
relations that shape the context under study. The ethnographer can avoid neither 
complex emotions nor inadvertently influencing, through his or her interactions, the 
relationships and events being studied.  
In my case, I could not avoid feeling impatient at the ways in which Islam and 
sexual minorities were misrepresented or stereotyped in Malaysia and Britain. As a 
gay Muslim, I felt hurt, angry, and sometimes even afraid when I encountered 
unjustifiably negative attitudes about Islam and homosexuality. What assurances can I 
provide my readers that these negative emotions have not led me to reproduce 
unhelpful stereotypes about those whom I perceived as stereotyping Islam and sexual 
minorities? Along similar lines, how can I demonstrate that the overall social and 
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political context has not led me either to reproduce damaging stereotypes about my 
participants or over-idealise them?  
 In this chapter, I have spelled out the various ways in which my participants 
and I experienced ‘shifting identities’ (Narayan, 1993: 682) in relation to Islam and 
sexuality. I have argued that ethnographic methods provided me with the necessary 
tools to investigate the making of gay Muslim identities empirically and reflect on the 
strengths and limitations of my approach. As the anthropologist Kirin Narayan (1993: 
682) puts it, ‘Knowledge, in this scheme, is not transcendental, but situated, 
negotiated, and part of an ongoing process.’  
This also means that for me and my participants being gay and Muslim is not a 
pre-existing or static fact of life. Rather, interest in studying gay Muslims or Muslim 
sexual minorities has emerged within a context of heightened image-construction of 
‘homosexuality in Islam’ by the mass media, activists, political ideologues and other 
social actors. Thus, while my research aims to challenge inaccurate or stigmatising 
views of people based on their religion and sexuality, I am also maintaining and 
continuing the construction of ‘gay Muslims’ or ‘homosexuality in Islam’ as objects of 
study and discussion, which may carry social and political consequences.     
 Amid these larger political concerns, my study aims to provide a 
comprehensive picture about the lived experiences of the people I encountered, 
including their prejudices and stereotypes about themselves or others. As Duneier 
(1994: 149) argues, ‘sociology cannot survive the burdens of political correctness’. 
Indeed, my participants in particular would not benefit from an inaccurate or sanitised 
portrayal. Similarly, the views of those who have prejudices against Muslims and/or 
sexual minorities in Malaysia and Britain deserve to be represented accurately and 
fairly. All these perspectives need to be contextualised as part of the social processes 
leading people to construct, maintain or challenge the boundaries that separate 
‘insiders’ from ‘outsiders’.  
In the next chapter, I review the academic literature that has contributed to the 
construction of ‘Islam’ and ‘homosexuality’ as inter-related objects of study. I also 
identify some of other relevant theoretical and conceptual frameworks that I draw upon 
and indicate the gaps in knowledge that I intend to fill.  
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Chapter 2: Studying Islam and homosexuality 
 
For many, the impression that Islam inherently opposes homosexuality is 
compounded by widespread stereotypes linking Muslims to terrorism and other anti-
modern religious expressions. In this climate, academic studies are vital to develop 
more nuanced and accurate public debates and policies on Islam, Muslims or religious 
diversity more broadly. This includes analysing the contingent nature of identity 
construction among misunderstood, stigmatised and often invisible minorities such as 
gay Muslims.  
In the first half of the chapter, I review relevant empirical literature on Muslim 
sexual minorities in various social contexts and point out the gaps that this study can 
help to fill. This review shows that the making of gay Muslim identities in these 
different contexts is importantly a story of the making of ‘outsider’ identities.  
The second half of the chapter thus opens with a review of core insights from 
sociological studies of deviance which can offer novel perspectives for the study of gay 
Muslims in Malaysia and Britain. This discussion builds upon my ‘social 
constructionist’ starting point in studying the making of gay Muslim identities (as 
mentioned in the Introduction to this work). I suggest that this theoretical approach can 
be strengthened by drawing upon relevant social scientific insights from studies of 
ethnicity, nationalism, social movements and globalisation. I show that these concepts 
help to identify and analyse some key factors that influence the perception of ‘gay 
Muslims’ as ‘outsiders’.  Finally, I discuss pertinent examples from non-Muslim 
contexts to highlight the crucial yet variable role of state regulation of ‘sexual 
outsiders’ beyond Muslim settings. 
 
2.1 Studies of ‘Islam’ and ‘homosexuality’ 
 
To understand the lived experiences of gay Muslims, it makes sense to 
investigate the specific content and contexts of Islamic rulings that forbid or condemn 
homosexuality. This section discusses growing scholarship – focusing on textual 
hermeneutics, historical analyses and contemporary empirical studies – complicating 
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widespread assumptions that Islam ‘inherently’ opposes homosexuality and 
demonstrating the intersections of the doctrinal, political and social dimensions.  
I begin with the work of Scott Kugle, the openly-gay Muslim American 
academic who has consistently published on Islam and sexual diversity since the early 
2000s. Kugle advocates an inclusive interpretation of Islam, but neither solely as an 
activist nor on the basis of doctrinal sources only. He conducts his own empirical 
research informed by interdisciplinary approaches on Islam, gender and sexuality. His 
Living Out Islam: Voices of Gay, Lesbian, and Transgender Muslims, for example, is 
based on interviews with fifteen activists in South Africa, the Netherlands, the UK, the 
US and Canada and engages critically with the work of the political scientist Joseph 
Massad36 and the anthropologists Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood (Kugle 2014:4–7).  
I focus my discussion on Kugle’s Homosexuality in Islam: Critical Reflections 
on Gay, Lesbian, and Transgender Muslims (2010) because it contains the bulk of his 
doctrinal reflections on the subject (Kugle 2014:8). After reviewing Kugle’s approach 
and the relevant critiques of it, I discuss clusters of scholarship on historical dimensions 
of sexual diversity in Muslim contexts, and contemporary case studies of gay Muslims 
– in the West, in Muslim-majority countries, and in Malaysia specifically. These 
clusters might not always overlap, but they still shape and contribute to a growing body 
of academic work on Islam and homosexuality as inter-related topics.  
 
2.1.1 A gay-friendly Islam?  
 
 Kugle is a convert to Islam and holds a doctorate in the History of Religions37 
with a concentration in Islamic Studies. He publishes as ‘Scott Kugle’ for works 
directly related to his academic speciality and as ‘Scott Siraj Al-Haqq Kugle’ for more 
explicitly activist scholarship to allow the public to distinguish between these two 
orientations38.  
 Kugle (2010:3) characterises his activist scholarship as ‘reformist’ or 
‘progressive’, aiming to re-assess Islamic doctrines and traditions on gender and 
                                                          
36 I discuss Massad’s work and the critiques of it, including by Kugle, in section 2.1.3.  
37 From his official page on the Emory University website (2010).  
38 Personal communication at the fifth Imaan national conference, London, 2012.  
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sexuality from the perspectives of contemporary lesbian, gay, and transgender 
Muslims39. In his earlier work, he credits the influence of Islamic feminist scholarship 
particularly on his thinking on the ‘ambiguities’ in Islamic teachings on gender and 
sexuality (Kugle 2003:194). Like these Islamic feminist scholars, Kugle is also not a 
traditionally trained alim (Islamic scholar) and his attempts to re-articulate Islamic 
knowledge challenge or even bypass conventional Islamic authority structures. He is an 
example of how non-institutional Muslim actors – or those aligned with institutions not 
deemed ‘traditionally’ Islamic – are contesting normative expressions and 
interpretations of Islam. 
 Kugle (2010:2) engages the full range of the Islamic religious tradition and its 
texts – ‘from Qur’an as scripture and hadith40 as oral teachings to fiqh41 as legal rulings 
and the shari‘a as a rhetoric of orthodoxy’. He argues that, historically, Islam did not 
address ‘homosexuality’ as this is a modern term conceived out of particular cultural 
and political circumstances. Instead, Muslims interpreted the Quran and hadith to 
formulate historically and culturally specific rulings on various sex acts and gender 
expressions (Kugle 2003:194).  
 The foundation of Kugle’s (2010: 50) approach lies in his assertion that there is 
no Quranic term corresponding with ‘homosexual’ or ‘homosexuality’. Instead, the 
Quran contains particular vignettes about the people of the prophet Lot42 – in parallel 
with the Biblical Lot – who were punished for particular transgressions43. He 
demonstrates that medieval Quranic commentators saw the transgressions of Lot’s tribe 
as not simply about anal sex between men, but involving inter-related acts including 
                                                          
39 Kugle (2010:10)  has not yet addressed the issue of bisexuality, arguing that while he finds ‘oblique 
but potent scriptural reference to gay men, lesbian women, and transgender persons’ in the Quran, there 
is no equivalent ‘positive acknowledgement of bisexual people’. He further acknowledges that his 
‘essentialist’ approach – i.e. that sexual orientation is inherent and innate, and not primarily the product 
of social influences – presents him with specific analytical problems regarding bisexuality (Kugle 
2010:9–12). I touch on the relevant aspects of essentialist and constructionist perspectives on sexuality in 
section 2.2.1.  
40 Written accounts of exemplary conduct and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. 
41 Islamic jurisprudence.  
42 Also styled ‘Lut’ by other Muslim writers – here, I follow Kugle’s style.  
43 Amreen Jamal (2001: 69) has also conducted detailed semantic analysis of these narratives, concluding 
that ‘same-sex abominations are not an exceptional category of sin’ and ‘Islam is not clear about the 
position of same-sex sexuality’.  
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hostility towards strangers and disobeying Lot’s authority44. Some interpreters, 
however, concluded that Lot’s people were punished primarily because they condoned 
anal sex between men and coined the term ‘liwat’ to label this act.  
Kugle (2010:50–53) shows that these interpretations did not go unchallenged – 
for example, the prominent eleventh century Andalusian jurist Ibn Hazm argued that 
Lot’s tribe was subjected to divine punishment but not for liwat. Kugle (2010:56) also 
suggests that the Quranic narratives condemn the non-consensual nature of these sexual 
acts but are silent on loving and mutually consensual same-sex relationships. He argues 
that these particular verses should be read alongside other Quranic passages enjoining 
diversity which are just as contextual and ambiguously worded, but could be interpreted 
as encompassing sexual diversity45 (Kugle, 2010:66-68).  
Furthermore, according to Kugle (2010:86-87), the bulk of the anti-liwat hadith 
reports were most likely fabricated by politically-motivated groups or factions in the 
early history of Islam. They proliferated alongside numerous other politically-
motivated fabrications, leading early Muslims to develop a methodology of verifying 
hadith which actually rejected many anti-liwat reports that remain popular today46 
(Kugle, 2010: 98-110).   
Kugle contends that selective interpretations of the Quran and hadith had a 
knock-on effect on fiqh rulings regarding sexual behaviour. For example, the major 
Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence which emerged in the eighth century CE all 
forbade liwat, but with divergent reasons resulting in different legal consequences. The 
Hanafis did not consider anal sex between men analogous to zina (heterosexual 
fornication), but the Shafiis, Hanbalis and Malikis considered liwat and zina equivalent 
(Kugle 2010:157–159). Therefore, the Hanafis still regarded liwat as a crime but 
                                                          
44 Different aspects of the Lot narrative appear briefly in several sections, e.g. Quran 7:80-83, 27:55, 
26:165-166, 11:78, and 15:68-71 (Kugle, 2010: 54-56), for example: ‘We sent Lot and he said to his 
people, “How can you practise this outrage? No other people has done so before. You lust after men 
rather than women! You transgress all bounds! The only response his people gave was to say [to one 
another], “Drive them out of your town! These men want to keep themselves chaste!” We saved him and 
his kinsfolk – apart from his wife who stayed behind – and We showered upon [the rest of] them a rain 
[of destruction]. See the fate of the evildoers.’ (Quran, 7:80-83).  
45 For example: ‘Another of His signs is the creation of the heavens and earth, and the diversity of your 
languages and colours. There truly are signs in this for those who know.’ (Quran, 30: 22)  
46 See his detailed analysis of variations of this hadith: ‘The Prophet said, “Whoever you find doing the 
act of the people of Lot, kill the one doing and the one done-to”’ (Kugle, 2010: 102).  
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recommended a limited number of lashes while the other schools advocated capital 
punishment. The Zahiris were the most lenient in suggesting the punishment for liwat, 
recommending no more than ten lashes (Kugle 2010:161).  
 Kugle highlights these ambiguities in traditional Islamic rulings47 to 
demonstrate that there was no historical consensus about the nature of liwat, which also 
informed disagreements about how to punish it or why. He juxtaposes this insight with 
historical evidence that Muslim jurists constantly reformed and reinterpreted fiqh 
rulings in light of changing social and political circumstances. In fact, for many 
medieval Muslim jurists, the shariah was meant to protect individual liberties and the 
public interest, which depended on specific circumstances. For Kugle (2010:172–174), 
this evidence from Islamic history justifies a need to rethink Islamic teachings on 
sexuality based on fresh understandings of shariah.   
 While Kugle’s writings on Islam and sexual diversity are explicitly activist-
oriented, they are still based on valid empirical data, especially his historical sources. 
His analysis and combination of activism and scholarship have been dismissed by 
ideologically-driven secular gay activists and anti-gay Muslims as ‘wishful thinking’ or 
a futile exercise in identifying ‘scriptural loopholes’ (Kelly, 2010:248). These 
criticisms are largely driven by assumptions that Islam is static and reject the possibility 
that it can or does change through social action.  
On more substantive grounds, Christopher Grant Kelly (2010:259, 264) argues 
that Kugle’s essentialist framing of sexuality is too narrowly informed by the US 
context, where minority rights are often conceived through ‘ethnic’ models. Against 
this background, asserting that gays, lesbians, and transgenders are ‘born this way’ 
results in a particular politics of difference that might resonate in the North American 
context, but possibly not in others. Kelly suggests that this essentialism also frames 
Kugle’s interpretation of Quranic passages on diversity, which similarly might not hold 
in contexts where sexual preferences are simply not considered an aspect of human 
diversity.  
Kecia Ali, a Muslim feminist scholar focusing on Islamic jurisprudence and 
women in early and modern Islam, critiques Kugle’s stretching of the concept of 
consent in his revisionist interpretation of the Lot narrative. Ali agrees that the Quran 
                                                          
47 Kugle (2010: 24) addresses similar problems in traditional Islamic rulings on sex between women, 
which I do not reproduce in the interest of space and because contemporary condemnations of Iiwat 
often extend to female homosexuality, too.  
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condemns Lot’s tribe for larger ethical crimes, not just sex between men, but disagrees 
with Kugle’s contention that this condemnation was partly for non-consensual anal sex. 
According to Ali (2012:83), ‘elsewhere in the Quranic text, as with female captives [,] 
consent is not always relevant to the formation of licit sexual relationships’. For Ali 
(2012:xvii), contemporary analyses of sexual relations in Islam still need to address 
whether the institution of slavery directly or indirectly influenced rulings on gender 
relations.  
Like Kugle, Ali is also a convert48 writing from activist and scholarly angles and 
advocating an overhaul of basic Islamic doctrines on sex and marriage. She, too, argues 
that this is possible since classical Islamic rulings were developed through constant 
interpretation of sacred texts according to specific social contexts, i.e. Islamic law has 
always been dynamically reinterpreted and revised (Ali 2012:154).  
Kugle’s and Ali’s analytical flexibility could be related to their position as 
converts who embraced Islam by choice within the context of a liberal democracy. As 
Wim Peumans and Christiane Stallaert (2012:118) suggest, Muslim converts in the 
West feel more able to engage critically with ‘the hegemonic interpretations and 
meanings of religious texts’ compared to those born and socialised into Muslim 
families and communities or in Muslim countries with state-controlled expressions of 
Islam. Furthermore, many of these converts might also emphasise Islam’s teachings on 
diversity ‘to negotiate and even justify their conversion to their Muslim and non-
Muslim peers’ (2012: 117).  
Additionally, Mahruq Fatima Khan (2010:362) observes that in the North 
American context, white gay or lesbian converts are more able to ‘reconcile their 
sexuality with their faith […] compared to their Muslim-born counterparts who were 
raised within immigrant households and religious communities’. In other words, 
Kugle’s background was probably not shaped by the same factors influencing the 
upbringing of individuals born into Muslim families or communities. Also, he would 
probably not face the same pressures to defend his ethnic and religious identity the way 
many Muslims in the West of immigrant backgrounds might feel compelled to. These 
                                                          
48 In a 2005 interview, Ali explained her conversion as follows: ‘The reality is that I don't think I have 
made my peace with everything contained in Islamic religious texts and certainly not with everything 
that transpires in Muslim communities. But the rest of the world isn't a feminist paradise either, and I 
found the overall core of Islam, the overall core of the Quran's message to be so convincingly egalitarian 
that the rest seemed to be in some sense just details.’ (Tippett, 2005) 
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factors could have contributed to his flexibility in critique-ing Islam and dominant 
attitudes towards it in the West. 
Kugle’s and Ali’s works have yet to gain vast influence among the majority of 
Muslims but are still part of a growing body of ‘contemporary texts and forms of 
cultural production’ contesting ‘monolithic’ conceptions of Islamic attitudes towards 
homosexuality (Shannahan 2012:108). These include the works of Amina Wadud, the 
African-American woman convert and scholar of Islam, who identifies as an ‘ally’ of 
LGBTQI Muslims (2012:111). Therefore, while scholars such as Kugle, Ali and 
Wadud are not Islamic authority figures in the traditional sense, they do inform 
contemporary contestations of Islam in various social and political contexts.  
More crucially, their ideas – although marginal – are informed by and contribute 
to a wider cross-pollination of research on Islam, gender, and sexuality. This study 
partly tests whether these ideas directly or indirectly influence the self-understandings 
of gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain.  
 
2.1.2 Translating the past 
 
From a historical perspective, there is abundant evidence of intimate acts and 
relationships between partners of the same sex which were tolerated in Muslim 
societies, despite fiqh rulings against liwat and other unlawful sexual conduct. Still, it is 
problematic to refer to them using contemporary concepts – such as ‘homosexual’, 
‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘transgender’, or even ‘queer’ – unquestioningly because these might 
obscure or misrepresent historical lived realities.  
Historical research is therefore necessary because the claims that 
‘homosexuality’ was always condemned in Islam – or not inherently condemned, as 
argued by Kugle and Ali – often utilise history to construct or contest religious 
‘authenticity’. It is also risky because when we translate the past through contemporary 
filters we might lose or distort crucial nuances and insights. For these reasons, we 
would encounter similar problems employing the category of ‘Islam’ uncritically, as 
though its meaning has remained static or uncontested amongst Muslims throughout 
history.   
Bearing this in mind, I now review arguments for the usefulness of the term 
‘homosexuality’, focusing on Stephen Murray’s and Will Roscoe’s perspectives, and 
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that it is a misnomer, focusing on Khaled El-Rouayheb’s approach. I then discuss some 
other approaches on historical sexual diversity in Muslim contexts, especially Afsaneh 
Najmabadi’s on Qajar Iran and Michael Peletz’s on early modern Southeast Asia.  
In their edited collection, Islamic Homosexualities, Roscoe and Murray 
(1997:6–7) posit that there have been two main expressions, or models, of ‘modern 
homosexualities’ in the history of the West. According to their ‘gender variant’ model, 
‘to be homosexual was to be a non-masculine man or a non-feminine woman’, while 
their ‘sexed being’ model applies to those attracted to the same anatomical sex, 
regardless of their degree of masculinity or femininity. They argue that historically, 
homosexuality in Muslim societies consisted mainly of the gender-variant type while 
the sexed-being type was largely non-existent. Murray (1997:32) further contends that 
these gender-variant ‘homosexual roles […] were and are lexicalised and written about’ 
in various genres of literature in predominantly Muslim societies. Both writers contend 
that these labels for homosexual roles and the social networks that emerged around 
them demonstrate the existence of homosexual identities in pre-modern Muslim 
societies (Roscoe and Murray: 1997:5).  
Roscoe and Murray (1997:4) see the development of ‘Islamic homosexualities’ 
as a challenge to what they refer to as the ‘Eurocentrism’ of social constructionist 
conceptions of ‘homosexuality’. According to them, this Eurocentrism underlies 
notions that contemporary expressions of homosexuality are ‘incomparable to any other 
pattern’ throughout history or in non-Western societies. They argue instead that there 
are shared characteristics in past and present expressions of homosexuality, and 
between Muslim and European societies (Roscoe and Murray 1997:5–7).  
The counter-argument is that the concept of ‘homosexuality’ simply did not 
exist among pre-modern and early modern Muslims in the Middle East (El-Rouayheb 
2009:1). According to El-Rouayheb (2009:3), Islamic legal rulings from the early 
sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries only prohibited sexual intercourse between 
men, while non-sexual expressions of same-sex affection were allowed to unfold 
publicly and privately. Still, there was a hierarchy of prohibitions of sexual relations 
between men – the most severe being on penetrative anal sex (liwat), while ‘kissing, 
fondling, and non-anal intercourse’ were considered ‘less serious transgressions’ (El-
Rouayheb 2009:6). There were also grey areas, such as whether legal and moral 
sanctions should apply against men who gazed at and wrote love poetry to youths (El-
Rouayheb 2009:111–118, 147). Muslim jurists even debated about whether liwat, like 
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wine, would be permissible in the hereafter even though it was forbidden in the earthly 
realm (El-Rouayheb 2009:130–134).  
According to El-Rouayheb (2009:137), the definition of liwat during this period 
was much narrower than current definitions of homosexuality, and qualitatively 
different. Therefore, there was no contradiction between the co-existence of visible, 
public same-sex affections and stringent punishments for liwat. In their analysis of pre- 
and early modern expressions of sexuality in Europe, Kim Phillips and Barry Reay 
(2011:5) concur with El-Rouayheb, arguing that the terms ‘heterosexuality’ and 
‘homosexuality’ inadequately and inaccurately explain ‘pre-modern desires’. They 
suggest that El-Rouayheb’s description of same-sex affections among the Ottomans 
could also apply to other pre-modern societies such as the ancient Greeks who 
commended ‘chaste infatuation with youthful, male beauty’ but not ‘baser, carnal 
longing’. Murray (1997:14) maintains, however, that ‘homosexuality’ did exist in 
Muslim contexts but was tolerated because of ‘a common Islamic ethos of avoidance in 
acknowledging sex and sexualities’, or ‘the will not to know’. 
Despite these disagreements on the applicability of the term ‘homosexuality’, 
El-Rouayheb (2009:1–2) and Murray (1997:15) share the view that after the advent of 
modernity, Europeans were shocked and even scandalised by overt and affectionate 
behaviour between males in Muslim societies. Many European travellers and writers 
interpreted these displays as examples of sexual immorality characteristic of Muslims. 
According to El-Rouayheb (2009:9), this encounter with ‘European Victorian morality’ 
is what led Muslims themselves to equate liwat with ‘homosexuality’.  
Focusing on Iran, Najmabadi (2008:288–289) also argues that political elites 
and reformists began equating local same-sex practices with European conceptions of 
‘homosexuality’ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, alongside other 
‘culture wars’ about gender and sexuality. She argues that when Europeans associated 
the country with ‘homosocial and homosexual practices, Iranian modernists came to 
identify with and simultaneously disavow this abject position’ and all traces of 
‘homoerotic desire had to be covered’ (Najmabadi 2005:4; 2008:286). 
Najmabadi does not insist that pre-modern Iranian same-sex practices were 
‘homosexual’ or claim that there is a clear dividing line between sexual acts and 
identities. Instead, she proposes that we should look for various ‘directions of meaning’ 
to ‘illuminate the complex node at which notions of gender and sexuality are worked 
out’ (Najmabadi 2008:282). For example, she examines how perceptions of the amrad 
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(an attractive youth pursued by adult males), shifted from pre-modern to early modern 
Iran.  In pre-modern understandings, the amrad was not yet fully male but also not 
classifiable as female. This intermediateness meant that the amrad was initially seen as 
a legitimate object of adult male desire, but gradually turned into an object of ridicule at 
the turn of the twentieth century (Najmabadi 2008:283).  
According to Najmabadi (2005:8), conceptions of gender and sexuality were 
and still are central to modernist and counter-modernist rhetorics in the Middle East but 
were not solely imposed by European powers. In the case of Iran, she argues that for 
centuries, there was ‘cultural hybridisation’ with Europe, the Ottoman Empire, and the 
Indian Subcontinent (Najmabadi 2005:5). Iranians, Europeans, and people from other 
cultures influenced and mutually informed each other’s sensibilities about gender, 
sexuality and other matters. Thus, even though European powers used their military and 
economic influence to colonise many non-European societies, ‘cultural traffic’ more 
likely flowed on a ‘two-way street’. The issue now is how the regulation of gender and 
sexuality becomes tied to nationalism, or the rhetoric of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ in 
contemporary constructions of the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’.  
Amid these and other concerns, the edited collection Islamicate Sexualities: 
Translations across Temporal Geographies of Desire by Najmabadi and Kathryn 
Babayan (2008:xiii) aims to historicise constructions of gender and sexuality in 
‘Islamicate cultures’ to avoid a ‘monolithic rendering of Islamicate sexual practices and 
discourses throughout the ages’. In one case study, Frederic Lagrange (2008:165, 169) 
details how Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi, a prominent tenth-century writer, insults the vizier 
’Ibn Abbad for ‘his avowed love for boys as an active partner and the secret reality of 
his character, which is passively effeminate and obsessed by obscenity’. Lagrange 
(2008:189) argues against simplifying these as attacks on ‘homosexuality,’ but suggests 
that the ‘insult may accidentally construct what it denounces’ and build on conceptions 
of ‘homosexuality’ more broadly and indirectly. According to Dina Al-Kassim 
(2008:307), this example also suggests that in the ‘East’, as with the ‘West’, particular 
sexual norms influenced constructions of sexual ‘types’, complicating the idea of a total 
‘East/West divide’ in sexual epistemologies.   
 Non-Middle Eastern Muslim societies also had particular sexual hierarchies that 
partially accommodated same-sex relations in the pre-modern era. Michael Peletz 
(2011:661) argues that the ‘gender pluralism’ of early modern Muslim Southeast Asia – 
alongside less hierarchical relations between men and women compared to 
61 
 
neighbouring regions – informed some degree of tolerance for homosexual 
relationships. However, they needed to comply with a ‘heterogender’ pattern, e.g. 
where feminised men formed relationships with masculine men (Peletz 2011:665), 
resembling Roscoe and Murray’s concept of ‘gender-variant’ homosexualities.  
For example, the bissu – feminised male ritual specialists among the Bugis of 
Sulawesi, Indonesia – could marry and live with masculine men amid wider acceptance 
of ‘gender pluralism’. They ‘identified with a highly syncretic variant of Islam 
influenced both by Hindu-Buddhist beliefs and practices, and by the Austronesian ritual 
cults that predated Indic and Islamic influences in the region’ (Peletz 2011:664). From 
the seventeenth century, they were discredited, expelled and even executed by rising 
Islamic movements driven by overly anti-feudal and legalistic interpretations of 
syariah. As court specialists, the bissu also suffered under Dutch colonialists who 
sought to subjugate the sovereign kingdoms of Sulawesi in the early twentieth century 
(Peletz 2011:669). 
 Like the amrad in Iran, the bissu went from enjoying relative acceptance to 
becoming targets of punishment and humiliation but, like Najmabadi, Peletz does not 
attribute this solely to European influence. Although Peletz does not use Najmabadi’s 
term ‘cultural hybridisation’, he shows how the interwoven cultural legacies in 
Southeast Asia have shaped diverse or even contradictory expressions of gender and 
sexuality. In Malaysia, for example, while the sodomy charges against former Deputy 
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim originated from British colonial legislation, until the 
1960s the State of Kelantan had villages inhabited by male couples known to practice 
‘same-sex erotics’ (Peletz 2011:671, 673). These villages were patronised and 
supported by the Sultan, while the main breadwinners among these same-sex couples 
were ‘transvestite dancers of a Thai-origin dramatic genre known as mak yong’.  
While the desires of many gay Muslims for their identities and relationships to 
be recognised and even sanctioned within Islam might be unprecedented, they are also 
shaped by these multiple historical factors – Western/colonial, national, and local. My 
comparison of gay Muslims in ‘Western’ Britain and ‘non-Western’ Malaysia partly 
expands upon these insights on cross-cultural influences in Muslim societies and how 





2.1.3 Gay Muslims in the West – identities in flux 
 
 From here, I review research on contemporary contexts of Islam and sexual 
diversity published after 200149, dividing my discussion between the ‘West’, ‘non-
West’, and Malaysia for clarity and convenience. However, I am aware of edited or 
single-authored volumes examining case studies from both Western and non-Western, 
or Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority, contexts (e.g. Habib 2010; Yip and Nynas 
2012; Rahman 2014). Also, while there have been notable works on Muslim sexual 
minorities by journalists and other non-academics since 2001 (e.g. Bradley 2010; 
Sharma 2007; Whitaker 2011), I focus solely on academic publications.  
In reviewing studies on the West, I focus on two recurring themes – the 
possibilities for reconciling being gay and Muslim, and the perceived gap between 
Muslim and Western attitudes on sexual freedom. These themes often accompany 
wider public debates in which the claims of religious and sexual freedoms are often 
construed as incompatible.  
Studies investigating the experience of being gay and Muslim often explore 
their strategies to renegotiate their religious beliefs and/or advocate more inclusive 
interpretations of Islam. In North America, Omar Minwalla, Simon Rosser, Jamie 
Feldman and Christine Varga (2005:123) propose that the identity journeys of gay 
Muslim men consist of three inter-related dimensions: ‘religious identity’, ‘ethno-
cultural identity’ and ‘colour identity’. Their insights were based on participant 
observation and in-depth interviews at two annual conferences for LGBTQ Muslims 
organised by the Al-Fatiha Foundation – one in the US in 2002 and the other in Canada 
in 2003 (Minwalla et al, 2005: 116).  
Minwalla et al observed that their participants constantly tried to balance and 
renegotiate their belief in Allah, family and community connections, and belonging 
within the predominantly white and non-Muslim gay scene. These strategies were made 
more complicated by the growing climate of suspicion towards Muslims in the US after 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, including within the gay community. In a 
more recent ethnographic study of American Muslims, Mahruq Fatima Khan 
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(2010:356) identified similar conditions and argues that ‘queer Muslims’ employ some 
common narratives to reconcile their religious and sexual identities: ‘God Is Merciful’; 
‘This Is Just Who I Am;’ and ‘It's Not Just Islam’ (that contains anti-homosexual 
interpretations).  
In Britain, Andrew Yip’s (2005:272, 283–285) work – based on qualitative 
interviews with 20 female and 22 male LGB Muslim participants in 2001 and 2002 – 
also highlighted similar issues, suggesting that Muslim LGB identities are more 
politicised than other LGB identities in a post-9/11 context. Against this backdrop, Yip 
(2005: 278) argues that LGB Muslims, like LGB Christians, engage in ‘religious 
individualism’, i.e. ‘a religiosity that prioritises the authority of the self over that of the 
institution’. However, Yip (2005: 285) also proposes that their ‘individualisation’ of 
Islam is constrained by ‘religious and sociocultural roles and obligations’ related to 
their immigrant and ethnic minority backgrounds.  
Matthew Wood (2010:278)  criticises Yip’s argument that ‘self-authority’ has 
the upper hand over institutional authority, which implies that ‘the self is always 
distinguishable from, and exists in opposition to, that which lies outside it’. Rather, 
Wood (2010:279) argues that Yip’s findings are evidence of the ‘relative 
formativeness’ of religious institutions – instead of a dichotomy between self and 
institution, there are ‘diverse social authorities’ individuals engage with when 
constructing their identities. 
More recently, Yip, in a mixed-method study with Sarah-Jane Page (2013:5), 
has focused on the ‘lived experiences’ of religion, gender and sexuality among young 
British adults. Based on online questionnaires, face-to-face interviews, and video 
diaries from participants of various religious backgrounds, Yip and Page (2013:160) 
propose that ‘the best way to understand how individual religious actors make sense of 
the connection between their religious faith and sexuality is through the lens of 
embodiment; in other words, how religious faith and sexuality mutually inform the 
construction of bodily subjectivities and practices’.  
Through his interviews with British Muslim gay men and gay Iranians in 
Britain, however, Rusi Jaspal (2012:84; 2014:56) argues that conflicts between religion 
and sexuality resulted primarily in ‘anxiety’, ‘suicidal thoughts’, ‘shame’, ‘guilt’ and 
‘fear’. This theme of conflict also emerges strongly in Asifa Siraj’s (2006:204) 
ethnographic research on British LGBT Muslims. In her more recent work, Siraj 
(2014:205–206) focuses on Scottish Muslim lesbians and argues that they try ‘to 
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reconcile conflicting parts of their lives through fundamentally shifting their 
interpretation and understanding of Islam’. This sense of belonging to Islam is 
strengthened by their involvement in Imaan, which lets them develop networks and 
friendships with other Muslim lesbians.  
In earlier publications, however, Siraj’s (2006:204) own assumption was that 
the Quran unambiguously condemns homosexuality, with no room for interpretive 
flexibility. She has since acknowledged that her personal identity as a hijab-wearing, 
heterosexual Muslim woman produced a certain amount of ‘heterosexist bias’ in her 
earlier work, for example, when she found herself ‘judging’ her participants’ ‘beliefs 
regarding the accommodation of homosexuality in Islam’ which subsequently affected 
her interpretation of the data (Siraj 2012:65). Siraj’s reflections illustrate the specific 
ways that scholarship on being gay and Muslim can be shaped by the researcher’s own 
unexamined assumptions. They provide constructive and complementary insights for 
this study which I, as a gay Muslim researcher, began with my own personal 
assumptions about Islam and sexuality (discussed in Chapter 1).  
Gay Muslims in the West do not only grapple with dominant Muslim attitudes 
on homosexuality, but also widespread stereotypes about Islam and Muslims. In her 
study of queer Muslim women in North America, Ayisha Al-Sayyad (2010:377) argues 
that ‘Orientalist’ stereotypes portraying ‘Islam and homosexuality as incompatible’ did 
not prevent her participants from feeling ‘comfortable being Muslim and queer’. 
Furthermore, she suggests that ‘diasporic Muslims or Arabs’ internalise the idea that 
Islam and Arab culture oppose homosexuality amid the ‘unbearable pressure to 
assimilate in North America’ (Al-Sayyad 2010:381).  
Through his qualitative study of twelve queer Muslims in Australia, Ibrahim 
Abraham (2009:84–85) similarly argues that public debates overwhelmingly equate 
Islam with terrorism while Australian Muslim communities largely disapprove of 
homosexuality. Against this backdrop, ‘[for] conservative Muslims a queer Muslim 
becomes the unviable subject, [and] for some in the queer community, a queer Muslim 
is an impossible—or at least dubious—subject’ (Abraham 2009:88–89). Abraham 
argues that gay Muslims therefore try to ‘compartmentalise’ their religious and sexual 
identities, downplaying being gay or Muslim depending on how unsafe or 
uncomfortable they feel.  
Other studies examine this dimension without focusing directly on the 
experiences of Muslim sexual minorities, but on controversies or polarised debates on 
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Islam and gay rights. In the Netherlands, for example, Paul Mepschen, Jan Duyvendak 
and Evelien Tonkens (2010:965) argue that discussions on multiculturalism often 
involve and indicate negative attitudes towards Islam, which is widely perceived as 
hostile to gay rights. Numerous Dutch polls reflect this, with a high proportion feeling 
that the integration of Muslims into Dutch society has failed or that Muslim immigrants 
threaten national identity.  
Sindre Bangstad (2011:5–7) contends that in Norway similar assumptions led to 
a moral panic about Islam in early 2010, when several newspapers reported that 
immigrant Muslims had formed ‘morality squads’ harassing gay men and women not 
wearing hijab. These reactions overlooked class dynamics, i.e. the deprived nature of 
the Oslo neighbourhood where these events occurred, escalating instead into a 
nationwide panic portraying Muslim immigrants as illiberal and European Norwegians 
as liberal.   
Joseph Massad argues that such Western assumptions about Islam’s ‘inherent’ 
homophobia are informed by a legacy of Eurocentric, Orientalist distortions and 
misrepresentations of Middle Eastern peoples, including their sexual attitudes. Massad 
(2007:37) contends that on the eve of modernity, Europeans predominantly considered 
Muslims inferior for being too permissive about homosexuality, whereas current 
Western public opinion considers Islam too repressive. This argument resonates with 
El-Rouayheb’s regarding the impacts of ‘European Victorian morality’ on Middle 
Eastern societies after the advent of the modern era (discussed in Chapter 2.1.2 above). 
However, Massad goes further in claiming that this is what drives Western gay rights 
groups – which he labels the ‘Gay International’ – to prioritise the ‘rescuing’ of Arab, 
and by extension Muslim, homosexuals. According to Massad (2007: 173-174), Arabs 
who identify as ‘gay’ are a Westernised, ‘minuscule minority among […] men who 
engage in same-sex relations and who do not identify as “gay” nor express a need for 
gay politics’. Massad characterises gay Arabs and/or Muslims as ‘native informants’ 
and ‘diaspora members’ of the Gay International, engaged in ‘a simple political 
struggle that divides the world into those who support and those who oppose “gay 
rights”’. 
Massad’s dualistic conception of the ‘Gay International’ has sparked off 
numerous criticisms, but I focus for now on those addressing the experiences of gay 
Muslims in the West. While agreeing with Massad’s critique of ‘Orientalism’, Al-
Sayyad (2010:384) disagrees that ‘Western liberationists can create homosexuals in the 
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Arab world’, arguing that her participants had ‘the agency and determinism to choose 
their own identifications’. Similarly, Momin Rahman (2014:5) partially agrees that 
‘current forms of queer political strategies contain a Western bias’, but criticises 
Massad’s monolithic portrayal of the ‘Gay International’. Instead, Rahman argues that 
Massad runs the ‘danger of reinstating a Eurocentric view of modernity by ceding the 
construction and regulation of homosexuality as exclusively “Western”.’ Also, Kugle 
(2014:4–5) frames his latest work as a documentation of ‘the lives of the kinds of 
activists whom Massad denounces’ and who complicate the notion of a ‘Manichean 
struggle between postcolonial Arabs and the Western imperium driven by American 
military interests and UN declarations’.  
The issues raised in these growing studies of gay/queer Muslims in the West 
also emerged in my research, in which I came across similar themes of identity conflict 
and stereotypes about Islam. In fact, Massad’s arguments and the critiques of his work 
also informed my choice to compare the experiences of Malaysian and British gay 
Muslims. As I show in upcoming chapters, my findings complicate the notion that gay 
Muslims are either collaborators or victims of ‘Orientalist’ and/or Islamist politics.    
 
2.1.4 Sexual minorities in Muslim-majority countries 
 
Research on sexual minorities in Muslim-majority countries also addresses how 
they construct sexual and religious identities when their individual dispositions conflict 
with wider social and cultural expectations. Some of these studies also explicitly 
respond to Massad’s critiques by problematising notions of ‘foreign’ or ‘indigenous’ 
sexual categories. For example, in the introduction to her two-volume edited collection, 
Islam and Homosexuality, Samar Habib (2010:xix) argues that Massad unwittingly 
‘oppresses’ the work of grassroots LGBTQI groups in the Arab world, ‘reducing these 
initiatives, in an academic discourse, to nothing more than agents of 
Western/imperialist sabotage of Arab nations’. Bearing these debates in mind, I focus 
on works discussing the impacts of dominant expressions of Islam on the experiences 
of Muslim sexual minorities.  
 Focusing on Indonesia, Tom Boellstorff  (2005a:5) argues that many sexual 
minorities there increasingly adopt Western-derived labels and render them partially 
meaningful within the national context, e.g. ‘Indonesianising’ gay and lesbian into 
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‘gay’ and ‘lesbi’. According to Boellstorff (2005a: 35), although historically there were 
‘indigenous’ labels to describe gender and sexual minorities, there is no ‘clear temporal 
trajectory connecting gay and lesbi with “indigenous” homosexualities’. Through his 
ethnographic research, Boellstorff (2005a:154–155) contends that actually, the state 
itself has unwittingly fostered the emergence of gay and lesbi identities through its own 
modernising policies. In contrast with Massad’s claim that non-Europeans who adopt 
gay identities are Westernised elites, Boellstorff (2005a:118–119) suggests that gay and 
lesbi identities are more likely linked with the rise of a new middle class.  
 Boellstoff also argues that gay and lesbi Muslims construct their identities 
without necessarily feeling the need to reconcile with Islam’s position on 
homosexuality. Some of his gay Muslim interlocutors did not see being gay as sinful, 
while others saw it as a minor sin easily forgiven by God (Boellstorff 2005a:183). Their 
individual understandings of Islam enabled them to ‘inhabit’ the apparent 
‘incommensurability’ between being gay or lesbi and Muslim (Boellstorff 2005b:575).  
 Boellstorff (2005a:8) further argues that ‘gay’ and ‘lesbi’ do not necessarily 
mean the same thing in Indonesia as ‘gay’ and ‘lesbian’ would in the English-speaking 
West, where their meanings are neither settled nor monolithic anyway. In Indonesia, 
however, the gap is considerably larger in the translation of ‘gay’ and ‘lesbian’ into 
locally intelligible terms, yet this does not make gay and lesbi incoherent ‘subject 
positions’ (Boellstorff, 2005a:5–7). Rather, it means that in a globalised world, 
translation is always necessary at different levels and necessarily incomplete.  
 Through his ethnographic research in northern Nigeria, Rudolf Gaudio (2009:9–
10) argues that it is mostly the educated urbanites who adopt the term ‘gay’ which, in 
that context, might partially support the notion of it being a ‘Western’ and ‘elite’ 
identity. The predominant categories used by most Hausa speakers to describe 
homosexual dispositions are ‘yan daudu (feminine men who have sex with other men) 
and masu harka (masculine men who have sex with other men, including ‘yan daudu). 
Neither is accurately translatable as ‘gay’, and Gaudio argues that to translate ‘yan 
daudu as ‘transgender’ instead is equally problematic.  
Despite not adopting a ‘Westernised’ identity themselves, ‘yan daudu have 
become increasingly vilified and targeted by state authorities and the mass media which 
portray them as transmitters of Western decadence and threats to Nigerian society. 
Gaudio (2009:124) maintains, however, that ‘yan daudu enjoyed a relatively high 
degree of tolerance in Hausa Muslim society before the turn of the twentieth century, 
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after which they began being viewed increasingly negatively. This transformation 
resembles Najmabadi’s account of changing perceptions of the amrad and Peletz’s of 
the bissu. Gaudio (2009:191) further contends that the increasing persecution of 
Nigerian sexual minorities at the turn of the twenty-first century was ‘incited not by 
Northern Nigerian activists affiliated with a supposed “Gay International”, nor by an 
intrinsic cultural or religious hostility towards homosexuality, but by a nationalistic 
desire to defend the North’s reputation against negative sexual stereotypes’.  
On another level, Gaudio’s findings are similar to Boellstorff’s in that although 
‘yan daudu perceive their religious identities and sexual dispositions as incompatible, 
this does not cause them too much internal conflict. Gaudio (2009:141) argues that 
‘although ‘yan daudu understand that their unconventional gender and sexual practices 
make them imperfect Muslims, they also know that such imperfection exists throughout 
the Muslim world, even among those who revile them’. Armed with these 
understandings,‘yan daudu often use confrontational humour to poke fun at themselves 
and hostile social manifestations of Islam while remaining ‘devoted to their Islamic 
faith’ on a personal level (Gaudio, 2009:117–122, 141).  
Gaudio and Boellstorff show how Muslim sexual minorities negotiate their lives 
in the face of increasing hostilities towards sexual diversity, especially in light of the 
inter-related transformations of the nation-state and expressions of Islam. In her more 
recent work on Iran, Najmabadi explores how transsexual advocacy there actively 
contributes to the transformation of the state. She argues that bio-medical, psychology, 
and fiqh practitioners have mutually influenced each other’s discourses to construct 
‘transsexual’ as a distinct category of persons in post-revolutionary Iran (Najmabadi 
2011:540). But despite the initially negative loadings attached to this category, Iranian 
transsexual activists are gradually carving out spaces of acceptance by engaging 
critically with these overlapping discourses. According to Najmabadi (2011:534), 
‘trans-activism — far from being a state-driven and controlled project that at most has 
produced some policy benefits for transsexual persons — is part of the ongoing and 
volatile process of state-formation itself’. What is usually glossed as ‘the state’ is 
therefore constantly being shaped and re-shaped, fractured and re-fractured, ordered 
and re-ordered by different actors.  
Najmabadi’s approach addresses the problems of translation (as articulated by 
Boellstorff and Gaudio) and supposedly ‘foreign’ impositions (as articulated by 
Massad) of sexual categories. In particular, she shows how Western bio-medical and 
69 
 
psychological categories relating to gender and sexuality entered Iranian discourses and 
now circulate within the Iranian Islamic bureaucracy. Najmabadi (2011:550) calls for a 
deeper analysis of what such ‘borrowing, appropriation, and embracing means for the 
importers’ rather than with the ‘origin of the import’. Her insights suggest that people 
mix foreign and local or old and new terms – encountering various opportunities and 
risks along the way – to make sense of their lives amid changing circumstances.  
For my purposes, these works on sexual minorities in Muslim-majority contexts 
are important for their deconstruction of the concepts of ‘Islam’, ‘sexuality’ and ‘the 
state’, and their focus beyond the Arabic-speaking Middle East. They contain useful 
and relevant analytical leads for exploring the experiences of Muslim sexual minorities 
in Malaysia, which has already been initiated by some Malaysian researchers.  
 
2.1.5 Muslim sexual minorities in Malaysia 
 
In Malaysia, rising controversies and moral panics involving Muslim sexual 
minorities need to be understood within a context of overt state regulation of Islam 
which, according to tan beng hui (2012:8) ‘upholds heterosexuality as the sole 
legitimate form of sexuality’. Through her qualitative study of the Islamic bureaucracy, 
however, tan (2012:53) also found that state and non-state actors advocating more 
stringent applications of Islamic law consist of competing ideological strands and 
political loyalties. State-led efforts to systematise and expand the application of Islamic 
laws might appear uniform but are fraught with factional rivalries, involving contests 
for financial and human resources and political leverage. Within this context, state-
crafted syariah laws criminalising sexual offences – including homosexuality and 
transgenderism – are applied only arbitrarily and selectively, making the state’s ‘anti-
gay bark […] worse than its bite’ (tan 2012:148, 158). Still, this creates a climate of 
fear amongst Muslim sexual minorities, especially when pro-syariah ideologues also 
drive sensationalist and negative mass media coverage of those labelled as sexual 
‘deviants’.  
Based on her ethnographic research, Yuenmei Wong argues that some 
Malaysian Muslim pengkids (masculine women erotically attracted to feminine women) 
remain largely indifferent or defiant towards increasing stigmatisation. Wong 
(2012:443) highlights a 2008 fatwa (official Islamic ruling) from the Islamic authorities 
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forbidding pengkid or ‘tomboy’ identities, which resulted in much negative media 
coverage. In the midst of this controversy, some pengkids agreed to be interviewed in 
the mass media and openly challenged the fatwa. Wong (2012:439, 444) suggests that 
pengkids are increasingly subject to religious and political scrutiny because pengkid 
identity is modern – it may be an appropriation of the English term ‘punk kids’ – and 
becoming more visible. 
On the other hand, Zainon Shamsudin and Kamila Ghazali (2011:287) argue 
that the young gay Muslim men they interviewed did not want to challenge the state or 
religious authorities, and instead expressed contentment at being gay in Malaysia. They 
did not report feeling persecuted or discriminated against by state authorities, but 
confessed feeling conflicted about being gay and Muslim and aspired to get married 
eventually for ‘a better future’ (Zainon and Kamila 2011:298). These findings resemble 
the observations by Boellstorff and Gaudio about how gay and lesbi Indonesians or 
Nigerian ‘yan daudu did not necessarily try to ‘reconcile’ their sexual and religious 
identities.  
Still, Joseph Goh (2014:609) argues, the challenge posed by gay Malaysian 
Muslims towards ‘Malaysian institutional Islam’ need not be overtly confrontational – 
they influence their surroundings simply by being gay and Muslim. Goh analyses the 
same-sex civil partnership of Ariff Alfian Rosli, a Malaysian Muslim man, in Ireland in 
late 2011 which triggered the fury of Muslim pressure groups, especially after leaked 
pictures of the ceremony showed him in traditional Malay costume. According to Goh 
(2014:606), ‘[t]hese images manifested the unthinkable coalition of a Malaysian Malay-
Muslim masculine identity with non-heteronormative sexuality within a matrimonial 
framework’. Yet, in response to the controversy, Ariff Alfian did not deny that he was 
in a civil partnership, asserting instead that he was Muslim and nothing could shake his 
faith. Goh (2014:607) suggests that Ariff Alfian’s response might have been possible 
because the anti-homosexual sentiments of state Islamic authorities are rarely matched 
by the everyday attitudes of many Malaysians, Muslim or non-Muslim.  
 These studies of Muslim sexual minorities in Malaysia show that even amid 
strong state impositions of anti-homosexual interpretations of Islam, Muslim sexual 
minorities might still have nuanced connections with Islam on an individual level. 
These studies also demonstrate that many supposedly ‘Islamic’ positions are shaped by 
particular political exigencies. They highlight the timeliness and value of comparing the 




2.2 Beyond gay Muslims – potential analytical directions 
The issues at stake in the lived experiences of gay Muslims are not confined to 
debates about ‘homosexuality’ and ‘Islam’. They touch on broader concerns regarding 
the roles of religion and sexuality in the construction of stigmatised, ‘outsider’ 
identities, especially the impacts of majority-minority dynamics on groups that society 
embraces or excludes. Besides, majorities, minorities, and the myriad expressions of 
religion and sexuality in society are not pre-ordained or ‘naturally’-occurring either – 
they emerge out of particular social and cultural conditions.  
In this half of the chapter, I argue for the usefulness of drawing upon 
sociological studies of deviance to make sense of the experiences of gay Muslims in 
Malaysia and Britain. They offer a rich legacy for analyses of social constructions of 
‘deviant’ or ‘outsider’ identities. I propose that these perspectives can be sharpened by 
relevant social scientific insights on ethnicity, nationalism, social movements, and 
globalisation – factors which often complicate or overlap with contestations of religion 
and sexuality. Finally, I explore some examples from non-Muslim contexts to highlight 
the similarities and differences between these and the Muslim examples already 
discussed.  
 
2.2.1 Social constructions of deviance 
 
Although there were growing debates and controversies about sex and gender in 
the nineteenth century, ‘classical sociologists’ were silent on these issues – perhaps 
because of ‘their privileged gender and sexual social positions’ as men (Seidman 
1997:4). In the 1950s and 1960s, however, shifting sociological perspectives on the 
phenomenon of ‘deviance’ provided a new framework for studying homosexuality 
(Seidman 1997:7). These studies argued that ‘deviance’ was not inherent, but rather 
that conformity to and defiance of socially-produced norms was what produced 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in society.  
Among the pioneers of this approach was Robert Merton (1968:188–189), who 
proposed that there are different degrees to which ‘institutional controls’ regulate 
culturally defined values and goals. According to Merton, when people who adhere to 
‘institutionally prescribed conduct’ fail to meet culturally defined goals, the 
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discontinuity between institutionalised norms and cultural expectations leads them to 
explore ‘deviant’ alternatives. Merton (1968:194) proposed five ‘modes of individual 
adaptation’, depending on the degree of continuity between their responses to 
institutional control and cultural expectations – conformity, innovation, ritualism, 
retreatism and rebellion.   
Merton’s insights paved the way for subsequent sociological studies of 
deviance, which incorporated homosexuality as part of larger analyses of deviant 
behaviour (e.g. Becker 1991:30, 34–35, 36–38, 167–168) and stigmatised identities 
(e.g. Goffman 1990:53, 71, 102, 109). These studies rarely mentioned religion, 
however, and focused on overall societal reactions towards the perceived disreputability 
of various ‘deviants’, including drug users, single mothers and homosexuals.  
Particularly relevant here is Howard Becker’s theory of moral enterprise in his 
study of societal reactions towards marijuana users and jazz musicians in the 1950s US. 
Becker (1991:147) coined the term ‘moral entrepreneurs’ to describe the organised 
collectives that define and police acceptable behaviours and moral boundaries in 
society. This analysis formed part of Becker’s larger approach – now often referred to 
as ‘labelling theory’ – in his Outsiders: Sociological Studies of Deviance. According to 
this theory, those who label particular behaviours ‘deviant’ are the ones who create and 
maintain social and moral norms, and go on to designate ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in 
society. Often, the outsiders end up adopting these labels for themselves and 
exaggerating their ‘deviance’ in response.  
Among ‘moral entrepreneurs’, Becker (1991:147-148, 155-156) distinguished 
between ‘rule creators’ and ‘rule enforcers’. Rule creators are ‘crusaders’ who 
‘typically believe their mission is a holy one’, identifying moral problems and seeking 
to eliminate them by pressuring the authorities into action. When they manage to 
convince a significant section of society that there is a problem, the authorities often 
create a new moral rule or law to be implemented by ‘rule enforcers’ consisting mainly 
of state-salaried bureaucrats.  
There is no clear dividing line between rule creators and enforcers, however – 
some enforcers might have the same moral zeal as rule creators. Still, enforcers are 
constrained by institutional limitations – e.g. finite human and financial resources 
making it difficult to juggle different moral portfolios – leading to arbitrary and 
selective enforcement (Becker 1991:161). The resulting inconsistencies or 
inefficiencies often lead to tensions between rule creators and rule enforcers, and can 
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inspire rule creators to refresh or expand their campaigns (Becker 1991:162). This, in 
turn, can incite sporadic, zealous bouts of enforcement by rule enforcers to maintain 
favourable public opinion.  
Becker’s insights formed the backdrop for emerging sociological studies of 
homosexuality in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In his ethnographic study, Laud 
Humphreys focused on men who engaged in anonymous homosexual sex in public 
restrooms in the US but did not necessarily identify as ‘gay’ or ‘bisexual’. Within this 
context of intense social stigma against homosexuality and state repression, Humphreys 
(1970:143–146) found that many of these men were married, outwardly ‘respectable’, 
and even displayed conservative attitudes on issues such as civil rights and the Vietnam 
War. According to Humphreys (1970:135), this conservatism functioned as pre-emptive 
defence – what he termed ‘the breastplate of righteousness’ (originally from Ephesians 
6:14) – to conceal their ‘deviance’ from potentially damaging public scrutiny. 
Humphreys’ and Becker’s insights remain especially relevant for the Malaysian 
context, where state and non-state actors do label sexual minorities deviant and call for 
them to be punished or rehabilitated.  
Taking a different direction, Mary McIntosh critiqued the ethnocentrism of 
some gay liberation activists in the 1960s who assumed that homosexuality was 
universal or inherent. According to McIntosh (1968:184–186), notions of 
‘homosexuality’ have changed over time and differ depending on the social context, 
and the ‘institutionalised homosexual role’ is a consequence of social control. She 
proposed that society creates and vilifies this ‘homosexual role’ to maintain the purity 
of the rest of its members, the same way punishing criminals is meant to keep the 
majority law-abiding. This societal regulation contributes to the formation of a bounded 
homosexual identity or ‘condition’, which many ‘homosexuals themselves welcome 
and support’, since this ‘removes the element of anxious choice’ of staying ‘deviant’ or 
becoming ‘normal’.  
The above perspectives contrast with essentialist or biologically deterministic 
notions that ‘sexual desires are not a “preference” but a fixed “orientation”’ (Epstein 
1987:133). According to Steve Epstein (1987:134), ‘hard’ anti-homosexual essentialists 
might condemn homosexuality as an ‘incurable illness’ where ‘hard’ constructionists 
regard it as a sin open to rehabilitation. At the same time, pro-homosexual essentialists 
might defend the view that some people are born gay, while for constructionists 
sexuality is fluid and sexual expressions should spring from free individual choice. In 
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practise, the condemnation or advocacy of sexual diversity often mixes essentialist and 
constructionist views.  
Sometimes, these perspectives can drive the emergence of moral panics, 
specifically where religion and sexuality are concerned. The puzzle is why some kinds 
of social deviance trigger moral panics and not others, or as Stanley Cohen (2011:8) 
puts it, why ‘the deviant label […] does not always “take”’. According to Cohen 
(2011:14), moral panics emerge from a combination of ‘structural conduciveness’ 
(social conditions under which particular types of collective behaviour become seen as 
legitimate) and ‘structural strain’ (e.g. ‘economic deprivation’ or ‘population invasion’ 
creating openings for ‘race riots, sects, panics’, etc.). Cohen (2011:219) suggests that 
prolonged strain can produce a ‘boundary crisis,’ i.e. ‘a period in which a group’s 
uncertainty about itself is resolved in ritualistic confrontations between the deviant and 
the community’s official agents’. During such boundary crises, the escalation of social 
control often triggers more extreme expressions of deviance, or ‘deviance 
amplification’ (Cohen 2011:226).  
Particular concerns about homosexuality and Islam have provided the basis for 
potential moral panics in different contexts, directly or indirectly. In the aftermath of 
the 7 July 2005 bombings in London, for example, British policy-makers and media 
reports zoomed in on disaffected young Muslim men as particularly prone to 
radicalisation, following a pattern of what Stuart Croft (2012:2) calls the 
‘securitization’ of Muslims in the West. In Malaysia, homosexuality is overwhelmingly 
portrayed as deviant in mass media reports and the pronouncements of political and 
religious leaders. Nevertheless, these portrayals of homosexuality or certain types of 
Muslims as deviant do not always produce sustained moral panics, even though they 
have the potential to do so. Understanding these variable dynamics can provide more 
nuanced insights into how gay Muslims experience and negotiate polarised social 
conditions.  
In this study, I draw upon these sociological approaches on deviance for 
different levels of analysis. In Chapter 4, I examine individual pathways into 
identifying as gay and Muslim by looking at Merton’s theory of ‘role adjustments’. In 
Chapter 6, I engage with theories of ‘moral enterprise’, particularly as developed by 
Becker and Cohen, to explore how gay Muslims respond individually and collectively 
to wider regulations of their religious and sexual identities. 
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Sociological studies of homosexuality have nevertheless been critiqued by some 
queer theorists for being too narrow and rigid, and reifying Eurocentric conceptions of 
homosexuality (e.g. see Ferguson 2005:53, 61-62). These criticisms, however, refer to 
particular sociological views and approaches and cannot devalue the entire sociological 
endeavour in the study of sexuality. Moreover, they can only enhance it, considering 
that queer theorists are also concerned with fluid aspects of meaning-making and 
socially constructed expressions of gender and sexuality (e.g. see Butler 1993:21; 
2008:34; Jagose 2003:3; Seidman 1997:11, 17). Furthermore, prominent queer theorists 
such as Judith Butler are also influenced by the work of Michel Foucault (Green 2010: 
319; Mills 2003:253), who argued that modern conceptions of sexuality are constrained 
by state regulation (e.g. see Foucault 1990:143; 1991:95; 2003:243–245, 252, 257).   
These shared analytical perspectives have resulted in a growing cross-
fertilisation of approaches between queer theory and the social sciences in studies of 
religion and sexuality (e.g. see Goh 2014:601; Hamzic 2012:25; Ioannides 2014:128; 
Rahman 2010:949–951; Taylor and Snowdon 2014:1). As Claudia Schippert (2011: 82) 
points out, these rejoinders from queer theorists can encourage scholars of religion to 
analyse inter-related aspects of religion and sexuality more critically. Bearing in mind 
these developments in relation to queer theory, this study takes a different approach by 
exploring the analytical possibilities offered by sociological studies of deviance.  
 
2.2.2 Related factors – ethnicity, nationalism, and social movements 
In Malaysia and Britain, unstated assumptions about the links between religion 
and ethnicity often inform everyday interactions and wider debates on national identity. 
In Malaysia, being Muslim correlates with being part of the ethnic majority, while in 
Britain, Muslims consist mostly of ethnic minorities of immigrant backgrounds. 
Studying the construction of gay Muslim identities in both countries can therefore 
benefit from analyses of ethnic and national identity as inter-related factors informing 
wider attitudes about particular groups of ‘outsiders’.  
The term ‘identity’, however, can be used in various and often contradictory 
ways. As Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2006:31) point out, ‘identity’, as 
with terms such as ‘race’, ‘nation’, and ‘ethnicity’, ‘is both a category of practice and a 
category of analysis’ and so its usage requires analytical precision and clarity. Brubaker 
and Cooper (2006:41–48) recommend three analytical clusters to help sharpen 
investigations of identity construction – categorisations by self and other (including the 
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state as a ‘powerful identifier’); fluid self-understandings motivating action in 
particular circumstances; and whether there is an ‘emotionally laden sense of belonging 
to a distinctive, bounded group’. These clusters can help clarify the connections 
between the individual’s identity construction and his or her surrounding social 
networks, institutional authorities, and religious or non-religious meaning systems.  
This framework assumes that there is no causal or inevitable relationship 
between religion, ethnicity and national identity, but that they can share overlapping 
meanings, symbols and rhetorics. In particular, Brubaker (2012:3) proposes four 
approaches to analyse the relationship between religion and nationalism – treating 
‘religion and nationalism, along with ethnicity and race’, as ‘analogous phenomena’; 
specifying the ways that ‘religion helps explain things about nationalism’; considering 
‘religion as part of nationalism’, paying attention to specific ‘modes of interpenetration 
and intertwining’; and positing a ‘distinctively religious form of nationalism’.  
For my purposes, these approaches can help distinguish between ‘the various 
ways in which Islam has accommodated itself to – and been inflected by – differing 
national and state contexts’ (Brubaker 2012:12). For instance, on a broader level, Islam 
can be conceived as being mobilised by certain actors as a ‘politicised ethnicity’ 
(Brubaker 2012:5) in Malaysia and Britain. In Malaysia, however, Muslim identity 
coincides with Malay ethnicity such that Islam becomes ‘so deeply imbricated or 
intertwined with nationalism as to be part of the phenomenon’ (Brubaker 2012:9). 
Here, advocates of Malay privilege often use Islamic rhetoric to defend the traditional 
family against ‘economic and cultural forces that weaken its authority or socializing 
power’ by upholding ‘traditional gendered divisions of labour’ and promoting ‘a 
restrictive regulation of sexuality’ (Brubaker 2012:13). On the other hand, Muslim 
activists in Britain have mobilised around religious identity to negotiate claims for 
‘economic resources, political representation, symbolic recognition [and] cultural 
reproduction’ (Brubaker 2012:5), for instance, in campaigns for ‘official statistics on 
British Muslims and to introduce a religious question in the 2001 census’ (Hussain and 
Sherif 2014:415). According to Serena Hussain and Jamil Sherif (2014:420), ‘Muslim 
campaigners hoped [for] more extensive government engagement’ and were supported 
by census findings ‘that Muslims were […] the most socioeconomically disadvantaged’ 
among the religious populations surveyed. In Brubaker’s terms, the use of Islam by 
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British Muslim activists is analogous to but not the equivalent of nationalism, whereas 
in Malaysia, Islam becomes part of Malay nationalism50.  
On the relationship between sexuality and nationalism, George Moss (1985:3) 
points out that modern European nationalisms emerged in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries alongside marked changes in notions of moral respectability. 
Mosse (1985:4) argues that nationalism and this new ‘ideal of respectability’ in sex and 
morality was also tied to the rise of the middle class. The national stereotypes in 
Germany and England during the Napoleonic wars therefore conceived ‘manliness’ as a 
combination of courage, manners and moral uprightness (Mosse 1985:13). By 
extension, conceptions of the ‘inferior’ races often portrayed them as transgressing 
ideals of respectability – ‘[the] black was thought feckless, while the Jew was without a 
soul’ (Mosse 1985:134). In some rhetoric, Jewish men were portrayed as inferior for 
behaving like women, illustrating how conceptions of sexual purity, race and 
homosexuality intertwined in these forms of nationalism (Mosse 1985:17, 140).  
Nira Yuval-Davis (1997:1, 23) therefore argues that constructions of nationhood 
also incorporate specific notions of manhood and womanhood, in which ‘[g]ender 
symbols’ play a particularly significant role. Along similar lines, Joane Nagel (2003:1) 
coins the phrase ‘ethnosexual frontiers’ to describe convergences in the construction of 
ethnic and sexual boundaries.  
To analyse how the boundaries of religion, ethnicity, sexuality and the nation 
can overlap, it is helpful to refer to Brubaker’s (2006:10) concept of ‘ethno-political 
entrepreneurs’ which shares similarities in approach with Becker’s ‘moral 
entrepreneurs’ (discussed in section 2.2.1). The entrepreneurial analogy suggests 
deliberate yet adaptable actions by particular groups to promote what they construe as 
their core interests and business, in this case ethnicity and morality, possibly infused 
with religious references.  
These interests can overlap when, as Mary Douglas (2002:4) suggests, 
particular notions of sexual ‘pollutions’ become ‘analogies for expressing a general 
view of the social order’. Bodily symbolism – particularly the rhetoric of sexual 
morality – is therefore a powerful framework for maintaining or defending notions of 
ethnic, religious and national cohesion and unity.   
                                                          
50 I explain the context of Islam in Britain and Malaysia in more detail in Chapter 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.  
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In relation to this, Jasbir Puar (2007: xxiv) argues that post-9/11 the issue of gay 
rights is increasingly manipulated by political ideologues in the US to justify military 
intervention in unstable and/or hostile Muslim-led regimes. She argues that where 
homosexuals were once cast by the political establishment as potential threats to the 
nation (e.g. as Communist collaborators in the 1950s and carriers of HIV/AIDS in the 
1980s), they are now held up as beneficiaries of liberalising laws and attitudes on gay 
rights (Puar, 2007: 4). According to her, this produces ‘homonationalism’ – shared 
attitudes by the political establishment and some gay activists that sexual minorities 
owe their rights to liberal, democratic Western states and should therefore support 
military campaigns against so-called terrorist ‘Others’, especially in the Muslim world 
(Puar, 2007: 51).  
Puar (2007: 81, 92) contends that such attitudes are also informed by enduring 
stereotypes about supposedly exceptional sexual repression in Muslim societies. This 
puts greater pressure on people who are queer and Muslim to justify and explain their 
identities and escape scapegoating in the US (Puar, 2007: 169). She is therefore also 
interested in the strategies that ‘queer Muslims and queer Arabs’ use in such 
ideologically charged circumstances (Puar, 2007: xiii).    
Although Puar raises important questions about how nationalist rhetoric might 
influence expressions of religious and sexual identity, her analysis ends up focusing 
more heavily on the producers of ‘homonationalism’ than on the responses of ‘queer 
Muslims’. My study can be regarded as an attempt to balance her analysis by looking at 
how gay Muslims respond to real or perceived attitudes that could be construed as 
‘homonationalist’ in two different social contexts. For my purposes, it is therefore 
useful to analyse religion as a ‘cultural resource susceptible to many different uses’ not 
just within formal groupings, but also among configurations of ‘people, material 
resources, ideas and feelings […] outside the framework of conventional religious 
activities’ (Beckford, 2001:232; 2000:169). This approach can illuminate the everyday 
responses of gay Muslims towards surrounding sentiments and attitudes on ethnicity, 
religion, and the nation. 
This line of questioning can be further pursued by focusing on organised social 
movements and, as Beckford (2001:244) suggests, approaching religious and social 
movements as analogous phenomena. Along similar lines, Mayer Zald and John 
McCarthy (1998:34) propose that social movement theory can provide a helpful basis 
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to investigate religious trends, for instance, sect formation or transformations in 
religious doctrines and expressions.    
These analytical nuances on social and religious movements also apply to 
LGBT groupings, especially in light of the significant advances in sexuality rights in 
some countries and backlash in others. David Paternotte, Manon Tremblay, and Carol 
Johnson (2011:5–7) propose that studies of lesbian and gay movements should look at 
their complex relationships with the state – which should be conceived as a 
multidimensional concept – and beyond the state. As with religious movements, LGBT 
movements also include less formal, diverse and fluid mobilisations which are shaped 
by and respond to particular cultural and social conditions.  
These perspectives on ethnicity, the nation and social movements supplement 
my engagement with sociological approaches on deviance in my ensuing data chapters. 
In Chapter 4, my analysis of the ‘role adaptations’ (Merton, 1968: 672) of gay Muslims 
is framed with Douglas’s (2002: 44) conceptualisation of ‘dirt’ as ‘matter out of place’. 
This is in line with my exploration of how gay Muslims in Britain and Malaysia try to 
bridge seemingly incompatible identities, with ethnicity often a crucial but unstated 
factor in their strategies. In Chapter 5, I zoom in on how gay Muslims engage 
specifically with Islam, drawing upon Brubaker and Cooper’s formulation of ‘identity’ 
as an analytical concept and Beckford’s suggestion to view religion as a ‘cultural 
resource’. Finally, my discussion on ‘moral enterprise’ in Chapter 6 also critically 
engages with Brubaker’s conception of ‘ethno-political enterprise’ and Puar’s of 
‘homonationalism’. Together, these threads provide another layer of insights into the 
intersections of sexuality, religion, ethnicity and nationalism in the construction of 
‘outsider’ identities.  
 
2.2.3 Globalisation, religion and sexuality 
 
According to Roland Robertson (1989:14), globalisation involves the 
‘particularisation of universalism (what is taken to be applicable to all is increasingly 
interpreted as referring to a particular global all) and the universalisation of 
particularism’. For my purposes, taking globalisation into account can help 
contextualise the universals and particulars in the construction of gay Muslim identities 
within and beyond specific national contexts.  
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According to Dennis Altman (2001a:91), sexuality is ‘an important arena for the 
production of modernity, with “gay” and “lesbian” identities acting as markers for 
modernity’ interpreted differently in different contexts. He suggests that we can see 
‘continuity’ between ‘precolonial forms of homosexual desire and its contemporary 
emergence’, or a ‘rupture’ with tradition in the emergence of gay and lesbian identities 
in ‘Delhi, Lima or Jakarta’ (Altman, 2001a:88). Either way, Altman (2001a:100) argues 
that homosexuality is now an ‘obvious measure of globalisation [since] the 
transformation of local regimes of sexuality and gender is often most apparent in the 
emergence of new sorts of apparently “gay” and “lesbian”, even “queer”, identities’. He 
sees the parameters of globalisation as being led or determined by the West, but is also 
‘sceptical of sharp divides between Western and non-Western experiences of sexuality’ 
(Altman 2001b:36).  
Altman’s framing of globalisation provides a wider view of changing attitudes 
about sexuality beyond specific national contexts, but is problematic when it comes to 
analysing religious attitudes. According to him, the anti-homosexual positions of the 
Moral Majority and the Taliban exemplify religion’s ‘retreat from and attack upon 
secularism and rationality’ (Altman 2001a:139). Altman (2001a: 155) also conflates the 
activities of ‘Mormon missionaries’ with the growth of a ‘powerful evangelical 
Protestantism’ as typical examples of the globalisation of religious homophobia. He 
concludes that appeals to ‘religion, tradition, and culture are often no more than 
justifications to perpetuate the worst kinds of institutionalised subordination and 
barbarism’ (Altman 2001a:164). In effect, he uses the terms ‘religion, tradition, and 
culture’ to generalise broadly about anti-gay ideologies, without analysing other aspects 
of their socially-contingent manifestations.  
In contrast, James Beckford (2000:165) argues that religion, with its fluidity and 
diversity, is actually an important factor ‘shaping the various processes leading to 
globalisation’. According to Beckford (2000:173), this is because many religions 
conceive of their reach and relevance in global terms, but attempt to elaborate this 
according to their own particularistic frameworks. He further suggests that there is an 
‘elective affinity’ between the concerns of some religious movements and global 
themes such as the promotion of peace, basic human rights and care for the 
environment. From his perspective, ‘religious movements, representing dissatisfaction 
with conventional religion and commitment to change, tend to be in the forefront of 
positive and negative responses to globalisation’ (Beckford 2000:183). With this 
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approach, we can analyse how sexual minorities can be targeted by and contribute to 
various movements associated with religion and/or sexuality within and beyond 
specific country contexts.  
 More specifically, Olivier Roy (2004:ix) argues that globalisation is not 
transforming Islam per se, but the various ways Muslims are relating to Islam by 
enabling new challenges to notions of legitimate Islamic authority. Roy (2004:5) 
contends that this involves the ‘de-territorialisation of Islam (namely the growing 
number of Muslims living in Western non-Muslim countries)’ which partly enables ‘the 
spread of specific forms of religiosity, from radical neo-fundamentalism to a renewal of 
spirituality or an insistence on Islam as a system of values and ethics’. Roy (2004:19, 
30) further suggests that this partly contributes to some Muslims imagining themselves 
and reacting as a ‘minority’, even in Muslim-majority countries, including asserting 
their Islamic identities more explicitly and individualistically. Although speculative in 
parts, Roy’s approach has the potential to contextualise the emergence of modern gay 
Muslim identities as an example of the impacts of globalisation on Muslim self-
expressions.  
 My study of gay Muslims in Britain and Malaysia requires an awareness of 
transnational dimensions of religion and sexuality. In this respect, I find Beckford’s 
recommendation to analyse religion as a ‘cultural resource’ particularly useful to 
account for local and transnational nuances in the construction of gay Muslim 
identities. I pursue this line of inquiry in Chapter 5, which investigates if a collective 
‘gay Muslim’ identity is being expressed within, between and beyond Britain and 
Malaysia.  
 
2.2.4 State regulation of sexuality and religion beyond Muslim contexts 
 
Homosexual behaviours and identities remain stigmatised and/or criminalised in 
various non-Muslim countries, too, with sentiments about homosexuality being a 
‘foreign contamination’ often spearheaded by religious groups or authorities. Studies on 
sexual diversity within non-Muslim contexts can shed light on key factors beyond 
Islam in the shaping of state policies and public attitudes towards homosexuality and 
how sexual minorities respond. In this section, I discuss examples from Russia and the 
Caribbean, contrasting these with developments in the US and Britain, to illustrate 
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possible permutations of state-religion-sexuality relations and their impacts on the lived 
experiences of sexual minorities.  
I begin by drawing upon the insight from Nicholas Jay Demerath III (2007:386) 
that state ‘constitutions themselves are an unreliable guide to actual relations between 
religion and power, even in the US’. Demerath (2007:382) contends that while many 
countries ‘have developed their own forms of “separation” [between religion and state], 
in no country […] is the separation absolute’. Instead of classifying states simply as 
religious or secular, Demerath (2007:387) recommends making two important 
distinctions – whether ‘religion has a legitimate role in national electoral politics’, and 
whether ‘religion is officially established within the formally constituted state or 
government’. The overlaps between these distinctions produce four combinations: 
‘religious politics with a religious state’; ‘non-religious or secular politics and non-
religious or secular state’; ‘secular politics and a religious state’; and ‘religious politics 
with a secular state’. These indicate the various possible permutations of religion-state 
relations in Muslim and non-Muslim countries.  
According to Demerath’s typology, Malaysia would be a religious state with 
religious politics – the constitution establishes Islam as the official religion and Islamic 
rhetoric drives many debates among political actors. The UK could be considered a 
religious state with secular politics (with its established Anglican and Presbyterian 
churches) or, since the state is so minimally religious in practice, as a secular state with 
secular politics (Demerath 2007:388–389). A country like Russia could be considered a 
secular state with religious politics – while it has a secular and democratic constitution, 
political leaders and the Russian Orthodox Church often drive religious and nationalist 
rhetoric (Essig 1999a:140).  
Homosexuality was decriminalised after the collapse of the Soviet Union, yet in 
her ethnographic study of ‘queer subjects’ in Russia in 1994 Laurie Essig (1999a:xi) 
encountered numerous ‘queer’ men and women who were still extremely secretive 
about their sexualities. Within this context, Essig (1999b:283) argues that they did not 
define their homosexual relations primarily in terms of sexual identity, but as ‘a set of 
signs, symbols, rituals, a “style”.’ According to her, these ‘queer subjectivities’ allowed 
some to identify as ‘heterosexual’ yet engage in homosexual relations and ‘queer 
performance without identity’ (Essig, 1999b: 282). This sort of ‘queerness’ was also 
visible on a national scale in popular music, literature and theatre, even though 
homosexual and/or gay identities were widely stigmatised by political and religious 
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figures (Essig 1999b:289). Essig’s findings complicate assumptions that ‘secular’ laws 
or values necessarily translate into explicit acceptance of sexual diversity, or that there 
are no shared dimensions in some ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ reactions towards sexual 
minorities.  
The Russian case contrasts with the US which could also be considered a 
secular state with religious politics, with its own history of anti-homosexual laws and 
sentiments spearheaded or supported by religious groups. However, the landscape of 
politics and public opinion there appears to be shifting significantly in favour of the 
rights of sexual minorities51. These developments can also be observed in the UK 
which, between 1967 and 2013, went from partially decriminalising homosexuality to 
legalising same-sex marriage52. Contestations of the religious and secular therefore also 
influence public debates on the rights of sexual minorities in the UK and US, but within 
environments that increasingly support liberal values on sexuality. Still, various British 
and American religious groups maintain that homosexuality is aberrant or sinful, for 
example when prominent Church of England clerics openly opposed the passage of the 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 (Vallely 2014).  
Yip (2003:136) argues that LGB Christians in Britain resolve their individual 
sexual identities with the mainstream churches’ position against sexual equality by 
privileging the individual self rather than religious authorities in shaping their 
spirituality. However, Michael Keenan demonstrates that the divide between the 
individual and the institution is not always that clear. In his qualitative study of gay 
Anglican clergy, he found that many remained within the Church because ‘it provided a 
space wherein [they] felt able to relate more closely to their emerging sense of self than 
they had been able to outside of Church’ (Keenan 2008:174). These examples raise 
questions about what sexual minorities who are followers of other religions might share 
in common with Muslim sexual minorities, especially regarding shifting state policies 
and public attitudes on religion and sexuality.  
Perspectives from non-Muslim contexts can also shed light on the impacts of 
overlapping or shared histories between contemporary nation-states, for example 
among former territories of the British Empire. According to Human Rights Watch 
                                                          
51 This can be seen, for example, in President Barack Obama’s open support for gay marriage (Mears 
2013).  
52 I discuss these developments in more detail in Chapter 3.3.1.  
84 
 
(2013:86), of the eighty or so countries that still criminalise homosexuality, ‘more than 
half […] inherited these laws because they were British colonies’. Anti-sodomy 
provisions in the penal codes of India (1860) and later Queensland (1899) spread across 
immense tracts of the Empire and were also influenced by legislation introduced within 
nineteenth century Britain (Human Rights Watch 2013:86–87, 96–99).  
Seen in this light, Malaysia shares with many other Commonwealth countries a 
defence and/or strengthening of colonial legislation dressed in anti-colonial rhetoric. 
For example, the Jamaican government has often characterised the pressure to revise its 
anti-sodomy legislation as postcolonial imperialism (LaFont, 2001), while Hindutva 
nationalists defend it as a component of ‘native’ Indian values (Waites 2010:974). In 
the 1980s and 1990s, former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew claimed that 
‘Asian values’ were superior to and incompatible with ‘Western’ values which tolerated 
homosexuality and extra-marital sex (Peletz 2003:3). In these examples, it also appears 
that anti-homosexual sentiments are part of various political elites’ wider justifications 
for authoritarian government in post-colonial nation-states.  
On the whole, these examples demonstrate the importance of clarifying how and 
why religion contributes or does not contribute to rising hostilities against sexual 
minorities in different national contexts. Specifically, this means investigating how 
states regulate religious and sexual diversity and the impacts of functioning democratic 
institutions on the experiences of minorities. In the case of Malaysia and other former 
British colonies, there is also the question of the role of religion in wider anti-colonial 
rhetoric, especially when this is wielded by authoritarian governments. In this study, 
Chapter 3 takes these state-religion-sexuality configurations into account by 
systematically comparing and contrasting the management of Islam and sexuality in 
Britain and Malaysia.  
 
2.3 Conclusion  
 
Studies of Muslim sexualities have become complicated by increasingly 
politicised expressions of and reactions towards Islam, notably after the events of 9/11. 
Within this landscape, one recurring debate is whether concepts such as ‘gay’ identity 
or even ‘homosexuality can apply to Muslim and other non-Western societies. In a 
strong version of the argument, Joseph Massad (2007; 2013) maintains that ‘gay’ 
identity is a Western construct and that gay rights advocacy is largely a continuation of 
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Orientalist imperialism. This has been increasingly challenged by newer studies on the 
contemporary experiences of Muslim sexual minorities in various country contexts 
showing that ‘gay’ and ‘Muslim’ identities are not necessarily incompatible. These 
contemporary accounts are accompanied by growing historical scholarship contesting 
the idea of an ‘East/West’ divide in sexual epistemologies. One of Massad’s critics, 
Scott Kugle (2003; 2010; 2014), not only documents the lived experiences of LGT 
Muslims in secular liberal democracies, but also advocates a more inclusive 
interpretation of Islam through his re-reading of sacred and historical texts.  
These studies provide the backdrop for my comparison of gay Muslims in 
Malaysia and Britain, particularly on the question of whether being ‘gay’ and/or 
‘Muslim’ means the same thing in different times and places. They indicate the 
overlapping issues confronting Muslim sexual minorities in Western and non-Western 
contexts based on the dominant notion that Islam opposes homosexuality, but crucially 
highlight that this is not the full story.  
Sociological studies of ‘deviance’ can therefore provide useful insights into how 
norms are drawn, broken and redrawn around acceptable behaviours and groups of 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. This approach is especially helpful when combined with 
insights into the overlapping constructions of religious, national and ethnic identities, 
the impacts of globalisation, and the role of state regulation of religion and sexuality. 
However, I have highlighted some pertinent criticisms of sociology from perspectives 
within queer theory, namely the danger of conceptualising sexuality in rigid and/or 
Eurocentric terms, but these enhance rather than undermine sociological analysis.  
Overall, these diverse empirical studies and theoretical approaches suggest that 
gay Muslims construct their identities based on their individual dispositions and 
interactions with multiple social authorities – Islamic and non-Islamic. Exactly how 
similar or divergent their experiences are in differing national conditions is the focus of 
the rest of this study.  
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Chapter 3: Emerging gay Muslim identities – comparing Malaysia and 
Britain 
 
 The previous chapter contained discussions on how Muslims who express non-
heterosexual desires or identities engage with notions of Islam and sexuality affected by 
various factors. This chapter sets the stage for my ensuing analysis of the experiences 
of gay Muslims by comparing how the contexts of Islam and sexuality have been 
shaped in contemporary Malaysia and Britain. I argue that while some developments 
resulted directly from British colonialism, in particular the spread of anti-sodomy laws, 
other trajectories of modernisation have also affected the ways in which Muslims 
construct their identities.  
I begin by discussing the impacts of three developments on expressions of Islam 
and sexuality in the two countries – colonial legal and political legacies, notions of 
nationhood, and the growth of ethnic and religious diversity. I then expand on the 
dynamics of Islam in both countries – its role in identity construction, marking out 
majority-minority boundaries, and its relations with the state. After this, I discuss the 
dynamics of sexuality, specifically how it is managed by the state and how gay identity 
is construed by wider society and Muslim communities in particular. State management 
of Islam and sexuality is a recurring theme in my comparison, especially the role of 
functioning liberal democratic institutions.  
 
3.1 From Empire to Commonwealth – shared histories and cultural 
exchange  
 
 Malaysia consists of territories which were once part of the British Empire 
between the late eighteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Colonial policies regulating 
expressions of religion and sexuality in vast tracts of the Empire were eventually 
inherited by many former colonies – now part of the Commonwealth – including 
Malaysia. As I show in this section, the British often regulated religion and sexuality in 
the colonies by adapting their domestic legal frameworks.  
The breakup of the Empire from the mid-twentieth century resulted in mass 
immigration of former colonial subjects, including Muslims, into Britain. They have 
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since become involved and implicated in public debates on social equality, 
multiculturalism, human rights and other issues. Contemporary Britain and Malaysia 
thus share intertwining colonial legacies affecting the dynamics of Islam and sexuality.  
 
3.1.1 Legal and political legacies – regulating Islam and sexuality 
 
In colonial Malaya, British administrators systematically codified Islamic laws, 
specifically in the Malay sultanates, and gradually established Islamic bureaucracies in 
the Malay Peninsula (R. L. M. Lee & Ackerman, 1997: 33). In post-independence 
Malaysia, successive administrations expanded upon these colonial laws and 
bureaucratic structures in a process some scholars refer to as ‘Islamization’ (e.g. J. C. 
H. Lee, 2010: 19; Ong, 1990: 272). The historian William Roff (1998: 211) suggests 
that codification was one strategy for the British to engineer more obedient and quietist 
versions of Islam to contain and neutralise burgeoning anti-colonial varieties. Roff 
further argues that these colonial interventions became the ‘vehicle for much 
subsequent “Islamization” of Malaysian society […] right up to the present day’.  
 Alongside codifying Islamic laws, the British also constructed notions of ‘race’ 
in their Malay colonies. The historian Anthony Reid (2004: 10) argues that Thomas 
Stamford Raffles, the scholar-administrator and founder of modern Singapore, was one 
of the first colonial officials to propound the idea of a ‘“Malay” race or nation […] 
embracing a large if unspecified part of the [Malay] Archipelago’. This use of ‘Malay’ 
as a catch-all term referring to a particular race or ethnicity was a British peculiarity 
and was not, for example, replicated in Dutch-controlled Indonesia53.  
The British eventually expanded the term ‘Malay’ to encapsulate all Malay-
speaking, Muslim peoples in British Malaya.  For example, the early colonial censuses 
of 1871 and 1881 listed ‘Malays, Boyanese, Achinese, Javanese, Bugis, Manilamen, 
Siamese, and so on as separate groups’ (Reid, 2004: 16). However, the 1891 census and 
subsequent censuses organised the population into three main ‘racial categories’ – 
‘Chinese, “Tamils and other natives of India”, and “Malays and other Natives of the 
Archipelago”, each elaborately sub-divided’ (Reid, 2004: 16).  
                                                          
53 The Dutch recognised Malay as the lingua franca in their territories, but preferred to label their 
colonial subjects ‘Indian’, which evolved into ‘Indonesian’ as an all-encompassing regional identity 
(Reid, 2004: 20).  
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This construction of ‘Malay’ as a race alongside the codification of Islamic law 
unwittingly fused Malay and Muslim identity. This is now expressed in Article 160 of 
Malaysia’s Federal Constitution which states that ‘“Malay” means a person who 
professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language, [and] conforms 
to Malay custom’ (Malaysia, 2010: 153).  
In relation to sexuality, the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which criminalised ‘carnal 
intercourse against the order of nature’, became the parent law for penal codes in many 
parts of the Empire (Human Rights Watch, 2013: 86). Colonial Malaya effectively 
received a duplicate in 1871, subsequently inherited by independent Malaysia and 
Singapore.  
This wave of anti-sodomy colonial legislation occurred alongside internal 
developments in mid-Victorian England, namely rapid industrialisation and 
urbanisation facilitating the emergence of a middle class that increasingly defined 
standards of respectability. According to Ronald Hyam (1991: 65), many middle-class 
reformers became concerned about ‘the easy-going attitudes of the working class’, 
‘adolescent sexuality’, and linked sexual pollution with fears of social instability and 
the downfall of the Empire. Lesley Hall (2000: 6) suggests that class-stratified notions 
of respectability and morality meant that even ‘early British surveys on sexual activities 
focused on the working classes’. Within this wider context, trials for sodomy occurred 
frequently (Hall, 2000: 20).  
The attitudes of these reformers towards working class sexualities were also 
affected by the influx of immigrants to England, beginning in the late eighteenth 
century, resulting from trade associated with the Empire. These immigrants – consisting 
of lascars (African or Asiatic seamen) and ayahs (female domestic workers) – were 
often viewed by reformers and politicians through the lens of class tensions and 
conflicts. According to Diane Robinson-Dunn (2006: 158), middle-class reformers and 
missionaries viewed the ‘un-Christianised poor as no better, and often as even worse, 
than the “uncivilised heathens” of the Empire’. Working-class radicals objected, 
sometimes by advocating universal equality but often by expressing outrage at being 
compared to foreign races.  
Within this context, some reformers campaigned against ‘white slavery’ – 
initially a description of the trafficking of Circassian women in Egypt but eventually 
also referring to prostitution and vice within England, effectively framing these as 
foreign and un-English (Robinson-Dunn, 2006: 131–132). Robinson-Dunn (2006: 135) 
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argues that this racialising of prostitution and vice followed the evolution of ‘race 
science’ in Victorian England. Previously widespread beliefs in ‘monogenesis’ – ‘that 
all human beings had the same origin and that physical differences were simply the 
result of climate or environment’ – gave way to more hierarchical beliefs about race 
from the mid-to-late nineteenth century. These cultural and political sensibilities were 
exported to the rest of Empire, resulting in tensions between what British 
administrators saw as proper behaviour and the behaviours of the people they ruled 
(Levine, 2013: 166).  
In 1861, against this backdrop, the Offences against the Person Act removed 
sodomy as a capital offence in England and instead made it punishable by up to 10 
years’ imprisonment (Marcus, 2011: 515). Within a decade, moral reformers gained 
momentum and successfully pushed for amendments to the Criminal Law Amendment 
Act in 1885, mainly to ban prostitution and purportedly to protect women and girls. As 
part of these developments, the ‘Labouchere amendment’ in the Act criminalised all 
sexual activity between men, not just sodomy, becoming known as the ‘gross 
indecency’ law (Hyam, 1991: 65–67). Its most high-profile use was on Oscar Wilde, 
charged in 1895 after a much-publicised and sensationalised trial in the midst of 
escalating moral panics about sexual pollution (Marcus, 2011: 517). 
Meanwhile, colonial administrators throughout the Empire inserted and adapted 
their own attitudes and assumptions about sexuality into the laws and policies they 
introduced. In their Malay territories, these interventions meant that the British 
effectively created the template for post-independence state actors to regulate 
‘acceptable’ expressions of Islam, Malay-ness and sexuality. These interconnected 
developments throughout the Empire influenced and were influenced by other related 
issues, such as the formation of national identity and modern state institutions, as I 
discuss next.  
 
3.1.2 Nationhood, statehood, and the shaping of Islam 
 
 Between 1689 and 1815, Great Britain (and subsequently the United Kingdom) 
was often at war with and vulnerable to invasion by Catholic France. According to 
historian Linda Colley (2009: xx) this, along with France’s close alliance with Spain, 
fostered a perception among many Britons that theirs was ‘a coherent and embattled 
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Protestant nation’. In the nineteenth century, this self-perception in relation to a 
Catholic ‘Other’ evolved into ‘a less sectarian sense of combined English, Scottish, 
Welsh and Irish effort in the face of a colonial and overseas “Other”’ (Colley, 2009: 
xxii). At the closing of the nineteenth century and the height of imperial expansion, 
Britishness was emphasised in the face of ‘new and formidable “Others”: a unified 
Germany, a burgeoning United States, and the Russian empire threatening Britain’s 
position in India’ (Colley, 2009: xxv). 
Muslims were part of this changing landscape of multiple ‘Others’, notably 
because the British dominated territories which included substantial Muslim 
populations whom they continued to trade and exchange cultural and intellectual 
expressions with (Gilliat-Ray, 2012b: 5). In fact, before the turn of the eighteenth 
century, the English associated Muslims primarily with the Ottoman Empire which they 
considered a great power. Furthermore, between the mid-sixteenth and late-seventeenth 
century, England’s trade with Muslims resulted in wealth but not territorial possession 
– imperialist ambitions were focused on America (Matar, 2008: 13).  
These pre-colonial legacies and eventual imperial expansion led the British to 
perceive Islam and Muslims in complex and contradictory ways. For example, within 
England ‘works which derided the Prophet Muhammad and attacked Islam remained 
popular throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as Humphrey 
Prideaux’s The True Nature of Imposture fully displayed in the life of Mahomet 
published in 1697’ (Gilliat-Ray, 2012b: 21). Yet, other British entrepreneurs introduced 
products and fashions from the Muslim world locally, such as Turkish-style coffee 
houses in the seventeenth century, which quickly became ‘a central institution in urban 
life in London’ (Gilliat-Ray, 2012b: 14).  
The sociologist Kishan Kumar (2006: 416) contends that it is crucial to account 
for the ‘imperial factor, and of imperial rivalry, in the making of English national 
identity’54. Kumar compares the development of English and French national identities 
in light of their external, imperial rivalry, and also internal social dynamics during the 
nineteenth century. He argues that revolutionary zeal, combined with competitiveness 
with the English, drove French colonialists to export the values of the Enlightenment 
aggressively to their colonies and integrate them into a uniform administration centred 
                                                          
54 Details in the debate on whether to refer to English or British national identity and if ‘Britons’ is 
merely a synonym for ‘the English’ have been discussed in other works (e.g. Colley, 2009: xvi–xvii).  
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in Paris. In contrast, aside from exceptions such as direct rule in India, ‘British imperial 
rule was generally indirect and marked by considerable local variation’ (Kumar, 2006: 
423).  
Compared with the French, the British were less hostile towards various 
expressions of local culture in their colonies, and eventually tolerated a degree of 
religious and ethnic diversity throughout the Empire. Kumar argues that this also ‘made 
it easier for British statesmen to espouse a policy of “multiculturalism” when, in the 
post-war period, the question arose of how best to integrate immigrants into British 
society’55. In contrast, the French model of a highly centralised and uniform imperial 
administration continues to frame contemporary policies requiring the ‘hard’ 
assimilation of post-colonial immigrants (Kumar, 2006: 422).  
Evolving notions of British nationhood were also accompanied by events which 
catalysed the formation of the modern British state. Historian Philip Harling (2001: 3) 
argues that the development of parliamentary democracy throughout the eighteenth 
century was partly influenced by protests against the state’s surging war-related 
taxation, leading to calls for parliamentary reform. In the following century, 
industrialisation, urbanisation, and accompanying demographic changes drove newer 
reforms, such as the extension of voting rights through the Reform Acts of 1832 and 
1867 (Harling, 2001: 8). Part of Britain’s modernisation therefore involved the gradual 
development of liberal democratic institutions alongside emerging notions of 
nationhood.  
Meanwhile, Britain’s administration of its colonial territories was not 
accompanied by the growth of comparable liberal democratic institutions. Rather, the 
Malaysian sociologist Syed Husin Alatas (2010: 18) argues that the colonies were 
primarily ‘markets for industrial goods [produced in Britain] and […] producers of raw 
materials and cash crops’.   
This does not mean that political consciousness was absent in British Malaya, as 
a culture of politics emerged among Malays partially in response to the ‘administrative 
and ideological forces of imperialism’ (Milner, 2002: 2). This resulted in fierce debates 
and disputes between ‘defenders of the old [Malay] monarchical system’ and ‘the 
exponents of new and subversive doctrines derived both from a resurgent Islam and 
                                                          
55 A prominent example is former Home Secretary Roy Jenkins’s espousal of a benign, tolerant form of 
multiculturalism in the 1960s (Weeks, 2012: 412).  
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Enlightenment Europe’ (Milner, 2002: 3). These political actors were not completely 
overpowered by colonialism, however, and some early Malay nationalists even engaged 
constructively with the British to expand the education system, employ more Malays in 
the bureaucracy, and establish advisory councils (Milner, 2002: 129).   
British imperial administrations, however, were neither consistently nor 
uniformly benign. When they abruptly wound up the Empire after World War II, they 
left intact racial, religious, and tribal animosities which they themselves created and 
fostered during colonial rule. These divisions fed into bloody sectarian conflicts and 
wars in India, Pakistan, Uganda, Nigeria, and to a lesser extent Malaya (Kumar, 2006: 
420).  
  In Malaya, many British administrators rejected the idea that Malays might 
benefit from higher levels of education, with one governor writing a novel ‘showing the 
catastrophic results of Malays becoming infected with Western ideas’ (Reid, 2004: 14). 
British policies aimed at keeping Malays politically quiescent and confined largely to 
the rural agricultural sector. Simultaneously, the British developed protectionist 
attitudes towards Malays amid the influx of Chinese and Indian immigrants, creating a 
small but influential Malay administrative class, a Malay elite (second only to the 
British colonialists), and a lower-ranked Malay clerical class (Mariappan, 2002: 205).  
 This pro-Malay protectionism unintentionally laid the framework for 
specifically ethnic forms of Malay nationalism to emerge, for example the formation of 
the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in 1946. By this time, the British 
had changed tack and wanted to promote more civic forms of nationalism to facilitate 
Malayan self-rule through their creation of the Malayan Union in 1946 (Alatas, 2010: 
29; Mariappan, 2002: 208). The Union was disbanded, however, after Malay 
nationalists – especially from UMNO – opposed it, and the British agreed to institute 
the Federation of Malaya instead in 1948 (Mariappan, 2002: 208). This Malay ethno-
nationalist framing of the nation continued into the independence of Malaya in 1957 
and the formation of Malaysia in 1963.  
  While nationalists such as UMNO were forging notions of nationhood based on 
ethnicity, others were organising around more politicised and anti-colonial expressions 
of Islam, such as the Pan-Islamic Malayan Party (now the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, 
PAS), formed in 1951 (Roff, 1998: 218). Successive post-independence UMNO-led 
governments have competed with PAS’s calls for greater emphasis on Islam in the 
education system, media, law, and economy. In this competition, UMNO itself 
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increasingly tries to foster more obedient expressions of Islam which contributes to the 
larger trend of ‘Islamizing politics’ (Roff, 1998: 218) in contemporary Malaysia.  
 This narrative of developments in connection with the Empire highlights the 
role of ‘Others’ in the formation of national identity in Malaysia and Britain. In 
Malaysia, the colonial ‘Other’ has historically shaped the understandings of religion 
and ethnicity among political actors such as UMNO and PAS which still influence 
current definitions and contestations of nationhood. In Britain, Muslims were 
historically part of a landscape of multiple ‘Others’ and continue to be involved and 
implicated in contestations of British national identity. As I have pointed out, however, 
one key aspect of the development of modern British nationhood is the growth of 
liberal democratic institutions. Modern Malaysia has inherited the Westminster system 
of government and holds regular multi-party elections, but has yet to democratise fully 
and still has an authoritarian government (Gomez & Jomo, 1999: 2; J. C. H. Lee, 
Wong, Wong, & Yeoh, 2010: 294; Welsh, 2013: 137). Against this backdrop, 
constructions of gay Muslim identities directly and indirectly reveal how Malaysian and 
British ideas of nationhood have been influenced by specific notions of Islam, race and 
sexuality, and constructions of the ‘Other’.  
 
3.1.3 Implications of ethnic and religious diversity 
 
Much of the ethnic and religious diversity of contemporary Britain and 
Malaysia is connected to the legacies of Empire. During colonial rule, the British 
brought in large numbers of Chinese and Indian migrant workers, who eventually 
settled and were granted citizenship upon Malaya’s independence (Mariappan, 2002: 
200)56. In Britain, mass migrations from the Caribbean and the Indian Subcontinent 
occurred after World War II, accompanying the breakup of the Empire57.  
                                                          
56 Muslims comprise 61.3 percent of the Malaysian population of 28 million, while 19.8 percent are 
Buddhist, 9.2 percent are Christian and 6.3 percent are Hindu. In terms of ethnicity, 67.4 percent are 
categorised as Bumiputera (a state-created term comprising ethnic Malays and other indigenous peoples, 
mostly in Sabah and Sarawak, who may or may not be Muslim), 24.6 percent are Chinese, 7.3 percent 
are Indian, and 0.7 percent are classified as ‘Other’ (Department of Statistics, Malaysia, 2011) 
57 As of 2013, the UK’s population is slightly more than 63 million, with England having a population of 
53 million. According to the 2011 census (BBC, 2012), in England and Wales, 59 percent percent 
identify as Christian, 25.1 percent say they have ‘no religion’, 4.8 percent are Muslim, 1.5 percent are 
Hindu, 0.8 percent are Sikh, 0.5 percent are Jewish, and 0.8 percent are classified as following other 
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In both countries, ethnic and religious minorities have sometimes challenged 
notions of nationhood and the cultural and political dominance of the ‘majority’. In 
Malaysia, the Malays form this majority whose position and interests are 
constitutionally enshrined, as discussed in section 3.1.1. Meanwhile, a significant but 
decreasing percentage of the white British majority still identifies as ‘Christian’ – 72 
percent according to the 2001 Census and 59 percent in 2011 (BBC, 2012). However, it 
has been argued that in these official statistics, identifying as ‘Christian’ might be a 
‘cultural rather than religious self-ascription’ or a ‘social marker […] to mobilise 
against those perceived as a threat’ (Day & Lee, 2014: 346; Guest, Olson, & Wolffe, 
2012: 66).  
With these nuances in mind, it can still be argued that the ‘ethnic’ and 
‘religious’ majorities in Malaysia and Britain come to view Islam from different 
vantage points. For Malays, the constitutional provisions and post-independence 
‘Islamisation’ policies have elevated Islam to become a core aspect of their individual 
and collective identity while the majority in Britain tend to associate Islam with 
immigrants and foreigners. From these different vantage points, various groups in both 
countries engage in highly visible and politicised debates on Islam, especially regarding 
majority-minority relations.   
In Britain, public debates on Islamic religious leadership, the integration of 
Muslims and other issues are often coloured by other global and national events such as 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 7 July 2005 bombings in London. In this climate, 
Muslims in Britain have become the ‘subject of public debate and focus for social and 
security policy in British society’ (Gilliat-Ray, 2012b: 262). Stuart Croft (2012: 16) 
argues that ‘in the specific case of the United Kingdom, discourses and practices of 
“Britishness” have led to the securitization of Islam’.  
These politicised public debates on Islam can sometimes oversimplify or distort 
the complex experiences of Muslims in Britain. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) 
explains that this is partly why it campaigned for official statistics on British Muslims 
and initiated the move to include a question on religion in the 2001 census (Hussain & 
Sherif, 2014: 415). The findings showed that Muslims were ‘the most 
socioeconomically disadvantaged of the general religious populations described in the 
                                                                                                                                                                         




census’, lending support to the MCB’s calls for more government engagement with 
Muslim issues (Hussain & Sherif, 2014: 420). These socio-economic dimensions rarely 
inform politicised debates and news headlines linking British Muslims with 
‘radicalisation’, religious extremism and other controversies. Despite this, many 
Muslims in Britain shape and expand more pluralistic understandings of being British, 
including intellectuals, artists, activists and entrepreneurs (Gilliat-Ray, 2012b: 262–
263).    
In Malaysia, many politicians and the government-controlled media also 
politicise Islam, but in terms of whether foreign or ‘un-Islamic’ agents are threatening 
the sanctity of Islam or Malay privileges. In recent years, state-appointed religious 
officials, government ministers, and government-controlled media commentators have 
increasingly construed LGBTs, Syiahs, Christians and other minorities as dangerous or 
deviant, along with concepts such as ‘secularism’ and ‘pluralism’ (Bernama, 2012, 
2013; Spykerman, 2014; Star, 2013; Sun, 2012; Teh, 2013). Such rhetoric often ignores 
or distorts historical evidence of tolerance and pluralism in colonial and pre-colonial 
times. For example, the historian Sumit Mandal (2012: 358, 364) argues that from the 
fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, keramat sites – or Sufi shrines – enabled 
‘heterogeneous’, ‘multi-ethnic and hybrid cultural practices’ of Islam and other 
religions. In many parts of Malaysia, Muslims continue to express Islam pluralistically 
and inclusively, albeit far less visibly and being vulnerable to politicised and polarised 
sentiments.  
For many gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain, ethnic and religious diversity is 
a fact of life and their day-to-day experiences of Islam are likely to involve multi-
layered interactions with non-Muslims and other Muslims. At the same time, they need 
to negotiate these everyday expressions and relationships amid strongly politicised 
notions of Islam in wider public debates. In Britain, these occur in a liberal democratic 
context where Muslims are a religious minority with high rates of socio-economic 
disadvantage. In Malaysia, Muslims form a religious majority, many of whom enjoy 
state-given privileges due to the fusion of Islam with Malay ethnicity within an 






3.2 Managing Islam 
 
 While Islam is a common factor in the identity constructions of gay Muslims in 
Malaysia and Britain, it is managed and mediated through diverse social authorities and 
institutions in the two countries. As I have highlighted in section 3.1.3, how Muslims 
relate to Islam also partly depends on whether they form a majority or a minority in a 
particular national context.  
 In this section, I compare how the British and Malaysian states manage Islam and 
how this influences its role in public policy, identity construction, and majority-
minority relations. Part of my argument is that state authorities in Malaysia and Britain 
directly and indirectly try to foster those expressions of Islam that they see as shared by 
the majority within these nations. However, these officially approved expressions of 
Islam often compete with those of other actors – including gay Muslims – who 
construct and sometimes promote their own versions of Islam.  
  
3.2.1 Britain: Fostering obedient Muslims?    
 
 In Britain, Muslims come from various ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, and 
have become part of the national landscape mostly through distinctive waves of 
immigration58. The first significant wave came immediately after WWII, consisting 
mostly of Pakistani and Indian refugees in the aftermath of the creation of independent 
Pakistan in 1947 and ensuing violence with neighbouring India (Gilliat-Ray, 2012b: 
46). In the 1960s and 1970s, larger numbers of Pakistanis, Indians, and Bangladeshis 
came to Britain as cheap labour for various industries. They eventually settled down, 
often bringing along kinsfolk from their countries of origin (Gilliat-Ray, 2012b: 47).  
 The 1960s and 1970s also saw significant but smaller numbers of East African 
Asian immigrants settling in Britain after being expelled from Uganda and Tanzania 
(Gilliat-Ray, 2012b: 50–52). In the 1970s and 1980s, Iranians and Arabs began 
                                                          
58 Around three-quarters of Britain's Muslim population are from Asian ethnic backgrounds, particularly 
Pakistani (43 percent), Bangladeshi (17 percent), Indian (9 percent) and Other Asian (6 percent). It is 
estimated that 6 percent of Muslims are of Black African origin (mainly from Somalia, Nigeria and other 
North and West African countries). Some 4 percent describe themselves as of white British origin, and a 
further 7 percent from another white background (including Arabs, Turks, Cypriots and East Europeans – 
especially refugees from Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo) (Gilliat-Ray, 2012b: 120).  
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immigrating in larger numbers following global trends and events such as the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979. Civil wars and unrest brought waves of Bosnian, Somali, Algerian, 
and Kurdish immigrants and refugees from the 1990s onwards.  
 On the whole, Muslim immigrants brought not only ethnic and linguistic diversity 
to Britain, but also much doctrinal variety and often personal experiences of war, 
discrimination and material hardship. The fact that they were all Muslim did not 
override these or other differences in economic status, education and their urban or 
rural origins. According to Humayun Ansari (2004: 3), intra-Muslim social ties in 
Britain have rarely cut across divides of ethnicity, national origin (for Muslims of the 
same ethnicity, e.g. Arabs), and class.  
 Despite the heterogeneity of the British Muslim population, in the early 1990s 
Muslim activists began lobbying for recognition as a single religious minority rather 
than simply as a collection of distinct cultural communities (Hussain & Sherif, 2014: 
418).  This foreshadowed the MCB’s campaign to include a question on religion in the 
2001 census, discussed in section 3.1.3. Among the reasons for such campaigning, two 
are particularly relevant here – the state’s inconsistent framing of ethnicity and religion, 
specifically in Britain’s legal framework of anti-discrimination, and the state’s interests 
in managing Muslim groups.  
  In response to the demographic effects of immigration, the British legislature 
and courts had to introduce new laws or amend existing frameworks regarding 
discrimination. For example, the courts eventually interpreted the Race Relations Act 
1976 as including Sikhs as a racial and religious minority. Nasar Meer (2008: 70) 
argues that some legal experts at the time advocated including religious dimensions 
when interpreting the Act such that it would extend to Muslims and other religious 
minorities, too. Nevertheless, confronted with ensuing controversies such as the 
Rushdie Affair59 – Parliament and the courts upheld a binary distinction between race 
and religion for Muslims.  
 According to Meer (2008: 63), this binary was especially prominent in public 
debates leading up to the passage of the Racial and Religious Hatred Act of 2006. 
                                                          
59 In 1989, Muslim protesters in Bradford burned a copy of British Indian author Salman Rushdie’s 
controversial novel The Satanic Verses, which many Muslims regarded as insulting to the Prophet 
Muhammad. Shortly after this incident Iran’s spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, released a fatwa 
calling for Rushdie’s death (Nye & Weller, 2012: 38–40). The Rushdie affair brought British Muslims 
into the public spotlight, with the media coverage created long-lasting images linking Muslims to anti-




Opponents of the proposed Act claimed that race should be protected as an ascribed 
characteristic of identity, whereas religious beliefs are chosen and do not require 
protection. Meer argues that such a dichotomy is untenable, firstly because race is not 
as ‘natural’ a category as some people claim – the way we conceive of ‘race’ depends 
upon different cultural, social and historical factors. Furthermore, people who are 
subjected to ‘racial’ prejudice or attacks often find that their religious backgrounds are 
also targeted. Meer contends that discrimination or hate incidents against Muslims in 
Britain often involve this blurring of the victims’ racial and religious identity.  
 Meer (2008: 72) contends that a doctrinaire separation of ‘race’ as involuntary 
and ‘religion’ as voluntary can lead to paradoxical legal outcomes. For instance, the 
London Borough of Merton asked the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to prosecute a 
British National Party (BNP) member and others who distributed offensive and 
threatening anti-Muslim material during the party’s 2005 general election campaign. 
The CPS refused on the grounds that Muslims were not a ‘racial group’ and therefore 
not covered by the Public Order Act (POA) of 1986. However, the same BNP member 
pleaded guilty to distributing similar material and inciting racial hatred against Jewish 
minorities – who are covered by the POA – in the same borough.  
 Government decisions to categorise and conceptualise the status of ethnic and 
religious minorities can thus create unanticipated challenges which can be exacerbated 
when various groups vie to represent these minorities nationally. In the case of Muslims 
in Britain, at particular times, the British state has preferred or even fostered some 
Muslim groups at the expense of others to engineer state-compliant expressions of 
Islam. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s, common political goals between Britain 
and Saudi Arabia regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan meant that Saudi 
preachers were given clearance to enter the country. They were able to recruit young 
British Muslims to fight in Afghanistan as well as finance charitable outfits and Islamic 
relief operations to aid Afghan refugees (Al-Rasheed, 2005: 156)60.  
 The above are just some examples of the complex and politicised nature of the 
question of ‘representation’ among British Muslims, illustrating the diverse and 
decentralised social organisation of Islam in Britain. Yet, as I have already mentioned, 
successive British governments and Muslim activists have tried to streamline and 
                                                          
60 This does not mean that British Muslims went on uncritically accepting Saudi Arabia’s overtures. For 
example, some became disillusioned and angry about the kingdom’s overt request for European and 
American military assistance during the first Gulf War in 1990-91 (Al-Rasheed, 2005: 160).  
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organise a definable British Muslim identity, often amid rivalry among various Muslim 
collectives. One milestone in these efforts by the state and a particular section of British 
Muslim activists was the formation of the MCB in 1997. Nevertheless, according to 
Sophie Gilliat-Ray (2012b: 109), rival Muslim individuals and groups have accused the 
MCB of being out of touch, remote, and elitist, and ‘presenting a monolithic view of 
Muslim opinion to government, media and policy-makers’.  
 In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the US-led invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001, the British government expected the MCB to manage the anger 
from British Muslims regarding the ‘war on terror’. Instead, under pressure from its 
grassroots membership, the MCB openly criticised British foreign policy (Gilliat-Ray, 
2012b: 109–110).  These events, along with ensuing protests against the 2003 Iraq 
invasion and the 7/7 bombings, partly led the government to rebalance its relationship 
with British Muslim organisations, for instance by giving preference to the British 
Muslim Forum and Sufi Muslim Council over the MCB (Gilliat-Ray, 2012b: 110). 
Gilliat-Ray (2012a: 117) argues that the government’s partisanship divides British 
Muslims and alienates those critical of its policies, and suggests the government may be 
‘deliberately creating the conditions whereby Muslims from one school of thought are 
placed in opposition to, or competition with, others’.  
 This background suggests that multiple factors – doctrinal and non-doctrinal – are 
at play regarding the attitudes of British Muslims towards specific issues such as 
homosexuality. Based on her qualitative interviews with heterosexual Muslims in 
Scotland between 2001 and 2002, Asifa Siraj (2009: 55) concludes that  they exhibited 
‘disproportionately negative attitudes towards homosexuals and homosexual 
relationships’ compared with the wider population. Siraj suggests that those who 
identified as ‘practising’ Muslims formed their attitudes about homosexuality through a 
combination of their ‘belief system and cultural upbringing’, yet some participants 
whom she characterises as ‘non-practising Muslims […] were just as critical and 
intolerant of homosexuality as their practising counterparts’. This raises the question of 
whether attitudes to sexuality can become an ethnic or religious boundary marker 
regardless of the degree of people’s religious commitment, which requires further 
investigation as existing quantitative surveys appear contradictory. For example, a 2009 
Gallup poll found that none of the British Muslims interviewed believed that 
homosexual acts were morally acceptable, but according to a 2011 Demos poll 47 
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percent agreed with the statement ‘I am proud of how Britain treats gay people’ (Butt, 
2009; Pink News, 2011).  
 Against this backdrop, gay Muslims in Britain are affected by and can potentially 
shape the landscape of Islam in different ways. By affirming their sexuality they 
explicitly or implicitly challenge anti-gay interpretations of Islam, which pits them 
against Muslims who hold Islamic interpretations that wider society is also likely to 
deem problematic. Yet, by highlighting the fact that they are Muslim, they emphasise 
the religious rather than racial aspect of their identities and, like other Muslims, can be 
critical of Britain’s foreign and domestic policies on Islam. In doing this, they 
complicate stereotypes of Muslims as flatly anti-Western or inherently conservative 
and of gay people as anti-religious.   
 
3.2.2 Malaysia: An assertive Islam? 
 
 As discussed in section 3.1.1, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia explicitly 
links Malay and Muslim identity while the political arena is dominated by ethnic and/or 
religious parties. The Malay-based UMNO governs in a coalition which includes other 
ethnicity-based parties, including the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and the 
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). The federal-level parliamentary opposition coalition 
includes the multi-ethnic and multi-religious People’s Justice Party (PKR) and the 
Democratic Action Party (DAP) in partnership with the Islamic party, PAS.  
 Ethnic and religious concerns thus dominate the political arena, influencing and 
even driving the interpretation and application of public policies. The New Economic 
Policy (NEP) – which the government instituted as a corrective after bloody racial riots 
in 1969 – initially aimed to redress inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic economic disparities. 
At the same time, it was construed by successive UMNO-led governments as 
affirmative action for Malays and involved government-led expansion of the Malay 
middle class (Gomez & Jomo, 1999: 23, 39). The new Malay middle class grew 
especially rapidly since Malays benefited the most from state-sponsored higher 
education, loans for home ownership and starting up businesses, and other NEP-related 
developments (Abdul Rahman, 2001: 88).  
 A middle class had already surfaced at the beginning of the twentieth century as a 
result of colonial policies, but it was relatively small and mostly Chinese (Abdul 
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Rahman, 2001: 82–83). The growth of a multi-ethnic middle class – incorporating the 
rapidly emerging Malay middle class – is largely a post-independence phenomenon 
directly linked with modernisation and industrialisation policies, including the NEP. 
Johan Saravanamuttu (2001: 107) estimates that ‘the middle class would have edged 
upwards to 45.8 percent in the year 2000’, and argues that ‘Malaysian society had 
become predominantly middle class by the end of the 1990s’. Against this backdrop a 
younger generation of Malaysians – especially Malays – has become increasingly 
upwardly mobile (Abdul Rahman, 2001: 87). 
 Historically, the Malaysian middle class – of all ethnicities – has been supportive 
of the state, especially during times of rapid economic growth as evidenced by the 
government’s landslide victories in the elections of 1990 and 1995 (Abdul Rahman, 
2001: 80). However, many sectors among the new Malay middle class became deeply 
unsettled during the political and economic crisis of the late 1990s, in which Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad sacked his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim.  Mahathir’s 
humiliation of Anwar – including lurid accusations of sodomy and corruption – caused 
a split in attitudes among the Malay middle class. Many objected strongly to Mahathir’s 
treatment of Anwar but others supported Mahathir’s overall approach to the crisis, 
including his scathing criticisms of Western-led globalisation (Abdul Rahman, 2001: 
95).  
 In response, a sizeable proportion of middle class Malays voted against the 
Mahathir-led government during the 1999 elections, which led PAS and other 
opposition parties to make significant parliamentary gains. According to Virginia 
Hooker (2004: 165), PAS’s rise challenged the Mahathir-led government’s dominant 
vision of modernity, especially in relation to Malays. She argues that before the crisis, 
Mahathir and Anwar drove the state’s regulation of Islam and Malay-ness by each 
trying to balance Malay communal interests and framing Islam as Malaysia’s ‘civil 
religion’ (Hooker, 2004: 155–156). However, the political crisis disrupted their project 
to define Islam in this way and the Mahathir-led administration more aggressively 
fostered ‘moderate’ or state-supportive Muslims and repressed ‘radical’ or unacceptable 
Muslims (Hooker, 2004: 165–166). Within this framework, Mahathir was especially 
keen to monitor PAS and its supporters and more progressive Muslims who objected to 
the treatment of Anwar and were critical of the UMNO-led government in other ways.  
 Ironically, Anwar was one the architects of the expansion of Islam in Malaysia. 
Initially an influential leader of the student-driven Muslim Youth Movement of 
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Malaysia (ABIM), Anwar was successfully persuaded by Mahathir to join UMNO in 
1982 and rose swiftly in the political ranks (Ahmad Fauzi, 2008: 218). By 1994, he was 
UMNO’s deputy president and Malaysia’s deputy prime minister. During his time in 
government, Anwar spearheaded or was associated with several projects to expand the 
influence and administration of Islam, for example the setting up of the International 
Islamic University of Malaysia (Ahmad Fauzi, 2008: 219). ABIM became a crucial 
partner in the state’s Islam-oriented nation-building (Ahmad Fauzi, 2008: 225). 
 Before Anwar joined UMNO ABIM’s relationship with the state was more 
antagonistic, with one of its most prominent confrontations occurring during the mass 
demonstrations of 1974 in the northwest of Peninsula Malaysia (Nagata, 1980: 408). 
These were triggered by rumours that Malay farmers were starving in the State of 
Kedah, suggesting that UMNO politicians were mismanaging the NEP and only certain 
groups of Malays were benefiting from it. The federal government arrested more than 
1,000 protesters, including Anwar (Nagata, 1980: 408).  
 ABIM’s confrontational stance was similar to those of other groups which 
emerged within the milieu of activism amongst various Malaysian Muslim students’ 
associations during the late 1960s. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid (2009: 145) argues that 
ABIM traces its intellectual and political lineage to its founders’ networks with the 
Muslim Brotherhood diaspora in Britain and also Abul A’la Maududi, founder of 
Pakistan’s Jamaat-i-Islami. By 1979, ABIM had a membership of 35,000 (Nagata, 
1980: 423). 
 The state was disturbed not only by ABIM’s potential reach with young, 
upwardly mobile Malays but also its transnational networks. For example, Anwar, who 
was ABIM president from 1974 to 1982, was welcomed by Ayatollah Khomeini in 
post-revolutionary Iran and was also a supporter of Pakistan’s Zia ul-Haq (Ahmad 
Fauzi, 2009: 146). In response, UMNO often attacked ABIM and other groups it 
accused of ‘attempting to import the Iranian revolutionary ideology’ into Malaysia 
(Ahmad Fauzi, 2009: 146), but ABIM’s fortunes changed when Mahathir came to 
power.  
 According to tan beng hui61 (2012a: 40), these transformations occurred 
alongside distinct phases of state-led ‘Islamisation’, which was more ‘haphazard, weak 
and ineffective’ in the 1980s and 1990s and left largely to the various States. Starting 
                                                          
61 I also discussed tan’s work in Chapter 2.1.5.  
103 
 
from the late 1990s, however, tan (2012a: 41) argues that the federal state embarked on 
‘Syariahtisation’, i.e. systematically expanding Syariah legislation and wrestling 
jurisdiction over it from the States. In this project, the federal state was and continues to 
be aided by a group of actors tan (2012a: 53) refers to as the ‘Syariah lobby’ – state-
salaried ‘religious functionaries’, ‘ethno-nationalists’ and ‘religio-nationalists’.  
 The ‘Syariah lobby’ advocates stricter punishments for Islamic offences, such as 
drinking alcohol and non-marital sex, including homosexual behaviour. Nevertheless, 
successive UMNO-led governments have not consistently implemented the rhetoric of 
‘Syariahtisation’, leading to selective, arbitrary and, as tan (2012a: 148) suggests, half-
hearted prosecutions of Islamic offences. With homosexuality, specifically, tan (2012a: 
158) argues that ‘the official anti-gay bark is worse than its bite’.   
 Rather, the state deploys Islam to ground its other development projects, 
especially post-NEP, even as younger Malays have started seeing Islam as a resource to 
critique and even challenge the government. Ever since the advent of ‘Syariahtisation’, 
however, the ‘Syariah lobby’ has become increasingly intolerant of alternative 
interpretations of Islam. For example, it frequently dismisses, condemns, or threatens 
Muslim women who interpret Islam from feminist perspectives, the most prominent 
example being the continuing harassment faced by the non-governmental organisation 
Sisters in Islam (SIS)62 (Ding, 2009). In fact, the Islamic Religious Council in the State 
of Selangor has an official fatwa accusing SIS of subscribing to ‘pluralism’ and 
‘liberalism’, hence ‘deviating’ from Islam (Bedi, 2014). In Malaysia, state-produced 
fatwa can carry the force of law and it is a crime for any Muslim to defy, disobey or 
dispute any fatwa currently in force (Zainah, 2013).  
 Attitudes towards sexuality among Muslims in Malaysia are therefore informed 
by wider, politicised, and state-approved interpretations of Islam and Malay ethnicity. 
Given the state’s authoritarianism, it is difficult to measure public attitudes frankly but 
a 2010 survey of 1,060 Malaysian Muslims aged between 15 and 25 found that 99.4 
percent disagreed with the statement, ‘It’s OK to be gay or lesbian’ (Chiam, Tunku 
’Abidin, Wong, & Suryana, 2011: 20). In the same survey, 97.5 percent disagreed that 
‘[it’s] OK to watch pornographic movies’ and 98.4 percent that ‘[it’s] OK to have sex 
before marriage’. The report’s authors suggest that the attitudes of young Malaysian 
                                                          
62 I am an Associate Member of SIS, as explained in Chapter 1.2.3.  
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Muslims are shaped by ‘highly-controlled’ broadcast media, local religious teachers 
and parents and, to a lesser extent, peers and other social networks.  
 Gay Muslims in Malaysia understand and express their religious and sexual 
identities within this matrix of state management, wider political sentiments and public 
attitudes related to Islam. At the same time, state-led modernisation has enabled them to 
pursue middle class lifestyles, including with the sexual dimension. As John D’Emilio 
suggests in the context of the US (1983: 109), capitalism can create the material 
conditions for homosexual desire to become the central component of some peoples’ 
lives. In the case of Malaysia, state-managed capitalism and the rise of a Malay middle 
class have enabled gay Muslims to explore new lifestyles and sexual expressions, but 
amid Islamic rhetoric that increasingly demonises sexual difference.   
 
3.3 Managing sexuality  
 
 According to Jeffrey Weeks (2012: 1), analysing a ‘history of sexuality’ means 
analysing a ‘history without a single, clear, fixed object’. Sexuality is not an 
‘unproblematic natural given’ – our perceptions and expressions of it are shaped by 
multiple factors which keep transforming throughout history (Weeks, 2012: x). Still, an 
analysis of the regulation of sexual expressions in different societies can illuminate how 
social relations were structured and how these historical patterns affect us now. With 
this in mind, in this section I focus on significant turning points in the state-led 
management of sexuality in Britain and Malaysia and how these impact on gay 
Muslims.  
 
3.3.1 Britain: From criminalisation to equality 
 
 Uneven industrialisation in nineteenth-century Britain led to ‘new class 
alignments, rapid population growth, changes in the social environment, urbanisation, 
and a disruption of settled and traditional patterns of sexual life’ (Weeks, 2012: 15). In 
various ways, these developments pushed the new Victorian middle classes to adopt 
and display largely conservative attitudes on sex, as discussed in section 3.2.1.  
 British public debate increasingly revolved around sex-related panics from the 
turn of the nineteenth century, even as the rapid expansion of the Empire enhanced 
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public awareness of cultural differences and informed sexual attitudes. Many of these 
panics also had a class dimension, with public and voluntary initiatives in the later part 
of the century effectively increasing surveillance of the urban poor (Hall, 2000: 6). In 
the 1830s and 1840s, for example, Parliamentary Commissions were ‘saturated with an 
obsessive concern with the sexuality of the working class’, and from the 1850s, 
‘venereal disease and prostitution’ entered ‘the heart of Parliamentary debate’ (Weeks, 
2012: 28).  
 In aspiring towards ‘respectability’, nineteenth-century middle-class reformers 
increasingly sought to condemn or curb sexual deviance by forming movements which 
they framed with Christian doctrines and values (Hyam, 1991: 66–70; Mosse, 1985: 24; 
Weeks, 2012: 39, 100–101). They pushed for greater state intervention on sexual 
issues, including laws on prostitution and ‘gross indecency’ as discussed in section 
3.1.1, and drove conceptions of moral purity as a metaphor for a stable society (Hyam, 
1991: 65; Weeks, 2012: 107).  
 Anti-sodomy laws, however, were in force from the sixteenth century and were 
applied in waves in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the end of the 
seventeenth century and in the 1720s, for example, there was a spate of convictions for 
sodomy ‘coinciding with morality crusades and the emergence of a distinctive male 
homosexual subculture in London – famously the molly houses’ (Weeks, 2012: 123). 
There was also a sudden increase in prosecutions in the first third of the nineteenth 
century in England, during which 50 men were hanged for sodomy63.  
 These waves of prosecutions and persecutions do not constitute the complete 
picture of the various historical sexual subcultures and how they changed over time. 
There is evidence, for example, that conceptions of homosexuality in the late 
seventeenth century conflated it with effeminacy and transvestism, whereas by the 
nineteenth century the emphasis on transvestism had diminished (McIntosh, 1968: 
188).  
 Also, contrasting the visibility of male homosexuality in the nineteenth century, 
erotic relations between women were able to flourish under the broad category of 
friendship which was virtually ignored by state authorities (Marcus, 2011: 524–525). 
Rather, the state regulated women’s bodies primarily in terms of their relations with 
                                                          
63 ‘In one year, 1806, there were more executions for sodomy than for murder, while in 1810 four out of 
five convicted sodomists were hanged.’ (Weeks, 2012: 123) 
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men through laws on reproduction, marriage and economic exchange. Within this 
context, in the late nineteenth century, financially independent women were able to set 
up households with other women – for mutual convenience but perhaps also as sexual 
or romantic partnerships (Hall, 2000: 40). According to Sharon Marcus (2011: 525–
526), ‘literate, educated women’ were able to manoeuvre their legal rights – e.g., 
through wills, property deeds, and even alimony payments – to ‘create approximations 
of marriage with other women’. The authorities ignored such women possibly because 
there were so few of them and they ‘were not seen as belonging to a type or category 
latent in all women’. 
 Still, Weeks (2012: 128) argues that in the conditions of the nineteenth century, 
the increasing stigmatisation of homosexuality unintentionally led the individuals 
targeted to develop a sense of homosexual identity, especially among the upper and 
middle classes. By forcing this awareness of sexual difference among the individuals 
targeted, newer forms of legal regulation created what Weeks calls ‘a new community 
of knowledge’.  
  These dynamics continued into the twentieth century, and Weeks (2012: 13) 
contends that ‘in the 1950s, Britain was still widely regarded as having one of the most 
conservative sexual cultures in the world, with one of the most draconian penal codes’. 
Homosexual men were increasingly arrested and prosecuted for ‘gross indecency’ up to 
the 1950s, with 622 arrests in 1931, 2,000 in 1945, 4,416 in 1950 and 6,357 in 1954 
(Waites, 2013: 152; Weeks, 2012: 307). Matthew Waites (2013: 152) argues that this 
might have had more to do with changing policing practices than a witch-hunt led by 
politicians, but nevertheless the ‘increasing press coverage of homosexuality led to 
political concern’.  
 This legal and political dimension was supplemented by medical and 
psychological opinion considering homosexuality a disorder (Hall, 2000: 4). According 
to Matt Cook (2007b: 166), family background and psychological explanations for 
sexual behaviour became increasingly cited in court cases from the 1920s, effectively 
portraying homosexuals as criminals who also required medical treatment. For example 
Alan Turing, who helped crack the enigma code during WWII, opted for hormonal 
therapy rather than a prison sentence after his relationship with another man was 
exposed and prosecuted (Cook, 2007b: 166). This led to depression and Turing was 
found dead in 1953, most likely from suicide.  
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 Continuing panics and debates around homosexuality led the government to 
appoint the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution in 1954 to examine 
the regulation of homosexuality and prostitution in England, Wales and Scotland 
(Waites, 2013: 150). Chaired by John Wolfenden, it published its report in 1957 which 
became a major turning point in public policies and attitudes towards sexual diversity.  
 The Wolfenden Report recommended the partial decriminalisation of 
homosexuality, clarifying that this was not equivalent to condoning it – the implication 
was that public expressions of homosexuality should remain banned (Waites, 2013: 
153). The Church of England and some influential media outlets, such as the Times and 
Daily Mirror, supported the report’s recommendations, with the Church producing its 
own interim report in 1954 supporting partial decriminalisation (Waites, 2013: 152–
153). 
 Even so, the government did not implement the Wolfenden recommendations 
immediately. Instead, new pressure groups and social movements such as the 
Homosexual Law Reform Society, formed in 1958, began lobbying for the 
recommendations to be implemented (Waites, 2013: 154). These demands grew amid a 
wider trend of liberalising social attitudes in the 1960s, for example rising pre-marital 
sexual relations among youth – a trend strengthened after the introduction of the 
contraceptive pill (Lewis & Kiernan, 1996: 373).  
 This ‘sexual revolution’ accompanied the changing attitudes towards 
homosexuality among some sectors of society. While academics now felt less 
restrained to explore homosexuality as a subject, films such as Victim (1963) and The 
Trials of Oscar Wilde (1964) portrayed it in relatively more sympathetic terms (Hall, 
2000: 168). Within this wider cultural climate, the Labour government also introduced 
other reforms including abolishing stage censorship, partially legalising abortion, and 
stopping prison floggings, partly from the influence of progressive leaders such as Roy 
Jenkins and Anthony Crosland (Waites, 2013: 155; Weeks, 2012: 341).   
 These events were also a major turning point for mainstream churches, which 
enjoyed brief post-War rejuvenation but whose influence on moral and social issues 
declined steadily from the 1960s (Brown, 2006: 36; Davie, 1994: 31–33; Guest et al., 
2012: 63). After this, Conservative Christians began reacting more negatively towards 
what they referred to as a ‘permissive society’ while other sectors of the mainstream 
churches continued to liberalise (Brown, 2006: 224, 240; Davie, 1994: 33; Ganiel & 
Jones, 2012: 308). Prominent liberal Christians were at the forefront of heated debates 
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and crises within the Church of England, for example with the publication of Bishop 
John Robinson’s controversial Honest to God in 1963 (Brown, 2006: 224; Brown & 
Lynch, 2012: 333). These took place within a wider trend of declining church 
attendance and membership from the turn of the twentieth century, which according to 
Steve Bruce (2002: 73) indicates the irreversible secularisation of Britain64.  
 Despite these liberal changes in religious and non-religious spheres, 
stigmatisation of homosexuality did not disappear overnight. While Parliament, the 
courts, and the police ceased criminalising homosexuality, medical researchers and 
professionals persisted in framing it as a medical condition, effectively shifting it from 
being a legal to a medical problem (Waites, 2013: 162). Furthermore, the partial nature 
of decriminalisation meant that prosecutions for public acts of homosexuality increased 
by 150 percent between 1967 and 1973 (Waites, 2013: 157).  
 Due to this gap between the more liberal atmosphere and continuing anti-
homosexual stigma, more radical gay and lesbian activists formed new action groups, 
such as the Gay Liberation Front (Cook, 2007a: 180; Hall, 2000: 180). Weeks (2012: 
365) argues that gay and lesbian activists therefore helped to ‘fix’ homosexual identity, 
making it almost comparable to an ‘ethnic identity’.  
 The increasingly assertive activism of the gay and lesbian movement prompted 
morally conservative activists, for example Mary Whitehouse65, to renew and escalate 
moral purity campaigns. In one of her more prominent efforts, Whitehouse brought a 
successful court action against the Gay News for ‘blasphemous libel’ for publishing 
James Kirkup’s poem ‘The Love that Dare Not Speak its Name’, in which a Roman 
centurion has sex with Jesus (Cook, 2007a: 192). The onset of the AIDS crisis in the 
1980s introduced another phase of backlash against homosexuality, as expressed by 
some members of the then ruling Conservative Party. One such development was 
Conservative backbencher David Wilshire’s successful introduction of Section 28 of 
                                                          
64 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to argue for or against the secularisation thesis, but the debates 
around it have been discussed elsewhere, e.g. in Shirley Hanson’s (1997) methodological and theoretical 
critique and Linda Woodhead’s (2012) overview of the state of the debate in Britain.  
65 Mary Whitehouse (1910-2001) was a teacher who, in the 1930s, joined the Oxford Group – a Christian 
pressure group founded in the late 1930s to oppose immorality (Brown, 2006: 198, 250). She went on to 
start a Clean-up TV campaign, and later the National Viewers’ and Listeners’ Association, to protest 
violent and sexually explicit content in the mass media. She was also a prominent leader in the Festival 
of Light, an evangelical Christian effort to halt moral decline which later became Christian Action 
Research and Education (Ganiel & Jones, 2012: 308).  
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the Local Government Act which made it unlawful for local authorities to ‘intentionally 
promote homosexuality’ (Weeks, 2012: 379).  
 According to Weeks (2012: 410), despite the backlash, the reforms of the 1960s 
created possibilities ‘throughout Britain, [where] many lesbians and gays were 
increasingly routinising their homosexuality, with a double life less and less a defining 
aspect of their lives’. Similarly, these reforms reflected and facilitated profound 
changes in heterosexual relationships, where ‘marriage, civil partnerships, [and] various 
forms of cohabitation or non-cohabitation [have] increasingly become choices, not 
moral imperatives’ (Weeks, 2012: 400).   
 Following these developments, the incoming Labour government of the late 
1990s brought in other sexuality-related reforms, including: lifting the ban on lesbians 
and gays serving in the armed forces in 2000; equalising the age of consent for 
heterosexual and homosexual relationships in 2001; abolishing the ‘gross indecency’ 
provision in the Sexual Offences Act in 2004; and introducing the Civil Partnership Act 
in 2005 (Cook, 2007a: 211–212; Weeks, 2012: 406–407). In 2013, under the coalition 
government of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, Parliament passed the 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act, which came into force in March 2014 (UK 
Government, 2014).  
 From the 1960s, therefore, the British state has gone from criminalising and 
stigmatising homosexuality to protecting and defending it as a human right. At present, 
sexual orientation is a ‘protected characteristic’, alongside religion, under the Equality 
Act of 2010 (Nye & Weller, 2012: 43–44). This has led to some high-profile 
controversies on whether one protected characteristic can ‘trump’ another, notably 
involving Christians claiming workplace discrimination for upholding their religious 
beliefs, including on homosexuality. For example, British courts upheld the legitimacy 
of disciplinary measures taken against four Christians – British Airways employee 
Nadia Eweida, dismissed for refusing to remove a crucifix displayed over her uniform; 
nurse Shirley Chaplin, prevented from working on hospital wards after declining to 
remove her crucifix; registrar Lilian Ladele, dismissed after refusing to officiate at civil 
partnership ceremonies; and relationship counsellor Gary McFarlane, dismissed for 
refusing to give sexual therapy to same-sex couples (Hunt, 2012: 705). The four 
challenged these decisions at the European Court of Human Rights, which eventually 
found in favour of Eweida but not the rest (Bowcott, 2013) 
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 Gay Muslims in Britain, along with other religious groups and sexual minorities, 
are directly affected by such debates. As members of sexual and religious minorities, 
they are protected by existing legislation but the tone and substance of current debates 
often implies an incompatibility or irreconcilability between their religious and sexual 
identities. By holding on to these identities, however, gay Muslims in Britain 
potentially problematise and expand current notions of equality, diversity, and civil 
liberties.  
 
3.3.2 Malaysia: Politicisation of sexuality 
 
 As discussed in section 3.2.2, the UMNO-led government began politicising 
homosexuality at unprecedented levels after Mahathir sacked Anwar in 1998 for abuse 
of power and sodomy. The ensuing political crisis unfolded amid a regional economic 
crisis which also sparked off political unrest in other Asian countries, such as Thailand, 
Indonesia and South Korea (Gomez & Jomo, 1999: 185). Anwar was eventually jailed 
for corruption and sodomy, but the Federal Court overturned the sodomy conviction in 
2004 (BBC, 2014). After his release, he was barred from active politics until 2008 but 
quickly emerged as the de facto leader of the People’s Justice Party (PKR), led formally 
by his wife Wan Azizah Wan Ismail. 
 When Mahathir sacked Anwar, he did not conjure anti-gay rhetoric out of thin air 
– he had previously espoused ‘Asian values’, in which he described homosexuality as 
one of numerous, unacceptable Western ills (Peletz, 2003: 3; tan, 2012a: 19–20). 
Mahathir’s anti-gay stance therefore accompanied his policies to modernise Malaysia 
and he targeted Anwar particularly viciously at a time when the state seemed on the 
brink of a major structural crisis. In this sense, politicised anti-gay sentiment in 
Malaysia during the 1990s resembled the anti-gay moral panics in Britain from the late 
nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries in that it emerged alongside drastic and 
unpredictable social changes. However, anti-gay rhetoric and policies were more 
explicitly and overtly manoeuvred by the Malaysian government for specific political 
purposes.  
 As I have discussed in sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.2, however, homosexual behaviour 
was already criminalised under colonially-created civil and Islamic laws, i.e. long 
before Anwar was sacked. This does not mean that Islamic rulings did not exist before 
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British colonialism, only that these were not uniformly enforced. At best, there were 
Islamic digests and codes in the different Malay sultanates but it is unclear to what 
extent their contents were applied (tan, 2012b: 350).  
 The state and more specifically the ‘Syariah lobby’ (tan, 2012a: 53) are therefore 
not advocating something entirely new, but rather want to strengthen and expand 
existing Islamic legislation. In this context, the state is not a non-partisan arbiter of 
public debate – state officials and government ministers actively politicise and polarise 
public debate on Islam and sexual diversity.  
 Since the late 1990s, the state has continued to politicise and polarise notions of 
Islam and sexuality on different levels at different moments. At times, UMNO leaders 
and the UMNO-owned mass media demonise homosexuality in thinly and not-so-thinly 
veiled references to Anwar, while at others, the ‘Syariah lobby’ whip up seemingly 
non-Anwar-related panics about sexual deviance. Sometimes only sexual minorities are 
attacked but at other times they are lumped together with Syiah and liberal Muslims 
and other so-called ‘deviants’, amid state-sanctioned rhetoric that paints ‘human rights’ 
as a threat to ‘Islam’ (Bernama, 2014).  
 Such sentiments against sexual and other minorities are espoused amid growing 
contestations of the state – especially since the 2008 and 2013 elections – by civil 
society actors demanding more accountable and democratic government. The 2008 
elections in particular took place amid widespread discontent against the ruling 
coalition and Mahathir’s successor, then Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (J. 
C. H. Lee et al., 2010: 294–295). In the run-up to the elections, these grievances were 
expressed in mass demonstrations consisting of multi-ethnic, multi-religious 
participants. In late 2007 alone, there were protests by Malaysian Bar Council members 
against corruption in the judiciary; the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections 
(BERSIH), petitioning the monarchy for electoral reforms; and the Hindu Rights 
Action Force (HINDRAF) highlighting the exploitation of Indians in colonial Malaya.  
 Following these developments, the 2008 general election left the UMNO-led 
Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition severely weakened, winning its slimmest victory since 
independence in 1957. Commentators regarded the BN’s loss of its two-thirds majority 
in Parliament as a watershed in Malaysian politics (J. C. H. Lee et al., 2010: 293). In 
light of their massive gains, the three major opposition parties – the DAP, PKR and 
PAS – formed the People’s Alliance (PR). Within months, however, Anwar was hit 
with new accusations of sodomy but still contested in a by-election and was returned to 
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Parliament, becoming Leader of the Opposition. He was charged with sodomy a second 
time the same year, but was acquitted by the High Court in 201266.  
 The events of 2008 resulted in an expansion of civil society and backlash by the 
BN federal government, intensified by the formation of pro-regime, ultranationalist 
Malay groups, the most prominent being PERKASA (the Association for Indigenous 
Empowerment) (Welsh, 2013: 139). Against this backdrop, BERSIH continued 
organising public demonstrations for electoral reform in 2011 (as BERSIH 2.0) and 
2012 (as BERSIH 3.0), which were violently broken up by the police. UMNO leaders, 
Malay ultranationalists and UMNO-controlled media then intensified their targeting of 
BERSIH and those associated with it, most notably BERSIH 2.0 chairperson Ambiga 
Sreenavasan – a non-Muslim Indian – when she agreed to speak at the sexuality rights 
festival Seksualiti Merdeka in late 2011 (Surin, 2011).  
 Initiated in 2008, Seksualiti Merdeka is a loose collective of individuals and 
groups supporting gender equality and LGBT rights. After the BERSIH 2.0 
demonstrations and ensuing threats against Ambiga, Seksualiti Merdeka was banned by 
the police – a decision it has unsuccessfully challenged in court (Sklar & Poore, 2012). 
Seksualiti Merdeka had earlier courted controversy when it produced a series of 
YouTube videos in 2010, including one of Azwan Ismail – a Malay man in his early 
30s – coming out as gay. Azwan was threatened and condemned by the Syariah lobby 
and other Muslims online (Star, 2010), but has not been subjected to any legal action or 
vigilante persecution and still lives and works in Kuala Lumpur67.  
  In the 2013 general election, the BN lost the popular vote to the PR, with 47.4 
percent against 50.9 percent, but managed to retain government (Welsh, 2013: 136). 
This victory was somewhat made possible by Malaysia’s Westminster-style first-past-
the-post voting system, and also due to the malapportionment of electoral districts in 
the BN’s favour and other irregularities (Welsh, 2013: 140). Against this background, 
the state and other pro-regime actors continue to politicise homosexuality and LGBT 
rights, framing them as a Trojan horse that will be the undoing of Malaysian society. 
This position does not go uncontested by civil society actors – in fact, Muslim non-
                                                          
66 The government appealed and in March 2014 the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court’s 
acquittal (BBC, 2014). Anwar challenged this decision and at the time of writing, the Federal Court has 
reserved its verdict for a later date (Arukesamy, 2014).  
67 Personal communication, November 2011 and August 2013.  
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governmental organisations such as SIS and the Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF) 
openly criticise anti-LGBT expressions of Islam (Ahmad Fuad, 2011; Sisters in Islam, 
2011).  
 Within this political climate, not all gay Muslims in Malaysia are affected by the 
politics of sexuality in the same way. Some might not connect the state’s targeting of 
Anwar with their personal circumstances, while others might feel affronted by the state-
sanctioned anti-gay rhetoric. Many might feel conflicted in wanting to defend their 
position as Malays and Muslims but also wanting to protect their private sexual lives. 
Regardless of these individual perceptions, they need to negotiate how they express 
their sexuality in ways that escape the state’s regulation of homosexuality, often by 




 Gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain live in environments where highly visible 
contestations of Islam impact their identity constructions. However, the conditions 
influencing the place of Islam in their identity-making differ and are shaped by multiple 
factors associated with colonial legacies and domestic trajectories of modernisation.  
 In Malaysia, Islam is not just the religion of the majority – it is also the state 
religion and the Federal Constitution explicitly links it with Malay ethnicity. It informs 
numerous public policies, including syariah laws, and is used to underline other state-
led modernisation projects, including those giving rise to a Malay middle class starting 
from the 1970s. However, successive UMNO-led governments have had to manage 
diverse expressions of Islam, especially those espoused by political actors critical of the 
regime, such as PAS. This management of Islam also has to be balanced with the 
management of wider ethnic and religious diversity. Within this context, various civil 
and syariah laws are often used by the authoritarian government to stifle debate and 
dissent in relation to Islam, even though Malaysia is formally a parliamentary 
democracy. Being Muslim is therefore not merely a religious and/or ethnic identity 
marker – the kind of Islam expressed by Muslims can also determine their economic 
and political fortunes.  
 With the sacking of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 on charges of 
corruption and sodomy, homosexuality became publicly vilified and politicised in 
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unprecedented ways. The expansion of an ethnically and religiously diverse civil 
society since then – calling for greater democracy and respect for human rights – has 
triggered further backlash by state leaders, Malay ultranationalists and the ‘Syariah 
lobby’. Against this backdrop, gay Muslims have to navigate increasingly politicised 
condemnations of sexual minorities in the name of Islam and weigh the costs and 
benefits of complying with state-approved expressions of Islam and Malay-ness.  
 In Britain, Islam was historically part of a landscape of multiple ‘Others’ – albeit 
with a small Muslim presence within the country during the colonial era – against 
which modern British identity was constructed. The bulk of the British Muslim 
population consists of immigrants arriving after WWII and the Empire’s dissolution. 
The resulting landscape of British Islam is heterogeneous, with much diversity and 
sometimes even division along ethnic lines. Beginning with controversies such as the 
Rushdie Affair in the late 1980s, British Muslims have not only become highly visible 
but also linked with conservative, anti-democratic or anti-Western attitudes – a view 
which has been exacerbated by the events of 9/11 and 7/7.  
 Muslims in Britain are also relatively more socio-economically deprived 
compared to other religious minorities, for example, experiencing higher levels of 
unemployment and ill health. This was one reason why Muslim activists, spearheaded 
by the MCB, began lobbying for official statistics on Islam – including a question on 
religion in the 2001 census – to justify socio-economic betterment for Muslims. Such 
campaigns are set against a background where Islam rather than ethnicity is becoming a 
primary referent in the identity constructions of British Muslims.  
 Meanwhile, the British state has also gradually evolved in its policies and 
attitudes on sexuality, going from partial decriminalisation of homosexuality in 1967 to 
the recognition of civil same-sex marriage in 2013. Within this context, the attitudes of 
British Muslims and other religious groups towards homosexuality have also come into 
the spotlight, especially when religious leaders seem out of step with more accepting 
public sentiment. Thus, gay Muslims in Britain – like gay Muslims in Malaysia – must 
navigate increasingly politicised notions of Islam and ethnicity alongside the 
assumption that Islam inherently condemns homosexuality. However, they do this as a 
minority within a minority in a liberal democracy.  
 This chapter’s comparison between Malaysia and Britain demonstrates that 
conceptions of ‘Islam’ and ‘sexuality’ are socially and historically contingent and 
shaped by multiple actors. Thus, while gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain are 
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affected by widespread assumptions that Islam condemns homosexuality, they engage 
with them under different national circumstances.   
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Chapter 4: The making of a gay Muslim 
 
In the previous chapter, I compared the wider contexts of Islam and sexuality in 
Malaysia and Britain to set the stage for analysing the construction of gay Muslim 
identities in both countries. In this and the next two chapters, I draw upon my 
ethnographic data to investigate how my British and Malaysian participants came to see 
and express themselves as ‘gay’ and ‘Muslim’.  
In this chapter, I unpack how my participants came to make sense of their 
apparently incompatible religious and sexual identities. To do this, I follow Becker’s 
(1998: 26-27) suggestion to look at the processes enabling individuals to make 
seemingly improbable or unexpected life choices. My aim here is to analyse the 
adaptations that my participants made or did not make to come to identify as gay and 
Muslim. I do this by examining the choices and constraints in expressing their religious 
and sexual identities, and demonstrate that ethnicity is a related, even pivotal, but 
sometimes unstated factor in the bigger picture. I argue that it is increasingly possible in 
both countries for them to claim and hold ‘gay Muslim’ identities by taking advantage 
of available spaces and opportunities to challenge, modify, or subvert institutional 
authority.  
I frame my analysis by engaging with Mary Douglas’s (2002: 44) 
conceptualisation of how the cultural boundaries between what we consider permissible 
and impermissible, legitimate and illegitimate, or ‘purity’ and ‘dirt’ are socially 
constructed.  According to her, we often apply our conceptions of ‘dirt’ to that which 
we are unable to classify or order into a coherent system, i.e. ‘matter out of place’. 
Within this framework, ‘purity’ and ‘dirt’ can be conceived in concrete or symbolic 
terms, for example imagining society as a body to be defended against real and 
symbolic pollution. Douglas (2002: 194) argues further that compared with other social 
pressures, sexual relations have greater potential to be perceived and interpreted as 
contaminating the internal ‘purity’ of a particular social body. By examining the 
boundary between the pure and impure, we can therefore understand much about the 
construction of hierarchies and relations between and within groups.  
Examining why so many people think of gay Muslims as ‘out of place’ or 
embodying moral ‘pollution’ can therefore help us learn more about the socially 
constructed boundaries between sexuality and religion. We can ask how people who 
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feel ‘out of place’ find ways to belong within wider society. To explain how gay 
Muslims make these choices, I find it useful to engage with Robert Merton’s (1968: 
672–673) typology of people’s ‘role adjustments’ to negotiate ‘acceptable modes of 
achieving […] culturally defined goals, purposes and interests’. 
We can also ask if the perception that gay Muslims are ‘out of place’ 
symbolises other assumptions about divides between societies or ideologies, for 
example between the so-called ‘West’ and ‘Islam’. Who exactly creates and polices 
these boundaries and can they shift or dissolve? Joseph Massad (2002: 362) argues that 
Western LGBT activists inadvertently strengthen these boundaries by regarding 
Muslim sexual minorities as victims needing to be saved from ‘Islam’, which they often 
construe as inherently homophobic. As I have discussed in greater depth in Chapter 
2.1.3, Massad also argues that ‘LGBT’ is Eurocentric terminology imposed by Western 
governments, activists, academics, and journalists upon non-Westerners.  
Massad has been critiqued on various grounds, but usefully points out that 
Western and Muslim ideologues often use sexual identity to imagine a binary between 
the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’. This, however, is not the focus of this chapter which explores 
how gay Muslims adapt, transplant and use local and imported concepts in ways they 
find personally meaningful. Instead, I take up Afsaneh Najmabadi’s (2011: 550) call to 
look at ‘what the borrowing, appropriation, and embracing [of sexual concepts and 
practices] means for the importers’. The cases I discuss therefore complicate or 
challenge some of Massad’s generalisations.  
I also highlight that some of the diverse conceptions and expressions of gender 
and sexuality among Muslims are rooted in history, using my Malaysian cases as 
examples. I engage critically with Michael Peletz’s (2011: 661) contention that there 
was a certain degree of ‘gender pluralism’ in Muslim Southeast Asia before the advent 
of Western colonialism68. I demonstrate that while this may be true, gay Muslims rarely 
draw upon this history consciously when forming their present-day identities. Rather, 
they adapt and experiment with various expressions of religion and sexuality, with 
some conforming to wider society’s expectations more than others.  
Structurally, the chapter begins with an ethnographic section comparing two 
episodes – of Ramadan gatherings organised by some gay Muslims in London and 
Kuala Lumpur – to introduce some common themes in the construction of gay Muslim 
                                                          
68 Discussed further in Chapter 2.1.2.  
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identities. This paves the way for two substantial sections – the first analysing the steps 
that my participants took and continue taking to identify as Muslim and the second 
focusing on their journeys in identifying as gay. This leads to a final section examining 
how notions of ethnicity contribute and complicate their engagement with religion and 
sexuality. This section argues that in forging their sexual and religious identities, they 
also draw upon and respond to some of the unstated assumptions among wider society 
linking religion with ethnicity.  
 
4.1 Two iftaris 
 
 In this section, I narrate my experiences at two different iftaris organised by gay 
Muslims in Britain and Malaysia. Through detailed descriptions of the people I 
interacted with, I analyse some similar patterns which can illuminate how gay Muslims 




In July 2013, my partner Giles and I attend an iftari in East London organised 
by Imaan. Imaan organises regular iftaris every Ramadan which began in London but 
now also take place in Manchester and Birmingham. We’ve arrived early because I am 
here to help Ebrahim, a gay South Asian male in his early 20s, co-facilitate a pre-iftar 
discussion, Demystifying Shariah.   
Around ten Imaan members show up for the session proper, from various ethnic 
backgrounds and doctrinal orientations within Islam. They are: Rabia, a lesbian 
Pakistani Shii in her early 40s who is Ebrahim’s co-facilitator; Ananta, a bisexual 
Bengali in his early 20s; Azeez, a gay Pakistani in his late 30s; Salman, a gay Pakistani 
and self-confessed former Salafi69 in his late 20s; Nat, a gay Southeast Asian convert to 
Islam in his early 20s; Luqman, a gay Indian convert to Shii Islam in his mid-20s; Noel, 
a gay South Asian of East African origin in his mid-20s; Sumaiya, an East African 
woman in her 20s who is new to the group; Imtiaz, a student from Pakistan in his early 
                                                          




20s; and Abdul, a gay Egyptian temporarily in London and in his mid-20s. More than 
half were born and raised in Britain.  
I introduced the Demystifying Shariah workshop to Imaan in April 2012, 
adapted from a module developed by Sisters in Islam (SIS) (2004). The SIS workshops 
focus on how Islamic jurisprudence was historically constructed and contemporary 
Muslim laws impact on gender, which I drew upon but added material on same-sex 
relations70. Today’s workshop by Ebrahim and Rabia is a shortened version of the full-
day session I piloted in 2012. 
Demystifying Shariah usually starts with a discussion on the socially constructed 
dimensions of ‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’, followed by a session on Quranic hermeneutics 
focusing specifically on gender and sexuality. This leads to separate sessions analysing 
hadith and fiqh, followed by a chronology of developments in the constructions of 
shariah throughout Islamic history. In today’s shortened version, Rabia will lead a brief 
discussion on the Quran and Ebrahim on the hadith.  
This is Rabia and Ebrahim’s first experience in facilitating this session so I agree 
to assist them in case they get stuck. They are aware that in addition to discussing 
content, they should also refrain from displaying bias towards particular madhahib, or 
schools of jurisprudence, which is also SIS’s approach. Like SIS, however, Imaan now 
presents these sessions as a means to advocate for more egalitarian and inclusive 
interpretations of Islam, specifically regarding gender and sexuality. 
At the end of Rabia’s and Ebrahim’s presentations, some hands go up. Abdul and 
Ananta, in particular, want to know if we more fully address what the Quran ‘says’ 
about homosexuality. Ebrahim assures them that we do, and I add that for this, we also 
draw upon the work of the openly gay American Muslim scholar Scott Siraj Al-Haqq 
Kugle71.  
Others are interested in whether the Quranic narrative of the Prophet Lot is the 
same as Jewish and Christian narratives of the Biblical Lot. I say we do not have the 
benefit of a Jewish presence today but invite Giles, who is an Anglican priest, to tell us 
how some gay Christians approach the Hebrew Scriptures and New Testament. 
According to Giles, inclusive Christians understand the story of Lot in the book of 
                                                          
70 I explained my involvement with Sisters in Islam and how I introduced ‘Demystifying Shariah’ into 
Imaan in more detail in Chapter 1.2.3.   
71 I reviewed his work in detail in Chapter 2.1.1.  
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Genesis as condemning arrogance, inhospitality and male rape, not consensual and 
loving same-sex relationships. I respond that this is similarly how Kugle and other 
progressive Muslims interpret the parallel Quranic narratives. I add that Imaan does 
not, however, seek to impose this interpretation of Islam on anyone but instead 
advocates diverse interpretations. Ananta smirks and says, ‘Oh, I fully intend to hit my 
parents on the head with this stuff.’*  
After the discussion ends, Ebrahim asks if I could lead congregational Asar 
prayers and a post-Asar zikr72, since there are still a few hours before iftar. I agree, and 
before we start we clarify to everyone that Imaan practices mixed-gender, non-sectarian 
prayers which are also open to non-Muslims. We also make it clear that congregational 
prayers in Imaan are not obligatory, so those who opt not to pray can relax and chat 
outside. About a third of the attendees do not participate, but Giles joins us and follows 
all the prayer movements.  
Over the next couple of hours, there is a steady trickle of new people arriving for 
the fast-breaking. Soon, we decide to play a guessing game in a large circle to distract 
ourselves from thirst and hunger. By the time iftar arrives, the table at the back of the 
room is laden with samosas, biryani, halal pizza, homemade Vietnamese summer rolls, 
chapatti, and different curries. The number of people in the room has tripled.  
When it’s time for Maghrib prayers, Salman asks if I’d like to lead, but I suggest 
it would be better for someone else to have a turn and ask Luqman if he’d like to73. 
Luqman accepts and some of us break to pray in a corner of the room while several 
others go on eating and chatting.  
When it’s time for Giles and me to leave, I lose track of the number of Imaan 
members I hug and give salam to. These goodbyes are especially long because I inform 
them that I’m going back to Malaysia in a few days and will be spending Eid-al-Fitr74 
there with my family. Several people say they will make dua (supplications) for me and 
my family and wish me a wonderful trip.  
 
                                                          
72 Devotional chanting and supplications usually associated with Sufi expressions of Islam.  
73 Imaan’s policy is to enable as many people taking turns leading prayers as possible – men, women, 
Sunnis, Shiis, newer and older members, etc.  
74 The end-of-Ramadan feast.  
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4.1.2 Kuala Lumpur 
 
Two Saturdays later, I am with two gay Malay men in a suburb on the outskirts of 
Kuala Lumpur just before buka puasa. I first met Dax and Zainal, both in their early 
30s, at a presentation I gave at SIS in November 201175. I stayed in touch and they 
eventually agreed to participate in my study – I conducted in-depth interviews with 
them during my first research visit in 2012.  
This time, when I informed them on Facebook about my return to Malaysia, Dax 
immediately asked, ‘Would you like to attend a buka puasa here?’* I told him I would 
be more than happy to, asking him to tell me more about it. He said it’s organised by a 
group of ‘bears’ in KL. After checking with the organiser, i.e. the Bear King, Dax told 
me I had been given the green light76.  
We are now walking in the grounds of the Bear King’s condominium complex. 
Dax and Zainal are not fasting, but I am. On our way, we bump into three Malay men 
getting out of a car and carrying several bags of food. Dax and Zainal recognise two of 
them, hugging them and giving salam. I give salam, clasp hands with all three men and 
introduce myself and learn that they have also come for the Bear King’s buka puasa.  
The Bear King hosts at least one buka puasa gathering at his house every year. 
He also hosts other parties, for example during the birthdays of some people within the 
circle of bears and their friends. Usually, it’s a very mixed crowd in terms of ethnic and 
religious background, but Dax tells me that tonight might be more predominantly 
Malay and Muslim because it’s Ramadan. It’s mostly attended by gay and bisexual men 
but sometimes their heterosexual male and female friends attend, too.  
When we finally get into the Bear King’s condominium, we are greeted by a 
dining table spilling over with food. I am embarrassed because I had no time to bring 
anything special but the Bear King greets me warmly and tells me not to worry – 
there’ll be plenty.  
The house is a stylish duplex that the Bear King shares with his live-in partner, 
Goh, a heavyset, polite and soft-spoken Chinese Malaysian man. Dax, Zainal and I 
                                                          
75 The presentation was based on my MA dissertation which examined the impacts of LGBT activism 
within the Church of England.  
76 Dax and Zainal are not bears, and neither am I – the Bear King’s parties are meant to be inclusive.  
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make our way to the plush living room area, where some men are already lounging on 
the huge sofa, the soft rug, or among scattered, giant cushions.  
Soon, one of the Malay men announces to everyone, ‘It’s time to berbuka!’ Some 
ask, ‘Are you sure? It’s not 7.30pm yet, is it?’ The Malay guy says, ‘Yes, because 
we’re in Petaling Jaya, we’re breaking at 7.28pm, not 7.30pm.’ A white Canadian rolls 
his eyes and whispers to me with a sneer, ‘What, so is it a different time in the State of 
Johor77 then?’ I reply, ‘Yes, it’s different in Johor.’* 
Soon, different conversation circles form and I find myself in one with the Bear 
King. I tell him about my research topic and he nods vigorously and says, ‘Yes, look, 
there’s a prayer space upstairs and it’s always full during my buka puasa gatherings 
because there will be people who want to pray.’ He continues, ‘Why should it be a big 
deal? You can be Muslim and you can be gay – why should people be so judgemental?’ 
He adds that his bookshelf has an entire section on theology.*  
At around 10pm, I find myself in another circle in the plush living room. 
Surrounding me are: Harun, a funny, loud Malay man in his 40s, wearing baju 
Melayu78; Walt, his Australian partner, also in his 40s and wearing baju Melayu and a 
songkok79; Charlie, a soft-spoken Chinese bear in his 30s; Saloma, a campy, cheerful 
Malay man in his 30s; Ning, a Malay-Javanese man in his 40s; Goh; the Bear King; and 
Zainal.  
Soon, Harun starts trying to recall the names of the gay venues that began 
mushrooming in KL from the 1980s, with others jumping in and trying to remember 
exactly what had happened, when, and where. Harun says he remembers that when 
Crooked Corner80 opened in the mid-1990s, they were very ‘radical’ and pushed for 
‘gay rights’ – he corrects himself and says ‘not gay rights, but gay lifestyle’. They even 
held a striptease performance once where he remembers the first performer stripping to 
complete nudity. But when the second performer had just taken his clothes off, the 
music stopped and the lights came on – the police were ‘raiding’ the place. There was 
an announcement on the sound system about the raid and the police escorted the 
performer, clad only in a towel at this point, out of the building.  
                                                          
77 The southernmost State in Peninsula Malaysia.  
78 Traditional Malay costume.  
79 Headgear for men.  
80 Not the actual name of the venue.  
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Harun says, ‘I was watching him, hoping and hoping that the towel would fall off 
but I didn’t say this to anyone. Suddenly a man beside me blurted out, wouldn’t it be 
sweet if that towel just came off!’ Everyone guffaws.*    
 
4.1.3 Comparing the iftaris 
 
How are these two iftaris related to wider perceptions of gay Muslims as ‘out of 
place’ or embodying moral ‘pollution’? Douglas (2002: 48) suggests that we can have 
different ways of ‘treating anomalies’. Negative treatments include ignoring or 
condemning them and positive treatments might involve creating a ‘new pattern of 
reality’ in which the anomaly has a place. These iftaris can therefore be seen as positive 
attempts by gay Muslims in London and Kuala Lumpur to create a ‘new pattern of 
reality’ in which they have a place. What are the building blocks of this alternative 
reality?  
Most significantly, the iftaris were an opportunity for gay Muslims to celebrate 
a religious ritual collectively as gay Muslims. The Imaan iftari explicitly catered for 
people of diverse sexualities and genders, while the Bear King’s buka puasa was a 
coming together of a particular subculture (‘bears’) within Malaysia’s wider gay 
‘scene’. Despite catering for a specific subculture, though, the Bear King’s buka puasa 
parties are open to non-bears, non-Muslims and non-gays, so long as he finds these 
individuals trustworthy.  
Imaan and the Bear King were able to convene these gatherings because they 
were held in urban spaces that those attending could feel safe in81, with much of the 
prior organising happening online. The Bear King had initially forwarded his buka 
puasa invitation to a closed list of contacts on the social networking site Facebook. 
Similarly, Imaan publicises its iftaris via Facebook, Twitter and its online forum, only 
disclosing a public meeting point at which an Imaan trustee will lead the attendees to 
the actual venue.  
                                                          
81 The London-based Imaan iftaris are usually held in the home of Ehsan, a senior Imaan trustee. I have 
attended Ehsan’s iftaris in the past and observed a similar light-heartedness there as I did at the Bear 
King’s buka puasa. On this particular Saturday, however, Ehsan’s place was unavailable and therefore 
some other Imaan trustees had organised for an alternative space. The proposal to conduct a 
Demystifying Shariah session at this iftari was also a first within Imaan.  
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The existence of these urban spaces allows Imaan and the Bear King to design 
these iftaris as social events and also for attendees to exchange information and insights 
on their specific concerns. At the Imaan iftari, they discussed various aspects of Islam 
as well as Imaan’s upcoming activities. At the Bear King’s party, they also discussed 
various aspects of religion and the gay scene in Kuala Lumpur but more informally. 
Furthermore, these iftaris were opportunities for Muslim sexual minorities to express 
Islam in whatever ways they felt comfortable, for example in the non-coercive, 
inclusive observance of congregational or individual prayers.  
Within these settings, the gay Muslims who attended not only felt comfortable 
expressing Islam in their own way but also critiquing religious and non-religious anti-
homosexual attitudes. In Kuala Lumpur, this was a bit more indirect and light-hearted 
despite moral policing being sanctioned and encouraged by the state, while the 
Demystifying Shariah workshop provided a more direct, structured discussion in 
London. In fact, the discussions and other practices in the Imaan iftari were specifically 
about creating expressions of Islam that were inclusive of gender, sexual and religious 
diversity82.   
Lastly, these iftaris also provided those who attended an opportunity to 
encounter people of diverse backgrounds, including gay non-Muslims. At the Imaan 
iftari, this even facilitated a critical exchange about how Christian and Muslim sexual 
minorities share similar strategies to interpret their sacred texts more inclusively.  
On the whole, both iftaris provided their gay Muslim attendees with 
opportunities to express their religious and sexual identities without being harassed by 
anti-gay or anti-Muslim actors. They are examples of how gay Muslims can avoid or 
bypass formal and informal Islamic authorities by making use of urban spaces to gather 
and interact safely enjoyably. They illustrate how people who are ‘out of place’ can 
forge social networks and use spaces creatively to foster a sense of individual belonging 
and group solidarity. Yet, what were the pivotal points in these gay Muslims’ own lives 




                                                          
82 I discuss these ‘gay expressions of Islam’ in more detail in Chapter 6.  
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4.2 Making, unmaking and remaking Islam 
 
 In this section, I introduce a Malaysian Muslim, Rohana, in her late 20s, to 
show how gay Muslims shape their understandings of Islam based on a combination of 
external interactions and internal reflection.  After discussing Rohana’s story, I 
compare it with the stories of Ebrahim and Rasheed, two gay Muslim men in their early 
20s from Britain. To understand how they have fashioned their individual 
understandings of Islam in relation to their sexuality, I draw upon Robert Merton’s 
typology of our ‘role adjustments’ in different circumstances.  
 
4.2.1 Rohana’s story 
 
8pm, Thursday night. I am in Petaling Jaya, a satellite city of Kuala Lumpur, for 
a game of indoor football, or futsal.  I am in a building that looks like a warehouse 
housing four futsal pitches. Three are currently occupied by teams of young men who 
appear to be of various ethnic backgrounds. I enter the fourth pitch, the only one with 
women, one of whom is Rohana while the other two are our mutual friends.  
Soon, the pitch fills up with a few more men and women including two Malay 
women, Rafika and Elisa. Rafika, a mutual acquaintance of Rohana’s and mine, has her 
hair in a ponytail and appears quite feminine. Elisa is wearing a red football jersey and 
black shorts. With her glasses and almost-Mohawk hairstyle, she – like Rohana – looks 
like a teenage boy. Rafika and Elisa are Muslim and I know that they are a couple, but I 
wonder if everyone else does as well.  
When the game is over we gather around some tables and chairs in the lobby 
area, panting and sweaty. We are surrounded by grunting, laughing, and swearing men 
on the other pitches, other men lounging in the lobby, and the blaring of a sports 
channel on television. I am gulping down a sports drink and notice that Elisa is on 
Rafika’s lap, in full view of everyone. Occasionally, they hug and are physically 
affectionate, and I’m surprised that they are so openly tactile here.  
After playing futsal with Rohana and her friends, I understand why she 
describes these friends, who see themselves as Muslim feminists, as her community.  
Rohana is what many Malays would call a ‘pengkid’ – a colloquial, often pejorative 
term describing masculine women who desire feminine women. In October 2012, just 
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after a Malaysian television station ran a documentary series portraying pengkids in a 
negative light, she was verbally and physically harassed on the street near her home.  
Tonight, however, Rohana feels safe and appears to be enjoying herself. She 
later told me she did not expect to become friends with so many Muslim feminists – she 
was merely looking for a job in Kuala Lumpur to pay the bills and ended up getting to 
know them through work. When she found out just how strongly feminist so many of 
her colleagues and their friends were she thought they were ‘deviant’ and freaked out: 
  
I was like, oh my God, who are these people? I didn’t say anything 
to anyone […] But I was like, because everyone […] was so kind, 
very kind, that was what made me feel that […] all the negative 
perceptions people have about them, they’re twisted83.  
 
Rohana is comfortable with these Muslim feminist friends knowing about her 
gender identity and sexual preference. In fact, through the influence of numerous 
discussions with these friends and other feminist activists, Rohana now says, ‘I prefer 
to describe myself as “trans man84” rather than pengkid.’ When I ask her why, she says 
she agrees with the activists she’s met that ‘pengkid’ is derogatory. She says, ‘Because 
they say that “trans man” doesn’t mean that you have to go for sex reassignment 
surgery or anything. If you just, how to say, want to dress this way, you can call 
yourself this [….] I think I prefer this.’ 
When Rohana was growing up, she believed that Islam condemned people like 
her. In secondary school, she had several girlfriends and was often reprimanded by one 
of her Islamic Studies teachers who caught on to this. The teacher made her attend 
counselling sessions during which Rohana was told that Allah had meted out a terrible 
punishment to the people of Lot, which troubled and terrified her. Now, however, she 
says:  
 
I feel that Islam is not a religion that only pinpoints people’s faults. I 
feel that actually Islam is more like, to me, when I read the 
                                                          
83 For example, the constant demonising of SIS by state and non-state Islamic actors is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3.2.2.  
84 I.e. transgender man, but she is still comfortable being referred to with the feminine pronoun.  
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translations [of the Quran] bit by bit, what I understand, the Quran, 
Islam, it’s asking us to live our lives, to do good for humanity, I feel 
it’s that. It’s not like, you only find fault in people, and you want to 
punish, punish, punish, punish. 
 
According to Rohana she revised her views on Islam based on her own study of 
the Quran and reflections on it. Yet it was her Muslim feminist friends who first 
exposed her to alternative ways of looking at Islam. It was probably a combination of 
meaningful interactions with friends and her own individual initiative that led Rohana 
to develop an understanding of Islam affirming her gender identity and sexuality. 
Would all gay Muslims respond to this combination of external and internal factors in 
the same way? In the next section, I further explore how and why some of them 




4.2.2 Adaptations of faith 
 
Rohana’s story allows us to glimpse how some people develop specific self-
understandings and behaviours based on wider social and cultural pressures and their 
own internal aspirations. Merton (1968: 672-673) divides the various social and cultural 
constraints into two ‘elements’ – ‘[the] first consists of culturally defined goals, 
purposes and interests’, while the second ‘defines, regulates, and controls the 
acceptable modes of achieving these goals’.   
Merton (1968: 677–678) suggests that individuals adapt to the structural 
conditions of society in five broad ways: conformists accept dominant ‘culture goals’ 
and socially regulated ‘norms’; innovators accept the goals but reject the socially 
regulated ways of achieving them; ritualists reject the goals but conform to the norms; 
retreatists reject the goals and norms; and rebels want to overturn existing structures 
and introduce a ‘new social order’ altogether. Merton clarifies that he is not freezing 
people into personality types but categorising their ‘role adjustments in specific 
situations’. One useful way of examining Rohana’s experiences with Islam is to look at 
the ‘role adjustments’ she has made at specific points in her life.  
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Like many Muslims, Rohana was brought up to believe that Islam forbids 
homosexuality and non-conformity to clear-cut gender roles. Islamic teachings and 
practices have always defined the background of her life. She attended a state-run all-
girls’ school which, in the late 1990s, made it compulsory for all Muslim students to 
wear the tudung. Still, many girls only put the tudung on after they entered the school 
gates and would take it off as soon as school was dismissed. Many also did not wear 
tudung for sports practise or other extra-curricular activities85.  
At home, Rohana’s late father would read and memorise the Quran every day 
and listen to daily Islamic sermons on the local radio station. Once, when Rohana and 
her siblings were watching a local variety programme on television he told them those 
sorts of shows were sinful.  
All of Rohana’s sisters and her mother now wear the tudung but her mother has 
never pressured her to wear it. When Rohana started cutting her hair very short at the 
age of 13 – like a boy, she says – her mother never scolded her or asked her to stop. 
Rohana says, however, ‘After a while, when I was like 17 or so, when all my cousins 
started wearing tudung, she started, she didn’t ask me to wear the tudung, but she 
persuaded me to keep my hair long.’ Rohana did not comply.  
Thus, even though it appears that Rohana’s childhood was infused with 
normative and conservative interpretations of Islam, in practise her mother and many of 
her friends did not expect her to absorb every last drop. In fact Rohana, like many other 
gay Muslims I encountered in Malaysia and Britain, experienced a range of everyday 
expressions of Islam and adapted or rebelled depending on the circumstances. Like 
Rohana, all my participants reported initially believing that Islam forbids 
homosexuality in the strongest terms.  
How can Merton’s scheme of ‘role adjustments’ help illuminate how someone 
like Rohana responds to the cultural goals and socially-regulated norms of Islam in 
Malaysia? For one, Rohana’s father and teachers could be seen as conformists, but 
Rohana alternated between innovating in certain spheres and making a show of obeying 
the rules (‘ritualism’) in others. For example, she once did accept widespread cultural 
expectations for Muslim women – to cover their hair and get married – yet found ways 
to resist the tudung and explored romantic relationships with girls.  
                                                          
85 I attended an all-boys secondary school in the mid-1990s which was near an all-girls school and 
witnessed similar dynamics around the tudung.  
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After finding her Muslim feminist friends, however, Rohana started questioning 
punitive expressions of Islam while trying to make the religion personally meaningful 
by innovating on her understandings of its dominant teachings. This is how she has 
developed a new perception of Islam as an inclusive religion, and has adapted and 
transformed it for herself within her particular circumstances. 
Gay Muslims in Britain make similar ‘role adjustments’ within a different social 
context of Islam. Take the experiences of Rasheed and Ebrahim, who are both of South 
Asian background and grew up in an industrial, working class area in the northwest of 
England. Rasheed and Ebrahim are second generation British Indians and their parents 
made them attend the local madrasa (mosque school) every day after school. Ebrahim 
says:  
 
So, we learned how to […] read the Quran in Arabic. We read kitabs 
or books on, you know, how to pray namaz, how to do wuzu (ritual 
ablutions), learn prayers, you know, about burial, quite a variety of 
things. It was mainly a lot of […] it was kind of things you are and 
you aren’t allowed to do in Islam. Even to the minutiae of how to 
sleep in the sunnah86 way.   
 
In Ebrahim’s Indian Muslim neighbourhood, parents sent their children to the 
mosque to socialise them into accepting the community’s goal to live as Muslims in 
Britain. The mosque teachers thus helped socialise the neighbourhood’s children into 
becoming ‘good’ Indian Muslims in Britain. Nevertheless, Ebrahim says he was 
dissatisfied with the lack of intellectual content in his madrasa studies:  
 
It was, you know, this is Islam, what we are telling you. You do this, 
don’t question it. There’s no need to ask questions because this is 
what it is. Nothing was justified in terms of, well, we do this because 
in the Quran it says this. It’s just, ‘We do this.’   
 
In his account, Ebrahim is not reacting against the content of the Quran per se but 
rather the authoritarianism of his mosque teachers. Rasheed experienced something 
                                                          
86 I.e. as practised by the Prophet Muhammad.  
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similar and explains how his parents would echo his mosque teachers’ attitudes: ‘I used 
to be in that situation and that made me used to hate Islam so much, like, you know, go 
do namaz, go do namaz, pray your namaz, dadadada, digging at you all the time.’ 
Like Rohana, Ebrahim and Rasheed grew up in environments where the closest 
Muslim authority figures in their lives – parents and teachers – were highly conformist 
and authoritarian. However, even though Ebrahim and Rasheed grew up in near-
identical contexts, Ebrahim’s response alternated between innovation and ritualism, 
whereas Rasheed showed flashes of rebellion even from a young age.  
Rasheed has a learning disability which went undiagnosed throughout his 
childhood and he used to get hit for not reciting the Quran fluently. He says:  
 
First I used to accept it. Second, I used to be like, this is unacceptable, 
and because of that, I’ll show you what I’m made of. And I used to 
terrorise the mosque teachers, and they used to hate me [….] I used to 
do so many things, like, oh God, like we used to lock the doors of the 
mosque, the teachers can’t come in [….] (Laughs) I remember one 
point, finding loads of dead spiders and putting them onto where the 
mosque teacher sits, and he sat on the spiders (giggles) and the other 
kids screamed really loud. 
 
Rasheed explains further that his rebellious actions were only possible because he 
was supported by other mosque ‘terrorists’. Rasheed and Ebrahim, unlike Rohana, then 
both went through a retreatist stage as well, where they contemplated renouncing Islam 
altogether, i.e. its goals and norms. Like Rohana, however, Rasheed and Ebrahim have 
now found what they describe as a community that accepts them – Imaan. This means 
that Imaan provides them a safe space from the anti-gay attitudes they associate with 
their Indian Muslim community’s version of Islam and the anti-Muslim attitudes they 
experience sometimes among certain sectors of British society, including the gay scene.  
Coming into contact with Imaan has also allowed them to rebel against 
homophobic and misogynistic expressions of Islam, and to innovate between 
conventional Islamic practices and new understandings of it as an inclusive religion. 




Imaan is a community that I’m really grateful for. I think, you know, 
within Imaan, some of these people I’d pick out for being kind of like 
my family, and everybody else is extended family as it were. So yeah, 
the queer Muslim community I think are my community. 
 
Even so, Ebrahim and Rasheed innovate and rebel differently from each other. For 
example, Rasheed still steadfastly keeps halal in terms of food and drink, while 
Ebrahim is not too concerned.  
These stories of Ebrahim, Rasheed and Rohana illustrate the options open to 
Muslims in modern societies to engage with Islam in different situations and at different 
stages in their lives. At every step, these Muslims could respond in any of the five ways 
that Merton has outlined, and they might even alternate between more than one response 
at any point. They might comply with the surrounding cultural and social expectations 
of Islam by choice to some extent and because they feel pressured to conform to 
particular conventions and norms. Others may have gone through similar experiences as 
Ebrahim and Rasheed, but decide to retreat from or renounce Islam altogether.  This is a 
viable option in a country like Britain, where the state does not deliberately impose 
legal and political constraints on affiliating or disaffiliating with Islam. In Malaysia, 
where there are heavy legal, political and social penalties for renouncing Islam, 
retreatism might often take the guise of ritualism, i.e. rejecting the goals of Islam but 
keeping up the appearance of adhering to its norms87.  
The experiences of not conforming to social and cultural expectations of gender 
and sexuality lead some gay Muslims to fluctuate between or experiment with 
conformist and non-conformist expressions of Islam. Many of those who end up 
conforming would probably have chosen to do so thoughtfully and carefully but there is 
no guarantee that they will ‘settle’ into this role permanently. In the next section, I 
discuss how culture and social structure shape how people express themselves as 
gendered and sexual beings.  
                                                          
87 In fact, when I separately approached two individuals for interviews in Malaysia – Dax and 
Wahid – they were initially doubtful that they were the ‘right’ people. Both said they privately do 
not identify as Muslim anymore even though by official state categorisation they were ‘Muslim’. I 
reassured them that I had no negative views about this but wanted to understand the various 




4.3 Naming romantic and erotic desires 
 
 When people decide to adopt particular identity labels, they are not necessarily 
or merely describing what they are – they are also announcing particular preferences 
which allow them to associate with others who share these preferences. A person’s 
preferred label for sexual identity therefore describes his or her sexual and social 
preferences. For example, a ‘queer’ woman and ‘bisexual’ man might use ‘queer’ and 
‘bisexual’ to describe their sexual attraction to both men and women. These labels 
might also signify their preference for a particular imagined community of ‘queers’ or 
‘bisexuals’, or a politics of being ‘queer’ rather than ‘bisexual’ and vice versa.  
 This section looks at how gay Muslims construct logics of sexuality for 
themselves and addresses the notion that ‘gay’ is an ‘imported’ or ‘imposed’ term when 
applied to Muslim sexual minorities. I show how, instead of passively accepting it as an 
‘imposed’ label, gay Muslims play and experiment with a range of foreign and local 
terms for self-expression. I focus on examples from Malaysia that especially complicate 
the idea that English terms are incompatible with Malay or ‘local’ concepts because 
they are ‘foreign’ or ‘Western’.  
 
4.3.1 The logic of sexual attraction 
 
Amin is a Malay man in his mid-20s, born and raised in a small town in the 
northern region of Peninsula Malaysia nearing the border with Thailand. In his teenage 
years, he was a promising athlete and represented Malaysia at several regional sporting 
events and alternated between schooling in his village and training at a sports complex 
in Kuala Lumpur. For the past nine years, Amin has been in a sexual and romantic 
relationship with Ebry, a man who is 10 years older. They live together with Ebry’s 
mother and siblings. 
Amin does not identify as gay and says he is ‘straight’. When I ask what he 
understands about being ‘gay’, he confesses that it is not something that makes 




Is it like, I apom88 you first, and then when I’ve climaxed, I’ve 
ejaculated and everything, then you apom me? Is it like that? I don’t 
know, I can’t figure it out. Or is it that you both masturbate and 
ejaculate and you think, wow, that’s nice? I have no idea. (Laughs.) 
I’ve never experienced it. 
 
Reflecting upon his incredulity about gay sex, Amin suggests that it might stem 
from his particular understanding of what it means to be male or female and masculine 
or feminine: 
 
I’m not disgusted by [gay sex]. I just feel like, I can’t imagine, how do 
they do it? […] If it were me, I don’t know, I couldn’t do it […] 
because […] I don’t desire it, right? I’m aroused by the womanly, like 
for example I’m aroused by this person (gestures towards Ebry). It’s 
like even his body is a bit feminine, so that’s my taste. I like him, and I 
get aroused looking at him. That’s what it is. If he came and was like 
(he grunts like a gorilla here), it’s over. I’ll automatically go limp.  
 
Amin understands ‘gay’ as referring to masculine men who are attracted to other 
masculine men. As a masculine man who is attracted to feminine men and women, 
Amin concludes that he is not ‘gay’ but ‘straight’. In fact, he also confesses being 
sexually active with girls since his early teens89.  
I ask, ‘So is Ebry the woman, then?’  
Amin replies, ‘Yes, Ebry’s the woman. He counts as a woman. Isn’t 
that right, Ebry?’  
Ebry and I giggle when he says this.  
‘So, do you want to be with him forever?’ 
‘Insya Allah. If God permits us to be together forever, then yes.’  
Amin’s experiences and the way he articulates his sexuality seem to fly in the face 
of popularly understood gender and sex categories. Should we refer to him as ‘gay’? He 
says he is not, and based on Eurocentric understandings of ‘gay’ some people might 
                                                          
88 Literally, ‘pancake’ – a euphemism for penetrative anal sex.  
89 Although he never engaged in penetrative sex, anal or vaginal.  
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accuse him of being in denial or in the closet. It is clear, however, that Amin does not 
try to deny or conceal his desire for Ebry. He sees his relationship with Ebry as 
homosexual in appearance but heterosexual in essence – he is, as he says, attracted to 
the feminine.  
This means that he is also attracted to feminine women, but does this make him 
bisexual? He does not identify in this way – he feels and presents himself as a 
masculine man and is attracted only to feminine men or women. By his logic, this still 
makes him ‘straight’.  
There is no reason to doubt Amin’s reasons for identifying as ‘straight’, his 
qualification that he is not anti-gay, or his love for Ebry. In fact, Amin has stood up to 
his colleagues and friends who have questioned his relationship with Ebry. He says he 
has lost many friends in this way and only stays in touch with the very few who are 
non-judgemental: 
 
But my friends, most of them have said nasty things. Like they say 
Amin, what’s this, going with a darai90? You were once a playboy, 
Amin! You liked [women’s genitals]. You can still get some of that, 
why go for [Ebry]?  
 
Amin says he stands up to these friends but does not want to be too 
confrontational. He still wants to be able to fit in with his village community and with 
society in general. He therefore balances being open to his village community about his 
relationship with Ebry and maintaining his identity as a ‘straight’ man.  This is possible 
in his village because it includes some individuals who do not conform to dominant 
norms of gender and sexuality, as he elaborates when I ask for examples:  
 
Amin: Couples, like, a man with another man, no, there weren’t any. 
But there’s like this ponen91, what’s his name, it’s Haih, I think – 
Shanon: So he’s from the same village?  
Amin: Yes, the same village, but he is soft, a ponen [….] One day he 
said to his mum, you know what he said? Mum, I’m pregnant. I’m 
                                                          
90 Derogatory term for ‘effeminate man’ in northwestern Malay patois.  
91 The occasional pronunciation of ‘pondan’ – explained in note 92 – in north-western Malay patois.  
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craving mangoes – could you get some for me? And his mother went 
along with it! She said, sure thing, I’ll get some mangoes for you. So 
she went and announced to all the villagers that her son was 
pregnant. The villagers were like, how did your son get pregnant? 
[…] Isn’t he a man? The mother said how should I know? He told me 
he’s pregnant so I’m looking for mangoes for him! I laughed until my 
sides hurt when I saw this.   
Shanon: But did the villagers insult or condemn them?  
Amin: No, there were no insults, they just laughed. There was no like, 
look at you, your son’s a darai, nothing that extreme [….] But in my 
village there are narrow-minded people, too. Not many, though. 
They’re like two per cent or three per cent, not many of them. But the 
rest are OK, no problems with them.  
 
Ebry often follows Amin back to his village and sleeps in Amin’s parents’ 
house, calling the mother ‘mum’ and the father ‘dad’. When I ask how the other 
villagers react to Ebry’s presence, Ebry interjects and says, ‘A beautiful woman is 
visiting their village, dear, what do you think?’ Amin confirms that Ebry gets along 
with the villagers.   
Yet, if his village community is so tolerant, what is stopping Amin from no 
longer identifying as a ‘straight man’ to acknowledge that he is now in love with 
another male? One clue might be in Ebry’s self-understanding of gender and sexuality, 
which complements Amin’s. Ebry says:  
 
I think the best word for me is I’m a pondan92 [….] Pondan is that, I 
love to be a woman, dress like a woman. But I don’t dress like a 
woman. Because, of course, the custom […] surrounding me, even 
though my mother accepts me, but I respect [the custom by not cross-
dressing]. 
 
                                                          
92 A Malay term that can be glossed as male-to-female transgender, slightly more fluid than the English 
‘transgender’ since it could also refer to effeminate gay men. Although it can be reclaimed in a neutral or 
even positive sense, as Ebry does here, it is more often used pejoratively.  
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In Merton’s terms, Ebry could be described as a ‘ritualist’ – even though he feels 
like a woman, he dresses as a man to conform to what he perceives as social and 
cultural expectations. However, there is no clear-cut separation between Ebry’s inner 
disposition and his rejection of external conventions. When I ask if he identifies as 
transsexual, he says:  
 
No, I don’t take myself as a transsexual. Because transsexual, in our 
opinion is, you are truly woman where you go for operation and you 
go for plastic surgery and all that to be a real woman. I can be 
sometimes transvestite, or a gay. 
 
Ebry rejects the idea that he is a ‘woman in a man’s body’ and goes on to employ 
multiple terms to describe his gender and sexuality. These seem to share a certain 
family resemblance – ‘pondan’, ‘transvestite’ and ‘gay’ – but contain subtle differences 
in meaning. He implies they are context specific – when he cross-dresses he is a 
transvestite and when he does not he is gay. Yet, he also feels like a woman on the 
inside which is why he thinks the best of all possible words to describe himself is 
pondan. At the same time, he rejects ‘transsexual’ because he does not want to modify 
his genitalia.  
When Ebry plays with these labels, he is ensuring that he can be different and still 
be part of his surrounding society. The region that he and Amin come from is not as 
urbanised as Kuala Lumpur – there are no gay nightclubs or a gay subculture there at 
the moment. Instead, there are spaces, such as Amin’s village and Ebry’s family home, 
where certain kinds of gender and sexuality diversity are tolerated but within traditional 
understandings of masculinity and femininity. In this context, it might be more 
appealing for Ebry to be ‘neither here nor there’ or ‘betwixt and between’ than to fix his 
identity as ‘gay’ or ‘transsexual’. Similarly, it also makes it easier for Amin to continue 
identifying as ‘straight’ rather than ‘gay’ or ‘bisexual’. For both, not explicitly or 
exclusively identifying as ‘gay’ (or ‘transsexual’ or ‘bisexual’) enables them to enjoy a 






4.3.2 Sexual consciousness: Imposed or indigenous?  
 
 The experiences of Amin and Ebry demonstrate that we need to unpack terms 
such as ‘LGBT’ or ‘gay’ – even when we use them as shorthand – to understand gender 
and sexual diversity across cultures. In a strong version of this view, Joseph Massad 
(2002: 372) argues that terms such as ‘gay’, ‘LGBT’, ‘homosexual’ and even 
‘heterosexual’ come out of a tradition of ‘Western sexual epistemology’. He argues that 
in the Arab world they are adopted only by ‘Westernised’, upper class and middle class 
Arabs who ‘remain a minuscule minority among those men who engage in same-sex 
relations and who do not identify as “gay” or express a need for gay politics’ (Massad, 
2002: 373).  
 According to Massad (2002: 362), these ‘Westernised’ gay Arabs/Muslims 
collaborate with international gay rights organisations to ‘liberate Arab and Muslim 
“gays and lesbians” from the oppression under which they allegedly live by 
transforming them from practitioners of same-sex contact into subjects who identify as 
homosexual and gay’. He argues that this liberationist impulse is driven by these 
activists’ assumptions that gay identity is universal and compounded by stereotypes 
about Islam’s supposed backwardness compared to the West. He concludes that such 
activism triggers Arab governments and Islamist ideologues to intensify 
‘antihomosexual’ programmes to oppose the ‘deviant’ and ‘debauched’ West (Massad, 
2002: 379).  
 Massad’s argument is potentially useful insomuch that he charts the ways in 
which some Western pro-gay ideologues and Muslim anti-gay ideologues counter-
demonise each other. According to him, in this escalating spiral of counter-demonising, 
it is people like Amin and Ebry who will suffer when gay rights activists insist on 
naming and shaming anti-gay attitudes in what they construe as ‘Islam’. In the backlash, 
Muslim-led governments will end up picking on easy, powerless targets like Amin and 
Ebry first, rather than Western-based gay rights groups.  
 This is what Ebry himself articulates when he justifies his opposition to the 
Kuala Lumpur-based LGBTQ initiative, Seksualiti Merdeka:  
 
Malaysia is not like London, or Malaysia is not like US [….] Malaysia 
is half Iran, and half US, that’s what it’s like. So you have to 
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understand that. So if you are doing gay rights activism, it’s not the 
half US part of Malaysia that will be there when we need them. The 
half US part is okay, they can enjoy the moment with us. But the half 
Iran part of Malaysia? These people are orthodox and conservative 
[and will] attack us until we cannot stand it anymore.  
 
Ebry sees Malaysia as polarised between the liberal, or what he glosses as the 
‘US’, and the conservative or fundamentalist, or ‘Iran’ as he puts it. In his estimation, 
conservatives hold the balance of power. He therefore does not oppose gay rights 
activism because he agrees that sexual minorities should be persecuted, but because he 
feels that Malaysian LGBT activists are out of touch with the reality outside Kuala 
Lumpur. Still, it is not that he has resigned himself to the dictates of state-sanctioned 
Islamic authorities – in fact he calls them ‘stupid’. Amin is similarly critical of the 
Islamic bureaucracy.  
This is why Massad’s argument is problematic when he posits that ‘gay’ Muslims 
only consist of middle- or upper-class elites who subscribe to a narrow ‘Western sexual 
epistemology’. People like Ebry and Amin do not live closed lives. Even though they 
live far from Kuala Lumpur – and even though Amin is of rural, working-class 
background – they have also been exposed to and engage with so-called ‘Western’ 
styles of living and being. They adapt, modify and play with different sexual labels – 
‘Western’ and ‘indigenous’ – depending on their circumstances. The difference is in 
how they play with their sexual identities on a personal level and how they become 
anxious of risks on a larger scale. They are less concerned with ‘Western sexual 
epistemology’ than the power and privilege wielded by anti-gay state and non-state 
actors, especially those who claim to act on behalf of Islam.  
 As Amin and Ebry show, on a personal level, people can play with ‘imported’ 
and ‘local’ concepts, trying some on in certain circumstances but not others, or mixing 
and matching different categories as they please. At this level, it makes little sense to 
speak of a divide between ‘Western’ or ‘non-Western’ sexual epistemologies or an 
‘imposition’ of ‘Western’ terms upon ‘indigenous’ Muslims.  
Attitudes can change, however, when these sexual labels become politicised at 
higher levels. This is what makes Ebry uncomfortable with gay rights activism in 
Malaysia, not with his own personal playfulness in using the term ‘gay’ as a self-
descriptor. As Najmabadi (2011: 550) suggests, we should ask: ‘What work does the 
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import do in its local context, in relation to the many other concepts and practices with 
which it becomes intertwined and that inform its meaning in the transplanted space?’  
 
4.3.3 Gender pluralism and sexual autonomy 
 
 According to Peletz (2011: 661), pre-modern and early modern Muslim societies 
in Southeast Asia tolerated a certain level of ‘gender pluralism’. He further argues that 
in the pre-modern era, Southeast Asian women were less socially inferior to men 
compared with women in Europe, East Asia, South Asia and Melanesia (Peletz, 2011: 
663). In this context, he suggests, homosexual relations were ‘legitimate (even imbued 
with sanctity)’ as long as they were ‘heterogender’ (Peletz, 2011: 665). It was therefore 
permissible, for example, for feminine men to have romantic and sexual relationships 
with masculine men but unthinkable for masculine men to have these relationships with 
each other.  
 Ebry and Amin’s relationship appears to fit into this ‘heterogender’ template, 
even though they do not consciously draw upon the myths, rituals and cosmology that 
Peletz refers to. There is also further evidence from the northwest of Peninsula Malaysia 
– where Amin and Ebry are from – that supports this logic of gender suggested by 
Peletz.  
In the Kedah93 State Museum, there is a row of three diorama exhibits of the 
region’s most popular and historic traditional Malay dances. This is the museum’s 
description of one of them:  
 
 The Hadrah is a stage performance, which incorporates singing and 
dancing. It has heavy early Islamic and Arabic influences and its lyrics 
are largely in Arabic. The Hadrah is usually performed at wedding 
and circumcision ceremonies.  
 
The Hadrah performances are sung with dances performed by four 
puteri (men dressed as princesses) and a rasuk who is the male 
character. The rasuk provides the humour content and tries to imitate 
                                                          
93 Kedah is a State in the northwest of Peninsula Malaysia. It is one of nine monarchical States – the 
other four are governorates. I visited the museum on 17 August 2013.  
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and throw the ‘princesses’ out of step. Besides the singing and 
dancing, the Hadrah also includes acting in the form of short sketches. 
The performances, which include all three performing art forms [i.e. 
drama, music, and dance], are usually held at night to enhance the 
festivities of particular occasions. 
 
Besides the hadrah, the other two Kedahan dances on display at the museum – the 
mek mulung and jikey – also involve female characters played by men. While not 
explicitly ‘gay’ in ways that would be intelligible to a contemporary Western audience, 
these dances demonstrate a history of cross-dressing and male-to-female gender-
bending in the Malay world.  This history forms part of the social and cultural fabric 
and probably informs how people like Amin and Ebry think of gender, albeit indirectly.   
According to Peletz, Malay society’s tolerance of ‘heterogender’ homosexual 
relationships was part of a pre-Islamic cosmological template influenced by prevalent 
sacred beliefs from the Indian subcontinent. After the coming of Islam and then Western 
colonialism, religious and political administrators and reformers began to view 
heterogender homosexuality and transgenderism as synonymous with pre-Islamic 
syncretism and became increasingly hostile towards them (Peletz, 2011: 667–668).  
Peletz (2011: 676–677) argues, however, that despite the increasing stigma 
against homosexuality and transgenderism, such gender pluralism remains ‘robust’. 
Peletz (2011: 673) notes that up until the 1960s, there were villages in Kelantan, a State 
in the northeast of Peninsula Malaysia, with ‘gender transgressors known to be involved 
in same-sex intimacies’. These villages were known to the inhabitants of other villages, 
local and regional non-religious and religious authorities, and the Kelantan Sultan 
himself who was their royal patron. In fact, the Sultan valued these ‘gender 
transgressors’ because they were performers of mak yong94, a Malay-Thai genre of 
courtly dance-music-drama.  
While Peletz’s theory can help explain a significant degree of historical and 
contemporary gender pluralism in Muslim Southeast Asia, it does not mean that 
Southeast Asia was or is entirely exceptional. In Renaissance Italy, there was also some 
degree of tolerance for intimate same-sex relationships that did not transgress what 
                                                          
94 The exhibit at the Kedah State Museum suggests that the Kedahan mek mulung shares many 
similarities with the Kelantanese mak yong.  
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Peletz would call ‘heterogender’ norms (Phillips & Reay, 2011: 6). Likewise, in 
Classical Athens, ‘most forms of consensual male-male sexual contact’ were tolerated 
‘provided they respected broader social hierarchies including age, status and citizenship, 
or instead celebrated only chaste love between men’ (Phillips & Reay, 2011: 5). In fact, 
the Athenians of this period viewed male-male sexual activity very similarly to the 
Ottomans of the early modern era – they tolerated male-male erotic relationships, but 
saw anal penetration as immoral95.   
Peletz stresses that ‘heterogender’ same-sex relationships were not merely 
tolerated on a practical level but part of a wider cosmological scheme. Overall, diverse 
sexual expressions were tolerated but effectively confined to the ‘heterogender’ 
framework. This contrasts with contemporary liberal thinking about sexual liberty, 
informed by ideas of individual autonomy and rejecting state regulation of sexual 
relations on this basis. 
People like Amin and Ebry do not have all this information at their fingertips. 
Still, their ability to adopt particular expressions of gender and sexuality and be 
accepted in some contexts appears to be part of the contemporary ‘robust’-ness of 
gender pluralism that Peletz observes. In fact, they appear to be negotiating competing 
understandings of sexual diversity – from contemporary, liberal notions of individual 
sexual autonomy to traditional attitudes that tolerate ‘gender transgressors’ as long as 
they know their ‘place’. Can these understandings be made compatible?  
One way to examine this is to look at how Muslim sexual minorities borrow, 
appropriate, and embrace what Najmabadi calls ‘imported categories and practices’ and 
intertwine these with local concepts and practices. To take another example, Razak is a 
gay Malay man in his late 20s who playfully mixes and matches different labels for 
himself:  
 
I’m a gay-boy. Consider adik-adik amongst the older ones, who are 
kakak-kakak, and I consider myself as kakak-kakak when I am with 
the adik-adik who are below me. 
 
The three terms here – ‘gay-boy’, ‘adik-adik’, and ‘kakak-kakak’ – are used by 
Razak to describe how he adjusts to different roles. He identifies with ‘gay-boy’ as an 
                                                          
95 These examples and Peletz’s ‘gender pluralism’ argument were also discussed in Chapter 2.1.2.  
142 
 
umbrella category, derived from the English ‘gay’ and ‘boy’ – the combination of both 
in Malaysia appears to have been coined by Malay speakers. The term adik-adik is 
literally the plural of adik (younger male or female sibling), while kakak-kakak is 
literally the plural of kakak (older sister). However, ‘adik-adik’ and ‘kakak-kakak’ can 
also be used as adjectives to describe whether someone behaves like a younger sibling 
or an older sister, and specifically as euphemisms for varieties of homosexuality or 
transgenderism. By extension abang-abang, literally the plural of abang (older brother), 
can be a euphemism for masculine gay men.  
In Razak’s case, he says he identifies – or can be identified by others – as adik-
adik or kakak-kakak depending on the situation. When I ask him to explain this fluidity, 
he says:  
 
All this status is given by the other person – you cannot consider 
yourself as one. Because whenever you consider yourself as someone, 
as adik-adik or abang-abang, you will not portray yourself, you will 
never know, because that one is given by the others. Like sometimes 
your friend will feel, oh there, that kakak-kakak is here now. But you 
might feel that you are adik-adik. 
 
In other words, these terms refer as much to the roles that others expect the 
individual to take in a particular situation as they do to how the individual feels inside. 
Razak’s narrative also illustrates how people can borrow, appropriate and embrace 
‘imported categories’ alongside local concepts and practices. The terms ‘kakak-kakak’, 
‘adik-adik’ and ‘abang-abang’ qualify the kind of ‘gay-boy’ an individual can be – 
older and masculine, older and feminine, or younger and masculine or feminine. Razak 
thus identifies ‘status’ distinctions between various expressions of sexual identity, but 
these are constantly negotiated and renegotiated by all those who identify with ‘gay’ as 
an umbrella category.   
When Razak uses these terms, he is neither self-consciously combining so-called 
‘Western’ and ‘Malay’ sexual epistemologies nor drawing upon deep knowledge of 
historical ‘gender pluralism’ in the Malay Archipelago. Instead, he is picking and 
mixing from the potpourri of ‘imported’ and ‘local’ terms which he feels best describe 
him. This picking and mixing also indirectly involves negotiating liberal assumptions 
about sexual autonomy (implied in the label ‘gay’), traditional conceptualisations of a 
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sexual hierarchy (implied in the labels ‘adik-adik’, ‘kakak-kakak’ and ‘abang-abang’) 
and, as he suggests below, observance of Islam:  
 
I don’t want to be called […] murtad [i.e. an apostate]. […] I’m still, I 
want to be a Muslim. And then, however, I’m gay. That’s why I told 
you before that I don’t perform my obligatory prayers now, because I 
feel like that would be a sin if I do so, because I’m not ‘suci’ [i.e. 
pure]. That’s what I heard – if you are not in a state of purity, then you 
cannot [perform your prayers]. 
 
In this account, Razak still wants to belong to the wider fold of Islam but thinks 
being gay is an obstacle to being ‘properly’ Muslim since it hinders the observance of 
Islamic rituals. This implies that he struggles between expressing his individuality as a 
gay person and his loyalty to the larger community of Muslims. By grappling with these 
questions, however, people like Razak complicate not only the boundaries between 
sexual identity and religion, but also between religion, ethnicity and culture.  
 
4.4 Ethnicity: The implicit challenge 
 
 This section investigates how notions of ethnic and national identity are 
implicated when gay Muslims construct and claim their religious and sexual identities. I 
pursue this analysis by picking up on how my participants made spontaneous and 
recurring mentions of ethnicity in parts of the conversation which I thought were 
addressing religion and sexuality. I focus particularly on how my British participants of 
Asian background played with the term ‘coconut’, and how my Malaysian participants 
addressed the notion of the ‘typical Malay’.  
 
4.4.1 Gay Muslim ‘coconuts’ in Britain 
 
Osman is a second-generation British Muslim of Bangladeshi background, born 
and raised in the northwest of England. He works there now and lives with his non-
Muslim English boyfriend. He is in his mid-30s and is a member of Imaan. When I was 
planning a research trip to the North in May 2013, I informed the Imaan WhatsApp 
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group and almost immediately received a phone call from Osman telling me I could stay 
with him. I asked, ‘Really?’ He said, ‘Of course, you’re family.’*  
Osman is one of the more strictly practising Muslims in Imaan. He steadfastly 
consumes only halal food and drink, never misses his five daily prayers, and often 
teases me – quite mercilessly – about my lack of fidelity to halal dietary requirements. 
Yet when I visited the North, he not only gave me a place to sleep in but also a lift from 
the train station and even took me sightseeing. During my second trip, he stocked his 
kitchen with the ingredients I requested – all halal – because I promised to cook a 
Malaysian dinner for him and a few other Imaan members.  
During our interview, when he tells me that he identifies as gay and likes the 
label, I ask, ‘But don’t you, do you not feel at some point that it’s very white, the word 
“gay”? The minute you say “gay” you think it’s a white person?96’  
Osman replies, ‘But I’m a bit of a coconut anyway.’ 
This is one of several times that I would hear Imaan members use the word 
‘coconut’ as a self-descriptor and also to label me.  
Ebrahim also says he is a ‘coconut’. When I ask him what it means, he says, with 
a chuckle, ‘Brown on the outside, white on the inside.’ I prod further, ‘White in terms of 
what?’ Ebrahim replies:  
 
It’s kind of like, things that, especially in the community that I grew 
up in, [there’s this whole thing of], this is what Asian people do, and 
this is what white people do. Even in terms of the kind of music that 
you like, there would be, this is the kind of music Asian people like 
and everything else that isn’t in that group is ‘white people’ music. 
 
I still don’t quite understand, so I try to test some examples. ‘So, for example, is 
Beyoncé coconut music?’ I ask. 
‘No, Beyoncé is fine,’ says Ebrahim. ‘So stuff like pop music is fine. Bhangra is 
fine, you know, kind of like clubby kind of music is fine. But say you like Sufjan 
Stevens or Jessie Ware, or something like that, that’s “white people” music.’   
                                                          
96 I phrase my question in this way probably because at this point I was still digesting postcolonial 
critiques of LGBT activism such as Massad’s.  
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I personally enjoy and follow ‘alternative’ British and American bands and 
singer-songwriters – this explains why by Ebrahim’s standards and those of some other 
Imaan members, I am a ‘coconut’, too. I need to understand better and go on to ask 
Ebrahim about television shows:  
 
Shanon: So if you watch Modern Family97, is that – 
Ebrahim: No, […] they (non-‘coconut’ Asians) wouldn’t really get 
Modern Family. Modern Family is probably white people stuff. 
Malcolm in the Middle98 is white people stuff. 
Shanon: The Big Bang Theory99 is white people stuff?  
Ebrahim: The Big Bang Theory is kind of OK.  
Shanon: Because there’s a brown person in it100?  
Ebrahim: Yeah, exactly.   
Ebrahim: Stuff like Miranda101 is OK.  
Shanon: Really?  
Ebrahim: Yeah, Miranda’s fine.  
Shanon: How come?  
Ebrahim: It’s on BBC1102. It’s OK. (Chuckles.) 
 
Thus, while Ebrahim uses the word ‘coconut’ to describe himself and explain 
some of his preferences, he also admits he cannot define it consistently or coherently. 
Rasheed also used the word ‘coconut’ once as a shorthand term to explain his response 
to a particular incident, and I asked him if he thought of himself as one:  
 
In [the town I grew up in] I was. I was, because I’m the one that wears 
skinnies103, I’m the one that would straighten his hair, have long hair, 
                                                          
97 A very popular and critically acclaimed American sitcom that is also popular in Britain.  
98 Another popular and critically acclaimed American sitcom that has now ended but gets repeated on 
British television.  
99 Another popular and critically acclaimed American sitcom that is also popular in Britain.  
100 The Hindu, Indian astrophysicist Dr Rajesh Koothrappali, played by Kunal Nayyar.  
101 A popular British sitcom, with an all-white cast.  
102 Suggesting that BBC1 is ‘popular’ and hence acceptable to British Asians.  
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you know. I’m the one that doesn’t have a [local] accent, that ‘innit 
bruv’104 kind of attitude. I’m the one that’s well-spoken in English. 
But when I came out of that area, I’m the one that’s so Indian that eats 
nothing but chilli sauce, you know? So, I’m in a limbo […], because 
[back where I come from] I’m like the gora105, I’m the white one, you 
know […] hangs around with white people, black people, what the 
hell is he doing? And then like in Liverpool, I’m the one that couldn’t 
eat chips without chilli sauce (giggles), you know, like I love my 
Bollywood, I love my Indian dramas, I love speaking in Hindi with 
people. 
 
Rasheed, Ebrahim and Osman do not use ‘coconut’ pejoratively, even though they 
acknowledge that it has negative connotations among many British Asians. Rather, they 
partially reclaim it for themselves and use it light-heartedly, with funny examples and 
lots of giggles.  
It appears, then, that a ‘coconut’ – adapting from Douglas – is an ‘out of place’ 
Asian person. To go even further, it appears that the gay British Muslims who partially 
reclaim it are responding to particular cultural complexities in their everyday lives. In 
Rasheed’s case, he feels and is perceived as ‘white on the inside’ when he is among the 
Asian community in his hometown, but suddenly becomes ‘Asian on the inside’ when 
among his white-majority circle of friends elsewhere.  
A ‘coconut’ might therefore simply be an Asian individual who tries to conform 
to so-called ‘white’ British values and tastes. However, Rasheed, Ebrahim and Osman 
appear to be more nuanced and non-conformist than this, neither conforming to the 
cultural and social expectations of the communities they grew up in nor to so-called 
‘white’ British society. Yet they all identify as British first and foremost.   
These cultural and ethnic dimensions create a further level of complexity for gay 
white British Muslims. For example, Nadia is a white English convert in her late 20s – 
she uses the term ‘revert’ – in a relationship with Carmen, who is also white but non-
                                                                                                                                                                         
103 I.e. jeans.  
104 Working class slang – literally, ‘Isn’t it, brother?’ but basically meaning, ‘Yes, friend.’  
105 Urdu/Hindi for ‘white’.  
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religious. Nadia eschews all sexual labels and says she finds it difficult to ‘fit in’. When 
I asked her to explain the biggest challenge about fitting in, she said:  
 
I think people assume because I’m white, I don’t know anything 
[about Islam] […] Last time I went to Jumuah (Friday prayers) […] I 
read two rakah (prostrations or prayer cycles) when I entered the 
masjid (mosque) and then like I sat against the wall. This girl next to 
me was like, oh, and then I started to take my socks off because I was 
going to do wudu (ablutions), and this girl who was sitting there was 
like, you know you should read salah (prayers) with your socks on. 
And I just turned and I was like, actually there’s two schools of 
thought. One is that women can have their feet and their hands 
showing and the face, and one that’s just hands and face. And she kind 
of looked at me as if to say, oh, you do know stuff, you know what I 
mean?   
 
Although the girl in the mosque did not explicitly say she was correcting Nadia 
because Nadia was white, Nadia perceived this to be the case. In the mosque, she felt 
treated like an ‘out of place’ white person. However, Nadia did not use any terms that 
paralleled ‘coconut’ to explain her ‘out of place’ white-ness. Yet this example also 
suggests that there is a wider perception of a shared boundary between ethnicity and 
religion or, more specifically, between being non-white and Muslim.  
When I first started interacting with the Imaan community, I thought that I made 
friends with many of them so quickly because we shared similar experiences about 
being gay and Muslim. It was only through more sustained fieldwork and in-depth 
interviews that I recognised the implicit ethnic dimension in our interactions. I realised 
how much pleasure my new friends took in expressing themselves as ‘coconuts’ and 
that they embraced me as a fellow ‘coconut’, too.  
These expressions of what it means to be a ‘coconut’ could easily be glossed over 
as a symptom of so-called ‘Westernisation’ of non-Western peoples. It is easy to take a 
cue from Massad’s criticism of ‘upper’ and ‘middle’ class, ‘Westernised’ Arabs who 
self-identify as ‘gay’ and assume that Rasheed, Ebrahim and Osman are also similarly 
privileged. Actually, the three of them – like almost every other Imaan member I 
encountered in the northwest of England – are second-generation British Asians brought 
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up in working-class families in areas where they witnessed or experienced varying 
degrees of anti-Asian racism.  
They also know of British Muslims of similar backgrounds who, unlike them, 
have ‘given up’ on Muslim or British society – Merton’s ‘retreatists’ – or who have 
chosen to rebel by joining extreme or radical Muslim movements. Theirs, however, 
appears to be a different kind of innovation or rebellion shaped by their surrounding 
social and cultural environments. Identifying as ‘coconuts’ allows them to claim a 
greater degree of belonging in Britain while retaining aspects of their culture, ethnicity 
and religion that matter to them.   
Najmabadi (2011: 550) argues that we are not talking about ‘just words’ when we 
unpack categories of gender and sexuality, in this case concepts such as ‘gay’. I would 
also argue that for these gay British Muslims, identifying as ‘gay’ is related to 
reclaiming the concept of ‘coconut’ which is not ‘just’ a word they joke about. Rather, it 
enables them to bridge their gay, Asian, Muslim and British identities and to negotiate 
multi-faceted roles within society.  
In Najmabadi’s (2011: 534) focus on Iran, she argues that transgender activism 
there is not merely a ‘state-driven and controlled’ project, but rather is ‘part of the on-
going and volatile process of state-formation itself’. She argues, ‘This process continues 
to shape and re-shape, fracture and re-fracture, order and re-order what we name “the 
state”.’ Gay British Muslims are part of this shaping and reshaping, fracturing and re-
fracturing, ordering and reordering of wider notions of what it means to be British and 
Muslim. Reclaiming a word like ‘coconut’ – which has ethnic connotations – to explain 
their sexuality is a powerful way of challenging and redrawing the boundaries between 
ethnicity, religion, nation and sexuality. To examine this further, I move to the concept 
of the ‘typical Malay’ in Malaysia to compare what ‘coconuts’ and ‘typical Malays’ can 
tell us about gay Muslim identities in different social contexts of Islam.  
 
4.4.2 The enduring myth of the ‘typical Malay’ 
 
Mohamad Abu Bakar, a historian at Universiti Malaya, is onstage, wearing a 
songkok and a batik shirt. He has just given the keynote lecture at this seminar on the 
uplifting of Malaysia’s Islamic laws, organised by the Syariah Section of the Attorney-
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General’s Chambers106. He has speculated on the origins and evolution of Islam in 
Malaysia – one of his propositions is that ‘Malaysia is an evolving Islamic state’ – and 
is nearing the end of his presentation. The audience consists of around 70 to 100 rank-
and-file and senior civil servants from Malaysia’s many state-formed or state-backed 
Islamic institutions. As a full-time doctoral candidate, I was able to register for this 
event and pay a concessionary fee.  
Mohamad is critiquing what he alleges as Muslim or Malay support for 
President Barack Obama of the US. ‘Yes, we worship Obama, Obama’s skin is black,’ 
he says. But, he continues, ‘Obama is an embodiment of American values.’ He’s still a 
Democrat, some maintain, distinguishing him from the Republicans, but after he has 
been in power for a while, we think, ‘Oh, looks like Obama’s the same as the rest [in 
his attitude towards the Muslim world].’ Mohamad questions why Malays fell for 
Obama in the first place and answers, ‘Because Malays are naïve and gullible.’  
Later, in the question-and-answer session, Mohamad gives some clues as to 
what constitutes this naïveté and gullibility. In the 1950s, he says, Malays were 
obsessed with Bollywood movies, memorising every single song and line of dialogue. 
Now they are obsessed with American and Latin soap operas like Ugly Betty. Also, he 
says, the Malay newspapers are only good for finding out which cat has become road-
kill for the day. The historian implies therefore that Malays are not only naïve and 
gullible but also capricious and shallow.  
He is addressing a room that is more than 90 percent Malay and is meant to be 
supporting the Malaysian state’s elevation of the position of Islam, and by extension 
Malay privileges. How, then, can he get away with stereotyping and essentialising ‘the 
Malays’? More to the point, what does this have to do with Malaysian Muslim sexual 
minorities?  
A few days after the lecture, I interviewed Zainal, a Malay man in his early 30s 
identifying as ‘queer’. Zainal explained to me that he could not fully connect with some 
of his acquaintances because they were ‘very Malay’. Zainal is Malay, too, but I wanted 
to understand what made someone ‘very’ Malay and how Zainal was different. So I 
asked him if he wanted to be ‘more’ Malay. He said no and explained:  
 
                                                          
106 Discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.2.1.  
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I think it’s associated with all this bad […] herd mentality […] in my 
opinion. I mean, I’m not being PC [i.e. politically correct] at all. But 
this is what I need to express. The fact that Melayu, it’s a bad brand 
here lah107, for me lah, personally. Because the establishment of this 
Bumiputera108 and Melayu, Malay pride, and Malay superiority, [it 
makes me cringe], hence I don’t feel the need to associate with 
Melayu lah. 
 
Zainal struggled against what he saw as a pervasive discourse of Malay-ness, 
which he understood as simultaneously supremacist and disempowering (i.e., ‘herd 
mentality’). I asked him if he agreed with Mohamad’s characterisation of Malays as 
‘naïve and gullible’ and he snapped back, ‘Of course not!’ 
On the other end of the ideological divide is Ebry, who said he identified as 
Malay, but believed that Malays generally were backward. He perceived Chinese 
Malaysians as being unified and always acting in solidarity, whereas Malays were riven 
by intra-ethnic pettiness. In his perception, Chinese Malaysian entrepreneurs, for 
example, were eager to help each other out, unlike Malay Malaysian entrepreneurs.  
 
Malays? No, they get envious if someone starts a new business. [They 
will think] let’s put a hex on them, let them die! That is the Malays. 
Muslims, you know? Setting up partners with Allah [by engaging in 
black magic]. Are they not afraid of going to hell? [And yet] they say 
only pondans go to hell.  
 
This reference to a primordial ‘Malay’-ness came up again when I spoke to Amin 
while Ebry was present. Amin was telling me about how he did not really feel 
comfortable hanging out with his old friends anymore:  
                                                          
107 A Malay suffix that many Malaysians also use when speaking English to emphasise certain words or 
phrases.  




Amin: With my other friends, I don’t know. They’re exposed [to other 
ideas], but like in terms of wanting to mix with Ebry it’s a bit difficult 
– 
Ebry: (Interrupts.) Typical Malay Malaysians!  
 
Here, Ebry drew upon the same family of traits that the Malay historian used to 
describe ‘Malays’ – naïve, gullible, and shallow – and insinuated that they were also 
bigoted and homophobic. This is in addition to Ebry’s previous characterisation of 
‘typical Malays’ – their willingness to practice magic in defiance of Islamic teachings.  
The image of Malays as a credulous, magic-obsessed race was first explored by 
Victorian-era colonial writers based in Malaya. This is unsurprising because the height 
of British expansionism in Malaya coincided with the beginnings of Victorian-era 
anthropology. Several colonial accounts of Malay rituals and practices even made their 
way into the anthropologist James Frazer’s seminal work, The Golden Bough, as 
examples of ‘magic’109.  
According the anthropologist Robert Winzeler (1983: 438), colonial writers in 
Malaya used the term ‘magic’ to include a broader range of beliefs and practices that 
they glossed as ‘folk’ Malay religion.  They understood this ‘folk’ religion as being 
antithetical to ‘orthodox’ Islam. Winzeler (1983: 438–439) argues, ‘Beyond the general 
use of the term magic, the notion that “orthodox Islam” and Malay folk religion, 
however labelled, are or were distinct traditions has been a very powerful enduring idea 
in Malay studies.’ He goes on to argue that many colonial writers and some postcolonial 
scholars linked Malay folk religion with the apparent economic backwardness of the 
Malays.  
After Malaya’s independence in 1957 and the formation of Malaysia in 1963, 
these stereotypes continued to inform the views of postcolonial political and opinion 
leaders. For example, in 2011, the still-influential former Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad chastised Malaysian makers of supernatural horror films for exploiting a 
credulous Malay public. He exhorted them to concentrate instead on subject matter that 
was more scientific and Islamic (Jamin, 2011).   
                                                          
109 See Frazer’s discussion on Malay charms (2009: 41–42), Malay magical beliefs about weather (2009: 
193), and Malay magical beliefs about kingship (2009: 213). 
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This narrative of Malays needing to abandon being naïve, gullible and 
superstitious in order to succeed as rational leaders of a post-independence Malaysia has 
been bolstered by various policies. For example, the Malaysian government and other 
government-linked corporations provide numerous scholarships for Bumiputera 
students to pursue tertiary education, mainly in disciplines such as medicine, 
engineering, finance and law. Many high-achieving Malay students have been sent to 
top universities in the UK, US, Australia, New Zealand and Canada in this way. Most of 
these scholarships are conditional – students need to return to Malaysia to work; if not, 
they need to repay the scholarship’s full value.  
In relation to this emphasis on scientific and technological development, the 
Malaysian government has also worked hard to build the country’s internet 
infrastructure. As of 2013, Malaysia recorded 67 internet users per 100 people, the 
highest penetration in Southeast Asia only after Singapore with 73 users per 100 people 
(World Bank, 2014). For many gay Muslims, the state’s development policies have thus 
also enabled them to use the internet to seek out alternative expressions of Islam and 
sexuality.  
On a separate trajectory, Joel Kahn (1992: 158–178) argues that the 1980s saw 
efforts by a new Malay middle class to revive ‘traditional Malay culture’. Civil servants 
and new entrepreneurs packaged and promoted symbols of Malay culture for an 
audience of Western tourists and local Malay consumers, and unwittingly politicised 
Malaysia’s cultural arena even further.  
According to Peletz (2005: 240–272), the same period saw Malay intellectuals 
providing the ideological spine for the state’s attempts to purify Islam from Western 
influence and local superstition. Daniel Regan (1976: 106–107) also argues that in the 
1970s, there was a ‘preponderance of Malay-Muslims in the national intellectual 
community’ who saw it as their duty to support the state’s nation-building projects 
specifically by elevating Islam. Regan (1989: 138–140) further notes how this same 
period saw the flourishing of new Islamic movements – consisting of students, young 
professionals and academics – seeking to transform the social order by elevating Islam 
in social, political and economic life.  
Thus, despite the dichotomous conceptions of ‘Malay’ culture and ‘orthodox’ 
Islam inherited from the colonial era, from the 1980s there have been parallel efforts to 
elevate Malay culture and Islam. On occasion, these efforts from state and non-state 
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actors to elevate ‘Malay’-ness have contradicted efforts to elevate ‘Islam’ and vice 
versa, for example when Mahathir rebuked Malay makers of horror cinema.  
Given this background, what do these various Malays, such as the Malay 
historian, Ebry, and Mahathir, mean when they dismiss or put down the ‘typical 
Malay’? To begin with, all of them share the assumption that the ‘typical Malay’ is 
downtrodden and an obstacle to rationality, intelligence and progress. Yet they all have 
different ideas of what counts as an obstacle – for Ebry, a ‘typical Malay’ is 
homophobic, for Mahathir he or she is superstitious, and for the Malay historian, he or 
she unthinkingly supports the US now just because President Obama is not white. They 
all turn the ‘typical Malay’ into a sub-category of deviant or ‘Other’ Malay while 
implying that they are non-typical, i.e. rational, intelligent and progressive.  
These accusations are particularly charged in an environment where highly 
politicised notions of Malay ethnicity and Islam inform nation-building policies. Within 
this context, pro-syariah ideologues and/or Malay ultranationalists constantly try to 
eliminate or rehabilitate ‘out of place’ expressions of being Malay and Muslim. They 
include gay Muslims in their notions of ‘out of place’ Malays, but many gay Muslims 
counter-demonise them and other Malays sharing such views as ‘typical Malays’. For 
example, Wahid, a Malay man in his mid-30s who announces publicly that he is gay, is 
scathing about ‘typical Malays’ and insists he is not one of them:  
 
They read Utusan Malaysia110, ya, they watch TV3111, they watch 
Melodi112, they watch, they read Harian Metro113, they regard 
Harian Metro as a newspaper [….] You don’t see them at the 
Chinese vegetarian restaurants, because they don’t go there114, and 
[…] they don’t read that much. They still believe […] whatever the 
                                                          
110 A Malay-language broadsheet owned by the ruling party, UMNO.  
111 A television network strongly linked with UMNO.  
112 A Malay-language entertainment programme on TV3.  
113 A Malay tabloid strongly linked with UMNO.  
114 This implies that they have an overly dogmatic view of halal. Halal regulations for food generally 
apply to the slaughter of meat – by this logic, vegetarian food should be halal. Wahid insinuates, 
however, that because ‘typical Malays’ associate the Chinese with pork-eating they would not even set 
foot in a vegetarian Chinese restaurant.  
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ustaz (Islamic teachers) are saying are true, they think they have to 
obey whatever they are saying. Those [are] typical Malays. 
 
Wahid therefore dismisses the ‘typical Malay’ as insular, conformist, and 
uninterested in exploring other aspects of the world while elevating himself as non-
typically Malay. In doing this, he reproduces stereotypes about the naïve, gullible Malay 
which are nearly identical to those produced by the Malay historian. The difference is 
that the Malay historian chastises ‘typical Malays’ for not keeping up with the state’s 
nation-building objectives, while Wahid chastises them for being too conformist.  
When different groups of Malays dismiss what they think of as the ‘typical 
Malay’, they are thus not referring to the same thing. Some, like Zainal, struggle to 
resist dominant stereotypes about Malay-ness or ‘typical Malays’ without counter-
stereotyping others. Yet Zainal, Wahid and Ebry all have to grapple with conflicting 
notions of being ‘Malay’, and being gay complicates their ethnic as well as religious 
identity. For each of them, affirming their sexuality also involves trying to loosen the 




In Malaysia and Britain, gay Muslims come to form their own versions of gay 
and Muslim identity by internalising and interpreting significant life events or 
relationships. The trajectory of their identity-making often includes being socialised into 
particular versions of Islam, later growing uncomfortable with these expressions, and 
eventually being exposed to alternative interpretations. Their identity-making also 
involves different levels of tension with their families, peers, and communities. The 
deeper their connection with other Muslims in their lives, the more they refrain from 
outright rebellion against the strictures of Islam imposed on them. Instead, they adjust 
their roles according to the situation – rebelling in some circumstances, innovating and 
conforming in others. If for any reason they no longer value these close inter-personal 
connections, they might rebel more intensely and counter-demonise the entire group – 
e.g. ‘Muslims’ or ‘Malays’ en masse – which they try to dissociate from. Self-
identifying as gay and Muslim therefore involves what Merton (1968: 672-673) 
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describes as ‘role adjustments’ in specific situations to negotiate ways of belonging in 
wider society and achieving ‘culturally defined goals, purposes and interests’.  
When they adapt to these roles, gay Muslims also redraw the boundaries 
between religion and sexuality, intentionally or unintentionally. They challenge or 
subvert normative and dominant understandings of Islam which assume that Muslim 
and gay identities are mutually exclusive by making these identities intersect, thus 
disturbing notions of religious and sexual purity. They are aware that in the eyes of 
wider society they are, in Douglas’s (2002: 44) terms, ‘matter out of place’, but try to 
claim their own symbolic and material spaces in the world.  
By putting together their gay and Muslim identities, gay Muslims also combine 
seemingly contradictory notions of the liberal and traditional which often involves 
drawing out the relationship between their religious and ethnic identities. In Britain, 
some reclaim the term ‘coconut’, which pejoratively refers to Asians with tastes and 
preferences normally associated with white Britons. They do this within a wider context 
where most Muslims come from migrant backgrounds and therefore Islam is widely 
perceived as ‘non-indigenous’ while gay identity is assumed to be upheld by the ‘liberal 
West’. 
In Malaysia, where the ethnic aspect of their identity is seen as ‘indigenous’, 
many gay Muslims try to distance themselves from ‘typical Malays’ whom they see as 
too traditional and intolerant of sexual diversity. Within this context there are also local 
traditions of tolerance towards sexual diversity which, Peletz (2011: 676-677) argues, 
remain robust to this day. This ‘gender pluralism’ was and still is hierarchical, however, 
and sexual minorities were tolerated by the rest of society as long as they knew their 
‘place’ and did not upset the status quo. This contrasts with contemporary liberal ideals 
of sexual liberty based upon notions of individual autonomy. Within this context, gay 
Muslims in Malaysia do not self-consciously draw upon historical traditions to construct 
their identities but still blend local expressions of gender and sexuality with ‘imported’ 
concepts. In this way, they too combine seemingly contradictory notions of the liberal 
and the traditional, which implicates their religious and ethnic identities.  
Some scholars, including Massad (2007: 5), argue that ideologues in the West 
and Muslim societies use notions of sexual liberty to construct and polarise the divide 
between the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’. My findings suggest that gay Muslims do sometimes 
struggle between ‘liberal’ and ‘traditional’ expressions of their religious and sexual 
identities, whether in Malaysia or Britain, but this does not necessarily mean that gay 
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identity has been ‘imposed’ upon them. Rather, they find ways to adopt or experiment 
with ‘liberal’ or ‘Westernised’ expressions of sexuality while holding on to their 
Muslim identities.   
By self-identifying as gay and Muslim, gay Muslims in both countries 
complicate, challenge or subvert constructions of ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’. In the in-
between spaces that they create, they find others like them who challenge, subvert, or 
adapt normative conceptions religion, ethnicity, and sexuality. My findings indirectly 
suggest that when societies modernise, they inadvertently allow people to create and 
expand these spaces which fall outside the reach of institutional authorities. In the next 
chapter, I pursue this analysis focusing specifically on the collective and individual 
dimensions of Islamic socialisation in forging a specifically ‘gay Muslim’ identity.  
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Chapter 5: Gay expressions of Islam 
 
The previous chapter charted the cognitive, emotional and interactive aspects of 
meaning-making enabling some people to identify as gay and Muslim in Malaysia and 
Britain. This chapter pursues this analysis further, focusing on the individual and 
collective dimensions of Islamic socialisation in forging distinctively ‘gay Muslim’ 
identities. I also explore how the religious expressions of gay Muslims are shaped by 
their surroundings and whether they are reshaping dominant interpretations of Islam by 
expressing their individual identities. 
My starting assumption is that individuals who identify as gay and Muslim feel 
strongly connected to Islam for various reasons and might conceive of this connection 
as ‘natural’ or ascribed. Also, while many might consider their sexual disposition as 
beyond their control, they would still express or repress it based on wider social 
expectations and/or religious injunctions, among other things. These dynamics 
contribute to multifaceted lived and prescribed dimensions of being gay and Muslim. I 
investigate if or how gay Muslims navigate these dimensions to construct a sense of 
belonging within the larger fold of Islam. I do not merely focus on their engagement 
with religious texts and doctrines but on their wider lived experiences of Islam.  
My discussion also investigates the links between religion, sexuality and 
identity, bearing in mind that the word ‘identity’ can be used in multiple and 
contradictory ways. Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2006: 35) argue that in 
academic and non-academic circles, it has been used: 
 
…to highlight noninstrumental modes of action; to focus on self-
understanding rather than self-interest; to designate sameness across 
persons or sameness over time; to capture allegedly core, 
foundational aspects of selfhood; to deny that such core, 
foundational aspects exist; to highlight the processual, interactive 
development of solidarity and collective self-understanding; and to 
stress the fragmented quality of the contemporary experience of self, 
a self unstably patched together through shards of discourse that are 




For Brubaker and Cooper (2006: 35), the term ‘identity’ is therefore ‘made to do 
a great deal of work’ often leading to vague analysis. They propose using ‘three clusters 
of terms’ as substitutes for ‘identity’ to refer to particular individual and social 
phenomena.  
There is the question of how people are identified or categorised by others, or 
how they self-identify and self-categorise to differentiate themselves from others 
(Brubaker & Cooper, 2006: 41). Here, it is crucial to account for the state as a ‘powerful 
“identifier”’ since it has the ‘material and symbolic resources’ to impose categories that 
structure how those within its jurisdiction define themselves (Brubaker & Cooper, 2006: 
43). This line of analysis is useful when examining the internal and external factors 
influencing how individuals come to perceive themselves and others.  
People might also explain their actions more fluidly depending on a particular 
situation, in which case Brubaker and Cooper (2006: 44) suggest we examine their 
‘self-understanding and social location’. This is because in many settings, ‘people may 
understand and experience themselves in terms of a grid of intersecting categories; in 
others, in terms of a web of connections of differential proximity and intensity’. From 
this line of analysis, we get to examine how people’s sense of self can fluctuate, change, 
or intensify depending on particular scenarios.  
We can also focus on how people develop ‘the emotionally laden sense of 
belonging to a distinctive, bounded group, involving both a felt solidarity or oneness 
with fellow group members and a felt difference from or even antipathy to specified 
outsiders’ (Brubaker & Cooper, 2006: 46). This line of analysis allows us to examine 
how some people form groups within which there is a strong ‘feeling of belonging 
together’ (Brubaker & Cooper, 2006: 47).  
Despite Brubaker and Cooper’s rejoinders for social scientists to be more 
circumspect and perhaps reject ‘identity’ as a category of analysis, much research still 
purports to examine the relationship between ‘religion’ and ‘identity’. According to 
Arthur Greil and Lynn Davidman (2007: 550), these numerous studies of ‘religion’ and 
‘identity’ still need to develop a more ‘coherent story’ of how religion is transforming 
under the conditions of modernity.  
These caveats are useful to clarify the different facets of ‘identity’ I am looking 
at but I do not discard or replace all references to it. Rather, I draw upon the analytical 




Structurally, the chapter begins with a section examining the interplay between 
external categorisations or impositions of Islam and the individual religious self-
identifications of gay Muslims. Here, I compare how my gay Muslim participants were 
socialised into Islam through their families, schools, and peers in Malaysia, where the 
state explicitly and deliberately imposes Islam as a category of identity, and Britain, 
where this is not the case.  
This leads to the next section, analysing aspects of identity related to the ‘self-
understanding and social location’ of gay Muslims which can fluctuate, change, or 
intensify depending on particular circumstances in Malaysia and Britain. The following 
section then investigates whether individuals express ‘gay Muslim’ as a distinctive, 
collective identity within and beyond their local contexts, i.e. if there is a strong ‘feeling 
of belonging together’ as gay Muslims in the two countries.   
These three sections engage specifically with Brubaker and Cooper’s 
conceptualisation of ‘identity’, demonstrating that gay Muslims increasingly express 
Islam individually and collectively in ways that resist, subvert or avoid institutional 
control. Often, they draw upon what they imagine to be ‘true’, ‘correct’ ideals of Islam 
from external sources, but adapt these to their local or individual circumstances. They 
still seek ‘belonging’ within what they construe as ‘Islam’ but also revise and refine 
their understandings of it based on their specific experiences.  
These observations lead to the last section which investigates some ways in 
which gay Muslims use urban or virtual spaces to interact and reinforce their religious 
and/or sexual self-understandings and self-representations. Here, I suggest that they use 
‘Islam’ as what James Beckford (2001: 233) terms a ‘cultural resource’ to fashion 
intentionally or unintentionally eclectic self-understandings and self-expressions. I 
contend that gay expressions of Islam are not merely instances of individual agency (i.e. 
of gay Muslims) clashing with a supposedly oppressive monolithic structure (i.e. 
‘Islam’). Instead, gay Muslims negotiate the opportunities and constraints provided by 
multiple Islamic and non-Islamic authorities, spaces, and networks to fashion their own 
expressions of Islam.  
I further propose that gay Muslims are probably not very different from other 
Muslims who also use Islam as a ‘cultural resource’ to fashion eclectic self-expressions. 
However, my findings show that they feel the need to innovate on their expressions of 
Islam because of their specific experiences of sexuality. I suggest that moral 
entrepreneurs, such as Malaysian syariah advocates with their efforts to control 
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expressions of Islam, heighten identification with Islam among gay Muslims and 
unintentionally drive them to innovate on their religious expressions. This is why I find 
it useful to take up Beckford’s suggestion for sociologists to analyse religion more as a 
‘cultural resource’ than as a ‘social institution’. This approach enables us understand the 
experiences of gay Muslims as indicators of how dominant, global images of Islam and 
sexuality are becoming refracted in new ways at national and local levels (Beckford, 
2000: 183).  
 
5.1 Identifying and being identified as Muslim 
 
 The previous chapter showed that for some people to identify as Muslim and 
gay, they need to develop specific understandings of what it means to be Muslim and 
gay. I also demonstrated how gay Muslims accumulate early and long-lasting 
understandings of Islam from their families, peers and schools. In this section, I develop 
this narrative and explore further how self-identifying as ‘Muslim’ depends on how 
people experience state regulation – or lack of regulation – of Islam.  In Malaysia and 
Britain, such regulation results in different contests among Muslims – as the religious 
majority in Malaysia and a minority in Britain – as to what constitutes authoritative, 
ideal ‘Islam’.  
The previous chapter also indicated that many Muslims develop informal 
understandings of Islam alongside what they are told to accept formally. In this section, 
I explore further how gay Muslims – like many other Muslims – supplement their 
understandings of formal, normative Islam with informal, non-normative beliefs, 
including in magic, sorcery and witchcraft. I examine how they sometimes use these 
non-normative beliefs as an outlet to subvert dominant Islamic teachings on sexual 
difference.  
 
5.1.1 Transmitting Islam: Families 
 
 Within families, authority figures such as grandparents or parents are the ones 
who most often transmit understandings of Islam to those in their care. The 
understandings of Islam and the strictness with which these are transmitted can vary 
from family to family, or from time to time within the same family.  
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Some of my Malaysian participants said when they were younger their parents 
were not overly concerned about observing Islam strictly but, over time, became more 
religious. These parents even started pressuring their adult children to do ‘Islamic’ 
things, such as performing obligatory prayers. Zulkifli, in his late 30s, and I had the 
following exchange when I asked whether his parents were strict about his childhood 
Islamic education:  
 
Zulkifli: When they were young, they weren’t strict. They went to 
parties and whatnot. They’d come back late at night after all the 
drinking and drunkenness. But now they’re very strict.  
Shanon: OK, they’ve been to Mekah (for the haj pilgrimage) and 
everything?  
Zulkifli: Yes, they’ve been to Mekah and whatnot, and now they’re 
very strict. It’s not like they’re going to whip out the cane if I don’t 
pray or anything, no. But they will make noise, they’ll nag. 
Shanon: And your mother – has she started wearing the tudung? 
Zulkifli: Yes, she’s put on the tudung. 
 
On the other hand, Osman, who grew up in a town with a significant Bengali 
population in the northwest of England, described his family as religiously observant 
from the beginning. According to him, when they were younger, his father used to drag 
him and his brothers by their ears to the mosque. In fact, his father sent one of Osman’s 
brothers to a darul uloom, or Islamic seminary, while Osman ended up joining a 
conservative Muslim social movement, the Tablighi Jamaat, in his late teens and early 
20s with his family’s approval. His father has since passed away, but Osman said his 
entire family was still strictly religious. When I asked him how he would describe their 
religiosity now, he said:  
 
I think we’ve all gotten a lot more religious-minded. And spiritual as 
well. I think before it was just dogmatic ritual Islam, but now there’s a 
bit more of a, obviously with political changes and climate, things are 
a bit more politically charged, as well [as now there are] a lot more 




Osman noticed a shift in the way that his family members ‘did’ Islam now – it was 
more ‘politically charged’ but also more ‘spiritual’. They appeared to be reflecting more 
upon the context of contemporary Britain in which they identified primarily as Muslim. 
In this sense, even though Osman and Zulkifli grew up in very different environments, 
they shared the experience of watching their families’ perceptions of Islam transform. In 
Zulkifli’s case, although his parents were never as religiously observant in their younger 
days as Osman’s, they eventually began to grapple with how they wanted to position 
and present themselves as Muslims within wider Malaysian society.  
According to Zulkifli, he personally rebelled and ended up identifying as Muslim 
on a very basic level only. He did not pray regularly, nor did he fast – instead he 
equated being a Muslim with being ethical and charitable towards others. This ethical 
dimension was important to Osman, too, but he placed far greater emphasis on adhering 
to what he understood as authentic Islamic beliefs and practices. I thus found it 
surprising that it was Osman who believed it was okay to be gay and Muslim, while 
Zulkifli held that Islam forbade homosexuality.  
The apparent paradox here is that although Osman had the more doctrinaire 
family upbringing in relation to Islam, he came to see his sexuality as congruent with 
his religious convictions. He did not think the rest of his family shared this perspective 
and therefore was not open with them about his sexuality. Zulkifli, on the other hand, 
had a more lax upbringing and appeared to be uncomfortable with his parents’ 
increasingly doctrinaire expressions of Islam, but could not fathom a gay-friendly 
version of the religion.  
The family is therefore a crucial source of exposure to Islam – gay Muslims are 
shaped by and often react against how their families understand Islam it. Yet, Osman’s 
and Zulkifli’s divergent responses suggest that the family is not the only institution that 
shapes gay Muslims’ understandings of Islam. To understand the apparent paradox 
between people like Osman and Zulkifli, we need to also explore how they relate to 
other social institutions that have shaped their views.  
 
5.1.2 Transmitting Islam: Schools 
 
Beyond the family, the next most common source of Islamic education for 
virtually all the gay Muslims I interviewed in Malaysia and Britain was special religious 
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schooling, e.g. in madrasas or mosque schools. Some enjoyed the experience but quite a 
number openly characterised this religious education as superficial and dogmatic.  
Nonny, a Malaysian in her late 30s who described her sexuality as ‘fluid’, said she 
made steady progress at her state-sponsored religious school, but the content of the 
teachings never resonated with her115. She confessed this during part of a longer 
exchange we had about the tudung, since she used to wear it in school but later removed 
it. In Nonny’s words:   
 
I was, you could say I was the smart kid at religious school. 
[…]Alhamdulillah116 I passed through all the levels and made it to the 
advanced level. Once you get to this advanced level, you are entitled 
to train as an ustazah117. But even though I studied all of that stuff, in 
my heart since I was little, I was like, it’s not that I rebelled, but I 
always felt, why as a Muslim, why do I as a Muslim have to do all 
this? Why don’t other people need to do this? Because my ustazah and 
ustaz118 used to say, if you don’t wear the tudung, you will be dragged 
by your hair through the fires of hell, right? I couldn’t accept that 
concept. But I never dared to tell my ustazahs, because with these 
ustaz and ustazah, I was like the teacher’s pet, right?  
 
Nonny also confessed having doubts about other Islamic teachings in the religious 
school but dared not express them. She conformed outwardly, but internally she was 
already developing what her teachers would probably have characterised as deviant 
beliefs. The kind of religious education she received allowed her to become familiar 
with Islamic concepts and doctrines but effectively prevented her from exploring her 
own views on Islam.  
                                                          
115 I include Nonny’s accounts here because even though she does not personally identify as ‘gay’, as a 
Muslim with ‘fluid’ sexuality she still empathises with other gay Muslims and expresses her support for 
them whenever she can.  
116 Arabic for ‘Thanks be to God’. 
117 A female religious instructor.  
118 Male religious instructor.  
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For other gay Muslims, encountering alternative authorities on Islam alongside 
more normative religious education helped them rethink rather than dismiss their 
relationship with Islam. Bilan, a British Somali lesbian in her early 30s, said that even 
though she became disillusioned with her madrasa, she eventually discovered an 
alternative source of Islamic knowledge. This was through an English convert who was 
a scholar of religion but did not reveal to anyone else that he had embraced Sufi Islam. 
Bilan was doubly struck when he revealed his inner faith to her because, according to 
her, she came from a respected lineage of Sufi saints119 in Somalia:  
 
And he was like super interesting and we got on so well, so he was 
another big influence. He showed me another model [of being 
Muslim], right? And I could also retain part of me, too. As in I could 
say, oh, I come from a Sufi family. 
 
Bilan went on to join and leave several Muslim movements – from Salafi-inspired 
groups at university to Sufi groups. For a long time, however, she struggled with the 
concept of being gay and Muslim and put her active engagement with Islam ‘on hold’ 
when she eventually came to terms with her sexuality. At the time of our interview, she 
said she was ready to put her faith in Islam and her sexuality together again but it was 
still difficult. From her narrative, her negotiation of religious and sexual identity is also 
linked to her family’s religious legacy in Somalia, her normative and alternative Islamic 
education in Britain, and the various Muslim groups she joined and left.  
 
5.1.3 Transmitting Islam: Peers 
 
What roles do peers play in the transmission of Islam from family or school 
authorities? In this section, I focus on how some peers can disrupt and transform an 
                                                          
119 Sufism is ‘long established and well developed’ in Somalia, where the majority of Muslims adhere to 
the Shafii school of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam (Lewis, 1998: 8). According to Ioan Lewis (1998: 14), 
it is usual in Somalia for the founders of local Sufi Orders and congregations to be venerated and 
sanctified after their death. Their tombs often become shrines tended by followers and family members 
and are scattered all over Somalia and ‘many, apparently, commemorate pre-Islamic figures who have 
been assimilated in Islam’ (Lewis, 1998:15).  
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individual’s normative understandings of Islam through a combination of forming 
meaningful relationships and being challenged by new ideas.  
As discussed in chapter 4.2.1, Rohana said she became very troubled when she 
discovered that some of the Muslim women she got to know through work were 
feminists. According to Rohana, they spoke highly of Amina Wadud, an American 
Muslim woman theologian frequently demonised by many Islamic leaders around the 
world120. This piqued Rohana’s curiosity, which then provoked shock and discomfort:  
 
So I Googled, and I found out stuff about Amina Wadud, that she had 
‘deviated’ from Islam. I was nervous as hell. Honestly, I didn’t say 
this to anyone. I was really nervous. I was like, oh my God, what kind 
of people were they?  
 
According to Rohana, discomfort gave way to acceptance when she realised that 
they interpreted Islam inclusively and welcomed her into their circle, which made her 
re-examine what she understood about Islam. She did not dismiss all the knowledge she 
had acquired as a Muslim but began using Islamic resources differently. She started re-
reading the Quran on her own – even downloading a translation onto her smartphone – 
no longer assuming that Allah judged her negatively or that Islam was a punitive 
religion.  
Osman also said his view of Islam was quite ‘closed’ before he joined Imaan. 
Through Imaan, he met and befriended gay Muslims who came from different schools 
of thought with differing interpretations of Islam:  
 
I think, well, in [Tablighi] Jamaat days […] it was kind of like a 
closed world, you know. You only come across one type of Muslim 
usually, you know, your Sunni, Deobandi, whatever. So it’s a very 
safe world and it is really nice in that sort of way. Through Imaan and 
the wider world, generally, you meet all sorts of Muslims, and you 
                                                          
120 In 2005, Wadud made the headlines and created much controversy when she delivered the khutbah 
and led a mixed-gender Friday congregational prayer in New York (BBC, 2005). She was subsequently 
condemned by several Islamic leaders and ulama around the world. Her actions provoked panic in 
Malaysia, where one writer accused her of ‘mocking’ Islamic teachings and trying to ‘erode the role of 
the ulama and fuqaha (jurists)’ (Ghafani, n.d.).  
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have to kind of like, think about how you think about them, and how 
you think they fit in your perspective of what Islam is, so that side has 
broadened massively.   
 
Osman and Rohana show that gay Muslims do not solely rely on Islamic 
authorities to shape their religious self-identification and often have peers who influence 
their overall views on Islam. Nevertheless, as Osman alluded when talking about his 
family, being Muslim is also influenced by the current, more ‘politically charged’ 
public perceptions and state policies relating to Islam.  
 
5.1.4 Transmitting Islam: The state 
 
So far, my findings show key similarities in how Islam is transmitted to gay 
Muslims in Malaysia and Britain, through their families, religious schools, and peers. In 
Malaysia these intersecting relationships and institutions are managed by state 
authorities that have the power to impose particular expressions of Islam upon those 
categorised as Muslim. In Britain, state authorities do not impose such expressions of 
Islam but still attempt to manage Muslim minorities in light of politically charged 
public debates and controversies involving Muslims. In this section, I examine how gay 
Muslims in both countries narrate their experiences and responses to these state-driven 
dynamics.  
According to Nonny, one key event that consolidated her rejection of state-
imposed Islam in Malaysia was a syariah enforcers’ raid on her next door neighbour in 
her condominium complex in Kuala Lumpur: 
 
It happened at two in the morning […]. Suddenly I heard a loud noise 
below my house. Turns out it was the anti-vice officers. They were 
raiding the house of this actor, Ako Mustapha121. I didn’t know it was 
him at the time. But I could hear loud screams: Open the door! Open 
the door! […] All the neighbours came out to see what was going on. I 
                                                          
121 Nonny’s anecdote tallies with what was reported in the press. In 2009, Ako was charged and 
sentenced to a fine and three months in jail for khalwat by the syariah court. Ako paid the fine but 
successfully appealed against the jail term (Star, 2011).  
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didn’t come out – I peeped through my kitchen window. And then they 
broke into his house. [They screamed] if you don’t open the door in 
ten minutes, we’re breaking in! […] I was so angry. I remember I 
called my boyfriend, Norman (who was at his own apartment). I said 
why are they doing this? I said no wonder all these kids plunge to 
their deaths from all these buildings122. To escape (the syariah 
enforcers), right? Of course they don’t intend to commit suicide, but 
they’re trying to escape.  
 
According to Nonny, this event was a turning point in how she perceived Islam 
and developed a deep resentment towards state-backed syariah enforcers in Malaysia. 
Nonny’s case shows the importance of the state as a network of institutions with the 
power to influence how people think about themselves and relate to others. In this case, 
her objection to the syariah enforcers’ aggressive imposition of Islamic moral codes 
turned her away from state-sanctioned interpretations of Islam.  
In Britain, anti-homosexual sentiments are still espoused by some non-state 
actors, including Muslims, for example the three men in Derbyshire convicted in 2012 
for distributing leaflets advocating the death sentence for homosexuality (Press 
Association, 2012; Watson, 2012). My British participants were aware of such rhetoric 
in Britain and how similar sentiments feed the actions of Islamic authorities in countries 
such as Malaysia. Like Nonny, most of them disagreed with these interpretations of 
Islam, e.g.:  
 
I think [religiously-motivated policing is] completely wrong. I think, 
you know, there’s no, you know, Islam says there’s no compulsion, 
and I think it goes against faith. (Ebrahim, early 20s) 
 
I don’t think it’s anyone’s business what happens behind closed doors. 
I could understand when people have an issue when it’s outside, but in 
the same sense, it would be an issue if a heterosexual couple would be 
acting the same way [….] (Rasheed, early 20s) 
                                                          
122 She was referring to occasional news reports about young people who accidentally fall to their deaths 




I don’t identify with [religiously-motivated policing], it’s not the 
Islam I know. So it feels very alien [….] I think [Islam] should be an 
individual journey. (Ammar, early 30s) 
 
Like Nonny, my British participants opposed such anti-gay policing on 
humanitarian and doctrinal grounds. According to them there should be no 
‘compulsion’ in Islam, which should be an ‘individual journey’, while Nonny said 
repeatedly about Malaysia’s syariah enforcers, ‘God cannot be that cruel’. Unlike 
Nonny, my British participants had the ability and legal freedom to disassociate from 
these sorts of expressions of Islam, although there might be strong communitarian 
pressures to ‘stick to the Muslim side’. Nonny did not have the same degree of freedom 
to challenge the enforcement of Malaysia’s version of syariah, which is sanctioned and 
encouraged by the state’s institutions in charge of Islam. This made her even more 
resentful of what she perceived as ‘official’ Islam.  
My British participants acknowledged that the legal and political framework there 
allowed them to express Islam as they wanted to but were also critical of the anti-
Muslim and racist sentiments they sometimes encountered in society.  In Chapter 5.2.2, 
I discussed how some were critical of what they saw as prevailing stereotypes of 
Muslims as particularly prone to terrorism or radicalism. Many felt that these 
stereotypes also informed counter-terrorism and de-radicalisation policies. Their 
narratives suggest that in this way the British state is also a ‘powerful identifier’, 
directly and indirectly constructing images of Islam which inform self-identification 
among Muslims and their identification by others.  
In the case of Malaysia, state institutions are not merely concerned about 
homosexuality but also other groups they construe as ‘deviant’ or ‘dangerous’. During 
my two research visits, for example, spokespersons for the Islamic bureaucracy and 
cabinet ministers decried ‘threats’ from Syiahs, Christians, and liberal Muslims (e.g. 
Ahmad, 2012; Awang, 2012; Bernama, 2013; Mhd Tahir, 2012; Mohamad & Yatim, 
2012; Utusan Malaysia, 2013). The Islamic authorities also demonise groups calling for 
greater democratic freedoms and human rights. In May 2012, after a mass 
demonstration by BERSIH 3.0, a civil society coalition calling for fair elections, the 
National Fatwa Council declared it haram for Muslims to participate in rallies that 
could ‘incite chaos and disturbances within the nation’ (Bernama, 2012). Alongside this 
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announcement, the Council also declared that it was haram to support or sympathise 
with LGBTs123.  
State authorities therefore use Islam to justify various aspects of authoritarian rule 
in Malaysia. In response, people like Nonny see the state’s demonisation of sexual 
minorities as part of a larger manipulation of Islam to suppress basic human rights. On 
the other hand, there are people like, Ayie, a lesbian in her early 30s, who said:  
 
I don’t want gay rights rallies [….] To me, when you are a Muslim 
you are a Muslim, you cannot oppose what is enshrined in Islam. If 
you feel you want to be open, you can be open [….] You can hold 
hands [with your partner], you can embrace, but not to the extent that 
you want to defend your right to get married to each other.  
 
In other words, although Ayie admitted her desire to be affectionate with her 
girlfriend, she complied with the state’s wider position on Islam and homosexuality. 
Unlike Nonny, she did not identify the state as a producer of this Islamic rhetoric but 
regarded it as merely upholding what was ‘enshrined in Islam’.  
My Malaysian cases demonstrate that there is a link between state-imposed 
expressions of Islam and an individual’s religious self-identification, with responses 
ranging from conformist to rebellious. In Britain, although the state does not impose 
particular expressions of Islam among Muslims, Islam was still a core component of 
self-identity among my participants. The experiences of Islam among gay Muslims 
therefore cannot be reduced to a struggle primarily between the individual and an 
‘Islam’ imposed by the state or other monolithic Islamic ‘authorities’. Rather, gay 
Muslims engage with Islam via intersecting and multiple authorities, relationships, and 
viewpoints, within families, religious education institutions, and among peers. State 
management of Islam is also a crucial factor, but my findings demonstrate that we must 
identify and clarify exactly how different state actions are experienced and negotiated 
by individuals.  
 
                                                          
123 The lumping together of BERSIH and LGBT activism as threats to the nation was explained in 
Chapter 3.3.2.  
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5.1.5 A note on non-normative expressions of Islam 
 
 During my research in Malaysia and Britain, I encountered accounts or talk of 
phenomena such as spirit possessions, sorcery, witchcraft and magic when I least 
expected. It struck me that these expressions are part and parcel of the primary 
understandings of Islam among many Muslims, even though many formal Islamic 
authorities discourage or condemn these beliefs124.  
Isma, a lesbian Malaysian in her early 30s, told me she used to drink alcohol and 
not perform her obligatory prayers, but had stopped drinking and started praying 
regularly. I was interested in how this transformation occurred but did not anticipate the 
following turn in the conversation:  
 
Shanon: What changed?  
Isma: Ah, well. Wow. (Pause.) I don’t know whether this is – this is 
quite personal, and not many people would believe in it. You believe, 
you know this thing called saka?  
Shanon: Yeah, yeah. Is it like an inherited spirit?  
Isma: Yeah. This is my dad’s mother. And before she passed away, 
because my uncles and aunties knew about this before, they asked her, 
are you sure you don’t have it anymore? She said no, I got rid of it 
before I went to Mekah, […]. So before she passed away last year, her 
kind of saka, she had to skip one generation. So I was the chosen one. 
It got really bad, because she was sick [and] they tried to get rid of it. 
[…] So when it happened, I was here in KL – I got really sick over 
here. […] And I thought I was gonna die. […] Since then I’ve stopped 
drinking and started praying regularly. 
 
  I did not expect Isma to say that she was now a more observant Muslim because 
she had recently fought spirit possession. Her response prompted me to probe into the 
other circumstances that might have informed this episode:  
 
                                                          
124 Not only Muslims hold these beliefs within their understanding of religion – some Evangelical 
Christians, for example,  believe that demonic possession can cause illness (Dein & Illaiee, 2013: 290).  
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Shanon: Were you in a relationship at that time?  
Isma: Oh yes! I had two [girlfriends]. I broke up with both. (Giggles.) 
I said, look, people, like this one knew about the other one, and the 
other one also found out about this one. I said, I cannot deal with this, 
I cannot take it anymore so I broke up with both.  
Shanon: This is before you fell ill, or after?  
Isma: After. I broke up after that. 
 
Isma’s possession episode coincided with her needing to resolve a highly 
stressful, untenable situation with two girlfriends. Yet to her, the possession was self-
contained, real, traumatic, and has had long-lasting effects – she gave up alcohol, 
started praying regularly and got into a monogamous relationship125.  
In Isma’s view Islam forbids homosexuality, but it was not within her power to 
change her sexuality. In this instance, however, breaking up with her girlfriends and 
turning over a new leaf was not the result of consciously reflecting on normative 
Islamic doctrines. It was the result of a personal religious experience which indirectly 
allowed her to restructure her life as a lesbian and Muslim.  
After this exchange with Isma, I wanted to know whether other Muslims in 
Malaysia had similar narratives. I found numerous newspaper and magazine articles 
featuring similar topics, including one condemning mak nyah who used black magic to 
attract boyfriends (Mastika, 2012: 20–22). This suggested that popular discussions on 
Islam often entwined formal doctrinal perspectives with everyday superstitions albeit to 
disapprove of these beliefs and practices. I also asked two straight Muslim friends – 
Iskandar and Deanna, in their mid-30s126 – about ‘saka’. Although I had come across 
this term regularly, having grown up in Malaysia, it was not a concept that I understood 
in much detail. Iskandar, Deanna and I then had the following conversation 
(paraphrased and reconstructed from my field-notes):  
 
Shanon: What is saka actually? It’s not just hantu raya127, is it?*  
                                                          
125 I also asked if she became celibate. She laughed and said no.  
126 Iskandar is a full-time musician while Deanna is a freelance business consultant. They know I am gay 
and were aware of the nature of my research.  
127 A supreme male demon that can be tamed by a practitioner of black magic. 
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Deanna: (Smiling, and eyes wide open.) Saka comes from the word 
‘pusaka’, meaning it’s something inherited. So if a hantu raya is not 
inherited, but you found it yourself, then it’s not a saka.*   
Shanon: Okay, I understand that, but I want to know what kind of hantu128 
can become saka.*  
Iskandar: Something that will do something for you, that can perform a 
task.*  
Deanna: Like toyol129.*  
 
From this single question about ‘saka’, I continued receiving an in-depth tutorial 
on the Malay pantheon of spirits and demons. Not only that, Iskandar and Deanna went 
on to educate me about the various hexes still at work in contemporary Malay society. 
They told me that some restaurant owners place ensorcelled human faeces in cooking 
pots to ensure their patrons keep returning – among many Malays, this explains 
restaurants that do brisk business even though the quality of the food seems mediocre.  
Because of the prevalence of these spirit beliefs, some British colonial writers 
dismissed the seriousness with which Malays practised Islam – Islam was seen to 
provide merely a façade to legitimise ‘folk’ beliefs and practices (Winzeler, 1983: 437). 
This dichotomy between conceptions of ‘folk’ and ‘orthodox’ Islam went on to inform 
similarly dichotomous views among anthropologists. Regarding British colonial 
Malaya, anthropologists and colonial administrators used the term ‘magic’ 
interchangeably with ‘folk’ Islam to describe a wide range of beliefs and practices 
which they saw as antithetical to ‘orthodox’ Islam130 (Winzeler, 1983: 438–439).   
This dichotomy also informs contemporary state-imposed expressions of Islam 
in Malaysia, where the authorities constantly condemn superstitious beliefs and 
practices as deviant or even idolatrous (e.g. Fatwa Committee of the National Council 
for Islamic Religious Affairs Malaysia, 1993; Jamin, 2011)131. The authorities actively 
                                                          
128 Generic term for spirit, demon or ghost.  
129 A malevolent child spirit. 
130 Also discussed in Chapter 4.4.2.  
131 These state-backed views of magic or superstition as ‘deviant’ are not confined to Muslim societies – 
even in Britain, the state decriminalised ‘witchcraft’ and other magical practices only in 1951 (UK 
Parliament, n.d.).  
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try to marginalise these expressions of Islam to regulate the ‘proper’ beliefs and 
practices of the larger population.  
In Britain, my encounter with magical beliefs occurred after one of Imaan’s 
Demystifying Shariah workshops in the northwest of England. After the workshop, 
Waqqas, Haniya (a British Pakistani bisexual women in her early 30s, not wearing 
hijab), Rasheed, Rubeina (a British Indian hijab-wearing lesbian in her late 20s) and I 
had dinner at a Pakistani restaurant. We got nervous when we walked in – it was filled 
only with Pakistani men, some with long beards and stern looks on their faces, and 
Waqqas joked that we might get ‘gay-bashed’.  
In this context, I was surprised once again when the conversation eventually 
turned to black magic, spirit possession, and the occult (as I captured in my field-notes):  
 
The conversation turns to jinn132. They talk about something called 
tahwiz, which sounds to me like an amulet, worn as a bracelet or 
necklace133. Rubeina confesses that she’s wearing one right now, even 
though she doesn’t believe in it.  Haniya’s eyes widen and she tells 
Rubeina she needs to do namaz and get rid of it.  
 
Waqqas says this sort of conversation freaks him out. He asks me if 
we have lots of this in Malaysia.  I say yes, and that I thought only 
Malays believed in this kind of stuff. He says no, it’s big among South 
Asians too.  
 
In other words, many gay British Muslims also incorporate these sorts of beliefs 
within their everyday understandings of Islam. According to Simon Dein and Abdool 
Samad Illaiee (2013: 291), many British Muslims particularly of South Asian 
background continue to demand for traditional healers to resolve issues related to ‘spirit 
possession and the evil eye’. Dein and Illaiee (2013: 290) suggest that possession is 
experienced more commonly by women and marginalised groups and ‘may be a vehicle 
                                                          
132 Invisible, capricious beings mentioned in the Quran, e.g. in 72:1.  
133 A locket filled with Quranic excerpts or symbols, and is meant to ward off evil, very popular among 
South Asians.  
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through which they can express their complaints in a context in which they can be 
heard’.  
Anastasia Lim, Hans Hoek and Jan Dirk Blom (2014: 4) propose that non-
Muslims in the West seldom hear about these beliefs because Muslims themselves are 
reluctant to share them, especially regarding ‘any first-hand experiences of jinn’. 
Nevertheless, these experiences often become known to medical practitioners and 
mental health professionals because experiences of jinn and spirit possession are still a 
prevalent ‘idiom of distress’ among many Muslims (Lim et al., 2014: 8).   
Isma’s anecdote about her grandmother’s saka can certainly be seen as part of an 
‘idiom of distress’. My British participants, however, discussed the occult as part of a 
larger conversation to contest and clarify the boundaries of normative Islam.  
Another story I heard about spirit possession seemed less an ‘idiom of distress’ 
than an idiom of subversion. It was relayed to me by Ebry, a sometimes-gay, 
sometimes-pondan man in his mid-30s. Ebry and I were friends since we were 11, and 
he always tried to convince me to treat ‘invisible beings’ with at least basic respect. One 
day, when I was hanging out with him and his boyfriend, Amin, I asked about a mak 
nyah we knew when we were teenagers, Ivana. Ebry told me that Ivana had passed 
away a long time ago, probably from an AIDS-related illness but he had a funny 
recollection about her:  
 
Apparently, Ivana’s mother took her to a bomoh (traditional healer) 
one day to exorcise her into becoming a straight man. Immediately 
after that, Ivana started dressing up as a man and even grew a 
moustache. The mother was very impressed that the bomoh managed 
to rehabilitate Ivana. Even Ebry was impressed when he saw the 
‘changed’ Ivana. But then a few weeks later Ivana started wearing 
dresses again and looking for boyfriends – being ‘cured’ was just an 
act to get her mother off her back, and eventually Ivana couldn’t stand 
it anymore and went back to her old ways. 
 
This story is but one variant of other similar stories I heard in Malaysia about 
families forcing members perceived as transgressing gender or sexual norms to get 
‘healed’ by bomoh. In other words, these families also resorted to what the authorities 
saw as ‘deviant’ Islam to cure ‘deviant’ expressions of gender and sexuality. Many of 
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these stories ended the same way, however – the bomoh cure would fail and the 
sex/gender ‘deviant’ would revert to his or her old ways. The moral of these stories, 
often told from the perspective of the gender or sexual minorities themselves, seemed to 
be that sex/gender deviants cannot be cured by religious deviants134.  
I mention these stories because they are reminders to look beyond the textual or 
doctrinal when investigating the experiences of Muslims. In the case of gay Muslims, 
beliefs in sorcery, spirits, and the occult can illuminate the different layers in their 
expressions of Islam. From my findings, these beliefs can provide a safety valve for 
them to temporarily escape the pressures of being gay and Muslim, and also strategies 
to assert ‘belonging’ within the wider fold of Islam.  
 
5.2 Fluidity and stability in the self-understandings of gay Muslims  
 
In the previous section, I examined how gay Muslims navigate external 
categorisations or impositions of Islamic identity alongside their internal self-
identifications as Muslim. Here, I look at how they negotiate experiences and 
understandings of being gay as Muslims.  
According to Brubaker and Cooper (2006: 35), it makes little sense to use 
‘identity’ as an analytical term if we simultaneously claim that it is voluntary and 
involuntary, or multiple and singular, or permanent and stable. Instead of asking 
whether ‘identity’ is stable or fluid, or singular or multiple, we could instead examine 
the factors which make people fluctuate between stable and fluid self-conceptions. This 
line of analysis is especially pertinent in a discussion of how gay Muslims develop their 
self-understandings of religion and sexuality over time and in different social 
conditions.   
  I came across a range of attitudes among gay Muslims about the nature of 
sexuality which intersected with specific aspects of their religious beliefs. Many 
believed they were ‘born this way’, i.e. that their sexuality was involuntary, but others 
believed that it was possible to ‘change’ by the will of Allah. I focus on how these 
differing self-understandings intersect or are informed by larger beliefs about being 
                                                          
134 Although in Chapter 5.3.1 I include Sulaiman’s account of what he called a ‘successful’ bomoh cure 
for his uncle’s homosexuality. 
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Muslim, beginning with gay Muslims who entertain the idea of their sexuality as 
impermanent.  
 
5.2.1 Understanding sexuality as changeable 
 
 Some of my Malaysian participants often speculated about whether they could 
‘change’ (‘berubah’). I observed this kind of talk most frequently among those who 
believed it was a sin to be gay.  
In our interview, Ayie asserted that being gay was ‘wrong’ in Islam and this is 
why she agreed in principle with the moral policing of sexual offences. However, she 
said nobody could ‘force’ her to change her sexuality or gender identity and she would 
prefer it if syariah enforcers were ‘gentler’ with people like her. This prompted the 
following exchange:  
 
Shanon: But if the person speaks to you gently, are you going to 
change, or will you stay the same? If someone tells you gently, dress 
like a woman, go out with a man, would you change, would you be 
with a man? 
Ayie: OK, so it’s like this. There are certain things, they could apply 
to anyone – but not to me. Because I’m already like, I don’t know, 
maybe I can tell you in ten years? I could change without anyone 
telling me to. […] I might be with Rosie (her girlfriend at the time) or I 
might not be with Rosie. […] Maybe after this when you meet me 
again I might be wearing a tudung. […] If Allah unlocks the doors of 
my heart, I will change.   
 
Here, Ayie suggests that ‘changing’ her sexuality from homosexual to 
heterosexual could be a future option, with the assumption that this would be desirable. 
However, she complicates the notion of ‘change’ with several terms and conditions.  
She suggests ‘change’ might manifest as her finally conforming to expectations 
about women’s dressing, e.g. wearing the tudung. There is also the ‘change’ which 
could affect personal relations – Ayie might refrain from having a girlfriend in the 
future. Although she stops short of saying she might be with a man, embracing the 
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concept of ‘change’ allows her to suggest this as a possibility. By placing these 
different caveats on ‘change’, Ayie is able to create a grey space where she can park 
unresolved issues about religion and sexuality135.  
This enables her to accept the premise of moral enterprise because she basically 
agrees that homosexuality is a sin and that she needs to ‘change’. However, by asserting 
that only Allah can make her ‘change’, she reclaims and asserts a considerable degree 
of personal autonomy regarding the religious and sexual aspects of her life. This allows 
her to somewhat resolve her own ‘sinful’ existence as someone who feels inherently 
lesbian yet believing in Allah as the only legitimate power that could ‘change’ her.  
Sometimes this idea of ‘change’ is used as a weapon by gay Muslims against 
other gay Muslims contemplating ‘changing’ and living a heterosexual life. I listened to 
a conversation between Isma and her butch lesbian friend Kal about lesbians who want 
to ‘change’, as captured in my fieldnotes:  
 
Isma says ‘berubah’ (‘changing’ or ‘change’) is between the person 
and God, but you can’t go around asking people when they are going 
to berubah. Kal adds, yes, if you berubah but you still don’t pray and 
fast, then that’s no good either.  What if someone is a pengkid but 
prays and fasts faithfully? What further ‘change’ do people want from 
that person? 
 
Here, Isma and Kal stretch the concept of ‘change’ with Isma reiterating a 
position very similar to Ayie’s, i.e. even if sexuality is mutable, only God has the power 
to change an individual. Kal complicates this by distinguishing between changing one’s 
religious as opposed to sexual conduct. In other words, Isma focuses on a change of 
inward disposition, while Kal adds a behavioural layer. They both set up a hierarchy 
whereby if some people ‘change’ the outward aspects of their sexual choices, it does 
not necessarily make them better than those who do not change. Kal juxtaposes the idea 
of a pengkid who prays and fasts faithfully with an ex-pengkid who still does not pray 
                                                          
135 Tom Boellstorff (2005: 575) describes a similar phenomenon among gay Muslims in Indonesia, where 
there are also strong expectations for Muslims to practise Islam visibly and the public sees 
homosexuality as incompatible with Islam. In this scenario, he argues that gay Muslims find ways of 
‘inhabiting incommensurability’ to hold onto to their religious and sexual identities.  
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or fast. In her view, the observant pengkid is religiously and morally superior to the 
non-observant ex-pengkid.  
  The concept of ‘change’ thus opens up an intermediate space which gay 
Muslims who believe their sexuality is a sin can occupy in relative peace. It also 
provides them with a resource to argue against the actions of moral entrepreneurs 
without actually challenging the basis of moral enterprise. Appealing to the notion of 
‘change’ hence allows some gay Muslims to fluctuate between asserting their individual 
sexual desires and conforming to the wider community of Muslims, or ummah.  
 Moreover, this talk of ‘change’ was much more prevalent in Malaysia than in 
Britain, which is unsurprising given prevailing state-controlled interpretations of Islam 
and homosexuality in Malaysia. Yet, while Isma and Ayie appeared to be articulating 
normative ideas about Islam and homosexuality, they were actually ambivalent about 
state-sanctioned punishments for homosexuality. Nonny, of a similar background to 
Isma and Ayie – i.e. from a ‘traditional’ Malay family but now living and working in 
the capital – used similar sentiments to embrace sexual variety:  
 
I believe that God created variety in humankind. Right? So, yes, there 
are Muslims, there are Christians, there are Buddhists, there are 
Jews, right? There are effeminate men, there are straight people, 
there are people who are not straight. But at the end of the day, what 
counts is your goodness. Goodness is not merely about praying five 
times a day or whatever. […] It’s as long as you are a good human 
being to other people. To me, how do I say it? That’s what God wants, 
perhaps? It’s like we fail to realise, we only think about our 
relationship with God. But we fail at our relationships with people.  
 
Nonny’s narrative of God and sexual diversity has much in common with Ayie’s, 
Isma’s and Kal’s, but with some crucial differences in emphasis. Unlike Ayie, Isma, 
and Kal, Nonny places even greater emphasis on good deeds rather than inherent 
personal characteristics in her interpretation of the divine will. She even expands the 
notion of good deeds to encompass all ethical conduct between people and not just 
religious rituals and acts of worship. She also believes that God created diversity and 
that this is desirable. She locates the need to behave ethically and celebrate diversity as 
coming from God, yet in doing so she locates agency in human actors rather than a 
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divine actor. For Nonny, because God has endowed human beings with a sense of good 
and bad, we are capable of working out ethical ways of treating each other, including 
respecting equality and diversity. In her view, this is ‘what God wants’ and so the 
question of whether an individual can or should ‘change’ his or her sexuality is 
irrelevant.   
 
5.2.1 ‘Created’ gay?  
 
 Many gay Muslims also believe that they were born gay, or that Allah created 
them gay and that they cannot change this. This conception of a stable sexuality can 
also lead to varying responses depending on whether they believe homosexuality is 
forbidden or permissible in Islam.  
Sulaiman said as a teenager he believed that his homosexual desires were only 
‘temporary’. Eventually, he came to identify as ‘gay’ and believed this was 
unchangeable:  
 
For me, I guess, it’s just me. I can’t be someone else […]. But the first 
thing, I just believe [if] it is wrong, then it’s wrong […]. I mean, you 
cannot challenge something that’s really wrong, if [it’s] really wrong 
according to religion. But you can’t change, either.  So, you live your 
life hoping that, you know, whatever you do, besides f**king people 
or being f**ked occasionally, is good enough for you to be a good 
person. And I want to go to Heaven too (laughs). 
 
  According to Sulaiman’s narrative, same-sex desires are inherent but 
homosexual conduct is still forbidden in Islam. One still cannot claim that it is 
permissible to be gay just because it is an inherent disposition. However, Sulaiman 
appealed to the basic Islamic teaching that Allah will weigh the accumulation of good 
versus bad deeds, i.e. a works-based view of salvation. Within this framework, 
Sulaiman reasons that the sin of having gay sex can be offset by doing good deeds. This 
rationale gives him a degree of psychological relief since, according to this logic, the 
ultimate arbiter of good deeds is Allah and not any other human authority. In fact, 
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Sulaiman posited that he might actually be causing more harm if he were to try to 
‘change’:  
 
Shanon: […] Do you feel that you are born this way?   
Sulaiman: […] Born this way? After a while then, you know, you 
realise, oh, this is genetic. Then, OK, I should not blame myself […] 
Shanon: Do you want to change? No?  
Sulaiman: It’s me. If I change also, I feel that I’ll go out with other 
guys. Change me, meaning, change means I get married to a woman 
right? Then it’s the same, I think, [in that I’ll still be gay].   
 
 In this logic, the only ‘change’ that would be possible would be superficial – 
Sulaiman could only hide his homosexuality and get married to a woman. However, 
even if he were in a heterosexual marriage, he believed he probably would not cease 
having homosexual desires. If this were the case, he might end up having sex with other 
men behind his wife’s back which would be as sinful as being in a homosexual 
relationship.  
 On the other hand, it is also possible for gay Muslims to believe they were born 
gay according to Allah’s will and reason from this that Islam does not condemn 
homosexuality. For example, when I asked Ebrahim to tell me about how his thoughts 
on Islam and sexuality developed over the years, he said:  
 
It’s only really in the last […] two years […] when I kind of finally 
started to accept my sexuality. At the time, I was quite anti-religious 
in that I felt like I’m going to have to leave Islam, and I was fine with 
that, to be honest, at that point. […] I still kind of felt, well, is the 
Quran condemning me? Well, if it is, then, you know, maybe the 
Quran is not true, because why would I feel this way? Why would 
God condemn me? So it’s really only like in the last couple of years 
where I’ve been able to kind of come to terms with what the Quran 
says and think about it in a different way, you know, through reading 
181 
 
books like Homosexuality in Islam by Scott Siraj al-Haqq Kugle136, 
and doing more research online and talking to people from Imaan. 
 
In this narrative, Ebrahim felt so strongly that his sexuality was inherent and not 
aberrant that he was willing to entertain the idea that Islam was not the ‘true’ religion. 
His conception of his sexuality as ‘natural’ and involuntary might even have 
predisposed him to seek out and eventually embrace more inclusive and alternative 
interpretations of Islam:  
 
I don’t think Islam says very much, if anything. My understanding is 
that the verses about Prophet Lot137 in the Quran were about rape, and 
other crimes, and they’ve kind of been turned into talking about 
homosexuality. So I don’t think there’s anything wrong with 
homosexuality in the Quran. 
 
 Ebrahim’s position is similar to Sulaiman’s in that he also places greater 
emphasis on the ethical quality of a person’s actions rather than his or her inward 
disposition. Ebrahim’s position causes him much less stress, however, because he no 
longer believes that being gay is forbidden in Islam in the first place and re-reads 
Islamic texts to support this belief.  
The exposure to alternative scholarship on Islam has allowed Ebrahim to develop 
a very different narrative from Sulaiman, where Sulaiman believes that neither his 
sexuality nor Islamic teachings on homosexuality can be changed. In Malaysia, 
publications that espouse alternative interpretations of Islam are frequently banned by 
                                                          
136 Discussed in detail in Chapter 2.1.1.  
137 The Arabic name for the biblical Lot. According to the Hebrew Scriptures, God destroyed Sodom and 
Gomorrah because its inhabitants did not heed Lot’s warnings to ‘not act so wickedly’ (Genesis 19:1-28). 
In all major denominations of Christianity, this passage has been interpreted as a clear denunciation of 
homosexuality. However, pro-gay Christians interpret it as referring to rape, violence and other kinds of 
domination, arguing that it is not anti-homosexual per se. They apply similar hermeneutical analyses to 
other verses in the Old and New Testaments (e.g. Goddard, 2008: 112–117). The story of Lot also 
appears in the Quran, albeit very briefly in different chapters or surahs, and pro-gay Muslim scholars 




the Publication and Quranic Texts Control Division of the Home Ministry138. Within 
this context, Sulaiman is forced to work much harder to bridge his beliefs. Ebrahim, on 
the other hand, has come to believe that Islamic teachings on homosexuality can be 
revised and reinterpreted and has an easier time holding his sexual and religious 
identities together.  
 
5.2.3 Individual autonomy and identifying as gay 
 
 Regardless of the ways in which gay Muslims try to harmonise the religious 
and sexual aspects of their lives, many still face enormous family pressure to marry 
heterosexually. This is stressful for gay Muslims who feel unable to be open about 
their sexuality among family. Still, even without having to ‘come out’, this pressure 
can decrease as they develop greater individual autonomy from their families and 
communities. This autonomy is built upon the key components of financial 
independence and physical separation from their families and communities. For 
example, Razak, a gay Malaysian in his late 20s, said his parents and siblings used to 
make comments about his effeminate appearance and pressure him to marry, but this 
has decreased over the years: 
 
Razak: Because I have this new job (with a multinational bank), they 
can’t talk much about it, because I’m earning. Maybe that’s how they 
think. 
Shanon: So you feel that since you’ve become financially independent 
they don’t comment as much?   
Razak: Yes […]. Maybe because I’ve made a commitment, like I’m 
still helping my parents, you know? I give them money every month, 
and take care of them financially.  
 
                                                          
138 As at 15 January 2015, there were 1,543 banned titles listed on the Home Ministry’s website, with 
banning dates going back to 1971. Titles included Allah, Liberty and Love by the openly-lesbian and 
Muslim Canadian writer Irshad Manji, and Qur’an and Woman: Re-reading the Sacred Text from a 
Woman’s Perspective by the Muslim feminist theologian and co-founder of Sisters in Islam, Amina 
Wadud (Home Ministry of Malaysia, n.d.). Surprisingly, Kugle’s book was not on the banned list, but I 
did not spot it in any of the major bookshops when I was in Malaysia. Also, Malaysians are able to 
access alternative views on Islam via the Internet which is still largely uncensored.  
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 When Razak was growing up, his parents had working class occupations – they 
were both factory workers and although his mother had retired his father occasionally 
still worked as a security guard. Razak’s elder siblings were in lower-middle to middle 
class occupations. By having the most middle-class occupation in his family, Razak 
appeared to his parents to be the most financially well-off among his siblings. This is 
why he ended up contributing such a large proportion to his parents’ finances. 
According to him this, and the fact that his parents moved back to their village while he 
remained in Kuala Lumpur, was what eventually gave him more space to live as he 
wanted.  
 Such nuanced negotiations are not always required. Isma is from a middle-class 
family and had a well-paying job in Kuala Lumpur while her parents continued to live 
in the north of Peninsula Malaysia. She said:  
 
I think about probably nine years ago, my dad asked when are you 
gonna get married or do you have a boyfriend? I snapped. I scolded 
him, I said stop asking me these questions. I said, you know guys out 
there are all useless, so you just stop asking me these questions, 
because I’m happy being like this. He has never asked me again. 
 
   In fact, Isma said her parents knew she lived with her girlfriend Fauziah. She did 
not know if they were aware of the precise nature of the relationship but they did not 
pry.  
 There are many gay Muslims who achieve either financial independence or 
physical separation from their families but not both, which exposes them to greater 
pressures to marry. Ammar, a gay British Pakistani, said his mother constantly tried to 
arrange rishta meetings for him, even though he told her he did not want to get married. 
Ammar’s father knew he was gay, and therefore kept quiet when Ammar refused these 
rishtas. Still, Ammar felt particularly vulnerable when he accompanied his mother on a 
visit to Pakistan and was pressured into a rishta meeting there. He described the 
incident as follows:  
 
I went to Pakistan and my mum introduced me to a girl and everybody 
was there and I felt pressured to say yes. And I thought, should I say 
yes? But the girl was there. But in the corner I imagined Osman and 
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Waqqas, this image of them just standing there, and then just going, 
‘No, honey, you’re not doing this’ (laughs).   
 
Here, Ammar described another key component in the building of autonomy – the 
existence of an alternative community of support. Ammar became friends with Waqqas 
and Osman when he joined Imaan a few years ago. They all lived within driving 
distance of each other in the Northwest of England, and constantly met and kept in 
touch. Thus, even though someone like Ammar is not fully independent in the material, 
physical sense, in the symbolic sense he is at peace with being gay and Muslim because 
of his involvement with Imaan.  
Gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain can narrate their self-understandings about 
religion and sexuality in various ways. In Malaysia, state-controlled interpretations of 
Islam and homosexuality can certainly limit, but not eliminate, the possibilities for 
developing alternative religious self-understandings. In both countries, greater 
individual autonomy allows them – whatever their personal interpretations of Islam and 
homosexuality – to express being Muslim and gay beyond the control of state or non-
state Islamic authorities.  In the next section, I explore whether a combination of these 
self-understandings and social networks can produce a collective ‘gay Muslim’ identity.  
 
5.3 Gay Muslims and group belonging   
 
In this section, I look at whether the label ‘gay Muslim’ creates what Brubaker 
and Cooper (2006: 46) describe as ‘an emotionally laden sense of belonging to a 
distinctive, bounded group, involving both a felt solidarity or oneness with fellow group 
members and a felt difference from or even antipathy to specified outsiders’. I begin by 
looking at the case of Imaan in Britain and then move on to analyse the Malaysian 
context.  
 
5.3.1 Imaan: The making of a gay ummah?   
  
Imaan utilises spaces offered by other organisations within the British LGBTQI 
charity sector to hold regular meetings and other activities. These non-religious spaces 
become temporarily ‘Islamised’ whenever an Imaan event is held. For example, the 
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agenda for the Imaan Annual General Meeting in 2013 – attended by some 30 to 40 
Imaan members from London and other parts of England – included congregational 
Zuhr (midday) prayers:  
 
After more and more people arrive and exchange salams and hugs, 
Waqqas starts appointing bilals139 and imams140 for Zuhr and Asr 
prayers. He asks if I will ‘lead’ Zuhr, and I agree. Soon, Azeez (a 
former Imaan trustee) starts going around asking those of us who need 
wuzu141 to do it.  
 
After wuzu, Ebrahim and I chat with some other Imaan members in 
the corridor upstairs. Suddenly Waqqas turns up on the staircase and 
barks, ‘Shanon, they’re waiting for you!’ So I rush down and enter the 
room. A group of around 15 to 20 Imaan members – men and women 
interspersed – is standing in rows facing the Qibla142, which in this 
case is towards the bottom right-hand corner of the room. They are all 
standing barefoot on rows upon rows of prayer mats. Azeez has done 
the azan, and yes, they’re all waiting for me. Naved does the iqama143, 
I take the lead, and we start praying. 
 
 These congregational prayers are not merely guided by conventional religious 
obligation but grounded in Imaan’s organisational ethos – members take it for granted 
that Imaan events will set aside time and space for collective worship. The style of this 
worship blends tradition and innovation. I have observed that many Imaan prayers 
employ conventional Sunni-centric verbal formulae and physical movements, but 
sometimes Shii imams will lead using Shii formulae. In fact, Imaan’s leadership 
                                                          
139 The person who recites the adhan/azan, or call to prayer.  
140 Prayer leaders.  
141 Pre-prayer ablutions.  
142 Direction facing the Kaaba in Mecca.  
143 Smaller call to prayer.  
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encourages Sunnis and Shiis to pray together, forging a non-sectarian ethos within the 
organisation.  
Also, the congregation is usually mixed gender – those uncomfortable with this 
can opt not to join the congregation and pray on their own afterwards. Furthermore, 
different members are encouraged to lead at different prayer times or to recite the azan. 
Thus, during congregational worship within Imaan, members embody an underlying 
goal – for all Muslim sexual minorities to be fully included and equal to other Muslims 
within the fold of Islam.  
In other words, besides being acts of worship, congregational prayers in Imaan 
condense and express the organisation’s vision of what it means to be a ‘gay Muslim’. 
As an organisation for LGBTQI Muslims, Imaan makes room for these Islamic 
activities based on the needs and preferences of many of its members. Through their 
participation, members explore and consolidate their self-understandings and self-
representations as LGBTQI Muslims individually and collectively. These rituals 
provide, as Brubaker and Cooper (2006: 59) put it, the ‘performative, constitutive 
dimension’ in the making of group identity.   
 Some Imaan members therefore see it as not only a ‘gay’ organisation that 
addresses their concerns about sexual identity but also a valid Muslim organisation that 
fulfils their religious needs. When I asked Rasheed whether he ‘fits in’ with the wider 
British Muslim community, he replied:   
 
No, no no no no no no! I don’t want to, though. Frankly, it’s because 
my community is Imaan, […] and like, I fit in here, and you’ve got 
your gay community and your Muslim community joined together, 
what more, what better can you get?  
 
  Imaan provides people like Rasheed with the means for expressing themselves 
comfortably and confidently as ‘gay Muslims’. For them, the combination of religious 
rituals and social networking creates a sense of community or belonging to a cohesive 
group. Imaan therefore constructs rhetoric and activities enabling someone like Rasheed 
to develop, within the group, a ‘sense of overriding oneness vis-à-vis some constitutive 
“other”’ (Brubaker & Cooper, 2006: 46).  
At the same time, Rasheed explained that his involvement with Imaan led him to 
start participating in the Islamic Society at his university. Even though he was not open 
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about his sexuality there, he said he was trying to make it more ‘progressive’. This 
suggests that, even for him, the boundary between Imaan and other Muslim groups was 
not necessarily impossible to cross.   
Indeed, other Imaan members join after having been a part of other Muslim 
movements or communities and for some of them it becomes a replacement or 
surrogate community. Osman explained his attachment to Imaan in this way:  
 
I think it’s at a weird place, because it’s like, what my previous 
experience as a community was, [different compared] to this one, 
which is an unknown quantity. I think it’s still very fresh in its stages, 
and it’s like people are trying to work out where they fit in and how it 
fits in with them, and how, to what extent. So for me, I think it’s the 
closest to a community I’m going to get to replace the one which I 
used to have, like the Jamaat days and things. 
 
 According to Osman, Imaan is still a fluid social entity, perhaps reflecting that a 
‘gay Muslim’ identity is also fluid and new. This is also reflected in the numerous 
debates that some Imaan members have, which sometimes imply that the organisation is 
too rigidly Islamic or not Islamic enough for their liking. These debates illustrate that, 
as Brubaker and Cooper (2006: 59) observe, ‘groupness’ does not reflect pre-existing 
social boundaries but is ‘ambiguous and contested’ and constantly under construction.  
 
5.3.2 Boundary work within Imaan 
 
The ‘performative’ dimensions of identity in Imaan can sometimes result in 
intra-group tensions, especially when there are various communication platforms within 
the organisation. In addition to its face-to-face meetings, Imaan provides numerous 
digital platforms for its members to interact at various levels of anonymity. There is a 
blog, an online discussion forum, a closed Facebook group, a Twitter account, and 
numerous WhatsApp chatrooms.  
The discussions on these different forums are saturated with questions about 
Islam, gender, and sexuality, as well as other casual, non-religious exchanges. There is 
never any doctrinal consensus, simply because Imaan’s organisational structure and 
188 
 
ethos is such that it does not institute ‘acceptable’ or ‘unacceptable’ doctrines for gay 
Muslims. The chair of Imaan has even stressed that the organisation is open to anyone 
who self-identifies as Muslim, even ‘atheist Muslims’.   
Despite this, when Imaan members socialise, initial conversations are often 
preoccupied with various religious matters, such as whether the food and drink is halal. 
There have been numerous occasions when I have not really bothered about halal 
requirements, provoking jokes, snide comments and even admonishments from 
different Imaan members. Hence, when a potential member, Hirsi, a gay British Somali 
in his late 20s, asked me privately if it was a good idea for him to order pork and 
alcohol at an Imaan lunch gathering, I instinctively said no. This was not because I was 
trying to impose normative boundaries of haram, but because I sensed that it would 
provoke some Imaan members to react with horror. Hirsi did not expect this reaction 
and later told me this made him disappointed with Imaan.  
 In fact, Bilan – who had attended the same gathering – also told me she was 
deeply offended by this and other aspects of Imaan, as I later captured in my field-
notes:  
 
Bilan says she feels excluded as a black woman in Imaan settings. She 
said it appears as though most Imaan members haven’t seen the world 
or engaged with other cultures.  
 
First of all, I don’t think this is true – I tell her I’ve met Imaan 
members who are open to new people, but she disagrees with me 
vehemently. I suggest that perhaps some of the members she’s met 
were from closed communities in the North of England, and were not 
exposed to people outside their own cultural circles until their late 
teens or early adulthood. She says this is still unacceptable to her – 
wouldn’t they have gone to universities and so on?  
 
I add that perhaps this reflects larger issues in the landscape of British 
Islam, that perhaps British Muslims are divided along ethnic lines. In 
some of my interviews, I was told that for a long time even 
Bangladeshis and Pakistanis couldn’t get along with each other, let 
alone allow for African Muslims to enter into their worldview. Bilan 
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continues that this is unacceptable. Then she also says she was really 
offended when Hirsi couldn’t have pork and alcohol at the Imaan 
meeting. 
 
 According to Bilan, two issues discouraged her from getting involved in Imaan 
– the role of ethnicity and the normative Islamic standards which she saw as governing 
the group. She placed herself firmly as an outsider, arguing from her position as a 
Muslim of African origin who found Imaan’s behavioural codes too strict. These 
concerns were enough to stop her from joining.  
 Regarding the issue of ethnicity, the majority of Imaan members do appear to 
come from South Asian backgrounds. This does not indicate homogeneity, however – 
the South Asians include Pakistanis, Indians, Bengalis, and East Africans of South 
Asian background. Besides, I have also interacted with people of Arab, Turkish, 
Iranian, Southeast Asian, White British, and West and East African backgrounds at 
many Imaan meetings.  
 On Bilan’s concern that Imaan was too doctrinaire, I had also come across 
complaints from other Imaan members that it was not doctrinaire enough. For example 
Nadia, an English convert to Islam in her early 30s, frequently complained to Waqqas 
that Imaan members were too lax about observing Islamic rituals and rules of etiquette. 
Nadia, who is in a lesbian relationship, also felt she did not completely ‘fit’ within 
Imaan but attributed this to being a white convert whom others assumed still needed to 
be educated about Islam.  
 These concerns from Bilan and Nadia illustrate the boundary tensions within 
Imaan – amongst members, amongst the organisation’s leadership, and between 
members and the leadership. Eventually, Bilan distanced herself from Imaan 
completely, while Nadia maintains contact with only those members she considers her 
friends.  
 The boundaries of belonging within Imaan are therefore constantly being 
challenged and reworked by existing and potential members. On one level, Imaan does 
foster strong affective ties and a sense of collective belonging as gay Muslims among 
its members. Yet, as Nadia and Bilan show, there are also gay Muslims in Britain who 
do not derive their self-understandings from a tangible sense of belonging to a 





5.3.3 Not needing to belong?  
 
 Despite Bilan’s criticisms of Imaan, she still identified as ‘gay’ and ‘Muslim’ 
and when I asked what it meant for her to be Muslim, she said:  
 
I suppose for me now community has been stripped out of it. When I 
was younger, there was a community element, my family and 
whatever was around, and when I was practising, there was a huge 
community element, because I pretty much stopped talking to all of 
my friends [when I successively joined and left several Muslim 
movements], and just immersed myself into this new world, because I 
felt like that was what was going to save me. 
 
 Like some other Imaan members, Bilan was heavily involved in various Muslim 
movements before she encountered Imaan. However, she stopped ‘practising’ as a 
Muslim when she started to come to terms with her sexuality. Eventually, she did not 
feel the need to identify with a particular group or social network to self-identify as gay 
and Muslim. In fact, she said she did not fit into the gay community either and when I 
asked if she thought there was any difference between being a gay Muslim or non-
Muslim, she replied:  
 
Islamophobia, and just how deeply Islamophobic the gay community 
is, and how, at least in my experience, the gay community seems to 
have a disproportion of people that call themselves liberal, but are so 
backward. Like have just almost never really interacted with any other 
cultures, and never really opened up their minds, and I don’t know, 
think they’re a minority, but don’t understand that being a minority 
doesn’t give you the right to discriminate against other minorities, 
yeah? 
 
Bilan therefore retains a sense of being ‘gay’ and ‘Muslim’ while feeling 
alienated from Imaan and the larger gay community in Britain. In other words, being 
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‘gay’ and ‘Muslim’ are integral parts of Bilan’s self-understanding, but she identifies 
with them on an abstract level and has developed a hierarchy of different aspects of her 
‘identity’:  
 
For me being gay is pretty far down on my identity list, so I would say 
I identify as being black, and being Muslim, and being a woman, too, 
but again that’s not really that high up, and I guess being gay is just 
right at the bottom of it. Like it’s part of who I am, but it’s not a huge 
part of who I am, right? 
 
Bilan’s experiences show that people can clearly identify and understand 
themselves as being ‘gay’ and ‘Muslim’ without necessarily feeling a need to belong to 
any ‘gay Muslim’ group. She provides a clear contrast to someone like Rasheed, for 
whom ‘gay Muslim’ is a cohesive identity tied very strongly to his community. 
Brubaker and Cooper (2006: 46) suggest that in analysing collective formations of 
identity, we should distinguish between ‘more loosely affiliative forms of self-
understanding’, i.e. involving a more general feeling of ‘commonality’ or 
‘connectedness to particular others’, and more ‘strongly groupist, exclusive, affectively 
charged self-understandings’. In this instance, Bilan’s self-understanding as a ‘gay 
Muslim’ is much less ‘groupist’ and ‘more loosely affiliative’ than Rasheed’s.  
 In the absence of any involvement with an organised collective, then, it is still 
possible for people to come to identify as gay and Muslim. I found many instances of 
this in Malaysia, where there is no direct equivalent of Imaan. In fact, some of my 
Malaysian participants were sceptical about the value of having a specific gay Muslim 
group, especially to address the Muslim component of their lives. When I asked 
Sulaiman if he would be interested in joining a gay Muslim organisation, he replied:  
 
It’s good to have support groups to address homophobia – that’s a 
different thing if you are gay. But then again if I am in Malaysia, if I 
really want to learn about religion, then I don’t have to join like a gay 
Muslim group, I can just go to the mosque. 
 
  Sulaiman’s belief that Islam forbids homosexuality could be an unstated factor 
preventing him from entertaining the idea that gay Muslims might provide valid 
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resources on Islam. Strong state regulation of Islam, Malay ethnicity, and 
homosexuality probably also make him assign very low priority to being gay, especially 
if he has other ways of relieving the stress of being gay and Muslim.  
Even though there is no direct equivalent of Imaan in Malaysia, groups such as 
SIS sometimes act as proxy gay-friendly Muslim spaces. When I asked Dax, a gay 
Malay man in his early 30s, if he had a community he identified with, we had the 
following exchange:  
 
Dax: Religiously or? 
Shanon: Any kind of community. 
Dax: Anything, like how? What about SIS?  
Shanon: SIS, perhaps, or the Annexe144?  
Dax: I’m comfortable with people at the Annexe. I’m comfortable at 
SIS. 
Shanon: Do you feel like they are community? 
Dax: I do. 
Shanon:  Are they your friends? 
Dax: Yup. I am in my comfort zone with both, like I feel I belong, I 
feel comfortable. 
 
Dax added that he attends SIS events regularly, even the ones that did not 
explicitly address gender or sexuality, despite personally not identifying as Muslim 
anymore.  
In Malaysia, then, gay Muslims have limited access to some alternative Muslim 
spaces where they can express their sexual and religious leanings relatively safely, even 
though there is no explicit ‘gay Muslim’ collective. They also have limited access to 
groups like Seksualiti Merdeka, but these spaces do not address Islam specifically. This 
leads not so much to a strong ‘gay Muslim’ identity as it does to a larger or looser 
alliance of alternative, more inclusive Muslim identities. This is in contrast with the 
British gay Muslims who feel at home in Imaan and feel a strong sense of group 
belonging with other British gay Muslims.  
                                                          
144 An art gallery in Kuala Lumpur that hosted the sexuality rights festival Seksualiti Merdeka from 2008 
to 2010 (discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.3.2).   
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To put it in Brubaker and Cooper’s terms, there was a sense of ‘commonality’ and 
‘connectedness’ to ‘gay Muslim’ identity among my Malaysian participants that did not 
necessarily translate into ‘groupness’. My British participants from Imaan, on the other 
hand, demonstrated ‘commonality’, ‘connectedness’ and ‘groupness’ in their 
expressions of ‘gay Muslim’ identity. This does not mean my Malaysian participants 
were unconcerned about homophobia, but that they chose to address this in alliance 
with other progressive or inclusive Muslims rather than through a ‘strongly groupist’ 
gay Muslim movement. In the next section, I explore the ways in which gay Muslims 
express their religious and sexual identities in tangible spaces.  
 
5.4 The space to be gay and Muslim 
 
Up to now, I have shown how gay Muslims negotiate three inter-related aspects 
of their religious and sexual identities. I began with how they fashion their self-
identifications in response to external categorisations or perceptions of them as Muslim. 
I then looked at how their self-understandings of Islam and sexuality can shift 
depending upon their surrounding circumstances. Finally, I showed how they are 
forging a collective ‘gay Muslim’ identity in Britain through organisations such as 
Imaan, while in Malaysia the state’s penalties for Islamic and/or sexual offences inhibit 
the desire and ability to forge a bounded group identity.  
Ultimately in both countries, gay Muslims are increasingly expressing their 
religious and sexual identities in ways that avoid, subvert or challenge the control of 
normative Islamic authorities. For them, Islam is now less a ‘sacred canopy’ 
permanently providing identity, meaning, inspiration, and consolation than a resource 
which they actively engage with to fashion individual and collective identity.  
In this section, I take up James Beckford’s (2001: 233) call to think of religion 
‘less as a social institution and more as a cultural resource susceptible to many different 
uses’. I do this by examining how gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain engage with 
religious symbols, authorities and rhetorics in specific physical locations and at specific 
instances. I begin with how Imaan members negotiate their personal safety and public 
visibility as gay Muslims in Britain and then compare this with the Malaysian context. I 
suggest that in both countries urbanisation has created liminal or intermediate spaces for 
gay Muslims to be able to express religion and sexuality as they want. I also argue that 
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when gay Muslims negotiate these spaces, they directly and indirectly influence 
surrounding expressions and perceptions of Islam.  
 
5.4.1 Gay Muslim pride in Britain 
 
During the annual Pride parade in London, many different LGBTQI groups 
march under different banners, including religious LGBTQI organisations – Imaan 
has previously marched alongside Sikhs and Jews. Here is an excerpt from my 
fieldnotes on the London Pride march, 2013:  
 
I’m just chilling out with the other Imaaners and holding Scott 
Kugle’s book, Homosexual in Islam, in one hand and a banner with 
the other. I’ve grown a beard especially for Pride and I’m wearing a 
West African outfit that Giles lent me – it was given to him as a gift 
some years ago. Around thirty Imaaners are present, mostly dressed in 
traditional costume, holding up various placards with slogans like 
‘Frisk me, I’m Muslim’, ‘Queer Muslim Brotherhood’, ‘No to 
homophobia, no to Islamophobia’, and ‘Imaan: LGBTQI Muslim 
support’.  
 
Two men catch me unawares. They look like father and son. They’re 
dressed in “Western” clothing and speak with Arabic accents. They 
point at my book and ask me, ‘What is this?’ I say it’s a book by Scott 
Kugle. ‘What does it say?’ they ask. I say it’s called Homosexuality in 
Islam. The older one says, ‘It is rubbish.’ I say, ‘No, it’s not 
“rubbish”, it’s written by a Muslim academic,’ and I invite him to read 
it. He says he doesn’t want to read it because it’s ‘rubbish’.*   
 
Then the younger one points at our banners and asks, ‘What’s all 
this?’ I say, ‘It’s our float for Pride.’ He says, ‘And what does Islam 
say about homosexuality?’ I say, ‘Well, actually it says very little 
about homosexuality.’ ‘Rubbish,’ says the younger man. They both 
tell me that we should remove the word ‘Islam’ from our banners. I 
195 
 
say we won’t because we’re all Muslim. The younger man raises his 
eyebrows and asks incredulously, ‘You’re all Muslim?’*    
 
By this point, some of the other Imaaners have gathered around me. 
Ebrahim starts telling them to go away, while Salleh comes and ushers 
them sternly to the pavement. He exaggerates his Arabic accent and 
tells them if they want to criticise us, they can do it from the 
pavement.  
 
   Pride is a public event where safety and order are regulated by its organisers and 
the police force. I was therefore taken aback when these two men confronted me 
directly, but it allowed me to witness other group dynamics coming into play. Imaan 
members noticed that one of their own was being ‘threatened’ by an outsider, and so 
protected me in a way that reinforced the group boundary symbolically and physically.  
Also, if matters had escalated, the security personnel would have been firmly on 
the side of the Pride organisers and participants – while they would defend freedom of 
speech, they would not tolerate anti-homosexual attacks. The two men had no choice 
but to leave us alone lest they attracted unwanted attention from security personnel. 
Though they confronted me with ideas that circulate freely in Malaysia or other 
Muslim-majority countries and might have landed me in trouble there, I did not suffer 
any adverse consequences from this confrontation in London. In fact, in London, these 
men were confronted with the reality that there are people who explicitly identify as gay 
and Muslim.  
 From Imaan’s perspective, Pride is an event which, although occurring in a 
public, ‘secular’ space, allows for collective practices – e.g., making and carrying 
banners, chanting slogans, marching together, taking pictures – that bind members 
together. Unlike Imaan’s congregational prayer sessions, there are also tangible external 
dynamics that can reinforce a sense of intra-group connectedness and commonality, for 
example the two confrontational men. This incident was an example of Brubaker and 
Cooper’s (2006: 46) suggestion that group identity also involves as ‘a felt difference 
from or even antipathy to specified outsiders’.  
Apart from the two men, the mostly white, British, non-Muslim spectators 
during Pride are also external actors who help foster in-group feelings of solidarity 
within Imaan. Large sections often cheer loudly when they see the Imaan banner and 
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rush to take pictures with Imaan members. Some Imaan members respond by ululating, 
chanting Islamic slogans in Arabic, and doing bhangra steps or belly dancing. By 
interacting with the crowd in this way, Imaan members use Islam and ethnicity as 
cultural resources to construct public images of a gay Muslim collective. They make 
being gay and Muslim imaginable and intelligible to spectators at Pride by drawing 
upon universalistic images of ‘Islam’ and ‘gay’ identity and elaborating these in their 
own ‘particularistic terms’ (Beckford, 2000: 173).  
 It might thus seem paradoxical that many Imaan members who turn up to march 
during Pride employ various tactics to tone down details that might make them 
identifiable on a personal level. They might put on dark sunglasses or wear hijabs and 
niqabs, which become not only fashion statements or religious symbols but a means of 
protecting anonymity in public145. This is partly because many Imaan members need to 
balance their desire for social acceptability and the fear of being ostracised by their 
families and local communities if they were to be ‘found out’.  
 In Malaysia, I encountered several gay Muslims whose fears about being ‘found 
out’ were even more pronounced. One recurring fear was of potential gay pride marches 
in Malaysia, for example in Ayie’s objection to them as discussed in section 6.1.4. Ayie 
argued further:  
 
To me, why would you want to take the risk? You are a small 
community – you want to fight a big community? As long as certain 
people are OK with you then I think that’s fine. If people don’t attack 
your home, throw I-don’t-know-what into your house, you can live in 
a Malay community with your partner without people bashing you, to 
me that’s good enough. 
 
There are some strands in Ayie’s reasoning that need clarification. To begin with, 
she thinks ‘gay rights rallies’ could potentially draw unwanted attention to people like 
her and her girlfriend. In Malaysia, she argues, they enjoy a certain degree of freedom 
to be in a romantic relationship, living together in a Malay-majority area without 
anybody ‘bashing’ them or having their home attacked. She feels that attempting to be 
                                                          
145 For most Imaan members, putting on the hijab or niqab is also a strong endorsement of religious 
diversity in a ‘gay’ space.  
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more visible with her sexuality and demanding equal rights as a sexual minority would 
upset this delicate balance. A publicly visible rally would invite danger as opposed to 
the relative safety which she now enjoys.  
Ayie’s reasoning implies that there is a gap between the anti-homosexual rhetoric 
of Islamic authorities in Malaysia and the relatively more tolerant attitudes of the 
majority of Muslims in her local environment. According to her, it is possible to avoid 
state-led rhetoric by living semi-openly as a gay Muslim but not explicitly declaring or 
labelling what she is. To what extent is this true? In the next section, I examine if or 
how this partial invisibility works for gay Muslims in particular circumstances and 
whether this also involves treating Islam as a ‘cultural resource’.  
 
5.4.2 Balancing acts – expressing and concealing sexuality 
 
 Malaysia’s syariah provisions enable Islamic ‘enforcement officers’ to patrol 
public and private spaces for moral infractions by Muslim including alcohol 
consumption, non-performance of Friday prayers by Muslim men, non-observance of 
the fast in Ramadan, intimate heterosexual relations between unmarried Muslims, and 
homosexual relations146. It is practically impossible for these enforcers to assign the 
same level of priority to every type of infraction and to police them constantly and 
comprehensively. In practise, therefore, syariah enforcers often act on tip-offs from 
members of the public or pressure from political leaders147.  
Yet, there are venues where gay Muslims can be semi-public about their sexual 
identities without being targeted by these enforcers. During my field research, I became 
aware of two 24-hour open-air restaurants in two different Kuala Lumpur suburbs – one 
popular primarily among Malay pengkids and their girlfriends, the other among gay 
Malay men and mak nyah. After clubbing one night, at around 3am, Razak, Dax, and 
                                                          
146 Muslim men who fail to perform Friday prayers regularly, Muslims who eat in public during 
Ramadan, and Muslims who drink alcohol in public in the Federal Territories can all be fined and/or 
imprisoned under the SCOA (Malaysia, 1997: 13–15). Also, under the SCOA, heterosexual sex out of 
wedlock, liwat and musahaqah are all punishable by imprisonment and/or whipping and/or a fine 
(Malaysia, 1997: 16–17). Similar provisions exist under the Syariah Criminal Offences Enactments 
(SCOE) of the other States.  
147 Precisely how these syariah advocates and enforcers exert their influence over state institutions and 
the mass media and how gay Muslims respond was discussed in Chapter 5.2.  
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Ikhwan – in his late 20s – and I visited the restaurant popular with gay men and mak 
nyah, as captured in my fieldnotes:  
 
At least five tables have lelaki lembut, adik-adik or abang-abang 
sitting, eating and chatting. Razak, who is the most familiar with the 
place, takes us around and we sit inside. […] Immediately after we sit 
two young, slim, adik-adik skip past us, holding hands. Razak says to 
me, ‘Did you see that?’ I say, ‘I know.’ Ikhwan says they were at the 
nightclub before, too.*   
 
As the hour progresses, more and more adik-adik, abang-abang and 
mak nyah turn up. I see a dyed-blond, effeminate adik with his 
exposed chest, in his early 20s, walking in and laughing with a couple 
of his friends. Altogether, the gay men and transgender women 
occupy at least ten tables surrounding us now.  
 
The migrant South Indian waiters are nonchalant. They take orders 
calmly and good-naturedly, even while the adik-adik lean on each 
other, hug, laugh, and hold hands at their tables. I make a remark 
noting the waiters’ indifference, and Razak says, ‘Maybe they are 
resigned to their fate.’ *  
 
 This restaurant is not hidden or ‘underground’ by any means. It is located beside 
the main traffic light junction of this suburb and surrounded by other outlets such as a 
7-Eleven, more 24-hour eateries, and rows of cars parked under glaring neon lights. 
This square, in turn, is surrounded by numerous high-rise condominium blocks. 
Rohana, Sulaiman, and Razak all told me they thought many of the gay Muslims who 
frequented this restaurant lived within the vicinity.  
 In theory, the law allows syariah enforcement officers to police establishments 
like these to weed out homosexual behaviour or cross-dressing148. To my knowledge, 
                                                          
148 The exact wording of Article 28 of the SCOA, applicable in the Federal Territories, is: ‘Any male 
person who, in any public place, wears a woman’s attire and poses as a woman for immoral purposes 
shall be guilty of an offence and shall on conviction be liable to a fine not exceeding one thousand ringgit 
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they had never done so here but this does not mean moral enterprise does not exist in 
practise – it is just arbitrary and selective. Not far away in Seremban, the capital of the 
State of Negeri Sembilan, several mak nyah were so violently harassed by enforcers that 
they mounted a constitutional challenge against the syariah provision outlawing cross-
dressing. The civil High Court rejected their application on the grounds that they are 
Muslim and Islam forbids cross-dressing and transgenderism (BBC, 2012). In 
November 2014, however, the Court of Appeal found in their favour, ruling that the 
syariah provisions denied them their human rights and that Islamic law is subject to the 
Federal Constitution (Malay Mail, 2014)149.  
 In most circumstances, gay Muslims in Malaysia are aware that such policing 
exists and of its arbitrary and selective nature. Ebry and Amin live in a State with a 
reputation for stringent syariah enforcement and said they knew of several cases 
involving mak nyah there, too, especially those involved in drag performances. Also 
targeted were mak nyah hired by families to perform at traditional Malay weddings in 
villages and small towns. I asked Ebry and Amin why they thought the religious 
enforcers focused so much on drag shows and wedding performances, and we had the 
following exchange:  
 
Ebry: Because sometimes the ones who inform the officers about these 
events, they’re not outsiders. It’s the pondan themselves who have 
their own agenda.  
Shanon: What kind of agenda? 
Ebry: For example if the person enters a pondan pageant, and 
suddenly loses, or she’s an ex-beauty queen and is offended at not 
being invited as a guest of honour, she’ll tip the religious enforcers off 
about the event. Isn’t that twisted? Or maybe she spots her ex-
boyfriend attending with another mak nyah, or someone tells her the 
boyfriend’s cheating on her, she’ll inform the authorities 
[anonymously that something ‘immoral’ is going on].  
                                                                                                                                                                         
or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or to both (Malaysia, 1997: 17).’ Similar 
provisions exist in the SCOE in the other States. 
149 The ruling was denounced by state and non-state syariah advocates, including the Minister in the 




These stories are difficult to verify because of a lack of transparent data – there 
are no publicly available statistics about the types and frequency of syariah operations. 
Yet according to tan (2012a: 158), despite strong anti-homosexual rhetoric from syariah 
advocates, the syariah laws are seldom applied. The Federal Territories only had one 
case of liwat recorded in the first half of 2008, while the PAS-governed State of 
Kelantan – with its reputation for severe Islamic penalties – has not prosecuted anyone 
for this (tan, 2012a: 130). Most of the prosecutions for sodomy have been under civil 
legislation, specifically Section 377 of the Penal Code (tan, 2012a: 131). The syariah 
provisions against musahaqah (female homosexual behaviour) are similarly rarely 
applied.  
Mak nyahs are disproportionately targeted by the religious enforcers compared to 
gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals – between 2005 and 2009, 346 cases of ‘men behaving 
like women’ were brought to the syariah courts (tan, 2012a: 146). In the broader 
context, however, the number of cases involving homosexual men and women and mak 
nyah pales in comparison to the 27,277 cases of khalwat (illicit proximity between 
heterosexuals) recorded between 2005 and 2009 (tan, 2012a: 146).  
Ebry’s account is thus plausible and also significant in that he offers non-religious 
critiques and explanations of the actions of syariah enforcers. Even the government-
controlled newspapers routinely report these moral raids when they go awry, for 
example those resulting in extortion (e.g. Wan Noor Hayati, 2013), physical injuries 
and even death (e.g. Mohd Fadly, 2013).  
  Despite knowing about these actual and potential abuses, many gay Muslims in 
Malaysia are cautious about criticising the Islamic authorities too publicly. Often, they 
also do not feel the need to oppose things openly since the occasional and arbitrary 
nature of moral policing does not make life completely unbearable. Some of them even 
try to ‘beat the system’, as Ebry put it:   
 
If the religious department feels like it on a particular day, they’ll just 
go out and target all the Muslims who drink. That’s typical in 
Malaysia. You know what it’s like? It’s like when it’s pondan season, 
they’ll ooooooooooonly catch pondan! When it’s alcohol season, 
they’ll oooooooooooonly catch drinkers! During that season, pondans 
can go about freely, dancing carefree – nobody will bother them. So 
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recently, like my friend, he’s a Muslim and he ordered a beer while I 
had orange juice. We sat together, drinking and enjoying the moment. 
And then the enforcers showed up but he wasn’t charged – because he 
wasn’t in drag. 
 
Thus, many gay Muslims try to beat the system by lying low during ‘hunting 
season’ and come out of hiding when they think it has ended. For other gay Muslims, 
the very idea of even occasional moral enterprise is anathema. Fauziah and I had the 
following exchange when I asked her if she thought there were any differences between 
being a Muslim and a non-Muslim in Malaysia:  
 
Fauziah: I don’t get to choose my religion, I don’t get to choose how I 
would like to dress, I don’t get to choose what I want to eat or drink, I 
don’t get to choose a lot of things.  
Shanon: But in a very, in an everyday sense, effectively you do, right? 
You choose how you want to dress, you choose where you want to 
eat, what you wanna drink?  
Fauziah: Mmm, yes, but being aware the whole time of the 
consequences that come from those choices, having that hang over 
your head.  
Shanon: So you actually think about it? Like even now you’re not 
wearing a tudung, are you constantly thinking about it?  
Fauziah: Ya! Are you kidding me? Man, I would love to dress like a 
slut! Do you really think that’s possible? 
 
In Malaysia, then, the relative tolerance towards sexual minorities on an 
interpersonal, community level is inhibited considerably by the fear of actual and 
potential enforcement of syariah laws. People like Fauziah do try to criticise or oppose 
syariah enforcement in their own ways, however, by volunteering for or supporting 
organisations such as SIS and other women’s or human rights groups.  
My Malaysian gay Muslim participants therefore did not explicitly use Islam as a 
‘cultural resource’ to forge sexual and religious identity in the way that my British 
participants did with Imaan. Rather, many of my Malaysian participants sought to 
explain and critique syariah enforcement in practical, non-religious terms to analyse 
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and address state regulation of Islam and sexuality. They all treated the idea of Islam as 
sacred but were critical of the administration of Islam, suggesting that Islam was no 
more a ‘sacred canopy’ for them than for my British participants. People like Fauziah 
even supported organisations such as SIS which challenge state-imposed interpretations 
of Islam. Their experiences show how, as Beckford (2000: 183) puts it, ‘religion 
functions simultaneously on universalistic and particularistic “registers”’.  In this way, 
gay Muslims in Malaysia, as in Britain, also engage with Islam as a ‘cultural resource’ 
and can be potential agents of social change.  
 
5.4.3 Indications of wider change 
 
In Britain, state-led institutions protect the rights of sexual minorities, yet anti-gay 
sentiment and incidents perpetrated by non-state actors persist in some situations. For 
example, a survey commissioned by Stonewall (Guasp, Gammon, & Ellison, 2013: 4), 
the British LGB charity, found that in 2013, eight in ten LGBs reported experiencing 
harassment, insults and intimidation.  
Statistics like these go some way to explain why, despite being comfortable 
marching as a ‘gay Muslim’ collective during Pride, Imaan members still felt the need 
to mask their personal identity. They know their rights are protected by the state but 
remain concerned about the potential consequences of being ‘found out’ by their 
families, friends and local communities. In relation to these conflicting circumstances, I 
have discussed how gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain engage in ‘role adjustments’ 
(in Chapter 4.2.2) and how they might also form strategic connections with other 
sympathetic Muslims (in Chapter 5.3.2).  
Yet sometimes, the gay Muslims I met in Malaysia and Britain seemed surprised 
or perplexed by particular trends they were noticing among other Muslims. Rasheed 
told me he was amused and slightly unsettled by recent developments at a famous gay 
nightclub in the northwest of England: 
  
It’s the fact that every Thursday night, [this gay club] has a student 
night. All the Asians go there. All the Muslim Asians go there, and it’s 
crazy, ‘cause I was like, what? So I can’t go [gay clubbing] on a 
Thursday because [of] all the Asians there! […] But it shows that […] 
203 
 
slowly, it’s not a taboo thing, because even as a gay Muslim, you 
think, oh my God, if a Muslim person that I know saw two guys 
kissing, they’d be like, what the f**k! However, these [straight 
Muslim] guys go [gay clubbing], so it’s not a big thing for them. 
 
This example might not be representative, but it does make us ask whether 
Muslims – gay or straight, and in this case in the West – are experimenting with new 
ways of belonging within wider society. Rasheed was not convinced that this change 
was enough to protect him from being stigmatised by his community if he were to be 
seen at the same venue. To him, these other Muslims might be comfortable going to a 
generically gay nightclub, but would probably still be unnerved if they personally came 
into contact with a gay Muslim. This is why he stayed away on Thursday nights.  
Still, Rasheed was more amused than afraid – overall, he seemed to think it was 
good news that straight Muslims were partying at the gay nightclub in town. Rasheed’s 
account suggests that other younger British Muslims are also finding outlets to express 
themselves beyond the control of normative Islamic authorities. This example gives us 
a glimpse of how dominant, global images of ‘Islam’ and ‘sexuality’ can become 
refracted at national and local levels.  
 
5.5 Conclusion  
 
Gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain feel a strong sense of connection to their 
religious and sexual identities yet manage to express Islam in ways that avoid, subvert, 
or resist control by normative Islamic authorities. Drawing upon Brubaker and Cooper’s 
analytical framework on the different facets of identity construction, I examined the 
conditions that make this possible in both countries.  
In Malaysia, the state is a powerful identifier of religious identity – it categorises 
people’s religious affiliation and imposes particular expressions of Islam on Muslims. 
Many gay Muslims here take it for granted that they are Muslim and that their 
behaviour is seen as immoral and criminal. At the same time, state authorities cannot 
fully dictate how they live their lives as Muslims. In this context, they still negotiate 
and engage with multiple social networks, authorities and perspectives of Islam and 
develop their own self-understandings. Some even vehemently object to state-imposed 
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Islam, albeit mostly in private. This does not mean that they necessarily disaffiliate 
from Islam or that Islam ceases to hold personal importance for them but rather that 
they constantly engage in personal reinterpretations of it. However, the strong state 
regulation of Islam and Malay ethnicity, with sanctions for violations, inhibits the 
formation of a bounded, ‘strongly groupist’ (Brubaker & Cooper, 2006: 46) gay Muslim 
collective.  
In Britain, the state does not impose Islam upon Muslims – or religion upon the 
rest of the population – in the same way. Yet state management of Muslims as a 
religious minority makes them particularly visible especially in light of controversies 
and issues involving Islam. In this scenario, Islam also becomes a primary component 
of the identity of gay British Muslims. At the same time, they often need to grapple 
with anti-homosexual beliefs and attitudes within their families and communities. Here, 
too, normative Islamic authorities cannot monopolise the way gay British Muslims 
fashion their religious self-understandings. Instead, gay British Muslims formulate their 
own self-understandings based on negotiations and engagements with multiple social 
networks, authorities and perspectives on Islam. In fact, the politicisation of Islam and 
sexuality within the context of a liberal democracy has partly enabled organisations 
such as Imaan to emerge and be legitimised by the state. This wider context further 
allows Imaan to draw upon Islamic symbols, teachings and practices as cultural 
resources to build a strong sense of gay Muslim group identity.  
Thus, in Malaysia and Britain, gay Muslims draw upon what they imagine to be 
‘true’, ‘correct’ ideals of Islam from external sources, but they adapt these to their local 
or individual circumstances. They still seek to belong within the wider community of 
Muslims, but they also revise and refine their understandings of Islam based on their 
specific experiences. Gay expressions of Islam are therefore not merely instances of 
individual gay Muslims being dominated by or clashing with a supposedly oppressive, 
monolithic ‘Islam’.  
Furthermore, my findings suggest that gay Muslims might not be that different 
from other Muslims who also use Islam as what Beckford refers to as a ‘cultural 
resource’ to fashion eclectic self-expressions. In contexts where Islam is not imposed 
by the state, younger heterosexual Muslims might be developing less confrontational 
and more tolerant attitudes towards sexual minorities. In countries like Malaysia, on the 
other hand, syariah enforcers might try to control expressions of Islam yet 
unintentionally drive gay and other Muslims to seek alternative expressions of Islam. 
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These dynamics suggest that there is much analytical value in looking at religion more 
as a ‘cultural resource’ than as a ‘social institution’. This allows us to examine how 
widespread images of ‘Islam’ and ‘sexuality’ are refracted at national and local levels, 
and whether these, in turn, reshape ‘global’ or ‘dominant’ understandings of Islam. The 
next chapter explores how the inter-related transnational and national dimensions of 
‘Islam’ and ‘sexuality’ affect the regulation and expression of gay Muslim identity in 
Malaysia and Britain.   
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Chapter 6: The wider politics of halal and haram 
 
This chapter builds upon the previous one by comparing the ‘regulatory 
contexts’ (Beckford, 2008: 211) in which gay Muslims use Islam as a ‘cultural 
resource’ to fashion their self-identities. It looks at how gay Muslims negotiate their 
everyday lives around the dominant notion that ‘proper’ Islam condemns 
homosexuality as haram (forbidden).    
As I will show, this notion is not necessarily expressed explicitly but arises 
implicitly in several situations. My overall interest is in how state and non-state actors 
can construe particular kinds of behaviour as unacceptable and conflate these with 
particular groups of people – in this case, ‘homosexuals’. To pursue this analysis, I 
engage with theoretical insights from the sociology of deviance and, where relevant, on 
the ‘securitization’ of Muslims (Croft, 2012: 16) and ‘homonationalism’ (Puar, 2007: 4, 
39, 51).  
Popular understandings about what Islam ‘says’ about homosexuality are 
informed by images of rigid and draconian legislation associated with the term shariah. 
This conception of shariah, however, is a relatively modern development in how 
Islamic law is conceived. To be more precise, there is a distinction between shariah, 
understood as a moral and ethical code, and fiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence150. 
Historically, in fiqh, jurists from different schools of thought debated and often revised 
their interpretations of the degrees of permissible (halal) and prohibited (haram) 
conduct. The terms halal and haram could apply to various individual activities and 
social interactions including consumption of food and drink, financial transactions and 
sexual relations. The majority view in medieval and contemporary fiqh is that 
homosexual relations are a subset of haram sexual conduct. 
Yet in the history of Islam, there were dissenting opinions on the types of 
homosexual acts considered unacceptable, and the degree to which they were 
                                                          
150 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, a scholar of Islamic law and jurisprudence, argues that in the Sunnah 
(recorded traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) the words shariah and fiqh do not carry the same 
legalistic meanings that they are commonly associated with now (2006: 4). Kamali (2006: 6) further 
argues that the notion of the shariah as the ‘principal criterion of an Islamic state’ only gained 
prominence in the twentieth century through Muslim thinkers and activists such as Sayyid Qutb, Abu al-
Ala Mawdudi and Yusuf al-Qaradawi.  
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punishable151. It is thus more appropriate to refer to contested and diverse Islamic 
rulings forbidding particular sex acts, whether with those of the opposite or same sex. 
However, many Muslim-majority nation-states now codify anti-homosexual laws based 
on particular interpretations of fiqh or legacies of colonial anti-sodomy laws or both152.  
To understand the everyday implications of these understandings on gay 
Muslims, I draw upon insights from sociological studies of deviance, specifically 
regarding ‘moral enterprise’. I engage with Howard Becker’s (1991: 147) suggestion 
that ‘moral entrepreneurs’ can be divided into ‘rule creators’ who define certain 
activities or categories of people as ‘deviant’, and ‘rule enforcers’ responsible for 
meting out social penalties to deviants.  
We might think of ‘deviants’ as the ones provoking moral enterprise, but 
Stanley Cohen (2011: 8) argues that often, moral entrepreneurs create ‘moral panics’ to 
whip up anxiety or hatred towards ‘deviants’ or ‘folk devils’. This often triggers the 
‘folk devils’ to respond antagonistically, justifying the public’s fears and leading to 
further confrontations between the ‘moral entrepreneurs’ and ‘deviants’ – a process 
Cohen (2011: 226) refers to as ‘deviancy amplification’.  
According to these approaches, society’s perceptions of ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’ can and does change with time and different societies or cultures can have 
varying understandings of what counts as deviance. In the context of the West in the 
1960s, for example, homosexuality was still widely regarded as deviant, and 
individuals who identified as homosexual often kept this a secret. More recently, the 
authorities in several Muslim-majority societies increasingly target sexual minorities as 
‘folk devils’ while in Western liberal democracies, anti-Muslim ideologues often 
portray Muslims as potentially violent extremists or terrorists.  
In Britain, Stuart Croft (2012: 16) argues that this results in some state and non-
state actors bolstering ‘British’ identity by singling Muslims out as potential security 
threats – what he terms the ‘securitization of Islam’. In the US, Jasbir Puar (2007: 4, 
51) goes further and argues that stereotypes of Muslims as violent, misogynistic and 
homophobic are feeding pro-war, nationalist ideologies of America as exceptionally 
tolerant and gay-friendly, i.e. ‘homonationalism’.  
                                                          
151 I give examples of these debates in Chapter 2.1.1.  
152 The historical background of such laws in Malaysia is discussed in Chapter 3.  
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These perspectives on the ‘securitization of Islam’ and ‘homonationalism’ 
highlight the geopolitical dimensions affecting the management of Muslim minorities 
in Western liberal democracies. This chapter critically engages with them by comparing 
how gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain respond to notions of halal and haram within 
politicised and ideological constructions of ‘true’ Islam and ‘homosexuality’.  
Structurally, the chapter begins with a section exploring how dominant images 
of Islamic prohibitions of homosexuality are presented in the British and Malaysian 
mass media and how these affect the everyday lives of gay Muslims. This provides the 
backdrop for the next section, which compares the impacts of state-led monitoring and 
regulation of Islam and sexuality in the two countries upon gay Muslims. Here, I 
engage specifically with perspectives on moral enterprise, the securitization of Islam 
and homonationalism. The final section then discusses a key strategy gay Muslims use 
to reclaim social acceptability in both countries – developing alliances with sympathetic 
Muslims who accept and promote alternative and more inclusive interpretations of 
Islam.  
My analysis suggests that social constructions of deviance take on different 
complexions in Malaysia and Britain. In Malaysia, notions of moral, ethnic and 
religious purity overlap in the anti-homosexual rhetoric used by pro-syariah ideologues 
to defend the ‘purity’ of society. In Britain, on the other hand, there is growing 
advocacy tackling homophobia as part of wider activism focusing on the ‘social 
suffering’ of marginalised groups – what Cohen (2011: xiii) calls ‘good’ expressions of 
moral panics. However, some versions of gay activism can end up targeting religion, 
including Islam, as the ‘enemy’ of sexual freedom. There is therefore a more 
complicated intersection in Britain between activism aiming to eradicate homophobia 
and that which potentially scapegoats ethnic and religious minorities, especially 
Muslims, as exceptionally homophobic.  
Gay Muslims in both countries therefore often need to negotiate their sexual and 
religious self-expressions based on what they perceive as the wider public mood on 
‘Islam’ and ‘homosexuality’. I suggest that the growing media channels and fragmented 
state bureaucracies unintentionally provide spaces for them and their allies to ‘fight 







6.1 ‘Homosexuality in Islam’: mass media constructions 
 
Mass media channels are important sites where people can construct, disseminate, 
and contest influential images of the relationship between ‘Islam’ and ‘homosexuality’. 
In popular dailies in Malaysia and Britain, news stories, commentaries and features 
remind readers that ‘Islam’ and ‘homosexuality’ are irreconcilable and that this is 
impossible to change. In my observations, the most highly circulated Malay-language 
newspaper in Malaysia (Audit Bureau of Circulations, 2012), Harian Metro (‘The 
Daily Metro’), often carried reports and commentaries condemning homosexuality 
from what was claimed to be an Islamic perspective. In one example, a guest columnist 
who was also a pro-government Islamic scholar claimed: 
 
The Western-controlled media uses the issue of human rights to 
uphold lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) rights, yet this 
is nothing more than a futile effort […]. Upholding the rights of 
LGBTs is clearly opposed to the principles and foundations of Islam, 
which has never condoned freedom without restrictions. (Fathul Bari, 
2012) 
 
This view pits the ‘West’, construed as pro-LGBT and implied as misguided, 
against an ‘Islam’ construed as anti-LGBT and defended as upright. Assumptions 
about halal and haram therefore do not only inform codes of religious and moral 
behaviour – they also implicitly shape political and ideological boundaries.  
The idea that the West is pro-gay while Islam is anti-gay also often appears in 
many mass media channels in Britain, but with the roles of ‘us’ and ‘them’ reversed. 
For example the popular, right-leaning tabloid The Daily Mail prominently reported on 
three British Muslim men who were jailed in February 2012 for distributing literature 
advocating the death penalty for homosexuality. One headline read: ‘Muslim fanatics 
who called for execution of gays and wanted to set up a “medieval state” under Sharia 
law in Derby are jailed for up to two years’ (Faulkner, 2012). The Mail’s juxtaposition 
of the terms ‘Sharia’, ‘medieval’ and ‘fanatics’ creates an image of ‘real’ Islam as 
foreign, uncivilised and barbaric, and thus alien to civilised and tolerant Britain. 
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Despite some portions within the body of the Mail’s report explaining that ‘moderate 
Muslim leaders’ objected to the men’s activities, the article closes with this quote from 
a ‘gay resident’ in the area:  
 
It used to be lovely round here [….] Now, because of these people, 
you don’t feel safe. I don’t have any problems with Muslims. But 
these lot need to realise we live in England, not some Islamic state. 
(Faulkner, 2012) 
 
This closing line reinforces the notion that sexuality is a fault-line in the Mail’s 
construction of ‘Islam’ and ‘England’, regardless of the nuances included in the rest 
of the article.  
The Mail and Harian Metro therefore produce and repeat dominant images of 
‘Islam’ as inherently incompatible with ‘Western values’, including respect for gay 
rights, albeit with some key differences. Harian Metro claims that homosexuality 
comes from the West and thus constructs homosexuals as folk devils, while the Mail 
insinuates that violent homophobia often comes from Muslims, implying that Islam is 
potentially deviant.  
Also, Harian Metro is owned by a media conglomerate closely linked with the 
senior partner in Malaysia’s ruling coalition, UMNO, and so is in effect owned by 
proxy and controlled by the government (Ding, 2010: 18). Furthermore, all print 
publications in Malaysia are subjected to laws restricting freedom of expression and 
opinion, particularly regarding ‘sensitive’ topics such as Islam and homosexuality 
(Ding, 2010: 10–12). The Mail also has its own ideological leanings and caters to a 
specific audience but does not operate under the same restrictive media policies. 
These contrasts in how the mass media portray ‘Islam’ and ‘homosexuality’ as 
irreconcilable affect gay Muslims differently depending on their immediate 
circumstances.  
These observations partially support Puar’s conceptualisation of 
‘homonationalism’, with both papers portraying gay rights as a Western value albeit 
to draw different ideological conclusions. As I show throughout this section, 





6.1.1 Mass media coverage: Negative experiences 
 
On a basic level in Malaysia and Britain, media constructions of the 
irreconcilability between ‘Islam’ and ‘homosexuality’ affect the overall self-esteem of 
many gay Muslims. This is reinforced when gay Muslims also come across other 
reports that construe homosexuality in negative terms. Ammar, a gay Pakistani in his 
early 30s – born, raised, and still living in the Northwest of England – said when he was 
a teenager, he read an agony aunt’s column advising a teenager to not identify as gay 
because it was probably ‘just a phase’:  
 
So I took that on board and thought I’m not gonna stick to a label [….] 
So it was only when I got to 20, then my teenage years had ended and 
I thought, oh, it’s not gonna change [….] And that’s when I had to 
struggle with religion and sexuality. 
 
Ammar continues and says that even though the agony aunt’s advice was not 
overtly hostile towards homosexuality or religiously framed, it was based on the 
assumption that homosexuality was undesirable at the very least. This was partly what 
informed his eventual ‘struggle’ between his sexuality and adherence to Islam.  
This internal struggle is often reinforced through key interactions with family 
members, specifically authority figures within the family. Fauziah, a bisexual 
Malaysian in her late 30s, said her mother read Malay-language dailies and expressed 
opinions on Islam and sexuality aligned closely to what they reported. When I asked 
how she felt about the mass media’s coverage on LGBT issues in Malaysia, she 
replied:  
 
Angry lah! Because I know my mother reads these newspapers! And 
she believes what they say! [...] She doesn’t see any reason why they 
would lie or say something that’s not true. 
 
In fact, Fauziah believed such media reports reinforced what her mother learnt 
about ‘Islam’ and ‘homosexuality’ in other settings, for example in lectures at the local 




She, apropos of nothing, she starts talking about how homosexuality is 
like the worst sin, worse than murder, and that homosexuals, it is 
wajib (religiously obligatory) to kill them and not just wajib to kill 
them, but kill them in a horrifically cruel way, and that supposedly, 
because I said no, I don’t think Nabi (Prophet) Muhammad ever asked 
people to kill homosexuals […] she said, yes he did! And she got this 
from her ustaz, okay?  
 
In this instance, Fauziah tried to contest her mother’s views with some lesser 
known interpretations of the history of early Islam. While many Muslims argue that 
the Prophet Muhammad condemned homosexuality and transgenderism, it is 
impossible to verify any instances when such people were punished in his lifetime. 
Scott Siraj Al-Haqq Kugle (2010: 99) argues that according to key textual sources of 
early Islam, the first ‘punishment’ of a known homosexual occurred after 
Muhammad’s death153. Even then, these sources appear to focus more on the man’s 
political rebellion than his alleged homosexual behaviour. Fauziah was vaguely 
aware of this history but found it frustrating to argue it since her mother insisted on 
upholding the views of her ustaz and the government-controlled media. The way the 
mass media constructs images of Islam and homosexuality can therefore powerfully 
shape interpersonal relations within settings such as Fauziah’s family.  
There are other instances in which gay Muslims attribute the hostility against 
them to negative mass media constructions of Islam and homosexuality. Rohana, whose 
experiences were discussed in the previous chapter, said after negative coverage on 
pengkid on national television in late 2012 she felt threatened within her own 
neighbourhood. This is significant because Rohana and several of my other Malaysian 
participants said the neighbourhood had quite a considerable population of gay and 
transgender Muslims. However, Rohana described one incident in the vicinity of her 
home which made her feel unsafe:  
 
It was a motorcyclist. I was crossing the road on my own – I wanted to 
have something to eat at this place near my condominium. The 
                                                          
153 Kugle’s interpretive approach to Islam is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.1.1.  
213 
 
motorcyclist yelled at me, ‘Woi, pengkid!’ That’s all I heard, I 
couldn’t hear anything else (he said) [….] Everyone stared at me. 
 
 Rohana’s story demonstrates how the Malaysian mass media’s negative portrayals 
of homosexuality can turn gay Muslims into potential targets of hostile public 
sentiment. In Britain, despite laws and policies protecting sexual and religious 
minorities, ideological constructions of Muslims as ‘foreign’ or ‘anti-Western’ in certain 
media outlets can indirectly turn gay Muslims into objects of curiosity or suspicion. 
These images carry great force alongside other everyday situations in which gay 
Muslims are reminded that ‘true’ Islam opposes homosexuality.  
 
6.1.2 Islam and homosexuality: Other everyday reminders 
 
Gay Muslims regularly encounter everyday talk and banter reminding them 
that being gay is strange or sinful in Islam. Apart from family interactions and mass 
media reports, this kind of talk also happens at the workplace or among particular 
acquaintances. Ayie, a lesbian Malaysian civil servant in her early 30s, said her 
Muslim colleagues often engaged in negative talk about LGBTs whenever the issue 
made the headlines:  
 
Ayie: Yes, they talk about LGBT, including all the bosses, they’re 
talking about LGBT in meetings – 
Shanon: In the civil service?  
Ayie: Yes, in the civil service, talking about LGBT, they feel that 
LGBT [is] one of the issues that heavily affects youngsters. So I just 
keep quiet, I pretend I don’t know what’s going on. 
 
Because of restrictions on freedom of expression in Malaysia, specifically in 
relation to Islam154, people like Ayie feel they have limited ways of responding to such 
negative talk and often have to feign ignorance. She said the most she could do 
                                                          
154 E.g., the Syariah Criminal Offences Act (SCOA), applicable to all Muslims in the Federal Territories, 
criminalises ‘insulting, or bringing into contempt, etc., the religion of Islam’ and acting in ‘contempt or 
defiance of religious authorities’ (Malaysia, 1997: 11–12).  
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sometimes was ask her anti-LGBT colleagues if they had ever heard the LGBT person’s 
point of view. If they said they had not, she would chastise them for being ignorant and 
lacking empathy but according to her most of them did not seem bothered.   
 In Britain, gay Muslims also encounter everyday conversations that frame Islam 
and homosexuality as irreconcilable, but within a context where the law protects the 
rights of religious and sexual minorities155. Despite these protections, everyday jokes 
and comments about the supposed impossibility of being Muslim and gay can leave 
many gay Muslims feeling awkward and annoyed. Salleh, a British Arab in his late 20s 
who works for a local council in London, said: 
 
You know like at work, I’m the only Muslim in my team, and I’m 
gay. And to everybody, they don’t see the Muslim, they see the gay, 
you know what I mean? [...] So for example, on Friday, I like going to 
Jumuah [prayers]. And my [English] manager will let me go off, but 
he’ll say, oh, he’ll make comments like, oh, you’re such a haram boy 
because you’re wearing an engagement ring (since Salleh was in a 
same-sex civil partnership).  And I look at him and I think, you don’t 
actually understand the concept of what you just said to me. 
 
In this instance, Salleh’s manager invoked the concept of ‘haram’ to joke about 
what he perceived as the incongruity between Salleh’s religious and sexual identities. 
This dynamic contrasts with many of the other accounts discussed above where the 
idea of homosexuality being haram was taken for granted and not mentioned 
directly. Despite the attempt at humour, Salleh was befuddled at the use of ‘haram’ 
to refer not to particular actions but to his existence as a gay Muslim, which he 
considered a serious misconception.  
These monolithic images of ‘Islam’ and ‘homosexuality’ can result in mere 
social discomfort, as in Salleh’s example, but it can make others worried for their 
own personal safety. Ammar said when a heterosexual Muslim colleague who did 
not know he was gay heard about his trip to a stereotypically ‘gay’ part of England, 
they had the following exchange:  
                                                          
155 E.g. the Equality Act 2010 includes sexual orientation and religious affiliation under its list of 




He sent a text to me saying, it was quite an aggressive text, saying, he 
doesn’t like, he used the insulting term s**t stabbers […] and if I am 
one, then we’ll have to end our friendship.  
 
Ammar further explained that he did not think his colleague’s attitude towards 
homosexuality was due to his understanding of Islam per se, adding that some of 
their white, non-Muslim colleagues were also quite anti-gay. He attributed their 
attitudes to coming from a small Northern town where even many non-Muslim 
English inhabitants were not ‘open-minded enough’.  
These accounts by Ayie, Salleh and Ammar are not directly related to mass 
media constructions of Islam and sexuality but rather show how everyday 
conversations can reinforce the dichotomy between being gay and Muslim. Such 
everyday talk and mass media constructions work together directly and indirectly to 
reinforce the idea that being gay and Muslim is an anomaly. At the same time, 
growing spaces for debate within the mass media and in everyday interactions allow 
gay Muslims and those sympathetic to them to access and construct alternative 
images of Islam and homosexuality.  
 
6.1.3 Alternative discussions in the news media 
 
 In Malaysia and Britain, there are also reports on ‘Islam’ and ‘homosexuality’ 
or portrayals of Muslim sexual minorities that subvert or challenge the idea that 
being gay and Muslim is incompatible. In Britain, multi-layered discussions of 
‘Islam’s’ position on ‘homosexuality’ are more likely to be explored in relatively 
liberal or left-leaning outlets, since British media outfits tend to cluster around 
particular political ideologies (BBC, 2009). However, the liberal and left-leaning 
media generally attract a smaller audience suggesting that there might still be a lack 
of overall critical balance in media discussions of ‘Islam’ and ‘homosexuality’156.  
                                                          
156 As of June 2014, for example, the left-leaning tabloid The Daily Mirror’s readership was 57 percent 
of the Mail’s, while the left-leaning broadsheet The Guardian’s was only 36 percent of right-leaning 
broadsheet The Telegraph’s (Audit Bureau of Circulations, 2014).  
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 In its news coverage, the left-leaning broadsheet The Guardian gives 
prominence to virtually the same events as The Mail albeit with less sensationalised 
headlines. On the anti-gay Muslim men from Derby, one Guardian headline simply 
read: ‘Three jailed over gay-hate leaflet’ (Press Association, 2012). Its commentary 
and opinion sections also allow for subtler discussions on ‘Islam’ and 
‘homosexuality’. A series of articles on racism, for example, contained a piece by 
Rob Berkeley (2012) highlighting the disproportionate assumptions and targeting of 
homophobia among religious or ethnic minorities. Berkeley gave the example of 
reactions to British Muslim journalist Mehdi Hassan:  
 
Mehdi Hasan highlighted the vitriolic abuse he receives when he seeks 
to address issues of anti-Muslim discrimination on the basis that he is 
homophobic – well he must be, he is a Muslim after all and everyone 
‘knows’ Muslims are homophobes. Presumed guilty, he is asked to 
prove his liberal credentials before his reasonable arguments are even 
given a hearing.  
 
Berkeley clarified that this did not mean ethnic and religious minorities should 
be exempted from efforts to eliminate homophobia and sexism. He argued further, ‘It 
is more likely to be achieved through democratic debate, through efforts to empower 
women and LGBT people from these communities, and through just application of 
the law, rather than through threats to withdraw rights’ (Berkeley, 2012). Some 
months afterwards, Hasan (2013) confessed struggling with ‘the idea of 
homosexuality’ as a heterosexual Muslim yet also opposing homophobia.  
 There are also relatively sympathetic portrayals of homosexuality in the 
Malaysian mass media, albeit occurring far less frequently and prominently. Such 
low-key coverage is partly due to the wider restrictions on freedom of expression and 
might sometimes be a strategy to escape government scrutiny, especially for the 
government-owned media. For example, an analytical piece in the most highly 
circulated government-owned English daily, The Star (Audit Bureau of Circulations, 
2012), examined why Malaysian LGBT activists and their allies were not advocating 
gay marriage (Tam, 2013). This was in relation to news that Malaysia’s neighbours 
in mainland Southeast Asia – predominantly Buddhist Thailand and Vietnam – were 
contemplating legalising gay marriage. Instead, the Muslim and non-Muslim human 
217 
 
rights activists interviewed prioritised the need to overturn social stigma against 
LGBTs and to repeal existing laws that criminalise homosexuality.  
Such reports and commentaries show that even though the Malaysian 
government tries to muzzle public debate, the mass media – even government-owned 
publications – are not monolithic. Among government-controlled outlets, however, 
these views are more likely to appear in the English- and Chinese- rather than Malay-
language news media.  
On the whole, these nuanced news stories in both countries do not appear to 
have the power to completely undo dominant images of Islam as inherently opposed 
to homosexuality. Instead, many Malaysians and Britons need to turn to the fiction 
media – including film, television, and novels – for more multi-dimensional 
portrayals of ‘Islam’ and ‘homosexuality’.  
 
6.1.4 Mass media beyond the news 
 
Several of my Malaysian participants told me about Malay-language big-screen 
films and television dramas portraying Muslim sexual minorities in a relatively 
sympathetic light. Often, these films and programmes used the terms ‘gay’ or ‘lesbian’ 
or their equivalents sparingly, but the conflict in the storylines was obvious. One 
example is the made-for-television film Sutun (Shahrul Ezad, 2005), about a Malay 
schoolboy nicknamed ‘Adik’ – literally ‘younger sibling’ but also a euphemism for 
‘feminine young man’ – bullied relentlessly for being effeminate.  
Adik is taunted and teased by the other children in his village, his classmates, and 
even his father’s friends and colleagues, triggering the father to verbally and physically 
abuse him, albeit unwillingly. Yet Adik also gets moral support from his mother, his 
best girlfriend in school, and his new Chemistry teacher. There is even a suggestion of a 
budding romance between him and Shuk, the Chemistry teacher’s younger brother who 
is also the new boy in class.   
These sympathetic characters invoke Islam in their defence of Adik not by 
reinterpreting homosexuality as halal or ‘permissible’ but counselling sympathy and 
compassion towards people who are ‘different’. Adik’s mother and Chemistry teacher 
say repeatedly that Allah made Adik this way and it would be wrong to punish him for 
something he has no control over. During another pivotal scene, Adik is shown praying 
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and saying in a voiceover, ‘God must have had a reason for making me this way.’ On 
the other hand, Adik’s bullies also invoke Islam when they taunt him and manipulate 
their ustaz to punish him and Shuk for allegedly being ‘gay’.  
Towards the end, Shuk confronts Adik’s bullies on their daily canoe ride to school 
but everyone tumbles into the river. All the boys are saved but in the aftermath of the 
fracas, an unconscious Adik lies limp in the arms of his weeping parents. The final 
scene suggests that Adik has survived, grown up, and is married with children. The 
filmmakers thus balance an often straightforward critique of homophobia for most of 
the story with an ending that conforms to dominant Islamic norms and the state’s 
censorship guidelines.  
The Malaysian film censorship guidelines forbid ‘deviant’ portrayals of Islam and 
positive representations of ‘wild’ and ‘deviant’ lifestyles, including ‘scenes of unnatural 
sex’ (Department of Film Censorship and Enforcement Control, 2010: 8–15). Against 
this background, Sutun still proved extremely popular and well-reviewed and was even 
nominated for Best Television Drama at the state-sponsored Seri Angkasa Television 
Awards (Abd Aziz, 2006).  
My participants also highlighted several other Malaysian films which have 
explicitly or implicitly criticised anti-gay and anti-transgender attitudes, albeit 
complying with censorship regulations. During my first fieldwork trip to Malaysia, I 
also caught the Malay-language film Istanbul Aku Datang! (Istanbul, Here I Come!) 
(Chauly, 2012) which has a small but important gay sub-plot. Thus, despite the 
government-controlled media’s ‘hard’ ideological work constructing homosexuality as 
unacceptable in Islam and overall restrictions on freedom of expression, there are media 
practitioners attempting more nuanced representations of sexual minorities. 
Furthermore, as evidenced from the popularity of Sutun, Istanbul Aku Datang!, and 
other films, Muslim audiences in Malaysia appear prepared to tolerate relatively non-
judgemental portrayals of gender and sexual diversity. These attitudes are difficult to 
gauge, however, and it might be that for many Malaysian Muslims tolerance does not 
mean morally condoning homosexuality.  
Many British Muslims might hold similar attitudes, but these would carry 
different repercussions for them as religious and ethnic minorities157. For example, 
                                                          
157 I discuss the wider context of Muslim public opinion on homosexuality in Britain in Chapter 3.2.1, 
and in Malaysia in Chapter 3.2.2.  
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leading up to the passage of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, The Muslim 
News, a monthly newspaper catering for British Muslims, declared in an editorial that it 
opposed gay marriage. However, the editorial worded its argument as not anti-gay, 
specifically in its conclusion:  
 
The issue is not about discrimination against gay people but about the 
sanctity of marriage. The Bill will weaken the institution of marriage 
and will have negative implications on society158. (Muslim News, 
2013)  
 
The following issue also contained a letter to the editor claiming that the Muslim 
MPs who voted in favour of same-sex marriage were ‘out of touch with the Muslim 
community’ (Mohamed, 2013).  
Unlike The Guardian and The Daily Mail, however, coverage on homosexuality 
or sexuality in general in The Muslim News was quite sparse in the period I focused on, 
i.e. between February and September 2013. Still, in subsequent issues it gave prominent 
and even positive coverage of Sadiq Khan, the most prominent Muslim Labour MP to 
vote for same-sex marriage. In fact, immediately after the House of Commons vote, the 
Mail ran a long article on how Khan had received death threats from other Muslims 
(Taher, 2013), an aspect that went unreported in The Muslim News. Yet in August 2013, 
The Muslim News reported positively on Khan winning the Patchwork Foundation MP 
of the Year Award for his work in representing minorities (Buaras, 2013). This time, my 
search on the Mail’s online archives using the keywords ‘Sadiq Khan’ and ‘Sadiq Khan 
MP of the Year’ returned several articles about Khan being besieged by one controversy 
or another, but none about this accolade. A reader would thus have a very different 
image of Khan depending on which paper he or she reads. According to The Daily Mail, 
Khan is an embattled Muslim politician perhaps fearing for his life but according to The 
Muslim News, he is celebrated albeit with caveats for Muslims about his pro-gay stance.  
It appears that a person would get a very different picture of Islam and 
homosexuality in Britain depending on which news source he or she relies on.  The 
various publications appear to be trying to discern a ‘representative’ Muslim point of 
                                                          
158 A similar position was expressed by some columnists and commentators in right-leaning newspapers 
such as the Telegraph and Mail, and by some leaders in the Church of England prior to the passage of the 
Act (e.g. see Davies, 2013).  
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view, but their efforts show the difficulty in ascertaining what this view is or if it even 
exists.  
One way to refine the analysis is to note the specific Muslim voices portrayed or 
implied as ‘representative’ in different media spaces. For example, in 2009, the popular 
British soap opera EastEnders introduced a long-running storyline involving a gay 
Muslim in a romantic relationship with a gay white Englishman (Khaleeli, 2009). As 
reported by the BBC, Asghar Bokhari of the Muslim Public Affairs Committee opposed 
this storyline because: 
 
The Muslim community deserves a character that represents them to 
the wider public because Islamophobia is so great right now […]. 
There's a lack of understanding of Muslims already and I think 
EastEnders really lost an opportunity to present a normal friendly 
Muslim character to the British public (Mahmood, 2009, my italics). 
 
 According to this report, Bokhari would have preferred EastEnders to educate 
the British public to embrace ‘normal friendly’ Muslims, but does ‘normal’ refer to 
socially conservative and heterosexual? Did he mean, by implication, that the gay 
Muslim in EastEnders was not a ‘normal’ Muslim? In any case, Bokhari’s voice is 
implied in this news article as a ‘mainstream’ or ‘official’ British Muslim perspective 
on the issue.  
 The BBC managed to get other views on the subject, including one by an 
Imaan trustee at the time, who said: ‘It is entirely possible to be Muslim and gay and 
[there are] many of us in Britain today […]. It is great that the BBC have had the 
courage to raise such an important social issue in our society today.’ The BBC article 
thus enables readers to glimpse how various Muslims contest Islam in Britain, but is 
structured in such a way that it pits a ‘normative’ Muslim voice against an 
‘alternative’ one. This structuring makes it difficult to gauge the range of other views 
amongst Muslims which might complicate what is assumed as ‘representative’ 
Muslim public opinion on homosexuality.  
 This debate about EastEnders further shows that the fiction media have 
considerable influence in shaping public debate about Islam and homosexuality. 
Exactly how the EastEnders storyline impacted gay Muslims, other British Muslims 
and the British public more generally deserves more scrutiny. The Imaan chair told 
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me that registrations on the organisation’s anonymous online forum doubled from 
approximately 1,500 to 3,000 after the storyline premiered. For him, the reasons for 
this and its impacts need to be analysed further but it suggests that the storyline did 
reach many gay Muslims in Britain. This also suggests that it reached EastEnders’ 
wider Muslim and non-Muslim audience and potentially shaped their views about 
gay Muslims. Against this backdrop, the storyline could be interpreted as the BBC’s 
attempt not only to open up the debate on Islam and homosexuality but steer it in a 
particular direction.  
 In summary, although the news media in Britain and Malaysia largely construct 
images of ‘Islam’ and ‘homosexuality’ as irreconcilable, the implications are 
different in the two countries. In Malaysia, the government-controlled media 
construe homosexuality as foreign and undesirable, but in Britain, ideologically-
driven coverage in certain media outlets portrays conservative expressions of Islam 
as un-British and potentially disruptive. Despite these narratives, there are also multi-
dimensional discussions on Islam and sexuality in both countries in less immediately 
obvious media spaces, especially in the fiction media. Works of fiction, including in 
film and television, can often experiment with images of ‘Islam’ and 
‘homosexuality’ that challenge many of the stereotypes in the news.   
 
6.2 Morality, national security and gay Muslims 
 
 Agents claiming to protect religion and morality have often targeted 
homosexual behaviour in different places and moments in history. Britain once had 
laws criminalising homosexual behaviour, while Malaysia inherited colonial era 
penalties for sodomy and, after independence, expanded syariah provisions 
criminalising homosexuality159.  
 In this section, I examine how the notion that Islam opposes homosexuality is 
influenced by wider regulations of Islam and sexuality in Malaysia and Britain and 
the resulting impacts on gay Muslims. My starting point is Becker’s (1991: 147) 
theory that moral enterprise consists of two seemingly complementary, functional 
units – ‘rule creators’ and ‘rule enforcers’. Becker (1991: 161–162) further argues 
that the bureaucratic pragmatism of the rule enforcers sometimes results in tensions 
                                                          
159 Discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
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between them and the more ideologically zealous rule creators. According to Cohen 
(2011: 8, 226), moral panics involve ‘deviance amplification’ in which those who try 
to control morality often provoke further deviant reactions through their creation and 
policing of categories of unacceptable behaviour.  
 In some contexts, ethnic and religious entrepreneurs can take on the role of 
moral entrepreneurs. Just as ‘moral entrepreneurs’ want society to be structured 
around particular definitions of morality, ‘ethno-political entrepreneurs’ – as 
described by Rogers Brubaker (2006: 10) – want it structured around what they claim 
to be the interests of specific ethnic collectives. Similarly, religio-political 
entrepreneurs make their own interpretations of religion the core of their campaigns 
to restructure society.   
 In Malaysia, as I demonstrate in this section, the same actors often equate the 
defence of morality with the defence of ethnicity and/or religion. In Britain, however, 
changing definitions of acceptable sexual morality mean that notions of morality, 
ethnicity and religion intersect differently. Here, the public’s increasing tolerance of 
sexual freedoms is often accompanied by disapproval of or suspicion towards 
religious groups that are deemed conservative, including Muslims.  
 I begin this section by examining how various agents produce and pursue 
overlapping moral, ethnic, and religious concerns in Malaysia and how this 
contributes to perceptions of homosexuality as foreign, deviant or immoral. I then 
discuss the security-laden rhetoric on Islamic radicalism in Britain which influences 
the wider regulation of Muslim identities and how this affects gay Muslims there. I 
go on to illustrate some ways in which gay Muslims in both countries respond to 
their differing circumstances.  
 
6.2.1 ‘Foreign’-ness, Islam and morality in Malaysia 
 
 Moral, ethno- and religio-political actors in Malaysia often portray the notion of 
the human rights of LGBTs as a ‘Western’, ‘liberal’ imposition. I observed an example 
of this during my fieldwork in November 2012, when I attended a two-day state-
sponsored seminar – ‘Constitutional Law: The Position of Islam as the Religion of the 
Federation’160 (Syariah Section of the Attorney-General’s Chambers Malaysia, 2012).  
                                                          
160 My observations relate to a particular perspective on sexual minorities within the Malaysian Islamic 
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 The audience appeared to consist mostly of staff members of Malaysia’s Islamic 
bureaucracy, including from the AG’s Chambers’ Syariah Section as well as some 
syariah-trained lawyers and students. Altogether, there were approximately 70 
participants, male and female, the vast majority of whom were Muslim161.  
 One of the panel discussions, ‘The Agenda to Erode the Sovereignty of Islam in 
Malaysia: A Challenge’, was moderated by a pro-syariah activist and consisted of a 
legal academic and a high-ranking civil servant from the Syariah Technical Committee. 
As part of the discussion the civil servant, Naser Disa, said unprompted that ‘LGBT’ 
interests and ‘sexual orientation’ cannot be claimed as rights because they ‘violate’ 
religion. He then accused some ‘misguided’ Malaysians of undermining ‘Islam’ in the 
name of human rights and democracy.  
 According to Becker’s typology, Naser would be a ‘rule creator’ since he was a 
high-ranking civil servant with strong concerns about sexual morality. He is also clearly 
a religious entrepreneur or more precisely a syariah entrepreneur – his goal is not 
merely to rid society of ‘immorality’ but to ensure that it complies with his particular 
vision of syariah. He attacked the idea that Malaysia should become more democratic 
and recognise ‘LGBT’ rights – if unchecked, he argued, democracy could undermine 
Islam. He also rebuked certain quarters for referring to Islam as Malaysia’s ‘official 
religion’ through an extended exchange with the audience, as captured in my fieldnotes:  
 
Naser asserts that we shouldn’t say Islam is just an official or 
‘ceremonial’ religion. Because by saying this we lower the position of 
Islam as the country’s ideology. He asks if we would ever say, ‘My 
“official” religion is Islam?’ If we did, it would mean that we are 
subscribing to other, unofficial religions besides Islam – if this were 
the case, we would be committing idolatry. The audience murmurs 
and nods in agreement. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
bureaucracy, which is by no means monolithic. For a more comprehensive analysis of how this 
bureaucracy is organised and the range of views and approaches within it regarding sexuality, see tan 
beng hui. 2012. ‘Sexuality, Islam and Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the Shifting Strategies of 
Regulation’. Thesis, Singapore: National University of Singapore. 
 
161 I attended with two of my non-Malay, non-Muslim women friends – one an academic and the other a 
feminist activist. As far as we could tell, they were the only non-Muslim participants.  
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He continues, ‘So we have official and unofficial residences, official 
and unofficial cars, but do we have an “official” wife or an “official” 
husband? The truth is, Islam is the religion of the nation, whether it is 
official or not. So this phrase, “Malaysia is a secular democratic state 
with Islam as the official religion” is crazy talk.’*  
 
In this admonition, Naser does not merely want to merge religion and state – he 
appears to be claiming that Islam is the primordial religion of the Malaysian nation. 
Yet although the Federal Constitution establishes Islam as the religion of the 
federation, it does not explicitly designate syariah as the supreme law of the land 
(Malaysia, 2010: 20). The constitution does define Malays as Muslims but also 
recognises religious diversity by guaranteeing freedom of religion for all Malaysians 
(Malaysia, 2010: 25–26, 153)162.  
This constitutional linking of Islam and Malay identity appears to be the basis 
for Naser’s merging of particular notions of morality, ethnicity and religion. In his 
panel presentation, he slipped back and forth between moral, religious and ethnic 
talk. When dismissing the claim that Malaysian Indian minorities suffer 
discrimination, for example, he defended the ‘Malays’ rather than ‘Islam’. 
Furthermore, he rarely invoked the concepts of halal and haram explicitly and 
appearted to take for granted that people would equate the need for moral purity with 
the need for ethnic and religious purity.  
 Naser’s views were repeated by most of the other panel speakers who could 
similarly be conceptualised as ‘rule creators’ defending their particular notions of 
Islam, Malay-ness and morality. Yet, several were openly frustrated that despite the 
existence of an elaborate Islamic bureaucracy, the position of Islam still appeared 
insecure and was being more openly challenged by various minorities. For example, the 
Mufti of Perak State complained the following day:  
 
Now we are no longer like an Islamic state. If people visit in 
December they’ll think this is a Christian country. If they come in 
                                                          
162 The wider background to this was discussed in detail in Chapter 3.  
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February they’ll think it’s Buddhist. They go to Batu Caves and they’ll 
see a huge shrine*163. 
 
 Some speakers attributed what they saw as the ‘undermining’ of Islam to the lack 
of political will, and others to lack of Malay-Muslim unity. Yet I noticed that the people 
who appeared to be rank-and-file Islamic civil servants – those whom Becker would 
term ‘rule enforcers’ – were hardly paying attention. A couple of middle-aged women in 
tudung and loose black suits fell asleep on both afternoons, while the young women in 
the row behind me chatted and giggled away. The men in front, largely in their late 30s 
and early 40s, were playing with their smartphones, reading the sports pages, or chatting 
softly. Did they even come of their own volition or were they ordered to by their 
superiors? In any case, even in this two-day event whose attendees were mostly 
Muslims linked to the syariah bureaucracy, there appeared to be an imbalance of 
zealousness.  
 According to Becker (1991: 147), ‘rule creators’ are like moral crusaders while 
‘rule enforcers’ are often bureaucrats who see moral enforcement as merely a job. They 
are constrained by the realities of working bureaucratically – their priorities shift 
constantly, they find it impossible to enforce every piece of moral legislation on every 
single case, and they are sometimes implicated in corruption164.  
 This tension between ‘rule enforcers’ and ‘rule creators’ was most clearly 
expressed during the final panel discussion: ‘The Role of Islamic Institutions in 
Realising Islam as the State Religion: Steps Forward’. One of the panellists, Norlia 
Ghazali – a senior civil servant at the Malaysian Department of Islamic Development 
(JAKIM) – complained that JAKIM is often criticised by advocates of syariah for not 
doing enough to uphold Islam. She explained that JAKIM’s hands were tied because as 
a federal agency it only had the jurisdiction to coordinate and not enforce Islamic 
legislation, unlike the various State Islamic departments that had enforcement powers.  
                                                          
163 The Mufti appears to be lumping Buddhism and Hinduism together – the shrine in the Batu Caves on 
the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur is dedicated to Lord Murugan, the patron god of Tamil Malaysians who 
practice Hinduism (Nadaraja, n.d.). The February celebration he refers to is Thaipusam, observed by 
Tamil Hindus in Malaysia, many of whom process to the Batu Caves from the Kuala Lumpur city centre. 
The main Buddhist celebration is Wesak, which is in May, not February.    
164 For example, in August 2013 three syariah enforcers were arrested by the Malaysian Anti-Corruption 
Commission for extorting tens of thousands of ringgit worth of bribes from heterosexual couples caught 
for khalwat (1 Malaysian Ringgit is approximately 0.20 British Pounds) (Wan Noor Hayati, 2013). 
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 She added that JAKIM often had to do damage control when the actions of 
Islamic institutions within Malaysia were portrayed as ‘discriminatory human rights 
violations’ by the ‘international community’. She suggested that institutions like 
JAKIM could ‘utilise’ Muslim non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to ‘defend 
fundamental matters’ that should not be challenged by non-Muslims. After all, she 
reasoned, these NGOs were not bound by the same ‘disciplinary restrictions’ as state 
departments such as JAKIM.  
 Norlia’s reasoning shows that when bureaucrats carry out moral enterprise, it may 
become less efficient and consistent than what the ‘rule creators’ may have envisioned. 
As bureaucrats, rule enforcers may run into several obstacles to implement the rule 
creators’ vision, hence Norlia’s suggestion of enlisting the help of other crusaders. Yet, 
according to Becker (1991: 153), while some rule creators or crusaders continue being 
dedicated to their moral causes, others eventually tire out. This dynamic was hinted at in 
Norlia’s further acknowledgement that some of the non-state syariah actors that were 
more prominent in the past now appeared lacking in cohesion and zeal.  
 It therefore appears that there is much about moral enterprise in Malaysia that 
does not work at a practical level and that the system might even be falling apart. 
However, my impressions of these tensions or the lack of audience enthusiasm during 
the seminar should not be taken as conclusive of a moral enterprise in shambles. During 
this seminar, I also observed that the ‘rule creators’ and ‘enforcers’ among the speakers 
and the audience had the potential to unite against common enemies. When Naser 
complained about the lack of rigour in the implementation of syariah laws, for example, 
he singled out Sisters in Islam (SIS) for criticism because they openly opposed moral 
policing. SIS (2010; Star, 2008) has consistently criticised the policing of heterosexual 
couples for khalwat, arguing that this violates the Quran’s prohibition on spying165. 
Therefore according to Naser:  
 
                                                          
165 Among the Quranic passages that SIS relies upon are: ‘Believers, do not enter other people’s houses 
until you have asked permission to do so and greeted those inside – that is best for you: perhaps you will 
bear this in mind. If you find no one in, do not enter unless you have been given permission to do so. If 
you are told, “Go away”, then do so – that is more proper for you. God knows well what you do.’ (24: 
27-28). Another verse quoted by SIS is: ‘Believers, avoid making too many assumptions – some 
assumptions are sinful – and do not spy on one another or speak ill of people behind their backs: would 
any of you like to eat the flesh of your dead brother? No, you would hate it. So be mindful of God: God 
is ever relenting, most merciful.’ (49: 12) 
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To me they are enemies because their thinking is liberal. They say 
Malaysia is secular. They say khalwat laws cannot be applied because 
these laws are human constructions. (Some people laugh softly.) 
They’re slick. They’re taught by the Jews. All of this stuff was given to 
them by the Jews to make society hate Islam.* 
 
When Naser excoriated SIS in this way, he also appeared to unite the rule creators 
and enforcers in the room against a common enemy. Furthermore, according to his 
logic, Muslims like SIS were the proxies of ‘liberals’ and ‘Jews’ and therefore 
‘enemies’ of Islam. The majority of SIS’s founders are Malaysian Malays and two 
prominent members are daughters of former prime ministers, but by equating the 
‘liberal’ with the foreign Naser painted SIS as effectively foreign, too. Naser and the 
other speakers also only needed to mention ‘LGBTs’ or ‘sexual orientation’ explicitly 
during certain key moments, taking for granted that these would be understood as code 
for ‘foreign’, i.e. ‘enemies of Islam’. The boundaries of their vision of the nation 
therefore coincided with the boundaries of their particular interpretation of Islam.  
 
6.2.2 Islam, national security and gay Muslims in Britain 
 
From the nineteenth century until the partial decriminalisation of homosexuality 
in 1967, Britain had its share of influential movements advocating moral purity. 
However, with growing changes in legislation protecting the rights of sexual minorities, 
British state policies now enable the growth of movements, campaigns and public 
debates challenging anti-LGBT attitudes166. In the meantime, newer ‘folk devils’ have 
emerged among some sectors of society. In particular, Muslims in Britain remain 
potential targets of certain ideologues equating the ‘foreign’-ness of Islam with its 
undesirability, or who at least construe the increasing presence of Muslims as 
problematic.  
One potent stereotype of the ‘uncivilised’ Muslim is that of the ‘terrorist’ or the 
‘radical’, which often leads to panics about ‘radicalisation’ or ‘extremism’ framed 
around security concerns rather than morality. Stuart Croft (2012: 16) argues that this is 
occuring to the extent that some state and non-state actors now construct ‘British’ 
                                                          
166 This considerable shift in public policies and attitudes was discussed in detail in Chapter 3.3.1.  
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identity by securitising Islam as a potentially dangerous ‘Other’. When security experts 
and government officials discuss the ‘new terrorism’, for instance, they inadvertently 
put young Muslim males in the spotlight by claiming that they are especially prone to 
radicalisation. When this happens, young Muslims – especially males – often rebel by 
developing even more defensive religious identities and attitudes (Shterin & Spalek, 
2011: 148).  
Furthermore, right-leaning anti-immigration campaigners often coopt the 
language of security to fan public fears about the dangers of immigration or the threats 
posed by particular ethnic and religious minorities. These sentiments permeate the 
campaigns and slogans of groups such as the English Defence League (Townsend, 
2010), which construct and defend a nominally Christian, white English ‘purity’. In the 
previous section, I also highlighted how particular media outlets, such as the Daily 
Mail, sometimes link these fears with an image of Islam as exceptionally homophobic. I 
argued that the construction of such images partially demonstrate Puar’s argument about 
growing ‘homonationalism’ in the West.  
Some British Muslims counter these dynamics by appealing to democratic ideals 
on the fair treatment of ethnic and religious minorities which includes defending their 
religious perspectives on sexual morality. Publications such as The Muslim News 
present themselves as the main forum for the British Muslim community and designate 
some topics, such as same-sex marriage, as beyond the Islamic pale. In this 
environment, gay Muslims can fall into an indeterminate space – being ‘gay’ conforms 
to an increasingly accepted expression of Britishness, yet being ‘Muslim’ is largely 
associated with anti-gay attitudes.  
Against this backdrop, I did not come across examples similar to the Malaysian 
syariah seminar in Britain but instead found instances of how security concerns affect 
gay Muslims. For example, Waqqas told me and a few other Imaan members about an 
outing he had with Salleh one afternoon in a London suburb.  
Salleh and Waqqas were having a bit of a laugh, and Salleh ended up buying a 
niqab167 as a joke. When they got to the Tube station, Waqqas dared Salleh to put it on. 
Although initially reluctant, Salleh did it and they got on the train. Salleh then started 
playing pranks on the passengers in niqab drag, using Waqqas as an intermediary to flirt 
                                                          
167 In their various renditions of this story, Waqqas and Salleh have used terms such as niqab, chador, 
and burqa interchangeably. This implies that it is not the specific details of Salleh’s outfit that matter, but 
how he subverted an Islamic symbol and shocked the people around him in the process.  
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with a white man and reciting Quranic verses loudly to the visible discomfort of several 
white women. When I asked Salleh about Waqqas’s account of this story, he laughed 
and explained what motivated him:  
 
Because the thing is that it was just after [the 7/7 bombings]. Now 
what happened was [...] a couple of weeks prior to [the outing with 
Waqqas], I’d been to mosque, and I was wearing traditional clothing, 
and I got stopped by the police, [...] I was getting on the tube and [...] 
the police stopped me and asked me what I was doing. I said I was 
waiting for my husband. [...] And the policeman looked at me, and I 
have a stop and search form by the police that says on it, he is waiting 
for his husband, yeah? I’ve kept that. Because the thing is that, it was 
like, you know [...] he stereotyped me. 
 
According to Salleh, he put on the niqab and played pranks on the tube with 
Waqqas to ‘teach people a lesson’, namely not to stereotype Muslims:  
 
I thought, OK, I’m gonna wear a full, typical, you know, […] like 
[because] I’ve been called a sand-nigger, you know, and all sorts. But, 
I sat on the Tube and I thought you know what? Each time I got this, 
you know, hypocritical, very working-class, white person, they sat 
down and I started praying (laughs), la ilaha illallah, muhammadun 
rasulullah168, and then […] the woman would start shaking and I’d go, 
boom! (Makes a noise like a bomb going off and laughs.) And you 
would see this person shoot out of their [seat], and I was going 
(ululates).  
 
Salleh’s anecdote is an example – albeit a quirky one – of how gay Muslims are 
affected by the security-focused debates on Muslims in Britain. On one hand, he 
exercises his freedom of sexuality and religion in a country that he believes should 
protect them, e.g. engaging in a same-sex civil partnership and going to the mosque on 
                                                          




Fridays. From his point of view, he is being a good British citizen and even works for a 
local council. Thus when Muslims are stereotyped as ‘foreign’, ‘violent’, or ‘terrorists’ 
he gets offended personally.  
I cannot verify Salleh’s story about being stopped and searched after 7/7. Still, 
it is clear that he has internalised the feeling that his Muslim identity is being 
increasingly securitised by state and non-state actors. Even if Salleh is embellishing, 
his story is a response to dominant attitudes towards Islam in Britain – real and 
imagined – which affect him personally and he expects people to find it plausible.  
In retaliating, however, Salleh unintentionally reifies the stereotype of the 
‘violent’ Muslim, for example ululating and mimicking bomb sounds, and counter-
stereotypes some of the people around him, e.g. ‘the hypocritical, very working-
class, white person’. He does not react directly against the police officers, i.e. the 
official agents of social control, but against certain bystanders whom he treats as 
proxies of a wider, more diffused ‘control culture’ (Cohen, 2011: 121). However, 
Salleh’s actions did not provoke counter-attacks, for example no bystanders 
confronted him or reported him to the authorities. This episode therefore does not 
indicate the development of full-blown ‘deviancy amplification’ in the way Cohen 
(2011: 226) describes, but still illuminates how wider stereotypes or assumptions 
about Islamic symbols can affect gay British Muslims. In Puar’s terms, Salleh seems 
to be reacting against ‘homonationalist’ rhetoric by subverting Islamophobic 
stereotypes, albeit producing his own counter-stereotypes in the process.  
Thus, while gay Muslims might appear doubly vulnerable in Britain – being a 
minority within a minority – they can also feel empowered within the wider liberal, 
democratic context to challenge the multiple stereotypes imposed upon them. 
Ironically, they can sometimes reproduce these and also counter-stereotype those 
whose views they seek to challenge.  
 
 
6.2.3 Gay Muslim responses to moral enterprise  
 
 In Malaysia, some gay Muslims acknowledge their sexuality and are semi-
open about it, yet oppose any challenges to syariah regulations on sexual and other 
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offences. Ayie said that although she was uncomfortable about anti-homosexual 
syariah-inspired campaigns and rhetoric, she still would not challenge them because:  
 
What other people see about Malaysia [is that] Malaysia is Muslim, 
[that’s] our official religion. So in terms of community, and everything 
else, so many things will be affected. Instead of thinking of my 
freedom, I need to think about other people’s freedoms. […] For me 
it’s like, if it’s wrong it’s wrong, so you cannot defend it openly.  
 
In this part of the conversation Ayie emphasised her Muslim identity, putting 
the needs of the Muslim ‘community’ before her own and framing Islam as 
something that binds – or should bind – Malaysians together. Of particular salience 
in her reluctance to challenge the Islamic bureaucracy was that she personally 
believed homosexuality was ‘wrong’ in Islam.  
This understanding of ‘wrong’ needs to be clarified – does it mean that 
homosexuality is sinful or criminal? Here, Ayie did not seem to differentiate between 
the two – homosexuality being ‘wrong’ meant it was a sin and crime punishable by 
the state. For her, society and the individual were responsible for policing the 
boundaries of what was haram. She went further and maintained, however, that 
Allah made her gay and that no human power could force her to ‘change’ – she could 
only change, i.e. become heterosexual, if Allah willed it169. In the meantime, she was 
content being semi-open or semi-secretive about her sexual identity.  
 Some of my other participants said they would prefer ‘softer’ moral policing, 
such as Elly, a woman in her early 30s identifying as ‘straight’ but in a relationship 
with a lesbian Muslim. She said:  
 
On top of [their duties as moral enforcers], they have to also balance 
this with the right approach, with psychology, like how are they going 
to approach people like us? Maybe there are, among us, those who 
are able to change, but they have to approach us the right way. You 
cannot humiliate a person. […] Some people who are religiously 
                                                          
169 I analysed this rhetoric of ‘change’ in expressions of Islam among some gay Muslims in more detail 
in Chapter 6.2.1. 
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knowledgeable, they won’t come to us and just accuse us 
indiscriminately. They won’t do that, because they have their ways to 
make people follow what they’re supposed to follow.  
 
In Elly’s view, ‘true’ Islamic authorities do have the right to admonish gay 
Muslims but only after trying to empathise with their ‘plight’. Her underlying 
assumption is that gay Muslims want to conform to society’s expectations but are 
unable to – they want to escape the sin of homosexuality but cannot help being gay. For 
her, Islamic authorities can give moral pointers to Muslims but should gently guide 
rather than coerce them away from the haram.  
 In this kind of moral bargain, sometimes gay Muslims resort to putting on a 
modified version of what Laud Humphreys (1970: 135) calls the ‘breastplate of 
righteousness’. According to Humphreys (1970: 143), the secretive American 
homosexuals he interviewed displayed more conservative attitudes than the general 
population on issues related to civil rights, gender equality and the Vietnam War. They 
wore this ‘breastplate of righteousness’ within the context of the 1960s when social 
attitudes towards homosexuality in the West were hardly as liberal as they are now170. 
Displaying conservative moral values was therefore a way of protecting anonymity – 
these secret homosexuals hoped that a public appearance of uprightness would deflect 
attention from their private activities.  
The semi-openly or semi-secretly gay Muslims I encountered appeared to modify 
how they displayed righteousness by not denying their deviance. Instead they 
constructed a hierarchy of deviance, in which theirs was less severe or no worse than, 
for example, heterosexual sex outside marriage or Muslim women not wearing tudung. 
Ayie said on an online forum where people were posting negative comments about the 
‘LGBT menace’ in Malaysia, she responded:  
 
If you want to talk about being an Islamic country, Islam as the 
official religion, why do you allow this kind of [free mixing]? It comes 
up on TV and the entire Malaysia can see, and little kids can see and 
think there’s nothing wrong with that! [Unmarried men and women] 
                                                          




can sit in one compartment [at concerts], dance, grope each other and 
everything? If you want to [enforce morality], do it for everyone. Men 
and women should not mix. 
 
This was a common deflection strategy among many gay Muslims I spoke to in 
Malaysia and is powerful in that it highlights the inconsistencies in the prevailing state-
led regulations of sexual morality. However, it unintentionally reinforces the kind of 
overarching moral panic – not just about homosexuality but an entire spectrum of 
‘moral ills’ – which Malaysia’s ‘Syariah lobby’(tan, 2012a: 53) is keen to perpetuate.  
In Malaysia, I also found that gay Muslims who do not believe homosexuality is 
haram criticise the syariah establishment differently. Fauziah, who said she has 
‘reconciled’ her religious beliefs and sexuality because she has come to believe that the 
Quran respects sexual diversity, had this to say about syariah enforcers:  
 
Yeah, nothing better to do. Seriously, it’s like what the s**t? They do 
not realise the disservice that they are doing to the religion. 
 
According to this perspective, the religious enforcers are not only damaging the 
image of Islam but violating Islamic ideals, which for Fauziah are basically tolerant, 
inclusive and non-coercive. In her frustration, however, Fauziah also put on a modified 
‘breastplate of righteousness’ to explain her feelings about syariah-based moral 
policing:  
 
Well, you know sometimes I feel like writing to them and saying, if 
there are people who are turned off from converting [to Islam] 
because of what you do, the dosa (sin) is on you. Because that is the 
only language they understand. 
 
Here, Fauziah identified the dilemmas created by religiously-inspired moral 
enterprise by trying to look at things from the syariah advocates’ perspective. In her 
understanding, they want to purify and sanctify Islam but their aggressive zeal often 
provokes backlash amongst more liberal sectors of society who then develop negative 
perceptions of Islam. This disrupts the religious aspect of these advocates’ goals – to 
spread Islam to wider society. In her frustration Fauziah wondered if perhaps the only 
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way to challenge moral policing was by appealing to the larger goals of religious 
proselytising, i.e. syariah enforcers could give Islam a better name and attract potential 
converts if only they stopped targeting personal morality so much.  
Views like Fauziah’s are much more common amongst the gay Muslims I 
encountered in Britain. Waqqas, like Fauziah, thought that Islamic condemnations of 
homosexuality were the result of contemporary Muslim authorities distorting the core 
message of Islam:  
 
I think that religious policing is un-Islamic. There can be no 
compulsion, no enforcement in religion. I think these people are going 
to be punished for it on Judgement Day. I feel sorry for them, that this 
is what they truly believe in, to be honest, because they couldn’t be 
further removed from the truth. 
 
Like Fauziah, Waqqas used this reasoning to out-Islamise the Islamic enforcers, 
or out-moralise the moral entrepreneurs. Waqqas expressed this in an entirely different 
context, however, where his views would probably deviate from the normative views of 
Islamic authorities but match wider public opinion more closely. Thus, while both 
expressed nearly identical responses about moral enterprise and challenged the idea that 
Islam condemns homosexuality, Waqqas’s views are more protected because they are 
more in line with a liberal society’s expectations.  
People like Waqqas still feel frustrated, however, because despite conforming to 
wider British society’s expectations about individual liberties and freedoms, they 
remain vulnerable to stereotyping and attacks by anti-Muslim sectors. Unlike gay 
Malaysian Muslims, however, gay British Muslims are able to appeal to the more 
established, inclusive ideals of the modern, liberal and democratic British state, 
regardless of whether these ideals are matched in practise.  
Many of the British gay Muslims I met were therefore proud of being British. 
Despite his niqab-wearing pranks to challenge anti-Muslim stereotypes, Salleh said:  
 
I’m proud to live in this country that provides me with a safe haven 
and protection. I still feel very Arab. I feel like I’m an Arab British 
Muslim in this country. I feel proud to be British, I feel proud to come 
from a Middle Eastern background and I’ll fight anybody who like, 
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when people say, go home, well, go home where? I’m one of you! 
Even though they don’t see me that way. I think that the concept of 
being British is being proud of the country that you live in and I’m 
very proud of this country. […] Sometimes I don’t agree with all of its 
policies, but I am proud of this country. 
 
Salleh claimed a right to British-ness because he believed he was ‘safe’ in Britain, 
his ‘home’ and ‘haven’. When he said he disagreed with some policies here, Salleh was 
expressing what white British citizens often take for granted – citizenship in a liberal 
democracy includes the right to express dissent. Perhaps Salleh felt that he needed to 
reiterate this because of the fear that as an ethnic and religious minority, his dissension 
might be interpreted as disloyalty.  
Gay Muslims in Malaysia and Britain therefore respond to religiously-motivated 
moral policing by pointing out its deficiencies on practical grounds and based on their 
interpretations of Islam. If they agree that homosexuality is ‘wrong’, they question the 
other ‘wrongs’ that go unnoticed by the Islamic authorities. If they interpret ‘true’ Islam 
as inclusive or tolerant, they recast the moral police as ‘deviant’ Muslims distorting the 
religion’s underlying spirit. In Britain, however, this is complicated when gay Muslims, 
like other Muslims, sometimes need to contend with anti-Muslim sentiments from 
certain media outlets or prominent political ideologues. Within this context, they also 
appeal to the wider liberal, democratic principles that inform British policies and values 
to claim a legitimate sense of belonging as equals in society.  
 
6.3 Sympathetic straight Muslims: Potential allies or secondary deviants? 
  
 The preceding sections have shown that there are various personal convictions 
among gay Muslims regarding Islam’s position on homosexuality – whether it is a 
sin, a crime, both, or neither. In this section, I argue that these dilemmas about the 
haram and halal in relation to homosexuality also affect many heterosexual 
Muslims, and this shapes interpersonal relationships between ‘gay’ and ‘straight’ 
Muslims. I begin with the range of family experiences my participants recounted and 
then demonstrate similar dimensions in the building of more organised alliances 
236 
 
between gay and straight Muslims. Finally, I evaluate the effectiveness of these 
alliances within the larger social and political contexts of Malaysia and Britain.  
 
6.3.1 We are family: Dilemmas of being gay and Muslim 
 
 It is entirely possible for family members of gay Muslims to hold contradictory 
views, e.g. openly disapproving of homosexuality but tacitly accepting gay Muslim 
family members on a personal level. Fauziah initially told me that she was 
‘disturbed’ by her mother’s blatant homophobia, justified explicitly on Islamic 
grounds, but a few months later said she had an urgent update. She elaborated when I 
eventually met her and her girlfriend, as captured in my field-notes:  
 
The big news is that Fauziah’s mother told her younger sister one day, 
something to the effect of, ‘I prefer Fauziah to “bertenet” with Isma 
than with Naomi (Fauziah’s previous girlfriend)’. It appears that 
Fauziah’s mother ‘knows’ about her present and past relationships and 
has taken a liking to Isma. 
 
Fauziah was shocked because her mother chose to reveal this to her younger 
sibling yet never initiated this conversation with her. Fauziah was also pleasantly 
shocked at her mother’s use of the colloquial term ‘bertenet’, which means ‘romancing’ 
but with erotic undertones. She said she had also told her father about her sexuality – 
they were still on talking terms but he would occasionally ask her when she was going 
to find a husband. 
These ambivalent feelings among close family members occur in Britain, too. 
Ammar said he would not consider contracting a same-sex marriage because that 
might hurt his mother’s feelings, and explained the context as follows:  
 
Shanon: But do you think she kind of knows that you’re gay? 
Ammar: Oh my dad knows! 
[….] 
Shanon: How does your dad know? 
Ammar: He asked me outright.  
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Shanon: When was this? 
[….] 
Ammar: Well, you know how I refused to attend the rishta meeting171. 
The following day, I said to my mum, I’m not worthy of marriage. 
Main shaadi ke kabhi nahin huun172. So then my dad came to me 
afterwards and just said, what did that mean? Are you gay? I said yes. 
Shanon: Did he ask you in English or Punjabi? 
Ammar: Punjabi.  
Shanon: But he used the word gay? 
Ammar: Yeah. Tu gay eh? (Laughs.) 
Shanon: (Laughs.) And then what did you say?  
[….] 
Ammar: Can’t remember what was the word I used. I said something 
about I don’t want to hurt your feelings. And he said it doesn’t matter. 
[…] He said I’m 63 now, and I’ve seen a lot of things in the world.  
 
After this, Ammar said his mother kept arranging rishta meetings and his father 
kept consenting to them. Ammar kept refusing the rishta meetings and his father 
accepted this, too. Ammar’s father played the mediator or peacekeeper between his gay 
Muslim son and his ‘traditional’ Pakistani wife. The responses from Ammar’s and 
Fauziah’s parents are comparable to the ambivalence of the semi-openly gay Muslims 
who believe being gay is ‘wrong’ according to Islam, yet desire empathy and a ‘softer’ 
solution. 
There are some outright negative responses, too. Rina, a Malaysian lesbian in her 
early 30s, said when her mother found out she was lesbian, she ‘took away’ her 
‘independence’:  
 
Shanon: How did she take away your independence?  
Rina: She took away the car keys. So I couldn’t date.  
Shanon: But you were working at that time! 
                                                          
171 This is the preliminary meeting in arranged marriages – a common practice among Muslims of 
South Asian background. 
172 In Urdu, literally: ‘I am not worthy of marriage’.  
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Rina: Yeah, man. She made sure, she’d send me to work, and, how 
was I supposed to date? The only way to date was if she took the day 
off, or she came home and had lunch. That lasted for one month. I 
went crazy. And then I moved out.   
 
Eventually, Rina moved back home with her mother because she is an only child 
and did not want to be disobedient. She said she started compromising with her mother, 
wearing the tudung and not going out on dates with women. She also said she became 
celibate because she concluded that although homosexual sex should not be 
criminalised, it was still a sin in Islam. Rina’s example shows that even though some 
family members might strongly disapprove of homosexuality, it is not so easy for gay 
Muslims, whether in Malaysia or Britain, to cut off close family ties. In Britain, many of 
my participants had to think hard about balancing being relatively open about their 
sexual identity with friends or acquaintances but concealing it at home.  
It is even more complicated when authority figures within the family structure the 
family’s relationships according to their particular understandings of Islam. Sulaiman’s 
father is an imam (prayer leader) in his local village mosque, and his mother is an active 
volunteer with a local, pro-government Muslim women’s collective. Sulaiman attended 
a religious boarding school in his teens and told me he would never reveal his sexuality 
to his family but also said one of his uncles was an ‘ex-gay’:  
 
The family all knew that he liked this guy. That time there’s no term 
‘gay’, [and] he’s not pondan either. So, a few times he ran away with, 
because the guy works in KL (Kuala Lumpur), so he ran away to meet 
the guy, you know. Then what my grandfather did was he forced him 
to get married to a girl. The other side also found a girl, they got 
married [….] My uncle and his wife had one son, and then still like, I 
think one time he ran away again, he left his family, came to KL, [to] 
look for the guy, OK? […] Every time, my grandfather and his 
brother would always come look for him and bring him back. All the 
kampung (village) knows about this. They got him to see the bomoh 
(traditional Malay healer) to cure him, to forget this guy. Apparently 





Although Sulaiman did not dwell on this story for too long, he said later that he 
did not believe the syariah enforcers or the mass media were the biggest problems for 
gay Muslims:  
 
I think the pressure does not really come from like external [sources]. 
If it’s like pressure, it always definitely [comes] from the family or 
from peers. Not from government, not from the enforcement [of the 
law].  
 
Sulaiman’s family dynamics appeared to colour his perception of immediate 
‘threats’ to his personal life and he even regarded the family as more powerful than the 
syariah enforcers in regulating sexuality. On the other hand, there are also stories of 
acceptance within the family. Dax, a gay Malay man in his early 30s, described how he 
‘came out’ to his father. One night, when he was in his early 20s, his father came into 
his room and found Dax crying. His stepmother came in as well to find Dax in tears, 
telling them, ‘I’m not straight’:   
 
My dad said it’s OK, he said he understands. He said, I accept, he 
said this in Malay, he said I accept you how God intended you to be. 
 
Dax maintained that his father’s Sufism brought them closer to each other and 
made his confession easier. Yet Dax no longer identifies privately as Muslim and sees 
Islam as too restrictive, irrational and exclusive. Asked if he ever revealed this to his 
father, he replied:  
 
He knows, somewhat. Sometimes I tease my dad like, if in Malaysia 
we can, Malays are allowed to renounce their religion, I would have 
done it a long time ago. My dad was like, I can’t remember what he 
said, he was like quiet or he might have laughed. 
 
As Islam and Malay ethnicity are tightly linked and regulated, many Malay 
families assume being ‘real’ Malays means being ‘proper’ Muslims, for example 
through sending their children to religious schools, or getting involved in the local 
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mosque. Dax’s story shows that alternative views of Islam proliferate too and 
complicate family interactions. It is difficult to quantify or categorise these, because 
they are often expressed so fluidly and appear on the surface to conform to the state’s 
approved varieties of Islam. Besides, proliferation does not necessarily equal popularity.  
What this shows, however, is the importance of family ties in enabling or 
constraining particular expressions of identity among gay Muslims. In Malaysia, some 
gay Muslims manage to negotiate a relative degree of acceptance within the family but 
have to conform to dominant external expectations on Islam and sexuality. In Britain, 
gay Muslims might similarly find little room to negotiate acceptance within the family, 
but know that they can explore their sexual preferences more freely away from home. 
Still, in both countries the spectrum of family attitudes at the interpersonal level 
demonstrates that there is potentially much more diversity than is visible from a top-
down view of Islam.  
 
6.3.2 Crossing and redrawing the boundaries 
 
The personal struggles among heterosexual Muslims regarding sexual diversity 
sometimes reach outside the confines of the family into wider social settings. I have 
already discussed how the Malaysian film Sutun portrayed this conflict even within the 
confines of a restrictive policy of film and television censorship. Yet if there are straight 
Muslims who empathise with gay Muslims, where are they and how do they 
demonstrate this?  
At Imaan’s 2012 conference, I was asked to organise a panel discussion on 
engaging the wider Muslim community. I emailed different British Muslim 
organisations, such as the Muslim Women’s Network, the Muslim Institute, the City 
Circle, and the Islamic Society of Britain which are neither big nor ‘representative’. In 
fact, the assumption that there is one dominant body that could ‘represent’ the majority 
of Muslims in Britain is misleading. According to a 2006 survey by Channel 4’s 
Dispatches programme, less than four percent of British Muslims thought that the MCB 
represented them, while only 12 percent thought it represented their political views 
(Malik, 2006). Around 90 percent were unsure of who actually represented the views of 




Snapshots of British Muslims such as this are often invisible to the wider public – 
even many Imaan members have assumed in the past that British Muslims were 
monolithic and therefore unanimously hostile towards gay Muslims. Many were 
therefore pleasantly surprised at the presence of representatives from several British 
Muslim organisations at the conference. A few wept openly when one panellist opened 
his presentation by saying, ‘The Muslim organisations have failed people like you in 
this room for such a long time, and for that I am truly sorry.’ 
Since then, Imaan has kept in touch with these and other supportive Muslim 
organisations, resulting in further collaborations such as campaigns, talks and seminars 
on Islam and homophobia or Islam and diversity. In 2013, the Tell MAMA (Measuring 
Anti-Muslim Attacks) Project UK invited Imaan to be one of its patrons, explaining that 
it would include hate incidents against Muslim sexual minorities under the broader 
definition of anti-Muslim attacks (Tell MAMA, n.d.). Even so, not all Tell MAMA 
patrons were fully affirming, with one telling me he believed homosexuality was a sin 
in Islam but that gay Muslims deserved full social equality. The Tell MAMA staff also 
said they got flak from some British Muslims for engaging Imaan but were not too 
concerned as the majority of overall abuse they received was from the English far right.  
In March 2014, the City Circle (2014) invited Imaan, along with presenters from 
the Muslim Institute173 and JIMAS (The Association to Revive the Way of the 
Messenger)174, to discuss ways to tackle exclusion within Muslim communities. 
Although there were a minority of Muslim attendees vocally defending the view of 
homosexual behaviour as haram, the majority appeared willing to engage with more 
inclusive or tolerant approaches175. In May, the Muslim Institute and Imaan co-
organised a two-day conference, ‘Diversity: The Gift of Islam’, which included panel 
discussions on asylum, gender relations, conversion, sectarianism, citizenship and same-
sex marriage (Muslim Institute & Imaan, n.d.). Panellists included activists, journalists, 
                                                          
173 Represented by Ziauddin Sardar, a prominent public intellectual whom the majority of British Muslim 
activists I spoke to saw as progressive, including on sexuality.  
174 In the 1980s and 1990s, JIMAS was strongly connected to the global salafiyah movement (i.e. aiming 
to ‘purify’ Islam, often supported by Saudi Arabia) and Islamist activists. After 9/11, however, it 
fractured largely along pro- and anti-Saudi lines (Gilliat-Ray, 2012: 81). During this particular talk, the 
JIMAS representative was open to more tolerant and inclusive Islamic approaches on homosexuality, but 
admitted not having a religiously-based position on issues such as same-sex marriage.  
175 There were approximately seventy attendees and around nine out of ten were Muslim.  
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and academics, while the audience of approximately 100 consisted of university 
students, young professionals and pensioners.  
These interactions between Imaan and other British Muslim organisations 
demonstrate the vibrant and diverse, albeit often invisible, discussions on sexuality 
among British Muslims despite what the Islamic authorities might pronounce. In fact, 
tensions between the Muslim establishment’s rejection of sexual diversity and 
rejoinders by other Muslim activists can be traced back to 2006, when the MCB backed 
the Equality Act 2006 (Muslim Council of Britain, 2007). The MCB supported the 
Act’s protection of sexual minorities as a quid pro quo for its protection of religious 
minorities, but even this position invited considerable backlash from some prominent 
British Muslims. Despite the backlash, former MCB spokesperson Inayat Bunglawala 
(2007, 2009) continued supporting the rights of sexual minorities and even suggested 
that the MCB include ‘a gay Muslim support group as an affiliate’.  
In this sense, state policies to expand conceptions of equality and human rights 
have made various Muslim groups in Britain re-examine their notions of these 
principles, too. My findings suggest that heterosexual Muslims keen to discuss sexual 
diversity might now have greater public space and legitimacy to associate with groups 
such as Imaan even if they encounter opposition from other Muslims. State policies in 
this context enable everyday interactions between ‘straight’ and ‘gay’ Muslims to result 
in more organised, albeit nascent, collaborations.  
In Malaysia, my findings suggest that the rhetoric and practise of syariah 
enforcement can drive some gay Muslims to seek out other Muslims who object moral 
policing more generally. Some of these other Muslims, such as SIS, are also viewed by 
the Syariah lobby as ‘deviant’176. In this context, if gay Muslims are considered primary 
deviants in relation to how pro-syariah advocates frame homosexuality, then gay-
friendly heterosexual Muslims run the risk of being viewed as secondary deviants. The 
same can be said of Muslims who sympathise with other ‘primary deviants’, such as 
those who renounce Islam or whom the Sunni establishment does not recognise, 
including Syiahs and Ahmadiyyas.  
Sometimes, the primary and secondary deviants join forces to confront moral 
policing as a whole, which explains why many gay Malaysian Muslims do not see their 
priority as advocating for ‘gay rights’. Instead, they locate their quest for freedom of 
                                                          
176 For examples of these perceptions of SIS and more background, see Chapter 3.2.2.  
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sexuality within a larger framework of freedom from religiously-motivated policing. 
According to Zainal:  
 
When it comes to gay rights I feel like even women’s rights have not 
yet, the position of women is more important than sexuality for now. 
Wait wait, sorry! The example that is most [urgent], you know, is 
freedom of religion. When there is freedom of religion, because it’s so 
fundamental that when a Malay can profess another religion, a Malay 
can also profess other choices that he or she makes, such as […] well 
people say it’s a choice, but it’s not, the freedom to have a gay 
lifestyle or whatever, you know? 
 
In other words, because moral enterprise in Malaysia is linked with regulations of 
Islam and Malay ethnicity, dissenting Muslims – gay or straight – seek to break this link 
instead of primarily defending specific ‘deviant’ groups. Ironically, they do this by 
foregrounding their Muslim and Malay identities which means that counter-moral 
advocacy also becomes suffused with notions of religion and ethnicity, albeit in more 
inclusive ways.  
Many of the Malaysian gay Muslims I interviewed thus thought that the identity-
focused, individual-centred campaigns of Western LGBT rights groups were not 
entirely suitable for the Malaysian context. Some felt strongly that when secular, liberal 
gay rights activists from the West and in Malaysia addressed Muslims, they often 
misread Islam and missed the nuances of the local context. According to Fauziah:  
 
Homosexuality is not a Western import, but rights movements are a 
Western import. And with the gay rights movement, sometimes I feel 
like we are importing things lock, stock and barrel, and don’t take into 
account that traditionally or culturally, psychologically, we do things 
differently here. And maybe it would be more effective to utilise the 
ways that we have always done things in order to get our point across, 
or in order to further […] our interests. Maybe being so in-your-face 




Gay Muslims in Malaysia therefore do not deny that they need to address anti-
homosexual attitudes and actions, especially from the moral police and the mass media. 
Still, they feel there is a predominant model of ‘gay rights’ – characterised by Fauziah 
as the ‘in-your-face’ or individualistic approach in Western gay activism – which they 
see as too culturally dissonant for Malaysia. This is why Fauziah, Zainal and some of 
my other Malaysian participants said they preferred to engage with and support 
organisations such as SIS to advocate more inclusive expressions of Islam.  
In Britain, many gay Muslims perceived the LGBTQI movement similarly and 
felt that it was dominated by white Britons who often misunderstand religious and 
ethnic minorities or, worse, were hostile towards them. Yet, some did not want to 
dissociate from the larger LGBTQI community, but wanted it to expand its notions of 
diversity and cultural sensitivity. According to Waqqas: 
 
[The British LGBTQI movement] is a white rights movement. It’s not 
particularly in tune to the Muslim community and we’ve seen that 
with the whole discourse of marriage. [Imaan has] been asked so 
much about our opinion on gay marriage et cetera, to participate in the 
activism on it. My response, my thoughts have always been initially, 
and still are, that we have bigger issues to deal with than the concept 
of marriage and whether Muslims should be allowed to participate in 
same-sex marriages. [But] when [the main LGBTQI organisations] 
move forward, their moving forward isn’t incorporating our 
perspectives. 
 
Waqqas said for him, the solution was not to dissociate from the larger gay 
scene but to participate even more actively. According to him, more gay Muslims 
should attend the gay scene while asserting their own boundaries, for example 
visiting nightclubs but not drinking alcohol, taking drugs, or engaging in casual sex. 
He argued that it was this kind of social participation that would ensure that gay 
Muslims are ‘represented’ and ‘visible’ among other LGBTQIs. For the same reason, 
he insisted on marching every year as a gay Muslim under the Imaan banner during 
London Pride.  
Many gay Muslims thus work to expand the conceptual and practical ways in 
which society negotiates diversity and pluralism. In Malaysia, they forge indirect 
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alliances with sympathetic heterosexual Muslims to negotiate for more individual 
and collective autonomy in an environment where the state uses Islam to construct a 
strong collective identity. In Britain, they often have to navigate between a collective 
minority identity as Muslims who happen to be gay and wider society’s emphasis on 
individuality and human rights. How effective are these negotiations and strategies? 
In the next section, I look at how these efforts are inhibited or facilitated by 
particular institutions and structures.  
 
6.3.3 The search for authority: Contexts and impacts 
 
 Like the British moral reformers in the Victorian era, those who spearhead the 
Malaysian Islamic bureaucracy and other syariah advocates often equate moral purity 
with a stable society177. Yet in Malaysia, anti-gay policies and sentiments have been 
much more overtly utilised by the government for political purposes, namely after the 
sacking of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in 1998 for corruption and 
sodomy178.  
Anwar and former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad – then and now – seem to 
illustrate part of Max Weber’s definition of a charismatic leader. According to Weber 
(2012: 324–325), an individual possesses ‘charisma’ if he179 has authority over 
‘followers’ or ‘disciples’ who regard him as ‘extraordinary and […] endowed with […] 
at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities’, and is ‘exemplary’. Still, 
Mahathir’s and Anwar’s ‘charisma’ appeared to attract different kinds of followers, 
even though before 1998 they seemed to join forces to project a unified vision of Islam 
for Malaysia.  
Most of my Malaysian participants were from families with pro-government 
leanings before 1998, and grew up in conditions where the Mahathir-Anwar 
combination defined their political consciousness. This was within a context of strict 
government control of the mass media, especially by factions loyal to either Mahathir or 
Anwar.  
                                                          
177 As argued and explained in Chapter 3.  
178 Also discussed in Chapter 3.  
179 While Weber refers to ‘charismatic leader’ with the male pronoun, his description could also apply to 
women leaders depending on the context.  
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Zainal said he thought it was a ‘good combo’ when Mahathir was prime minister 
and Anwar was deputy and still did not prefer one over the other. He said his family 
were all pro-government before, especially on his mother’s side – many of the pro-
government women in his family were from Anwar’s parliamentary constituency. When 
Mahathir sacked Anwar and began vilifying him, many of Zainal’s female relatives 
became angry and he also said his parents were now capable of voting for the 
opposition just to ‘spite’ the government.  
Zainal’s story illustrates how charismatic authoritarian leaders can become 
symbols of collective cohesion or conflict. Before 1998, the combined charisma of 
Mahathir and Anwar held Malaysia’s multi-ethnic middle class together, but Mahathir’s 
sacking of Anwar was viewed by many middle class Malays as a crisis of ethnic and 
religious unity. Many chose sides based on whether they primarily aligned with either 
Mahathir’s or Anwar’s expressions of Islam and Malay-ness. Razak, who was in 
secondary school during the incidents of 1998, said he even defended Mahathir to his 
pro-Anwar teachers in school, even though he secretly had a crush on Anwar. Rohana 
said she ‘adored’ Mahathir to this day while Isma said she was ‘pro-Mahathir’, speaking 
highly of him as a ‘dictator’ because when he was prime minister ‘everything was fine’.  
When I proposed to all my pro-Mahathir participants that his dismissal of Anwar 
was grounded in homophobia, they agreed and said they disapproved of this aspect of 
his rhetoric. However, they still preferred Mahathir – and those associated with him – 
over Anwar and his associates. For those who ended up taking Anwar’s side, the 
homophobic aspect of the sacking was largely irrelevant. Zulkifli, a gay Malay male in 
his late 30s, attended pro-Anwar, anti-government rallies in 1998 and 1999 but said the 
focus of his anger was Mahathir’s authoritarianism, not his homophobia.  
Others responded more ambivalently and had difficulty choosing between 
Mahathir or Anwar. Fauziah summarised her dilemma as follows: ‘UMNO is setan180 
but Anwar is Iblis181. So what are you gonna do?’ Fauziah was aware that the UMNO-
led administration was responsible for fuelling hostile rhetoric and moral policing 
against Muslim sexual minorities yet was wary of Anwar and his Islamist past. In other 
words, she never found his charisma legitimate in the first place and perhaps knowing 
                                                          
180 The Malay pronunciation of the Arabic shaytan, or the followers of Iblis. In Islamic cosmology, Iblis 
was the angel who refused to prostrate before the first man, Adam, and was thus cast out of Paradise.  
181 See preceding note.  
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how influential he was among his supporters also had a negative effect on her. Or as 
Dax put it:  
 
I don’t belong in the BN182. I don’t like BN because they’re like 
corrupt. I don’t like DAP because they are too Chinese. I don’t really 
like PKR because of Anwar – it’s Anwar’s vehicle. So which party 
should I support? 
 
I reminded Dax wryly that there was also PAS, the opposition Islamist party 
which, besides UMNO, is the other major party that regularly trots out anti-homosexual 
statements. It also endorses moral policing – its only disagreement with UMNO is that 
UMNO’s version of moral enterprise is too ‘soft’. Dax replied, ‘PAS doesn’t even 
register on my list!’ 
Gay Muslim attitudes towards Mahathir and Anwar are thus indicators of their 
broader concerns about social change, stability, and the cohesion of their religious and 
ethnic identities. They largely perceive that no existing political party would ever 
oppose or challenge the victimisation of sexual minorities. For many, this translates into 
a ‘better-the-devil-you-know’ position – they prefer backing UMNO rather than risking 
it with the opposition coalition led by Anwar and including Islamists in PAS and PKR. 
Even those who choose to back the opposition parties are sceptical about the prospects 
for sexual minorities – they are driven more by overall concerns on the state of 
democracy and good governance. Finally, the vast majority – from all political leanings 
– perceive the Malaysian government as authoritarian or not fully democratic, making it 
futile to demand their rights through the political process. They assume that because of 
the constraints that ‘Islam’ places on various aspects of society, it is impossible to 
reform or change the political system.   
In this sense, the political attitudes of gay Malaysians Muslims are quite similar to 
other Malaysian Muslims, whom Michael Peletz argues are more ambivalent about 
state-led Islamisation than it might appear. These ‘ordinary Muslims’ are often reluctant 
to voice their concerns publicly – or might even regard such concerns as ‘unthinkable’ – 
for ‘political and moral reasons’ (Peletz, 1997: 232). Many might be uncomfortable 
with the state’s expansion of punitive Islamic legislation but also want to improve their 
                                                          
182 Barisan Nasional, or National Front – the ruling coalition of which UMNO is a senior partner.  
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standards of living through the government’s pro-Malay wealth-generating policies 
(Peletz, 1997: 243). However, Peletz observed this based on his fieldwork during the 
late 1970s and late 1980s, when it was possible for him to gloss ‘ordinary Malays’ as 
‘rural Malays’. In the decades since, rapid state-led urbanisation and modernisation 
have complicated this straightforward distinction between ‘urban’ and ‘rural Malays’183.  
Yet my discussion of the ambivalent political attitudes among my Malaysian 
participants suggests that some of Peletz’s observations might still hold. Although they 
did not state it explicitly, some of them might have been wary of upsetting the political 
balance because the prevailing social order still afforded them certain privileges as 
Malays. As I have shown in the previous sections, however, this political conservatism 
does not apply to all of them nor does it necessarily translate as inaction or passivity. 
Many of the gay Malaysian Muslims I observed did attempt to change their surrounding 
circumstances but more indirectly and outside conventional political structures and 
mechanisms.   
In Britain, on the other hand, the state’s legal and administrative institutions now 
aim to uphold equality, diversity, and the rights of minorities, including the religious 
and sexual. Still, the practical and sometimes uneven application of these laws and 
policies provokes grievances among some sectors, such as the religious groups 
opposing same-sex marriage discussed in section 5.1.4. Despite these complications, the 
legal provisions for equality and anti-discrimination enable gay British Muslims to 
claim, contest, and redefine their religious and sexual identities in ways that gay 
Malaysian Muslims would find difficult.  Even so, many gay Muslims in Britain still 
feel uncomfortable openly debating what Islam ‘says’ about homosexuality.  
I witnessed an example of this during a research trip to Greater Manchester in 
May 2013 to attend a full-day Demystifying Shariah workshop184. At the beginning, the 
facilitators checked the participants’ comfort levels on various issues through some 
interactive activities, as captured in my fieldnotes:  
 
Most people are pretty comfortable with the idea that it’s OK to be 
gay and Muslim. People are far less comfortable with statements 
                                                          
183 In 1980, it is estimated that 42 percent of the Malaysian population lived in urban areas, while in 2014 
it was 74 percent (World Bank, 2014).  
184 Described further in Chapters 1.2.3 and 4.1.1.  
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about the validity of Islamic authority or whether shariah law can be 
questioned – many feel that Islamic authority or shariah should not be 
challenged. This makes others confused by the statements, and leads 
to more discussion about our different positions. 
 
This activity crystallises two apparently conflicting orientations that many Imaan 
members have – that it is OK to be gay but wrong to challenge Islamic authority. Yet 
the nature or definition of ‘true’ Islamic authority is constantly debated within Imaan, 
whether on Facebook, WhatsApp, the online forum, or real group encounters, such as 
during meetings or informal gatherings.  
I have observed instances where this saturation of religious talk was accompanied 
by some members feeling uncomfortable or defensive about certain expressions of 
Islam within the group. One possible explanation for this is that Imaan tries not only to 
fashion itself as an organisation for gay Muslims, but also as a Muslim organisation that 
advocates for sexual diversity. As Muslim ‘outsiders’, however, the people attracted to 
Imaan do not have a focus of authority to bind the group together. A few members have 
quite a secular outlook, but many more grew up in traditional Muslim environments 
enclosed by class and ethnic boundaries. Hence, there is often tension between how 
Imaan members express their religion and sexuality individually and collectively.  
For example, Osman said as a British Bangladeshi growing up in the 1970s, he 
lived in majority-Bengali area, and some parents in his neighbourhood discouraged 
their children from befriending Pakistanis185. Muslims like Osman thus did not only 
grow up in traditionally Muslim environments, but also traditionally Bengali 
environments where collective ethnic identity was just as important as collective 
religious identity. When gay Muslims of different ethnic and/or national backgrounds 
encounter each other in Imaan, they therefore have to confront other expressions of 
Islam they might not necessarily be comfortable with. Unlike gay Muslims in Malaysia, 
however, they do not have to contend with state-led authorities enforcing particular 
interpretations of Islam and so have to work out for themselves what ‘Islamic’ authority 
means.  
                                                          
185 According to him, many harboured ill feelings towards Pakistanis in the aftermath of Bangladesh’s 
war of independence with Pakistan in 1971.  
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Within this context, a small minority within Imaan – as with other British 
Muslims – have previously joined transnational Muslim movements with a presence in 
Britain, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir or the Tablighi Jamaat186. Usually, they disaffiliate 
quietly from these groups once they come to grapple with their sexual identity and this 
leads them to engage with Imaan. Once in Imaan, they retain some of the perspectives 
and experiences of Islam they previously acquired through these different groups. I 
have observed some of them holding sway during exchanges about what constitutes the 
‘authentic’ Islamic position on various issues.  
These examples show that in Imaan, the absence of direct ‘Islamic’ authority to 
structure expressions of Islam does not negate the desire for, and the presence of, 
indirect authority. Yet the debates about what is authentically Islamic take place within 
a larger environment where the state is seen as duty-bound to protect the rights of the 




The dominant image of Islam’s ‘position’ on homosexuality is based on the 
assumption that homosexuality is absolutely haram. On an everyday level, individuals 
who identify as gay and Muslim have to actively negotiate such notions of haram and 
halal to make their existences viable. This is a continuing process, and regardless of 
whether they personally believe that being gay is haram they constantly need to 
interpret, internalise, and accept or reject dominant messages about Islam and 
homosexuality. Some redefine notions of haram and halal for themselves to balance 
belonging within Islam and expressing their sexuality.  
When gay Muslims negotiate these notions of haram and halal, they also 
complicate dominant notions of normality in their immediate contexts. In Malaysia, 
they complicate the position that Islam is absolutely anti-gay espoused by the 
government, those who spearhead the Islamic bureaucracy and other syariah advocates. 
These actors can be conceptualised as the ‘Syariah lobby’ (tan, 2012a: 53) or as ‘moral 
entrepreneurs’ consisting of ‘rule creators’ and ‘rule enforcers’ (Becker, 1991: 147). In 
                                                          
186 For example, I once had an informal conversation with Naved, who is in his early 30s, about his 
teenage years as an activist in Hizb ut-Tahrir. Also, in our formal interview, Osman recalled his years in 
the Tablighi Jamaat very fondly. Another on-and-off Imaan member, Salman, in his mid-20s, explained 
how he became part of a Salafi movement in his teens but left eventually.  
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line with Cohen’s (2011: 8) observation, they often manufacture and drive ‘moral 
panics’ about various ‘folk devils’, including sexual minorities. As I have discussed, it 
is a Herculean task for these moral entrepreneurs to consistently and comprehensively 
eliminate all the types of immorality they perceive. This even leads to tensions, as 
outlined by Becker (1991: 161-162), where the ‘rule creators’ accuse the ‘rule 
enforcers’ of being too soft or inefficient in enforcing moral rules.  
Within this context, gay Muslims develop particular responses to oppose or 
avoid moral enterprise. Those who hold that homosexuality is haram point out the 
practical or procedural flaws in moral policing, for example, highlighting other kinds of 
‘immorality’ that go unnoticed or unpunished by syariah enforcers. Those who hold that 
Islam does not forbid homosexuality turn the tables and criticise the version of Islam 
espoused by the moral entrepreneurs as deviant or distorted. Either way, these responses 
by gay Muslim involve putting on variations of a ‘breastplate of righteousness’ 
(Humphreys, 1970: 135) to out-moralise the moral entrepreneurs.  
In Britain, gay Muslims have to confront similar sentiments within Muslim 
communities as well as certain ideological sentiments framing Muslims as problematic 
because of assumptions that Islam is inherently illiberal and violent. Some gay Muslims 
are therefore also implicated by wider rhetoric and policies ‘securitising’ Muslims 
(Croft, 2012: 16) or juxtaposing ‘homonationalist’ stereotypes of an inherently 
homophobic Islam against the exceptionally gay-friendly West (Puar, 2007: 39). Yet 
gay Muslims are sometimes also empowered to respond by claiming their right to 
express their gay and Muslim identities. This might occasionally involve counter-
stereotyping the white, non-Muslim majority, partly resembling Cohen’s (2011: 89) 
description of ‘deviance amplification’.  
These experiences and perspectives of gay Muslims in relation to Islam and 
wider society are often shared by other Muslims in both countries. Gay Muslims in both 
countries therefore have multi-layered relationships with family and friends, and some 
are even forging nascent collaborations with sympathetic heterosexual Muslims. These 
networks can be nurtured more safely and readily in Britain, with its laws and policies 
upholding equality and prohibiting discrimination. Yet similar networks are also 
forming in Malaysia, despite the more authoritarian and repressive political 
environment. My findings also suggest that everyday negotiations of halal and haram 
by gay and other Muslims further reflect larger contestations and uncertainties among 
Muslims about what constitutes ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ Islamic authority.  
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In both countries, the details of these interactions remain largely invisible to the 
wider public and are often overshadowed by wider ideological and/or nationalist 
agendas. In Malaysia, such agendas are explicitly pursued by state and non-state actors 
defending ideas of national purity by employing Islamic and homophobic rhetoric. In 
Britain, the situation is mitigated by the existence of laws and policies protecting 
religious and sexual minorities, yet some ideologically driven actors promote ideas of 
national purity by casting Islam as exceptionally homophobic.  
My findings therefore indicate that transnational, geopolitical dimensions in 
constructions of ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’ influence the national contexts in which Islam 
and sexuality are regulated. Against this backdrop, gay Muslims do not respond to 
notions of halal and haram in an ideological vacuum. Their negotiations of Islamic 
injunctions on homosexuality are often constrained by nationalist and other agendas in 
Malaysia and Britain.  The making of a gay Muslim in either country is thus an integral 
part of a larger story on the relationships between religion, sexuality, and nationalism in 
the making of ideological and social boundaries.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
The experiences of gay Muslims and the issues they face do not solely involve 
questions on ‘sexuality’ or ‘Islam’. They relate to the larger question of how people 
with identities widely perceived as incompatible or undesirable cope with those who 
stigmatise, marginalise or persecute them. They make us ask how some identities or 
social interactions come to be seen as undesirable, abnormal or even dangerous in the 
first place. Are these widely held notions static and monolithic, or can they change?   
In this study, I addressed these concerns through an in-depth investigation of the 
lived experiences of gay Muslim in Britain and Malaysia. I chose these two countries to 
compare the impacts of Islam as a state-established majority religion, and as a minority 
religion with few state-supported privileges. Against this background, I explored how 
and why some people identified as ‘gay’ and ‘Muslim’ despite widespread attitudes, 
religious rulings and legal consequences (in the case of Malaysia) supporting the view 
that Islam condemns homosexuality. I also investigated the wider consequences and 
impacts of holding a ‘gay Muslim’ identity.  
I found that there is no definitive story or model in the making of gay Muslims 
– people come to identify as ‘gay’ and ‘Muslim’ through distinct personal trajectories – 
but their experiences are shaped by some common factors. In Britain and Malaysia, 
socialisation through families, schooling and peer interactions made ‘Islam’ a 
prominent, recurring theme in the everyday experiences of gay Muslims. In Malaysia, 
this was strengthened considerably by policies which deliberately and explicitly impose 
Muslim identity and Islamic doctrines among those the state categorised as ‘Muslim’. 
Although there are no comparable state impositions of Islam in Britain, events such as 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks and 7/7 London bombings have influenced increasing public 
scrutiny of Muslims and policies focused on Islamic radicalism. These dynamics have 
reinforced and in some cases heightened the salience of Islam as a primary referent in 
the construction of Muslim identities in Britain, including among gay Muslims. 
Regarding their sexual dispositions, most of my participants in both countries regarded 
‘gay’ as a convenient umbrella category even though they were aware of cultural 
differences in concepts describing sexual diversity or attraction.  
These lived experiences shaped ongoing, personal reflections and renegotiations 
of what ‘Islam’ or ‘gay’ identity meant to the people I studied. They still drew upon 
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what they understood as ‘true’ or ‘proper’ Islam to forge a sense of belonging within 
the wider fold of Islam. However, their personal Islamic understandings depended on 
whether they accepted the view that Islam forbids homosexuality. Those who saw being 
gay as haram defended themselves mostly by highlighting the moral imperfections of 
other Muslims and appealing to the idea that only Allah could judge human deeds and 
intentions. Those who did not see Islam as condemning homosexuality utilised 
alternative and more inclusive interpretations of the religion to claim the moral high 
ground or ‘out-Islamise’ anti-gay Muslims, portraying their beliefs as ‘deviant’.  
In both countries, I observed gay Muslims engaging in what Robert Merton 
(1968: 672) calls ‘role adjustments’ to different social and cultural expectations. Their 
choices to conform, rebel, innovate, retreat, or simply put up appearances to avoid 
trouble were partly influenced by the strength of their socialisation into Islam and 
relationships with other Muslims. I also found that laws, policies and the wider social 
climate on freedom of religion and expression significantly affected their responses. 
For instance, even though many of my British participants perceived the state’s security 
or de-radicalisation policies as unduly targeting Muslims, they felt able to articulate 
their opposition by appealing to wider liberal, democratic principles. They were also 
confident that they could appeal to legislation upholding equality and prohibiting 
discrimination to protect their status as sexual minorities. While many of my Malaysian 
participants were uncomfortable with religiously-motivated moral policing, most would 
not criticise it too openly in light of the many civil and syariah laws restricting freedom 
of religion and expression. This was made more complicated by the constitutional 
linking of Malay and Muslim identity and the government’s many pro-Malay policies.  
Still, in both countries, many gay Muslims managed to find or create spaces 
where they could interact safely, away from anti-gay or anti-Muslim sentiments. This 
was especially possible in more urban, middle-class environments, for example in 
people’s homes, restaurants or, in Britain, venues made available by the larger LGBTQI 
charity sector.  
My participants also tried to forge connections with other gay or sympathetic 
heterosexual Muslims to work out the Islamic component of their lives. This was easier 
in Britain, where LGBTQI Muslim organisations such as Imaan could legitimately exist 
and operate alongside other Muslim organisations with alternative or gay-friendly 
understandings of Islam. In fact, the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 protecting 
religious and sexual minorities have partly provided the platform for nascent 
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collaborations between Imaan and some of these organisations. Still, despite the more 
restrictive environment in Malaysia, an expanding civil society now includes Muslim 
and non-Muslim actors who increasingly support the rights of sexual and other 
minorities. Some Muslim civil society groups such as Sisters in Islam (SIS) and the 
Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF) openly oppose moral policing and anti-gay sentiments 
by advocating inclusive interpretations of Islam. Some Malaysian gay Muslims I met 
were therefore supportive of SIS and IRF while others were less so, depending on 
whether they personally believed that homosexuality was haram.  
Regardless of their religious beliefs about homosexuality, gay Muslims directly 
or indirectly challenge normative Islamic authorities across different contexts simply by 
holding their religious and sexual identities. My findings suggest that they are slowly 
but increasingly joined by other sympathetic Muslims, which makes this challenge 
more significant. In Malaysia, for example, public debates and contestations about 
Islam and sexual diversity now involve larger critiques from some Muslims about how 
‘Islam’ is being manipulated by an authoritarian, albeit considerably weakened, 
government. Similarly, while the nuances of British Muslim opinions about issues such 
as homosexuality can be obscured by the spotlight on radicalism and terrorism, I have 
found evidence of ‘gay’ and ‘straight’ Muslims exploring more inclusive, ‘British’ 
expressions of Islam and therefore stretching existing notions of liberalism and 
pluralism. I have also found evidence of ‘everyday’ liberal attitudes among British and 
Malaysian Muslims – ‘gay’ and ‘straight’ – which are often neither explicitly or self-
consciously political. These dynamics indicate that gay and other Muslims are 
increasingly engaging with Islam as what James Beckford (2001: 232) calls a ‘cultural 
resource’ to adapt to their specific, changing circumstances.  
Additionally, my findings suggest that in both countries, gay Muslims challenge 
explicit and implicit conceptions that link religion, nation and ethnicity. In Malaysia, 
where the constitution defines Malays as Muslims, panics about ‘LGBT rights’ are 
often instigated and escalated by pro-syariah ideologues and ultranationalist Malays 
arguing that ‘liberal’ or ‘Western’ values threaten ‘Islam’ and the nation. In Britain, 
respect for sexual diversity is increasingly seen as a British value, yet gay Muslims still 
confuse several boundaries since they are part of ethnic and religious minorities often 
perceived as conservative or anti-Western. The emergence of ‘gay Muslim’ identities in 
both countries therefore challenges the idea of an unbridgeable divide between the 
‘West’ and ‘Islam’ which often carries unstated assumptions about ethnicity. In fact, 
256 
 
some of my British participants appropriated the term ‘coconut’ – ‘brown on the 
outside, white on the inside’ – to capture their fluid and intersecting ethnic, religious 
and sexual identities. In Malaysia, some of them used the widespread notion of the 
‘typical Malay’ to counter-stereotype and dismiss anti-gay Muslims as ‘backward’ and 
unthinking, while others explored their own more nuanced understandings of ethnicity 
and culture.   
Overall, my findings challenge the notion that Islam ‘inherently’ opposes 
homosexuality, and instead suggest that ‘Islam’, like other religions, is fluid, internally 
diverse and constantly being contested at various levels. In countries such as Malaysia, 
the question is also to what extent the authoritarian government selects, manipulates or 
distorts particular Islamic interpretations to manage the population and how this 
impacts gay Muslims. Even so, the varieties of ‘lived’ Islam here indicate that strong 
state regulation can unintentionally foster newer and more innovative uses of Islam as a 
‘cultural resource’. In both Malaysia and Britain, the making of gay Muslims thus 
involves constant engagement with multi-layered social networks, diverse 
interpretations of Islam, and fragmented Islamic and non-Islamic authorities. 
 
7.1 Contributions to theory and public debate 
 
This study benefited from and contributes to sociological studies of deviance by 
investigating the construction of ‘outsider’, stigmatised identities and efforts to ‘de-
stigmatise’ them. In Malaysia, my findings supported Howard Becker’s (1991: 162) 
contention that moral enterprise creates ‘deviance’, not the other way around, and 
Stanley Cohen’s (2011: 14, 219) argument that moral entrepreneurs tend to instigate 
moral panics when society becomes unstable. Becker’s (1991: 147) classification of 
moral entrepreneurs as ‘rule creators’ and ‘rule enforcers’ was also useful to analyse the 
workings of pro-syariah actors in Malaysia, especially in explaining the complications 
and contestations of moral policing. Furthermore, I found that moral enterprise in 
Malaysia largely overlapped with ethnic and religious concerns, meaning that anti-gay 
Islamic authorities and Muslim ideologues could also be conceptualised as what Rogers 
Brubaker (2006: 10) calls ‘ethno-political entrepreneurs’. These theoretical frameworks 
helped me identify the multiple strategies of gay Malaysian Muslims to avoid, subvert 
or challenge these dynamics.  
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In Britain, my findings add to and complicate Stuart Croft’s (2012: 16) 
argument about the ‘securitization of Islam’ and constructions of ‘Britishness’ by 
illustrating how this affects the everyday experiences of gay British Muslims. I 
demonstrate that they, too, are implicated by securitising rhetoric but they and many 
other Muslims also try to bridge the perceived divide between being ‘British’ and 
‘Muslim’. My findings therefore also refine and complicate Jasbir Puar’s contention 
about growing ‘homonationalism’ in the West, i.e. perceptions of the West as 
exceptionally gay-friendly and therefore deserving support in the ‘War on Terror’. I 
show that this is only part of the picture – gay Muslims and other sympathetic Muslims 
here challenge and subvert such rhetoric in numerous, creative ways.  
My study therefore contributes an important perspective on the place of 
sexuality in the construction of overlapping religious, ethnic and national boundaries in 
Britain as well as Malaysia. In particular, it illuminates how gay Muslims are caught 
between and respond to wider political and ideological agendas in different social 
contexts.  
In relation to this, the study adds to the theorising on Islam and sexuality by 
providing a sustained comparison of the experiences of gay Muslims in two different 
countries. My findings support Afsaneh Najmabadi’s (2011: 551) proposal that through 
complex interactions within and across cultures, we produce specific sexual labels and 
hierarchies, just as we produce religious structures and state structures. It is also 
important to distinguish between the politicisation of ‘Islam’ and ‘sexuality’ in state 
rhetoric and their potential as ‘cultural resources’ to construct fluid self-understandings 
in cultural and interpersonal dimensions.  
My findings thus only partially support Joseph Massad’s (2002: 372–373) 
argument that gay identity is a Western imposition and his characterisation of gay 
Muslims as middle-class, Westernised elites in Muslim societies and the West. 
Certainly, some of the gay Muslims and other sympathetic Muslims I encountered 
could fall into Massad’s notion of a middle-class, Westernised elite, but many were 
from working-class backgrounds and were only recently becoming middle-class. These 
findings echo Tom Boellstorff’s (2005a: 118-119), that the emergence of gay and lesbi 
identities in neighbouring Indonesia were linked to the rise of a new middle class 
resulting from the state’s modernising policies.   
My study further clarifies the role of human agency in the constant adaptations 
gay Muslims make when expressing their religious and sexual identities individually 
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and collectively. Their ‘role adjustments’ (Merton, 1968: 672) to different social and 
cultural circumstances indicate that they are not simply passive victims of uniformly 
draconian religious dogmas and practices. Rather, they consider and choose their 
possible responses based on opportunities made available through their social networks 
and locations, and the wider legal and political context.  
This study also benefited from the call by Brubaker and Frederick Cooper 
(2006: 41–47) for greater analytical clarity on the three facets of identity-making – an 
individual’s or group’s self-identification or categorisation of/by others; the 
development of self-understandings in specific contexts; and feelings of commonality 
or connectedness with a bounded group. By paying attention to these aspects, my 
analysis also supports Beckford’s (2001: 232) recommendation to study religion as a 
‘cultural resource’ in identity construction and not merely as a ‘social institution’.  
According to my findings, the responses of gay Muslims to dominant ideas 
about Islam and sexuality slowly but steadily influence a growing number of other 
Muslims. These effects indicate that religion is not static, and that Islam is neither 
exceptionally nor inherently homophobic. These aspects of my findings could be of 
particular benefit to policy-makers and campaigners on human rights, gender and 
sexual equality and/or diversity, especially in the West, as an empirical basis to 
challenge ideological claims about Islam’s ‘inherently’ violent, anti-liberal, or anti-
modern tendencies.  
 My study also investigates what appears to be a gap between lived experiences 
of Islam and the expectations of conventional Islamic authorities. The gay Muslims I 
met constantly grappled with what these authorities pronounced but carried on forging 
social networks and lifestyles that avoided, escaped or sometimes challenged these 
pronouncements. Yet they were not the only ones characterised as ‘threats’ or 
‘deviants’ by conventional Islamic authorities and ideologues – for instance, during the 
period of my research, the Malaysian Islamic establishment also vilified Syiah, liberal 
and feminist Muslims. These overlapping panics about intra-Muslim diversity and 
dissent are wider indicators of the challenges confronting institutional regulation of 
‘proper’ or ‘authentic’ expressions of Islam. These aspects of my findings can therefore 
become resources for Islamic leaders, Muslim campaigners, and others interested in 




7.2 Implications of the study 
 
 By comparing how gay Muslims come to be seen as ‘outsiders’ and their 
responses in different national contexts, this study has probed the influences of 
overlapping religious, nationalist and security rhetoric on sexual minorities. It has 
shown how expressions of sexuality and national identity are used by different actors to 
construct or challenge constructions of ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’ as mutually oppositional.  
 The study’s limitations stem primarily from its focus on ‘outsiders by default’ – 
my sample mostly consisted of people born into Muslim families who were clear about 
having same-sex attractions. We can develop richer insights on constructions of 
religious and sexual identity – and the related factors of ethnic and national identity – 
by investigating the experiences of people who choose to cross supposedly 
unbridgeable boundaries.  
It could prove particularly fruitful to research the experiences of gay converts to 
Islam, especially in the West. Their narratives could provide helpful insights into how 
an individual chooses to cross a boundary from an environment that is construed as 
‘liberal’ to one often stereotyped as ‘anti-liberal’. Along similar lines, it could prove 
useful investigating the narratives of heterosexual Muslims who have gone from 
rejecting to accepting the rights of sexual minorities, i.e. ‘the making of a gay-friendly 
straight Muslim’. We could also gain valuable perspectives from Muslim sexual 
minorities who do not identify as ‘gay’ or other related sexual labels, and who therefore 
do not appear to cross the boundary.  
Also, this study focused mainly on the experiences of gay Muslims in their 
twenties and thirties. Further research on the experiences of Muslim sexual minorities 
from a wider age range could be useful to discern generational shifts in attitudes about 
Islam and sexuality. More research could also be conducted specifically on the 
influence of class in the formation of religious and sexual identities and its impacts on 
nationalist trends.  
 Throughout this study, I utilised ethnographic methods to make the most of my 
position as an ‘insider’, i.e. as a gay Muslim, immersing myself in and documenting 
and analysing the experiences of other gay Muslims. Much of my research also 
involved the emotional labour of being honest about and understanding my own 
motives, perceptions and reactions to particular situations, as discussed in detail in 
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Chapter 1. I therefore hope to contribute to the advocacy and enhancement of the 
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Appendix 1: Glossary 
 
Note: Some Arabic loan words are pronounced or transliterated differently in Urdu and 
Malay. Where relevant, I give the Arabic spelling first, followed by Urdu and Malay, 
e.g. wudu/wuzu/wuduk.  
 
As far as possible, transliterations are based on Esposito, J. L. (2003). The Oxford 
Dictionary of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Kamus Dewan. (2005). Fourth 
Edition. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (Institute of Language and 
Literature Malaysia); and Platts, J. T. (2008 [1884]). ‘A Dictionary of Urdu, Classical 
Hindi, and English.’ University of Chicago digital resource. Digital Dictionaries of 
South Asia. http://dsal.uchicago.edu/dictionaries/platts/. 
 
abang-abang elder brothers (literal), euphemism for masculine gay 
man/men (Malay) 
ABIM Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia 
(Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement) 
adhan/azan/azan ritual call to prayer 
adik-adik younger siblings (literal), euphemism for younger gay 
men (Malay) 
BERSIH Gabungan Pilihanraya Bersih dan Adil 
(The Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections) 
bhangra upbeat music associated with Punjabi culture, popular 
in Britain 
bilal person who gives the call to prayer, i.e. muezzin 
BN Barisan Nasional 
(National Front) 
bomoh Malay shaman/healer 
buka puasa breaking the fast (Malay), see also iftari 
Bumiputera sons of the soil (literal), an official term including 
ethnic Malays and Muslim and non-Muslim 




DAP Democratic Action Party 
darai derogatory patois for pondan (Malay) 
dhikr/zikr/zikir remembrance (literal), also devotional litanies 
associated with Sufism 
dosa sin (Malay) 
dua/dua/doa supplicatory prayers 
fatwa legal opinion  
fiqh Islamic jurisprudence 




hijab headscarf worn by some Muslim women, see also 
tudung 
iftari meal at the breaking of the fast (Urdu), see also buka 
puasa 
imam congregational prayer leader 
iqamah smaller call to prayer following the adhan 
IRF Islamic Renaissance Front 
JAKIM Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia 
(Department of Islamic Development, Malaysia) 
jinn/jinn/jin type of spirit mentioned in the Quran 
kakak-kakak elder sisters (literal), euphemism for effeminate gay 
men, pondan or mak nyah (Malay) 
kampung village (Malay) 
khalwat illicit proximity (as defined in Syariah law) 
khutbah/khutba/khutbah sermon, e.g. during Friday prayers 
lelaki lembut soft man (literal), euphemism for gay (Malay) 
LGBTQI lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex 
liwat sexual relations between males (in Syariah law) 
madrasa/madrasa/madrasah mosque school 




mak yong traditional dance from northern Peninsula Malaysia, 
particularly associated with the State of Kelantan 
MCB Muslim Council of Britain 
musahaqah sexual relations between females (under Syariah law) 
namaz obligatory prayers (Urdu) 
NEP New Economic Policy 
niqab face veil worn by some Muslim women in addition to 
hijab 
PAS Parti Islam Se-Malaysia 
(Malaysian Islamic Party) 
pengkid masculine women who desire feminine women (Malay) 
PKR Parti Keadilan Rakyat 
(People’s Justice Party) 
pondan derogatory term for male-to-female transgender 
(Malay) 
ponen variation of pondan in northern Malay patois 
PR Pakatan Rakyat  
(People’s Alliance) 
Ramadan/Ramazan/Ramadan ninth month of the Islamic calendar when fasting is 
required 
rishta relationship (literal), or meetings for arranged 
marriages (Urdu) 
salat prayer, sometimes rendered salah (Arabic) 
salaam/salam/salam peace (literal), an Islamic salutation 
SCOA Syariah Criminal Offences Act 
SCOE Syariah Criminal Offences Enactment 
shahadah declaration of Islamic faith 
shariah/shariah/syariah divine law, to be distinguished from fiqh 
SIS Sisters in Islam 
sunnah established custom based on Muhammad’s exemplary 
conduct 
Shafii/Shafii/Syafii school of law in Sunni Islam 
tudung headscarf (Malay), see hijab 
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ulama scholar/Islamic religious scholar 
UMNO United Malays National Organisation 
ustaz male Islamic religious instructor (Malay) 
ustazah female Islamic religious instructor (Malay) 
wudu/wuzu/wuduk ritual washing or ablutions, pre-requisite for prayers 




Appendix 2a: Details of Malaysian Participants 








M Malay No (Privately) Yes 5 Nov 2012 
Ebry Mid 30s M Malay Yes Yes 24 Oct 
2012 




















Shahrul Mid 50s M Malay Yes Yes 6 Dec 2012 
Zainal Early 
30s 
M Malay Yes 
(‘Culturally’) 
Yes 14 Nov 
2012 














F Malay Yes No 
(‘Straight’) 




F Malay Yes No (‘Fluid’) 5 Sept 2013 
Sulaiman Earl 30s M Malay Yes Yes 27 Aug 
2013 




M Malay Yes Yes 26 July 
2013 
 
Mean age:  33.5 years old    Median age:  32 years old 
Mean age of entire sample: 31.5 years old  Median age of entire sample: 31 
years old 
 
                                                          
187 All are pseudonyms. 
188 It is necessary to be vague to protect anonymity.  
189 I refer here to biological sex, reflecting my initial aim for a balance of male and female perspectives. I 
eventually learnt that not everyone had corresponding, normative gender identities – some had more fluid 




Appendix 2b: Details of British participants 
 














F Mixed South Asian Yes Yes 4 June 2013 
Bilan Early 
30s 












M Somali Yes 
(‘Culturally’) 




F Pakistani Yes Yes 3 June 2013 
Nadia Early 
30s 















M Arab Yes Yes 6 June 2013 
Waqqas Mid 
20s 
M Pakistani Yes Yes 18 May 
2013 
 
Mean age:  28.7 years old    Median age:  29 years old 





Appendix 3: Interview Guide 
 
Notes:  1.  This was a guide to cover the same ground with Malaysian and 
British gay Muslims to enable a systematic comparison of their 
responses.  
2. The questions were not fixed, but were conversation prompters 
allowing me to cover the different aspects of the interviewees’ 
experiences I was interested in.  
 
1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Background – date/place of birth, experiences with education, religious upbringing, 
friendships, work, current relationship/marital status etc.  
 Parents’ influences – on religious beliefs/practices? 
 Other family members’ influences? 
 Influences at school/work?  
 Friends’ influences?  
 
Views: What is your understanding of … 
 The Islamic position on homosexuality? 
 The Islamic position on gender relations? 
 Terms: ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘bisexual’, etc.  
 What would you call yourself? (‘Muslim’? ‘Gay’?) Why?  
 
Who are your role models? Why? Have they influenced your current ideas and beliefs? 
Are there certain books, films, events, art works, etc., that have influenced your current 
ideas and beliefs?  
 
2. EVERYDAY PRACTICES 
What do you think about bodies or governments that monitor Muslim practices, e.g., 
whether a person prays five times a day, goes to mosque on Fridays, fasts in Ramadan, 
consumes alcohol, etc.?  
 
Do you consider yourself Muslim?  
 
How would you rate your observance of Islamic rituals and practices?  
 Food/drink 
 Dress 




Is there anything you practise now that you never practised previously? Is there 
anything you have stopped practising? Are there things you are not practising but 




What does being Muslim mean to you now? Has this changed over the years?  
 
What do you ‘get’ out of being Muslim? What do you not ‘get’ from being Muslim?  
 
What do you ‘get’ out of being gay (or whatever term the person identifies with)? What 
do you not ‘get’ from being gay (or whatever term the person identifies with)?  
 
To what extent do you ‘hide’ aspects about your life from other people? Is there anyone 
in your life who knows ‘everything’ about you? Who are these people? Why/how do 
they know about you?  
 
(If appropriate, find out about sexual and romantic relationships, etc.) 
 
3. SOCIAL INTERACTIONS 
 
Who are your best friends? How long have you known them for? Do they ‘know’ about 
you? Where do you hang out? What do you do in your free time? What do you talk 
about?  
 
Is there a particular community you identify with? Why?  
 
What are your plans for the future? (Work/personal development/relationships, etc.) 
 
Do you think you ‘fit in’ society? What do you do to make it easier to ‘fit in’? What is 
the biggest challenge to ‘fitting in’?  
 
What do you think of the ‘gay rights’ movement?  
 
What do you think of the anti-gay statements by some Muslims?  
 
Are there differences between being a gay/queer Muslim and a gay/queer non-Muslim? 
What are the differences? What are the similarities?  
 
Feelings about:  
 Hijab/tudung 
 Human rights 
 Democracy in Muslim countries 
 Democracy in Europe, North America, etc.  
 The gay ‘scene’ – nightclubs, sex, entertainment, internet chatrooms, etc.  
 
 
 
